Vol. 59, no. 3: Full Issue by Law Journal, Denver
Denver Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 3 Article 10 
February 2021 
Vol. 59, no. 3: Full Issue 
Denver Law Journal 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
59 Denv. L.J. (1981). 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 






University of Denver D E N V E RCollege of Law LAW
1981 Volume 59 Issue 3 JOURNAL
Articles
Liberty vs. Equality: Congressional
Enforcement Power under the Fourteenth
Amendment Kbigsly R. Browne 417
Problems in Clinical Integration: A
Case Study of the Integrated Clinical
Program of the University of Denver
College of Law Robert M. Hardaway 459
Property Tax Incentives for Implementing
Soil Conservation Programs under
Constitutional Taxing Limitations Dean T Massey 485
and Margaret B. Silver
Note




Montana Strikes it Rich: Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana 563
Unleashing the Wildcats: The Supreme Court Immu-
nizes Wildcat Strikes from Individual Damage Lia-
bility for Employer Losses Resulting from the
Wildcat Strike, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis 577
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services: Due Process Takes
an Ad Hoc Turn-What's a Parent to Do? 591
Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette: May
























































STACIE GLASS FLANDERS NANCY I. PERTCHECK
FAYE M. FORSLUND CHARLES M. PRATT
DEBORAH L. FREEMAN KATHLEEN A. REILLY
DEBORAH L. FREIS NEAL A. RICHARDSON
ALTHEA M. GERRARD MARISSA RICHKER
STEVEN E. GRODAHL STEVEN W. SACKMAN
FRANCES C. HARTOGH LUKE SANTANGELO
LAURIE M. HAWLEY CHERYL SCOTT
JEANNE E. HERRICK-STARE SALLY R. STEINER
MARY HOPE HEATHER STENGEL
SHELLEY GURIAN KROVITZ JOHN STERNBERG
BARBARA J. LINDSTROM ALAN D. SWEETBAUM
RICHARD P. MANCZAK SHARON K. TARR
CHRISTOPHER J. MARTIN KATHERINE LYNN VAGGALIS
MARY D. METZGER ANTHONY VENEZIANO
DANIEL M. MINZER MARY E. WALTA
FRANKLIN D. PATTERSON MARY WANEK
JON SLAUGHTER PELEGRIN ROBERT WARD
MICHAEL PENNINGTON LINDA WEILER
Faculty Advisors
WILLIAM A. ALTONIN
The Denver Law Journal (ISSN 0011-8834) is published quarterly by the University of Denver College of Law
through the Denver Law Journal Association. Publication is in the fall, winter, spring and summer. Editorial
and General Offices are located at 200 West Fourteenth Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80204; Tel. (303) 753-2651.
Subscription* price: Domestic, $15.00 per volume; Foreign, $16.00 per volume. Subscriptions are renewed auto-
matically unless notice of discontinuance is received. No discounts are given to subscription services. Separate
mailing and billing addresses should add 5.75 per volume. Single issues of the current volume are available from
the Association at $7.00 per issue (enclose check with order). All issues of prior volumes may be obtained from
Dennis & Co., 251 Main Street, Buffalo, New York 14203. Address all other correspondence to the Offices of the
Association. Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate, typed triple spaced, with footnotes at the end, and
should comply with A Uniform System of Citation, published by the Harvard Law Review Association. Second class
postage paid at Denver, Colorado and at an additional mailing office. Copyright © 1981, Denver Law Journal,
University of Denver (Colorado Seminary) College of Law. * Senior Editor
LIBERTY VS. EQUALITY: CONGRESSIONAL
ENFORCEMENT POWER UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
KINGSLEY R. BROWNE
Introduction ...................................................... 4 17
I. Congressional Power to Reach Private Conduct under
Section 5 ................................................... 4 18
A . T he Guest C ase ......................................... 418
B. The Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment ... 421
II. Congressional Power to Define the Substantive Content of
Fourteenth Amendment Guarantees .......................... 424
III. Countervailing Forces Limiting Congressional Power .......... 431
IV . Equality and Liberty ........................................ 434
A. Equality and Liberty Defined ........................... 434
B. Can Liberty and Equality Coexist? ...................... 439
C. The National Obsession with Equality ................... 440
V. Costs of the National Obsession with Equality ................ 442
A . Econom ic Costs ......................................... 442
B . Social C osts ............................. ............... 444
1. M ediocrity ...................... ................... 444
2. Loss of Individualism ................................ 446
3. Devaluation of Minority Accomplishment ............ 447
C . Institutional Costs ...................................... 448
D . Political C osts .......................................... 451
C onclusion ....................................................... 457
INTRODUCTION
Although to some extent section 1 of the fourteenth amendment is self-
executing in its command that "[nJo State shall. . . deny to any person...
the equal protection of the laws," the framers of the amendment, in section
5, vested power in Congress to enforce the provisions of the amendment.'
The contours of congressional power are far from clear, however. The two
major areas of controversy concern congressional power to reach private con-
duct and congressional power to define the substance of section 1 guarantees.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states:
§ I All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
§ 5 The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
It is the purpose of this article to examine briefly the status of the law in
these two areas of fourteenth amendment interpretation, to consider the leg-
islative history of the amendment, and to try to determine the extent to
which current interpretation is in harmony with the goals of the Congress
that passed the amendment. In addition, it is the thesis of this article that
the concept of "equality of result," which is gaining currency at the expense
of the traditional "equality of opportunity," is quite different from the con-
cept of equality embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the four-
teenth amendment. Moreover, the "New Equality," espoused by certain
elements of modern society and reflected in some recent Supreme Court
opinions, is ultimately harmful to society because it makes equality the pre-
mier social goal, and other traditional values, such as liberty, fall by the
wayside. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, the New Equality is incompatible
with liberty. Finally, this article will attempt to show a number of social
costs-in addition to the sacrifice of liberty-that must be paid in order to
continue the crusade for the New Equality.
I. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REACH PRIVATE
ACTION UNDER SECTION 5
A. The Guest Case
The leading case dealing with congressional power to reach private con-
duct under the fourteenth amendment is United States v. Guest, 2 a criminal
action in which six defendants were indicted for criminal conspiracy in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 241.3 The indictment comprised five numbered
paragraphs, two of which are of particular interest to this inquiry. The sec-
ond paragraph alleged that the defendants interfered with the free exercise
and enjoyment of Negro citizens in "[t]he right to the equal utilization, with-
out discrimination upon the basis of race, of public facilities in the vicinity of
Athens, Georgia. . . . "4 The fourth paragraph alleged that the defendants
had conspired to interfere with Negro citizens in the exercise and enjoyment
of "[tihe right to travel freely to and from the State of Georgia and to use
highway facilities and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce within
the State of Georgia."
'5
Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart stated that a valid cause of action
was stated in paragraph 2 because the indictment alleged that one of the
means by which the objects of the conspiracy were achieved was "[b]y caus-
2. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976) states:
Consp'racy against nghts of atizens. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of
his having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of an-
other, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years or for life.
4. 383 U.S. at 753.
5. Id at 757.
[Vol. 59:3
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ing the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such Negroes had
committed criminal acts."'6 The Court held that this allegation was suffi-
ciently broad to cover a charge of active connivance by officials of the state
and, therefore, was not defective for failure to allege state action.
With respect to the fourth paragraph, Justice Stewart stated that the
right to travel is a fundamental right completely independent of the four-
teenth amendment. Thus, the right is protected against private, as well as
state, interference. If the right infringed were guaranteed only by the four-
teenth amendment, then only state interference could be reached.
Justice Clark's concurring opinion, 7 in which Justices Black and Fortas
joined, took exception to Justice Stewart's assumption that paragraph 2 of
the indictment could stand only if some state action were found. Justice
Clark made the sweeping statement that "there now can be no doubt that
the specific language of section 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws pun-
ishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with
fourteenth amendment rights."8
Justice Brennan's opinion,9 concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which he was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, also took
exception to Justice Stewart's conclusion that section 241's protection of
"right[s] . . . secured . . . by the Constitution" reaches only conspiracies in
which discriminatory conduct by state officers is involved. Justice Brennan
argued that section 241 reaches private conspiracies not because the four-
teenth amendment of its own force prohibits such conspiracies, but because
section 241 is a valid exercise of congressional power which, under section 5,
can reach all conspiracies. Moreover, he argued, the right to equal utiliza-
tion of state facilities is a right secured by the Constitution within the mean-
ing of section 241. He stated that a right can be "secured by the
Constitution" within the meaning of section 241, even though only govern-
mental interferences with the right are covered by the Constitution itself.
Justice Harlan dissented from that part of the Court's opinion that held
that the right to travel is protected against private interference. ' 0 He stated
that it is "dubious that the Constitution was intended to create certain rights
of private individuals as against other private individuals. The Constitu-
tional Convention was called to establish a nation, not to reform the com-
mon law . ... II He did, however, state that there are a few rights
protected against individual interference that have been read into the Con-
stitution, such as rights against interferences with voting in federal elections,
with federal law enforcement, and with communication with the federal
government.
An interesting feature of the Guest decision is that six members of the
Court specifically stated that Congress has power under section 5 to reach
6. Id. at 756.
7. Id. at 761.
8. id at 762.
9. Id at 774.
10. Id at 762.
11. Id at 771.
1982)
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conduct by private persons that is not covered by section 1 itself, although
that is not the holding of the Court. Neither Justice Brennan's nor Justice
Clark's opinion goes so far as to say, however, that fourteenth amendment
rights are rights against other individuals. They both take the position that
fourteenth amendment rights are rights against the state, but that individual
interferences with this relationship between the states and individuals may
be reached by Congress under section 5.
The law has not changed since Guest. The Supreme Court has never
held that section 5 gives Congress the general power to reach private con-
duct; it has not needed to. The Court's recent expansion of its interpretation
of congressional power under the thirteenth amendment' 2 has eliminated
the need for expansion of the fourteenth amendment, at least with respect to
racial issues.
The leading modern case concerning congressional power to reach pri-
vate action under the thirteenth amendment isJones v. A_)fred H. Mayer Co. ,13
in which the Court held for the first time that 42 U.S.C. § 1982'4 bars all
racial discrimination, public and private, in the sale or rental of property,
and that so construed the statute is a valid exercise of congressional power to
enforce the thirteenth amendment. In Griffin v. Breckenridge,' 5 the Court held
that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) 16 was a valid exercise of congressional power to
reach private conduct under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment, and, in
Runyon v. McCraqy, 7 the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 198118 prohibits private
schools from discriminating on the basis of race, using the questionable ra-
tionale that the power to make and enforce contracts under the statute im-
poses a duty on individuals not to refuse to contract for racial reasons.
The principal drawback (for those who favor a broad congressional
power in this area) of using the thirteenth amendment to reach private con-
duct is the inability of Congress to reach the conduct of individuals who are
discriminating on the basis of something other than race.19
12. Section 2 of the thirteenth amendment is substantially similar to section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment. The thirteenth amendment, section 2, provides that: "Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
13. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). For criticism of this decision, see Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.: Judicial Acti:t'm Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REV. 485 (1969).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976): "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property."
15. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976) (renumbered as § 1985(3) in Supp. III 1979). This statute
provides a civil cause of action for victims of conspiracies which have as their purpose "depriv-
ing, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws .
17. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) states: "All persons . . .shall have the same right . . . to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
19. The issue whether 42 U.S.C. § 1985 covers private sex discrimination was presented to
the Court in Great Amenan Fed Sa. & Loan Ass'n v. Nowotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). The question
was not resolved, because the Court held that the plaintiff could not avoid following the proce-
dures of Title VII by going under § 1985; the Court therefore vacated and remanded to the
court of appeals, which had held that § 1985 covered sex discrimination.
[Vol. 59:3
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Very little is certain in the area of fourteenth amendment interpreta-
tion, but it is virtually certain that the issue of congressional power to reach
private conduct under section 5 will once again be before the Court. Thus,
it may be useful at this point to examine the legislative history of the four-
teenth amendment for clues concerning the intent of the framers of the
amendment.
B. The Legislatv've Hzstoy of the Fourteenth Amendment
Vast amounts of research and analysis have been undertaken to ascer-
tain the "intent of the framers" of the fourteenth amendment. 20 It is not the
purpose of this article to perform another exhaustive study of the subject or
even to recapitulate that which has already been done. Rather, this article
will rely on the work of others and attempt to glean from other writers some
kind of insight into the problem of legislative intent.
21
The obvious starting point for determining the meaning of a provision
is its language. The fourteenth amendment states "nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Section 5 of the amendment gives Congress "power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article." The language seems clear:
States may not deny any person equal protection of the laws, and Congress
has the power to ensure that they do not. Moreover, the text says "equal
protection of the laws"; it does not say "equal treatment." Because of the
focus on laws, it seems unlikely that regulation of private conduct was con-
templated. Given the plain meaning of the amendment, the burden should
be on those claiming the framers had a different intent.
There were several versions of the fourteenth amendment introduced
prior to the introduction of the version that made its way into the Constitu-
tion. Although there were many differences between the various versions,
there were essentially two basic forms-the "positive" form and the "nega-
tive" form. The positive form is represented in the versions of the amend-
ment submitted by John Bingham, which in one form or another gave
20. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY]; C. FAIR-
MAN, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-1888, in HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES pt. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION]; H. FLACK,
THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956); J. TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965); Berger, The
Fourteenth Amendment: The Framers' Design, 30 S.C.L. REV. 495 (1979); Berger, The Fourteenth
Amendment: Lightfrom the F#feenth, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 311 (1979); Bickel, The On'ginal Understand-
ing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Frank & Munro, The Original Understand-
ing of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950); Gaffney, History and Legal
Interpretation." The Early Distortion of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Gilded Age Court, 25 CATH. U.L.
REV. 207 (1976); Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered.: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH.
L. REV. 1049 (1956); Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Righl" to Vote, and the Under-
standing of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33.
21. Not everyone agrees that legislative intent is of particular importance. See, e.g., Brest,
The Misconcezved Quest for the Onginal Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980). For the view that
opinions in Congress ranged so widely that the specific intent is impossible to glean, see Frank &
Munro, supra note 20.
1982]
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Congress power to pass laws to secure to all persons the right to equal protec-
tion of the laws. 22 The negative form is represented in the versions submit-
ted by Thaddeus Stevens, which stated that all laws shall operate
impartially, or that no state shall discriminate.23 The final product is some-
thing of a hybrid of the two versions-section 1 embodying the negative
version, and section 5 acting as a grant of power to Congress.
The question here is simply whether the grant of power to Congress is
merely to ensure that "no state shall deny" the equal protection of the laws,
or whether it is an affirmative grant to Congress of a general legislative
power with respect to life, liberty, and property. In other words, does Con-
gress have the power under section 5 only to protect the rights guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment, or does Congress have the power to protect inter-
ests similar to those safeguarded by fourteenth amendment rights? If Con-
gress has the power only to protect rights guaranteed by the amendment,
then Congress cannot reach private conduct.
Much of the confusion surrounding the interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment arises out of a careless use of the term "right," and a failure to
understand that for every right there is a dutv.2 4 Indeed, the term "right" in
the absence of a correlative duty is meanin;L1ess. Section 1 of the amend-
ment gives persons within the jurisdiction of the state the right to be free
from discriminatory treatment by the state. Who, then, has the duty to pro-
vide non-discriminatory treatment? The obvious-and only-answer is that
the duty falls upon the state.
Even the members of the Guest Court who argued that section 5 gave
Congress the power to reach individual conduct appear to accept this con-
clusion. Those members of the Court, however, seem to argue that section 5
gives Congress power not only to protect fourteenth amendment rights, but
also to protect the interests safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment.
They recognize that the fourteenth amendment does not of its own force
impose a duty upon private citizens to act in any particular manner toward
other citizens. It does, however, encompass certain interests, such as equal
treatment with respect to life, liberty, and property. Six of the nine members
of the Guest Court would allow Congress, then, to ban activities which vio-
late the spirit of section 1, but not the letter, much the way the Federal
Trade Commission Act 2 5 allows the FTC to reach violations of the spirit of
the antitrust laws.26 What is questionable in the economic sphere is to be
abhorred in the constitutional sphere-if section 1 imposes no duty on indi-
22. For example, on February 3, 1866, Bingham introduced the following amendment:
"Congress shall have power... to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immu-
nities of citizens in the several States (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several States
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property (5th Amend.)." Reconstnmcion and
Reunion, supra note 20, at 1274.
23. For example, on January 12, 1866, Stevens introduced the following amendment: "All
laws, state or national, shall operate impartially and equally on all persons without regard to
race or color." -d at 1271.
24. See generally Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptios as Appled to Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-59 (1913).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
26. See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
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viduals, then how can section 5, which is merely power to enforce section 1,
impose that duty?
One of the leading proponents of the view that Congress has the power
to reach private conduct under section 5 is Jacobus ten Broek. Ten Broek
argues that the fourteenth amendment is an abolitionist document and that
pre-Civil War abolitionist doctrine should be examined for elucidation of the
content of the amendment. 27 Ten Broek further contends that the negative
form of the amendment was adopted because the positive form made protec-
tion of the amendment only as certain as Republican control of Congress-if
protection were to come only from Congress, a hostile Congress could with-
draw the protection. Therefore, argues ten Broek, it was necessary to make
the amendment self-executing. This argument skillfully avoids the main
question: Upon whom is the duty to rest? If Congress actually intended to
impose a duty upon individuals as well as states and wanted the amendment
to be self-executing, why did the drafters not write "no state nor any individ-
ual shall deny . . ."? Certainly the framers were not so inept as to impose
the duty on the wrong party in their zeal to make the amendment self-exe-
cuting. Ten Broek argues further that the phrase "no state shall" in conjunc-
tion with section 5 must grant Congress the power to supply protection and
that, therefore, the negative form has the same meaning as the positive form.
Ten Broek seizes upon statements in the debates on the amendment by
Robert Hale, a conservative Republican who, in expressing his reservations
about the positive form of the amendment, stated that if one reads the lan-
guage precisely, it is "a grant of the fullest and most ample power to Con-
gress to make all laws 'necessary and proper to secure to all persons in the
several states protection in the right of life, liberty, and property,' with the
simple proviso that such protection shall be equal."128 There are obvious
problems in relying on statements expressing opposition to a given piece of
legislation because of a tendency on the part of those who oppose legislation
to predict horrendous results if the legislation should pass. Moreover, ten
Broek essentially ignores the significance of Thaddeus Stevens' reply to Hale:
Does the gentleman mean to say that, under this provision, Con-
gress could interfere in any case where the legislation of a state was
equal, impartial to all? Or is it not simply to provide that, where
any state makes a distinction in the same law between different
classes of individuals, Congress shall have the power to correct such
discrimination and inequality?
29
As a matter of statutory construction, statements by proponents of legislation
would seem somewhat more reliable than statements by opponents. For ex-
ample, how many people would wish to rely on Phyllis Schlafly's interpreta-
tion of the Equal Rights Amendment?
30
Ten Broek also ignores a number of statements by John Bingham, nota-
bly one made in support of the final draft of the amendment. Bingham
27. Ten Broek, supra note 20. See also Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of
Fourteenth Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368 (1972-73).
28. Ten Broek, supra note 20, at 212.
29. Id at n.6.
30. See generally P. SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN (1977).
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remarked that section 1 would fill a great need: "[T]hat is, to protect by
national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic
and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same
shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State. '3 1
Ten Broek also points to the large number of references in the debates
to accounts of individual atrocities-lynchings, beatings, and the like-and
argues that victims of these crimes were intended to be protected by the
amendment and, unless that amendment reaches private conduct, the
amendment is a futile gesture.32 Congress undoubtedly was concerned with
such occurrences, but ten Broek misapprehends the intended remedy. It was
not to punish the perpetrators of the crimes, but to punish state officials
when they failed to protect the victims. 33 The words of John Bingham best
show the remedy desired:
The question is, simply, whether you will give by this amendment
to the people of the United States the power, by legislative enact-
ment, to punish ofti'als of States for violation of the oaths enjoined
upon them by their Constitution? That is the question and the
whole question . . . . [If state legislators] conspire together to en-
act laws refusing equal protection to life, liberty, or property, the
Congress is thereby vested with power to hold them to answer
before the bar of the national courts for the violation of their oaths
and the rights of their fellow men.
34
Given the unambiguous wording of the amendment, and absent any
convincing evidence that the Thirty-ninth Congress intended the amend-
ment to encompass private conduct, the amendment should not be extended
to cover such conduct.
II. CONGRESSIONAL POWER To DEFINE THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEES
Beyond the issue of whether Congress has the power to reach private
conduct under section 5 is the question whether Congress can define the
substantive content of the amendment. This question has never been an-
swered definitively.
The leading modern case dealing with this issue is Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan.35 Morgan involved a challenge to section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965,36 which provided that no person who had successfully completed
the sixth grade at an accredited Puerto Rican school where the language of
instruction was other than English could be denied the right to vote in any
election because of an inability to read and write English. Plaintiffs were
31. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2547 (1866), cited in RECONSTRUCTION AND REUN-
ION, supra note 20, at 1287 (emphasis added).
32. Ten Broek, supra note 20, at 203-04.
33. Avins, Federal Power to Punish Individual Crnes under the Fourteenth Amendment The Ortignal
Understanding, 43 NOrRE DAME L. 317 (1967-68).
34. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (emphasis added).
35. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
36. 42 U.S.C. §1973b(e) (1976).
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registered voters of New York challenging the constitutionality of section
4(e).
The New York Attorney General argued that Congress can exercise its
section 5 power only if the judicial branch determines that the state law is
prohibited by the amendment Congress seeks-to enforce. Because Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections3 7 approved literacy tests not used for
invidious discrimination, the state argued that Congress had no power to
prohibit their use.
The question thus presented to the Supreme Court was whether Con-
gress could forbid the use of literacy tests even if the Court might not have
found such use to be a violation of section 1. The Court answered in the
affirmative, but the decision rested on alternative holdings. The Court held
that congressional power under section 5 is the same kind of broad power
expressed in the necessary and proper clause,38 and that there were two pos-
sible ways Congress might have exercised this power in passing section 4(e).
First, Congress could have decided that the enhanced political power
obtained through exercise of the franchise would be helpful in gaining non-
discriminatory public services for the Puerto Rican community. This is a
standard necessary and proper clause argument: The Puerto Ricans have a
right to non-discriminatory treatment, Congress has the power to guarantee
it, and Congress has chosen to guarantee it in this manner. The analysis is in
accord with Chief Justice John Marshall's classic formulation of the neces-
sary and proper power in McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
'39
There is nothing out of the ordinary about this first alternative holding in
Morgan, and it is a statement of the law with which few would disagree. The
second alternative holding is, however, if not revolutionary, at least
dramatic.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, also held that Congress could
have decided that literacy tests are a denial of equal protection, notwith-
standing the fact that the Court reached a contrary conclusion. Justice
Brennan's opinion displayed a great deal of deference to Congress' "specially
informed legislative competence" 40 and stated that it was "Congress' prerog-
ative to weigh these competing considerations," 4 1 and that it "is enough that
we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate [its] judgment.
'42
One might read this opinion narrowly and argue that Congress had merely
determined (or could have determined) that in this particular instance the
use of literacy tests was a denial of equal protection because the tests were
used discriminatorily. There is, however, some rather broad language in the
opinion that suggests that Justice Brennan had more than that in mind. He
37. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ed. 18.
39. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).





stated that "Congress might also have questioned whether denial of a right
so precious and fundamental in our society was a necessary or appropriate
means . . . of furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of the
franchise." '4 3 Here, Justice Brennan is essentially allowing Congress to make
the decision that literacy tests might violate the equal protection clause, even
when not used for invidious discrimination, despite the Court's contrary res-
olution of that question in Lasst'er.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented, arguing that the
literacy test was reasonably designed to serve a legitimate state interest.
Moreover, he argued that under Marbugy v. MAadon4 4 it is a judicial question
whether a practice is a violation of the Constitution. Justice Harlan also
distinguished between the question of whether a statute is appropriate reme-
dial legislation to cure an established violation and the question of whether
there has in fact been an infringement of a constitutional command. The
fact that there had been no findings of any discrimination in voting to sup-
port section 4(e) as appropriate remedial legislation led Justice Harlan to
dissent. He also argued that Justice Brennan's deference to Congress' special
legislative competence and to its ability to weigh competing considerations
would allow Congress to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of
the Court as well as to expand them.
45
Justice Brennan responded to that argument in a footnote in which he
stated that
[Section] 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in
the other direction and to enact "statutes so as in effect to dilute
equal protection and due process decisions of this Court." We em-
phasize that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants
Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these
guarantees.
46
This reassurance, however, is off-target. It begs the question to state that
Congress' power is limited to enforcing the guarantees of the amendment;
that is a statement acceptable to all. The question, left unanswered by the
footnote, is who decides what the amendment is to guarantee?
The conclusion to be reached from Justice Brennan's opinion is that
Congress' view of the content of the guarantee controls when it is more ex-
pansive than that of the Court, while the Court's interpretation applies when
the Court's interpretation is more expansive. This is superficially analogous
to the doctrine that a state court may interpret a provision of its constitution
that is identical to a provision of the United States Constitution in such a
way that the state constitution grants more protection, but it may not apply
its state constitution in such a way that does not provide the minimum pro-
tection required under the United States Constitution. 47 The analogy
43. Id at 654.
44. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
45. 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46. Id at 651 n.10.




breaks down, however, in two respects. First, the state's interpretation and
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation are interpretations of dif-
ferent documents. Second, the supreme court of a state may not interpret
the United States Constitution in a manner different from the interpretation
provided by the United States Supreme Court, even if the state court inter-
prets constitutional guarantees more liberally.
48
Beyond the naked assertion that Congress may only enlarge, not dilute,
there is no explanation of why this should be. If Congress has superior com-
petence, it should be deferred to; if it does not have superior competence, it
should not be deferred to. There is no principled way to distinguish enlarge-
ment from dilution.
49
The theory that Congress may expand, but not restrict, the scope of
constitutional guarantees has been called the "ratchet theory. ' '50 In addi-
tion to the problem of determining why the ratchet can turn only one way, is
the problem in some instances of determining in which direction the ratchet
is turning.5 1 For example, suppose Congress decided to pass a statute creat-
ing a newsman's privilege in state courts or enlarging the power of state
courts to issue gag orders. Such statutes would involve conflicts between the
first amendment rights of the press and the fifth and sixth amendment rights
of defendants. If Congress has a specially informed legislative competence, it
should be allowed to weigh the competing considerations and have its con-
clusion accorded the same deference as in Morgan.
The next case to deal with congressional power to define the substance
of fourteenth amendment guarantees was Oregon v. Mitchell,52 in which the
constitutionality of provisions of the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act was challenged. The challenged provisions provided for a nationwide
extension of the literacy test ban and an extension of the right to vote to
eighteen-year-olds in state and federal elections. The literacy test ban was
upheld unanimously. Justice Harlan, who dissented in Morgan, accepted as a
basis for congressional action actual findings by Congress that literacy tests
were tools of discrimination. Because of his firm conviction that the four-
teenth amendment has no application to voting cases, he concurred on the
ground that the ban was a legitimate exercise of Congress' enforcement
power under section 2 of the fifteenth amendment.
53
48. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
49. See Burt, Miranda and Title II A Morganatic Mamage, 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 81; Cohen,
Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Cox,
Foreword- Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91
(1966); Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 656 (1977).
50. Cohen, supra note 49, at 606.
51. Id. at 607.
52. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
53. Justice Harlan argued consistently throughout his career that voting was not covered
by the fourteenth amendment. He pointed to the fact that constitutional amendments were
necessary to bring about abolition of state restrictions on voting with respect to race, sex, and
failure to pay a poll tax (amendments XV, XIX, and XXIV, respectively). Furthermore, Jus-
tice Harlan convincingly argued that the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment dem-
onstrates that voting was intended to be excluded from the protection of the amendment, as
does the very text of section 2 of the amendment, which calls for a decrease in representation in
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The more interesting aspect of Oregon v. Mitchell lies in the treatment of
the eighteen-year-old voting provision. Four members of the Court argued
that Congress has the power to regulate voter qualifications in both federal
and state elections, 54 and four members of the Court argued that Congress
could regulate in neither. 55 Only one justice, Justice Black, believed that
Congress could regulate federal, but not state, elections. Because of the shift-
ing majorities, Justice Black wrote the decision of the Court.
To support his decision that Congress may regulate federal elections,
Justice Black relied on article I, section 4 of the Constitution, 56 an argument
of no relevance to the topic of this article. Justice Black also held that con-
gressional regulation of state elections was an invalid exercise of congres-
sional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, because the
power to determine voter qualifications is vital to the "separate and in-
dependent existence of the States."' 57 He relied on the fact that there had
been no finding that the twenty-one-year-old vote requirements were used
by states to disenfranchise on the basis of race. The applicability of Justice
Black's reasoning to cases not involving voting is doubtful, for his opinion
states that "where Congress legislates in a domain not exclusively reserved
by the Constitution to the States, its enforcement power need not be tied so
closely to the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race."
'58
Justice Black identified three limitations on congressional power:
1) Congress may not by legislation repeal other provisions of the Constitu-
tion;59 2) section 5 was not intended, and may not be used, to strip states of
the power of self-government or to "convert our national government of enu-
merated powers into a central government of unrestrained authority over
every inch of the whole Nation";6° and 3) Congress may not undercut other
fourteenth amendment guarantees.
6 '
Justice Douglas would have upheld the application of the eighteen-
year-old vote requirement to state elections.62 He stated that "Congress
might well conclude that a reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 was
needed in the interest of equal protection, '63 deferring to Congress' judg-
Congress of those states that denied blacks the vote. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). In fact, at the time of passage of the amendment, only six states had
extended the franchise to Negroes. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and
the Understanding of the Thirty-Nnth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 33, 70.
54. Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.
55. Burger, C.J., Stewart, Blackmun, and Harlan, JJ.
56. Article I, § 4 states, in pertinent part: "The Times, Places and Manner of Holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Places of chusing Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 3.
57. 400 U.S. at 125.
58. Id at 130.
59. Id at 128. The fourteenth amendment of its own force, however, gives Congress the
power to limit a state's eleventh amendment immunity. See, e.g., Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
(1979); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
60. 400 U.S. at 128.
61. Id This harks back to Justice Brennan's footnote in Morgan. See text accompanying
notes 45-49 supra.
62. 400 U.S. at 135 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id at 141.
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ment concerning the substance of the equal protection clause.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, would have
upheld the eighteen-year-old requirement on either of two alternative
grounds. First, he argued that it is questionable whether denying the vote to
those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one could withstand the scru-
tiny of the Court under the equal protection clause. 64 Second, he argued
that even if the state laws were proper under section 1 of the amendment,
"proper regard for the special function of Congress in making determina-
tions of legislative fact compels this Court to respect those determinations
unless they are contradicted by evidence far stronger than anything that has
been adduced in these cases.
' ' 65
Justice Brennan also stated that the twenty-one-year-old vote require-
ment would be subjected to strict scrutiny and a state would have to show a
compelling interest in the requirement. 66 Justice Brennan went on to state
that as long as Congress' decision that the equal protection clause requires
the extension of the franchise to eighteen-year-olds is rational, no more must
be shown to support its decision.
Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
would deny Congress the power to set qualifications in either state or federal
elections, and stated that section 302 is valid
only if Congress has the power not only to provide the means of
eradicating situations that amount to a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, but also to determine as a matter of substantive
constitutional law what situations fall within the ambit of the
clause, and what state interests are "compelling."
'6 7
Because Congress does not have the power to define the substance of the
amendment, Justice Stewart argued that section 302 was invalid.
Justice Harlan also argued that Congress could not lower the voting age
in either federal or state elections.6 He stated that the extent of congres-
sional power is to prevent or remedy discrimination that is within the pur-
view of the amendment. He characterized the suggestion that members of
the age group between eighteen and twenty-one were threatened with un-
constitutional discrimination as "little short of fanciful."'6 9 He went on to
say that "all the evidence indicates that Congress-led on by recent decisions
of this Court-thought simply that eighteen-year-olds were fairly entitled to
the vote and that Congress could give it to them by legislation." '70 This
comment points out a serious problem with deference to Congress in this
area. Realistically, Congress does not come to the conclusion that a given
64. Id. at 240 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Id
66. As Justice Stewart pointed out in his opinion, this is an impossible standard to set. Id
at 294-95 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He argued that no state could
possibly demonstrate a compelling interest in drawing the line at one age or another. The only
realistic approach is to determine whether a state has a compelling interest in setting an age
qualification and then to determine whether the age selected is a reasonable one.
67. Id at 296.
68. Id at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. Id at 212.
70. Id at 213.
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situation (for example, a twenty-one-year-old voting requirement) is a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause and then undertake to correct it. Instead,
Congress reaches the conclusion that a different situation is politically-not
constitutionally--desirable and then seeks to find some constitutional au-
thority for its action. Although the same criticism is often made of decisions
by the Court, Congress is, in principle as well as in fact, a political body; the
Court may at times respond to political pressure, but it is not overtly a polit-
ical institution.
It appears that in Oregon v. Mitchell there are five justices (Black, Doug-
las, Brennan, White and Marshall) who believe that, at least when Congress
is not impinging upon concerns left explicitly to the states, Congress may
expand the substance of fourteenth amendment guarantees.
More recently, in Ciy of Rome v. United States ,7 1 the Court was faced with
the question of the constitutionality of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
which requires "preclearance" by the United States Attorney General of
changes in voting practices in "covered" jurisdictions. Section 5 permits
such change only if the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will
not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color." The case centered around changes in the electoral system of
Rome, Georgia, primarily a change whereby city commissioners would be
elected at-large within wards. On the same day in a separate case, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of at-large elections in Mobile,
Alabama, where there was a racially disparate effect.
72
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in City of Rome, upheld the
challenged section of the Voting Rights Act as valid legislation under section
2 of the fifteenth amendment, despite the City's argument that, since section
1 of the amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination, Congress is
without power under the enforcement clause to reach conduct having only a
discriminatory effect. Justice Marshall held that the preclearance provisions
requiring both a lack of discriminatory purpose and a lack of discriminatory
effect were appropriate remedial legislation.
Although City of Rome was decided on the basis of the fifteenth amend-
ment, it is relevant to fourteenth amendment analysis because of the similar-
ity between the enforcement clauses of the two amendments, and because of
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, 73 in which he discussed the history of the Court's
treatment of the "remedial versus substantive" debate. Justice Rehnquist
argued that there are three theories of congressional enforcement power rele-
vant to the case. The first is that if the proposed changes violated section 1
of the amendment then, without question, Congress could prohibit their im-
plementation. Second, Congress could act to enforce the judicially estab-
lished substantive provisions of the amendments. The third theory is that
Congress has the power to determine that electoral changes with a disparate
71. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
72. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Mobile's plan was not covered by the Voting
Rights Act because Mobile was not seeking to change its system; it had been in effect since 1911.
Id at 59.
73. 446 U.S. at 206 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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impact on race violate the Constitution. 74
Justice Rehnquist argued that neither of the first two theories could
support the application of the Voting Rights Act to Rome. He argued that
under Mobile v. Bolden Rome's changes were not unconstitutional, and that
because of a lower court finding that the city had engaged in no purposeful
discrimination for almost two decades, application of the Act was not an
appropriate remedial measure. 75 Therefore, argued Justice Rehnquist, ap-
plication of the preclearance provision to Rome was constitutional only if
Congress had the power to determine that electoral changes with "a dispa-
rate impact on a minority group's ability to elect a candidate of their race
violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. ' 76 He went on to argue
that a majority of the Court has never ratified congressional power to define
the substantive content of the Civil War amendments. 77  It should be
remembered, however, that Justice Black's opinion in Oregon can be read to
say that Congress does have some power to define the substance of the
amendments' guarantees. 78 Based on his reasoning in Oregon, however, Jus-
tice Black would probably not have upheld this particular exercise of con-
gressional power.
III. COUNTERVAILING FORCES LIMITING CONGRESSIONAL POWER
There are two separate considerations that counsel restraint in inter-
preting congressional power under the enforcement clauses of the Civil War
amendments: federalism and individual freedom. 79 Interpretations that
would allow Congress to reach private conduct under the fourteenth amend-
ment primarily implicate concerns of individual liberty-if Congress grants
individuals rights as against other individuals, it necessarily imposes a duty
on the latter, thereby restricting individual liberty.8 0 Interpretations that
would allow Congress to define the substance of the amendments' guarantees
implicate primarily federalism concerns, at least so long as private conduct
cannot be reached. The extent of the impingement would, of course, depend
upon the expansiveness of the Court's view of the grant of federal power.
Therefore, speculation about possible effects of the view that Congress is em-
powered to reach private conduct and define the scope of the amendments
must be rather general, and only a few possible conflicts between congres-
sional power and either federalism or individual liberty will be addressed.
Without question, the fourteenth amendment was intended to be a
74. 446 U.S. at 210.
75. The Court held that the only way that Rome could "bail out" from under the
preclearance provisions was if the entire State of Georgia could bail out. In order for the entire
state to bail out, Georgia would have to show that every political subdivision had freed itself
from discrimination, thereby making every political subdivision in the state hostage to the trans-
gressions of a single subdivision. Id at 203-04 (Powell, J., dissenting).
76. Id at 219-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. Id at 220-21.
78. See text accompanying note 59 uspra.
79. See Cohen, supra note 49. Cohen argues that the federalism issue is the major constitu-
tional concern. The federalism concern may, however, be viewed as an aspect of the individual
freedom concern, because decreased state autonomy leads to a centralization of power.
80. See text accompanying notes 2-19 supra.
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limit on state power.8 ' The language of the amendment itself makes that
much clear. Moreover, the Thirty-ninth Congress intended that Congress,
not the courts, would be the primary enforcers of the amendment, 2 al-
though Justice Brennan dismisses that issue as "of academic interest only.
'" 83
It is also rather clear from the legislative history, however, that the intent of
the framers was not to effect too drastic a change in the federal system.8 4 An
expansive reading of section 5, in conjunction with current notions concern-
ing broad congressional powers under the commerce power8 5 and the spend-
ing power,8 6 would render the states hollow shells.
In addition to the regulation of voting, which was, without a doubt,
beyond the intent of the framers, 7 the most obvious exercise of congres-
sional power would be in the area of state justice systems. Despite the fact
that the Supreme Court has stated that the fourteenth amendment does not
require twelve-man juries8 8 or indictment by grand jury8 9 in state criminal
proceedings, nor does the amendment prohibit capital punishment per se,9°
Congress could presumably regulate in these areas.
Congress also might mandate bilingual education, even in the absence
of federal funding. It might find that in order for all children to enjoy the
equal protection of the laws, they must all be taught in their native tongues.
If Congress is permitted to weigh competing constitutional values, it
might also establish a newsman's privilege in state and federal courts.9 1 In
Welsh v. United States,92 three justices93 were willing to defer to Congress'
balancing of values of religious freedom and Congress' power to raise armies,
in Congress' establishment of criteria for conscientious objection to the draft.
An even broader reading might allow Congress to make its own determina-
tion of what constitutes a taking of private property, thereby allowing Con-
gress to regulate local zoning practices.
This is not to suggest that these particular acts will come to pass, only
that they are the kinds of actions Congress might take in exercise of an ex-
pansive power. Recent growth in power of the federal government has de-
creased in force the authority of Herbert Wechsler's classic statement on
81. Ste note 59 supra.
82. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 20, at 221-29.
83. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 263-64 n.37 (1970).
84. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949). Fairman states:
The freedom that the states traditionally have exercised to develop their own systems
of administering justice, repels any thought that the federal provisions on grand jury,
criminal jury, and civil jury were fastened upon them in 1868. Congress would not
have attempted such a thing, the country would not have stood for it, the legislatures
would not have ratified.
Id at 137.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
86. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
87. See note 53 supra.
88. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
89. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
90. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
91. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
92. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
93. Burger, C.J., White & Stewart, JJ.
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federalism that "[f]ar from a national authority that is expansionist by na-
ture, the inherent tendency in our system is precisely the reverse, necessitat-
ing the widest support before intrusive measures of importance can receive
significant consideration." '94 In theory, Wechsler is right; in practice, how-
ever, there seems to be a tendency for the perspectives of a congressman to
change once in Washington, from concern for state interest to national con-
cerns. Perhaps this is as it should be, but it does not make Congress a very
effective restraint on the exercise of congressional (its own) power.
With respect to concerns of individual freedom, congressional power to
reach private conduct is of great concern. Regardless of whether one favors
congressional intervention in particular private matters, it must be borne in
mind that such intervention does limit individual liberty. One may counter
that the liberty to be a bigot and act in a discriminatory manner is not worth
having. Perhaps it is and perhaps it is not. The fact remains that freedom of
action is restrained. The topic of individual freedom will be dealt with more
extensively below;95 for the moment it will suffice to identify areas of possi-
ble congressional intervention.
Congress might, for example, attempt to regulate all forms of private
discrimination, including such practices as private club membership, al-
though in such a case constitutional concerns of associational freedom would
probably serve as a limit.96 Congress might also impose upon private em-
ployers obligations of due process toward their employees with regard to
such matters as promotion and termination. Also, the Runyon v. MCray
97
rationale might be applied through the fourteenth amendment to reach sex
discrimination in private schools receiving no federal aid.98 Although un-
likely, Congress might go so far as to determine that corporal punishment of
children violates the children's civil rights and outlaw spanking, as Sweden
did. Again, of course, constitutional concerns of family autonomy and pri-
vacy would be raised.99
Another result of an expansive view of congressional power to define the
substance of fourteenth amendment guarantees is the bill now pending
before Congress stating that "human life shall be deemed to exist from con-
ception" and that the term "person" in the fourteenth amendment "shall
include all human life as defined herein." 100 The bill, expressly based upon
section 5, contains a finding that "present day scientific evidence indicates a
significant likelihood that actual human life exists from conception."10 1 The
purpose of the bill is, of course, to get around the holding in Roe v. Wade 1
02
94. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States n the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954).
95. See text accompanying notes 194-232 in/a.
96. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
97. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
98. See Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action"
Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 221, 243.
99. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
100. S. 158, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Rec. S. 287-88 (Jan. 19, 1981).
101. Id
102. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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forbidding states from banning abortions in most circumstances. Such a
measure would not only permit states to restrict access to abortions, it would
also, presumably, prohibit any state funding of abortions and perhaps require
states to ban abortions, or at least give Congress the power to prohibit abor-
tions nationwide.
Proponents of the Human Life Bill argue that the determination of
when life begins is a matter for which Congress is more suited than are the
courts.'0 3 In Wade, the Court declined to decide when human life begins,
but stated that the word "person" in the fourteenth amendment does not
include the unborn. The bill reflects one of the major difficulties with the
"ratchet theory."' 4 It is far from clear in the case of this bill which way the
ratchet is turning. It is true that the "privacy right" of a woman to abort a
fetus she is carrying would be restricted. At the same time, however, Con-
gress would be extending fourteenth amendment protections to a whole new
class of "persons." If, as Justice Brennan stated in Morgan, it is Congress'
prerogative to weigh competing considerations and that all that is necessary
to sustain congressional action under section 5 is "a basis upon which Con-
gress might predicate its judgment,"' 10 5 there is no principled reason to deny
Congress power in this area. If the bill passes, the Court will have to face
squarely the question of whether Congress has wide latitude in determining
the scope of fourteenth amendment rights when it seeks to advance liberal
causes, but a much narrower latitude in advancing conservative causes.
IV. EQUALITY AND LIBERTY
The year was 2081, and everybody was finally equal. They weren't
only equal before God and the law. They were equal every which
way. Nobody was smarter than anybody else. Nobody was better
looking than anybody else. Nobody was stronger or quicker than
anybody else. All this equality was due to the 211th, 212th, and
213th Amendments to the Constitution, and to the unceasing vigi-
lance of the United States Handicapper General.106
A. Equality and Liberty Defmed
Most of the attempts to expand congressional enforcement power under
the Civil War amendments have been attempts to assure greater "equality."
It is the thesis of the remainder of this article that the quest for greater equal-
ity has become a national obsession, at least among policy makers, and an
expansive reading of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment
poses very real dangers. Moreover, current conceptions of equality are far
removed from the notion of equality around which this country was formed.
The modern concept of equality, rather than being a necessary complement
to liberty, has become its antithesis. Finally, the quest for greater equality
103. Galebach, A Human Lift Statute, HUMAN LIFE REV. (Winter 1980), repnnted ih Cong.
Rec. S. 288 (Jan. 19, 1981).
104. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
106. K. VONNEGUT, WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 8 (1968).
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carries with it tremendous costs to society, costs which should be considered
in the decision-making process.
In his classic reflections on American society, Alexis de Tocqueville
observed:
Democratic nations are at all times fond of equality, but there
are certain epochs at which the passion they entertain for it swells
to the height of fury. This occurs at the moment when the old
social system, long menaced, is overthrown after a severe intestine
struggle, and the barriers of rank are at length thrown down. At
such times, men pounce upon equality as their booty, and they
cling to it as to some precious treasure which they fear to lose. The
passion for equality penetrates on every side into men's hearts, ex-
pands there, and fills them entirely. Tell them not that, by this
blind surrender of themselves to an exclusive passion, they risk
their dearest interests: they are deaf. Show them not freedom es-
caping from their grasp whilst they are looking another way: they
are blind, or, rather, they can discern but one object to be desired
in the universe.
I think that democratic communities have a natural taste for
freedom: left to themselves, they will seek it, cherish it, and view
any privation of it with regret. But for equality, their passion is
ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible: they call for equality in
freedom; and if they cannot obtain that, they still call for equality
in slavery. They will endure poverty, servitude, barbarism; but
they will not endure aristocracy.1
0 7
We are in such an epoch today. Tremendous attention and resources are
marshalled to achieve the goal of equality; every decision is examined to
ensure that it will have no disparate impact upon any group, at least any
"protected" group.
Equality and liberty are the two cornerstones of this country. The Dec-
laration of Independence states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pur-
suit of Happiness."' 0 8 Depending upon one's definition of the terms "Lib-
erty" and "Equality," these two values may come into conflict. If they do,
which is to prevail?
There are two major formulations of the concept of liberty or freedom.
One is the "negative" form, or "freedom from"; the other is the "positive"
form, or "freedom to."' 0 9 Under the negative formulation, a person is free
to the extent that no person or group of persons interferes with his activity.
Helvetius described a free man as one "who is not in irons, nor imprisoned in
a gaol, nor terrorized like a slave by the fear of punishment. . . it is not lack
of freedom not to fly like an eagle or swim like a whale."" 10 The essence of
107. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 191-92 (1842).
108. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, July 4, 1776.
109. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, repnnted in I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122
(1969). See alo Muller, The Meanings of Freedom, in H. MULLER, ISSUES OF FREEDOM 3 (1960).
110. Quotedin I. BERLIN, supra note 109, at 122 n.2.
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the negative form of liberty is that all coercion is inherently bad, although
coercion may have to be applied to restrain other, greater evils; and, while
non-interference is inherently good, it is not the only good."1 '
Under the "positive" form, or "freedom to," a person is free to the ex-
tent that he is his own master. 1 2 Bertrand Russell defined freedom as "the
absence of obstacles to the realization of desires." ' 1 3 This absence of obsta-
cles includes obstacles other than merely restraints by other people. The
essence of the distinction between the negative and the positive forms is that
the latter entails thepower to achieve the objective that one chooses. Those
who maintain that the positive form is the only true freedom argue that
whether one is restrained from achieving goals by external restraints im-
posed by other people, or for any other reason, such as lack of economic
power, the result is the same; therefore, the only realistic view of freedom is
that it is the possibility of meaningful choice.
The distinction between the two forms of freedom reflect the distinction
between the concept of "right" and the concept of "power." In response to
the question of whether a pauper has the freedom to buy a new car, one who
believes in the negative form of freedom will respond in the affirmative, be-
cause the pauper has the right to buy the car on the same terms as anyone
else; it is irrelevant that he does not have the economic power. One who
subscribes to the positive definition will respond to the question in the nega-
tive, because the pauper does not have thepower to buy the car; his theoreti-
cal right to buy it is irrelevant.
Opposing views in Hams v. McRae 114 also demonstrate the difference
between the two forms of freedom. McRae involved the question of the con-
stitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which severely restricted federal
funding of abortions. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, stated that the
statute was constitutional because it "places no governmental obstacles in
the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy ... . In a
statement clearly expressing the negative form of freedom, Justice Stewart
stated that "although government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its
creation. "116
Justice Brennan, dissenting, stated that "the Hyde Amendment not
only was designed to inhibit, but does in fact inhibit, the woman's freedom
to choose abortion over childbirth."' ' 7 This statement represents the posi-
tive view of freedom. Strictly speaking, of course, the Hyde Amendment
does not restrict a woman's freedom to choose an abortion, it merely restricts
her power to pay for it.
It appears that Justice Brennan's primary objection to the amendment
is that because Medicaid pays for childbirth but not for abortion, the state is
111. Id at 161.
112. Id at 131.
113. Qyotd tn H. MULLER supra note 109, at 9.
114. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
115. Id at 315.
116. Id at 316.
117. Id at 332.
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"wielding its enormous power and influence in a manner that might burden
the pregnant woman's freedom to choose whether to have an abortion."'' 8
It is true that to an indigent woman the Hyde Amendment serves to make
the childbirth alternative more attractive economically than the abortion
alternative. It is also true, however, that the maintenance of a public school
system makes the public schooling alternative more attractive economically
than the private schooling alternative, despite the fact that parents have a
constitutional right to send their children to private schools." 9 That does
not mean that the state has a constitutional duty to pay for private
schooling.
It is not difficult to understand the difference between the two defini-
tions of liberty, or to realize that each has some validity. The difficulty lies
in deciding which form of liberty it is that our government is to guarantee. I
would argue that it is the negative form. The Declaration of Independence
best characterizes the freedom: "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi-
ness"-not "Life, Liberty and Happiness"; or "Life, Liberty and the achieve-
ment of Happiness." The philosophers of the Western liberal tradition, out
of which this country grew, viewed the institution of government as a crea-
ture of a "social compact,"' 2 0 and believed that governments "deriv[e their
just powers from the consent of the governed."'12 1 For the Founders, free-
dom was considered to be the natural state, with the voluntary surrender by
the people of a certain amount of freedom in favor of security. Government
might be the protector of liberty, but it certainly was not the grantor of
liberty. Those who view freedom in its positive form view it as something to
be granted by the government, a view quite different from the idea of liberty
embodied in the Declaration of Independence.
Whether one accepts the positive or negative form of freedom, one con-
clusion is inescapable: the two forms of freedom are incompatible. Either
form, of course, in its purest sense is theoretically impossible. There cannot
be a complete absence of restraint on everyone; people being what they are,
one group will try to take advantage of another group by restraining them in
some way. If that is permitted to happen, the latter group is less free; if it is
not permitted, the former group is less free. Similarly, under the positive
definition of freedom, everyone cannot be given the power to achieve all of
his goals-people want too much. By giving one person the power to
achieve his desired ends, it is generally necessary to restrain someone else.
Merely because pure absolute freedom under either definition is not an
achievable goal, however, does not mean that freedom is not desirable or
that one form is not superior to the other.
Just as there are diametrically opposed definitions of "liberty," there are
equally conflicting definitions of the term "equality," the two forms being
"equality of opportunity" and "equality of result." 122 The concept of equal-
118. Id at 330.
119. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
120. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690).
121. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, July 4, 1776.
122. See M. & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 128-149 (1980).
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ity of opportunity embraces the proposition that no one should be prevented
for arbitrary reasons from using his capacities to pursue his own objectives.
Everyone can enter the race, but some are more likely to win. Equality of
opportunity does not mean an equal probability of success; it means an
equal amount of external restraints.
The "New Equality," equality of result, means something entirely dif-
ferent. To return to the metaphor of the race, it .means that everyone has an
equal probability of winning, or more commonly, that every "protected"
group-whether it be defined by gender, race or national origin-is propor-
tionately represented in the class of "winners." Those who favor this defini-
tion of equality argue that it is unrealistic to have "shackled" someone-or
someone of his group, as there is little concern that the particular individual
who receives the edge was ever the victim of discrimination himself12 3 -and
then to let him out of the shackles and expect him to compete equally.
1 24
The goal of equality of result, however, extends beyond the remedy of past
discrimination, and is considered a principle that should be reflected in all
aspects of society. James Fenimore Cooper reflected on the two forms of
equality almost a century-and-a-half ago:
Equality, in a social sense, may be divided into that of condition,
and that of rights. Equality of condition is incompatible with civi-
lization, and is found only to exist in those communities that are
but slightly removed from the savage state. In practice, it can only
mean a common misery.
125
An example of the difference in the two philosophies may be helpful.
One who subscribes to the "equality of opportunity" definition would argue
that a black child from a poor family where education is not valued has the
same opportunity to go to Harvard as does a white child from a well-to-do
family where education is stressed. That is, Harvard is not going to refuse
the poor applicant admission anymore merely because he is black, or be-
cause he does not come from the "right kind of family," or any other arbi-
trary reason. It may, however, refuse him because of his inadequate
academic achievement, but that does not reflect a lack of equality. The re-
sponse to that assertion by the advocates of the New Equality is that regard-
less of whether Harvard's decision is based upon arbitrary or rational
criteria, the fact remains that the poor child does not have the same
probability of success. That is true, but that conclusion does not necessarily
mean that government should intervene in order to "equalize."
The case of City of Rome v. United States, discussed above, 126 reflects an
acquiescence by the Court in a congressional policy embodying the concept
of equality of result.. In City of Rome, it will be remembered, Congress was
deemed to have the power to block a change in voting practices that might
123. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Some critics of the New Equality argue that for the proponents of the New Equality, it
is the race itself that is evil. See Jaffa, Equality as a Conservaive Pnn)citpe, Review of W. KENDALL &
G. CAREY, THE BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION, 8 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 471 (1975).
125. J. COOPER, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRAT 36 (1838).
126. 446 U.S. 156 (1980). See text accompanying notes 71-78 supra.
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result in fewer blacks being elected in Rome, Georgia. If equality of oppor-
tunity were being guaranteed, the Court would determine only whether
blacks were unfairly being denied access to the ballot or the ballot box. In-
stead, the Court guaranteed equality of result by allowing Congress to en-
sure that minority groups could be represented in public office in proportion
to their numbers in the population. Implicit in this decision is the assump-
tion that race is a legitimate criterion by which to evaluate candidates.
There remains the question of whether equality of result is the kind of
equality that was intended to be guaranteed by those whose ideas are repre-
sented in the Civil War amendments. Probably there is no better way to
answer this question than by looking to the words of Abraham Lincoln, who,
in his Gettysburg Address, stated that our nation was "conceived in Liberty,
and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.' 27 In
1857, he stated:
I think the authors of that notable instrument [the Declaration of
Independence] intended to include all men, but they did not in-
tend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to
say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral development, or
social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what
respects they did consider all men created equal--equal with "cer-
tain unalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness." This they said, and this they meant.
1 28
These are not the words of a man seeking equality of result or reward. Lin-
coln was not arguing for a change in the social order to ensure an equal
position for the Negro, but a change in the legal order to ensure that the
same law would apply to the black man as applied to the white man. The
equality that Lincoln sought was equality of opportunity.
B. Can Liberty and Equality Coexist?
Now that the terms "liberty" and "equality" have been defined, it is
instructive to consider a classic question in political philosophy: Are equal-
ity and liberty compatible, or are they necessarily antithetical? The answer
to this question depends upon the definitions of the terms chosen.
The negative form of freedom ("freedom from") and equality of result
are not compatible because, in order to ensure equality of result, the govern-
ment must necessarily impose external restraints on some people, and to that
extent their freedom of action is impaired. The government cannot ensure a
given outcome without in some way arbitrarily restraining someone else-
whether it is by redistributing wealth or by conferring other advantages.
The freedom of action of the person whose money is taken, or the person
who would have occupied the spot which has been assured to the other per-
son by the government, has been restrained. Equality of result is therefore
impossible because it cannot accompany equal freedom.
For the same reason, the positive form of freedom and equality of result
127. Address by President Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Gettysburg, Pa. November 19, 1863).
128. A. Lincoln, Address Delivered at Springfield, Illnoir, June 26, 1857, in THE IDEA OF
EQUALITY: AN ANTHOLOGY 185 (G. Abernethy ed. 1959).
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are also incompatible, or at least compatible only to a limited extent. They
are compatible only insofar as the desire for a given outcome coincides with
the outcome that the government deigns to bestow. A necessary feature of a
system that guarantees equality of outcome is the presence of a "master
planner" who decides what outcomes are to be protected. Equality of result
does not mean that any particular results are guaranteed; it means only that
the results are to be granted or denied equally. One might desire success,
but "success" generally connotes a level of" achievement beyond that
achieved by others. Under a system where equality of result is guaranteed,
the freedom to be successful is denied.
One might, at first blush, expect that "freedom to" and equality of op-
portunity would be compatible. "Freedom to," however, presupposes that
those who lack the means to achieve their goals will gain some form of aid to
achieve them. Generally, this cannot be achieved without some form of re-
straint on others, and this restraint is unequal. Since equality of opportunity
involves equality of external restraint, "freedom to" and equality of opportu-
nity cannot coexist. Moreover, to the extent that one person's "freedom to"
is granted, another's may be impaired.
"Freedom from" and equality of opportunity are compatible; in fact,
they are two sides of the same coin. When these two values coexist, everyone
enjoys the same absence of external restraint. These are the forms of liberty
and equality embodied in such documents as the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the Gettysburg Address. No one is assured of attaining a particu-
lar status in society, but everyone has the opportunity to try. One group of
society is not subject to different laws than is another group. One is not
guaranteed a position in society because of an ascribed status such as noble
birth, gender, or race; nor is anyone excluded from a position on these
grounds. When the government goes beyond the guarantee of "freedom
from" and equality of opportunity, every step it takes makes us less free. As
Thomas Jefferson observed: "The natural progress of things is for liberty to
yield and government to gain ground." 29 The question then becomes: to
what extent and with what fervor do we oppose this natural trend? Are we
willing to make equality the supreme end in itself and sacrifice liberty to
achieve it?
C. The National Obsession with Equality
The "reverse discrimination" cases are the clearest reflection of the
trend in this country toward the deification of equality. Equality has be-
come the new religion among policymakers. 130 If this were equality of op-
portunity there should be little cause for concern. Unfortunately, it is
equality of result, the goal of which is to achieve proportional representation
129. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to E. Carrington (May 27, 1788), reprinted in THE LIFE
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (A. Koch & W. Pedersen eds.).
130. It should be pointed out that studies show that a majority of both blacks and whites
oppose affirmative action. Bolce & Gray, Blacks, Whites and "Race Politts", 54 PuB. INTEREST 61




of selected groups in all things; not equality among individuals, but among
classes, reflecting a shift "from equality of prospective opportunity toward
statistical parity of retrospective results."'' The desire of contemporary
populists for wholesale egalitarianism is "not for fairness, but against ehtism;
its impulse is not justice, but ressentiment."132 .. To the extent that equality is
seen as an element of justice, it is seen as the only element of justice;13 3 the
term "meritocracy" is derided as "elitism."
It is not the purpose of this article to delve deeply into the "reverse
discrimination" cases; a brief synopsis of them is enough to show the ascen-
dancy of the concept of the New Equality in the Supreme Court. In Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke,i14 the Court ratified preferential admis-
sions programs in universities, so long as the programs do not involve quotas.
That is, even without a showing of past discrimination by the institution, the
institution may weigh the applicant's race in its admission decision. The
holding of the Court means that as long as the goal of the program is equal-
ity of result, traditional constitutional principles forbidding state-sponsored
racial discrimination are to be ignored.
In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 1 35 the Court held that an affirmative ac-
tion program that reserved fifty percent of the openings in a company train-
ing program did not violate Title VII, solely because the effect of the plan
was to achieve equality of result in the plant workforce. In order to reach
that result, the Court was willing to ignore the plain meaning of the statute,
as well as relatively unambiguous legislative history.
136
More recently, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,i 3 7 the Court upheld a provision
of the Public Works Employment Act of 19 77 138 that required at least ten
percent of federal funds granted for public works projects to be used to pro-
cure services or supplies from minority business enterprises. Despite the fact
that Congress had made no findings that there had been any prior discrimi-
nation in federal contracting, the Court was "satisfied that Congress had
abundant historical basis from which it could conclude that traditional pro-
curement practices, when applied to minority businesses, could perpetuate
the effects of prior discrimination."' 13 9 Again, the common thread running
through all these decisions is that the extent of protection that one has
against racial discrimination depends upon one's race, for in the name of
equality the Court is willing to extend constitutional protections unequally.
The above-described cases reflect a trend toward a return to pre-emi-
nence of the ascribed status that the architects of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the Civil War amendments intended to eliminate. Indeed, it
was not Lewis Carroll but a United States Supreme Court Justice who de-
131. Sowell, Weber and Bakke, and the Presupposdiotns of "AJimative Action", 26 WAYNE L.
REV. 1309, 1312 (1980).
132. Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 29 PUB. INTEREST 29, 65 (1972).
133. See Votaw, The New Equality: Bureaucracy's Trojan Horse, 20 CAL. MAN. REV. 5 (1978).
134. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
135. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
136. See text accompanying notes 181-189 inyia.
137. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 6701 (Supp. I 1979).
139. Id at 2775 (emphasis added).
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clared that "in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently."
140
The reverse discrimination cases demonstrate graphically the incompat-
ibility of equality of result and liberty; the means by which equality is ob-
tained is by restricting the liberty of others. In order to achieve statistical
parity, external restraints are placed upon some competitors solely upon the
basis of an ascribed status.
The national obsession with equality is vividly illustrated by a report
entitled Sex B&s in the US Code, 14 1 a report prepared under contract for the
United States Commission on Civil Rights. The purpose of the 230-page
report was to identify and analyze sex-based references in the Code. 142 The
report makes a number of recommendations. For example, the words "man-
kind," "manpower," "paternity," "manmade," "midshipman,; and "he"
should be eliminated from the Code and, presumably (if we have any social
conscience), from our vocabularies as well. These words are to be replaced
by "humankind," "human resources," "parentage," "artificial," "midship-
person," and "he/she,"' 143 respectively. It was also recommended that a fe-
male counterpart to "Johnny Horizon," the anti-litter symbol, be created. 14
4
While reading the report, one conjures up a mental image of the authors of
the report channeling all their energies toward the exclusive goal of becom-
ing offended. It seems that such a concentration on trivialities demeans le-
gitimate claims of sexual inequality and does little more than invite ridicule
of the women's movement in general.
V. COSTS OF THE NATIONAL OBSESSION WITH EQUALITY
The achievement of the New Equality is not without social costs, but
those who favor such equality may be willing to pay them (and make those
who do not favor it pay them as well). It is far from clear, however, whether
those who value this equality so highly have considered how much must be
given up to achieve it. These costs are associated not only with congressional
actions under the enforcement clauses of the Civil War amendments, but
also with actions of the judicial and executive branches. The costs of the
policy may be categorized as economic costs, social costs, institutional costs,
and political costs, with, of course, much overlap in the categories.
A. Economic Costs
Perhaps least important, but nonetheless substantial, are the economic
costs of the all-pervasive national obsession with equality. Surely, if equality
140. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
141. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEX BIAS IN THE U.S. CODE (1977).
142. Id at 2.
143. Id. at 15-16. Efforts to purge the language of allegedly "sexist" terms have not been
limited to the public sector. Roget's Thesaurus has banned "male chauvinist" terms from its
new edition, replacing such words as "mankind" and "countryman" with "humankind" and
"country dweller," respectively. Rocky Mountain News, April 11, 1982, at 2. There has been
no announcement about whether such terms as "nigger," "jungle bunny," and "jigaboo," which
appear in the 1977 edition, have been found equally inappropriate.
144. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 141, at 102.
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is the transcendent value some feel it is, it is difficult to complain that it costs
too much money. When it comes to liberty, for example, few would argue
that it is not worth the price. Certainly the massive defense budget suggests
that, for many, liberty is worth whatever price must be paid for it. t 45 But
what about equality? People may reach different conclusions about its
value, but everyone should realize that it is costing us dearly. It is impossible
to determine precisely how much is spent in the quest for equality; we do not
yet have a Department of Equality, whose budget may be scrutinized care-
fully by cost accountants. The costs of equality are diffused throughout soci-
ety; in this respect the situation differs from defense spending, which is done
primarily by the federal government.
The government spends a great deal of money on many kinds of equal-
ity-oriented programs. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department, as well as divisions in each cabi-
net department, all spend millions of dollars promulgating and monitoring
such programs. There are also hidden costs, such as the payment of higher
contracting fees to minority contractors because they are, to an extent, ex-
empt from competitive bidding requirements.
1 46
In addition to direct spending by the government are sums spent in the
private sector to comply with the edicts of the government. For example, it
is estimated that in the years 1974-78 business paid more than one billion
dollars in back pay awards, promotion, and training directly related to
achieving equality, and that does not include the money spent on legal fees,
changes in personnel systems, and the like.1 47 It also does not include the
massive sums spent by business to comply with government reporting
requirements.
Schools and universities are in much the same situation as business. It
has been estimated that the cost to colleges and universities of complying
with federal hiring and admission requirements has been over two billion
dollars.1 48  It is estimated that compliance with federal regulations at
Harvard alone consumed 60,000 hours of faculty time in academic year
1974-75,'49 and the University of Michigan spent $350,000 just to compile
statistics in connection with affirmative action programs.1 5 0 It is also esti-
mated that between 1976 and 1980 schools and school districts spent almost
800,000 man-hours completing Office for Civil Rights questionnaires. 15 1
145. Even most of those who do not favor massive defense spending oppose such spending
because they feel that it is not necessary for the preservation of our liberties.
146. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
147. Tamarkin, Is Equal Opportuniy Turning into a Witchhunt?, FORBES, May 29, 1978, at 29.
The Fortune 500 companies spend close to $1,000,000,000 per year on routine compliance activ-
ities alone. Seligman, AJ'omatioe Action is Here to Stay, 105 FORTUNE 143, 156 (April 19, 1982).
148. Note, Title IX Sex Dicrimination Regulations: Impact on Pnate Education, 65 KY. L.J. 656
(1977) (hereinafter cited as Sex Discriiiation Regulations).
149. Id
150. Sowell, Affrmateio Action Reconsidered, 42 PUB. INTEREST 47, 57 (1976).
151. Oversight Hearing on Paperwork Control Amendmnenti: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Elmentaqy Secondary and Vocational Education of the House Coamm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 46 (1979).
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These requirements involve tremendous sums of money.
The irony of these massive expenditures to achieve proportional repre-
sentation is that in addition to being inefficient they may be counterproduc-
tive as well. One is reminded of Jos& Ortega y Gasset's observation that
"[tihe mob goes in search of bread, and the means it employs is generally to
wreck the bakeries."' 15 2 Where equal representation, rather than efficiency,
becomes the goal of the national economy, large sums of money are chan-
neled into non-productive activities, which may have a stagnating effect on
the economy.15 3 Since, in the past, a growing economy was available to
allow immigrants to become assimilated, the very practices used in an at-
tempt to achieve equality may make its achievement impossible. This is a
classic example of the fable of the goose that laid the golden egg-a system
may, at its own pace, be capable of producing the desired result, but at-




Tremendous social costs are also associated with the drive for equality,
not least of which is the demonstration of the truth of John Stuart Mill's
observation that "the general tendency of things throughout the world is to
render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind."' 155 Mediocrity is
inevitable in a system that values proportional representation over
excellence.
Perhaps the trend toward mediocrity is nowhere more observable than
in the field of education. Even some who favor the Bakke decision acknowl-
edge that there will be some decline in average educational standards, "per-
haps an appreciable reduction."' 156 When equality of opportunity was the
accepted standard, the expectation was that excellence was the ultimate ob-
jective and that superior achievement would be rewarded. 157 Yet, when
standards for admission are lowered, there is pressure also to lower expecta-
tions, for otherwise there is the very real possibility that those for whom the
standards were lowered will fail at proportionately higher rates. An example
of the decline in expectations that accompanies a decrease in admission stan-
dards is shown by changes in grading policies at George Washington Univer-
sity in Washington, D.C. Prior to the early 1970's, George Washington
required as a condition of graduation a cumulative 2.0 overall grade point
average (GPA) and a 2.5 GPA in the major field-hardly a stringent re-
152. J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, REVOLT OF THE MASSES 60 (1932).
153. Walker, The Exorbitant Cost of Rediributhng Injistice, 21 B.C. L. REv. 1 (1979).
154. George Gilder has observed that "[ulpward mobility is at least partly dependent on
upward admiration: on an accurate perception of the nature of the contest and a respect for the
previous winners of it." G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 99 (1981). As long as people are
encouraged to believe that the contest is inherently unfair, there is little incentive to participate
in it. The result is that the only upward mobility comes from an increase in government lar-
gesse, and the contest is transformed into a race for a favored position at the federal trough.
155. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 62 (1859).
156. Griswold, The Bakke Probem-Allocation of &arce Resources in Education and Otler Areas,
1979 WASH. U.L. Q. 55, 69.
157. Id at 68.
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quirement in a day when the average grade was a "B." In the early 1970's,
however, the administration decided that since the school was admitting
"C" students it was "unfair" to require anything more than "C" work from
them. Consequently, the major GPA requirement was lowered to 2.0.158
Those who favor affirmative action argue that it does not require that
unqualified applicants be accepted, only that a minority in the "qualified"
pool be given precedence over a qualified non-minority. This argument is
misleading, however, because applicants do not fall into one of two discrete,
internally homogeneous groups-either "qualified" or "not qualified."
Within the group of applicants labelled "qualified," there are those who are
more qualified and those who are less qualified. A characteristic complaint
about the Department of Education is that "they do not make allowances for
quality judgments, appearing to regard the Ph.D. simply as being in the
same category as a machinist's union card." 1 59 To illustrate that simply la-
belling applicants as either "qualified" or "not qualified" is inadequate, one
need only consider the case of Allan Bakke, rejected from the medical school
at the University of California at Davis in favor of sixteen "qualified" minor-
ity students. Bakke had a GPA of 3.46 and Medical College Admissions Test
(MCAT) scores in the ninetieth percentile, while the average GPA of the
accepted minorities was a 2.75 and their average MCAT score was in the
thirty-second percentile. 16 0 Surely just to call them all "qualified" is not to
tell the whole story.
Another example of a willingness to accept mediocrity in order to attain
proportional representation is the change in the pass rate of the Penn-
sylvania bar examination. From 1955 to 1970, only 83 of 306 (27%) blacks
who took the state bar exam passed, compared with 7300 of 10,790 (68%)
whites. 1 6t In order to pass more blacks, the overall pass rate was increased to
85-98% in the years 1971 to 1975, thereby raising the pass rate for blacks to
about 60%.162
An unanswered question is at what point do we stop accepting subcom-
petence? We can admit students into college who would not otherwise be
considered qualified and take extraordinary measures to keep them in; we
can admit students into professional schools who would not otherwise be
considered qualified and take more extraordinary measures to keep them in;
and we can admit students into professions who would not otherwise be con-
sidered qualified. Do we then take extraordinary measures to keep them in
their professions? Is it "fair" to apply the same standards of professional
competence, or do we adopt separate malpractice standards for people who
were admitted under affirmative action programs? At what point do we stop
considering abstract notions of fairness and recognize that society has a
158. The author attended George Washington University from 1972 to 1975.
159. Letter from Carleton Whitehead, Affirmative Action Compliance Officer at Reed Col-
lege, Portland, Ore., cited in Sex Disermtnatton Regulations, supra note 148.
160. 438 U.S. at 277-78 n.7. The figures quoted are composites of the two years that Bakke
applied.
161. Symposium, The Minority Candidate and the Bar Examination, 5 BLACK L.J. 119 (1976).
162. Id New Mexico has also recently raised its pass rate in order to raise the pass rate of
minorities. Winter, N.M. Lowers Bar Exam Pass Score- Sparks Protest, 67 A.B.A.J. 1438 (1981).
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strong interest in having the standards of competence set as high as possible?
In the words of John Sparrow, "excellence may not be a matter for pride,
but it is never a matter for regret."'
63
Perhaps the supreme irony is the selectivity with which people decide
when to accept mediocrity. A decision to require proportional representa-
tion of whites-on a professional basketball team would be satirized through-
out the lan'd. Why? Well, obviously, one should be selected for a sports
team on the ability to play the sport, that is, on the basis of merit. Yet
requirements that certain groups be represented in certain proportions in
higher education receive more support. Does competence matter less in a
doctor than in a professional basketball player? Those who favor affirmative
action argue that it is acceptable to admit to professional schools those who
are objectively less qualified, because the objective criteria (for example,
GPA, Law School Admissions Test [LSAT], or MCAT) used to select stu-
dents do not predict how good a doctor or a lawyer one will be, even though
they may accurately predict academic success. That argument proves too
much. If the objective criteria are irrational they should not be applied to
anyone; in fact, if they are irrational, their use by state schools is
unconstitutional.
Mediocrity also brings with it economic costs, for when irrelevant crite-
ria such as sex or race are preferred to efficiency in a job, it takes more
people to do the same amount of work, either because a less competent per-
son works more slowly, or because he makes more mistakes that need correc-
tion. Consequently, productivity declines.
2. Loss of Individualism
Another great social cost associated with what Daniel Boorstin has
called "Intergenerational Bookkeeping"' 164 is the change in the traditional
liberal view of individualism and a return to consideration of people as
members of a group. The concept of equality of opportunity derives from
two basic tenets of classic liberalism-that the individual, and not the fam-
ily, community, or state, is the basic unit of society, and that the purpose of
society is to allow the individual the freedom to seek his own goals. 16 5
Equality of opportunity and the classic liberalism deny the precedence of
birth or any other criterion that determines position, other than competition,
the outcome of which is determined by talent, ambition, and luck. ' 66
Individualism is losing its importance in our society. No longer are we
considered individual actors in our dealings with the state (and each other);
we are considered merely as representatives of our race, ethnic group, or
gender. Perhaps, to paraphrase Justice Blackmun in Bakke,' 6 7 to treat peo-
163. J. SPARROW, Too MUCH OF A GOOD THING (1977).
164. D. BOORSTIN, THE SOCIOLOGy OF THE ABSURD (1970).
165. Bell, supra note 132. Se also J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HIs-
TORY at x (1978).
166. See Bell, supra note 132.
167. 438 U.S. at 407. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
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ple as individuals we must ignore their individual qualities and treat them
according to which group they represent.
Loss of individualism is another area where current conceptions differ
drastically from the principles around which this country was formed. Al-
though the founders were not egalitarians in the sense of being levelers (as
were the architects of the French Revolution), they were egalitarians in the
sense that they believed that people were to be treated the same under the
law without regard to birth or social station.1 68 The trend in modern society
is to go back to a state where legal relations depend upon membership in a
group.
3. Devaluation of Minority Accomplishment
In a sense, the saddest aspect of affirmative action is the devaluation of
true accomplishment by minorities, because the victims are the intended
beneficiaries of the programs. Even though many members of minority
groups would have succeeded without affirmative action, a common pre-
sumption today is that a minority person who succeeds does so because he
had help not available to others.
Thomas Sowell points out that black income as a percentage of white
income reached its peak in 1970-the year before the implementation of
"goals and timetables," though the percentage has since decreased. 169 He
argues that sociological "explanations" offered by white liberals and black
"spokesmen" to explain why blacks cannot pull themselves up the way other
oppressed minorities have in the past miss the mark, because the fact is that
blacks have pulled themselves up-from further down and against stronger
opposition-and they show every indication of continuing to advance. This
advancement, he argues, would have continued even without affirmative ac-
tion; all affirmative action has done is to destroy the legitimacy of what has
already been achieved.
Another way in which minorities are harmed by affirmative action is by
the shunting of minorities into certain kinds of jobs. For example, in faculty
hiring in colleges and universities, employers are faced with opposing sets of
incentives. By hiring from the government-designated groups, an employer's
short-run liabilities are lowered, but his long-run liabilities are increased be-
cause employees from designated groups can subject the employer to addi-
tional costs whenever their pay, promotion, or discharge patterns deviate
from those favored by government agencies. In faculty hiring programs,
these considerations can be significant because of "up or out" policies of try-
ing out new faculty and either renewing their contracts and perhaps eventu-
ally granting them tenure, or letting them go. The effect has been to reduce
demand for untested members of minority groups, raise demand for better
qualified members of such groups, and shift members of minority groups out
168. Thomas Jefferson wrote: "The foundation upon which all our constitutions are built is
the natural equality of man, the denial of every preeminence but that annexed to legal office,
and particularly the denial of a preeminence by birth." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
George Washington (1784).
169. Sowell, supra note 150.
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of faculty and into admi iisi ration where "up or out" policies do not apply.
These predictions are borne out by empirical evidence that: 1) blacks with-
out doctorates and having few publications earn less than similarly situated
whites; 2) blacks with Ph.D.'s from top schools and having several publica-
tions earned more than comparable whites; and 3) there is a higher propor-
tion of blacks in administrative positions than would be expected.17
0
Adverse impacts on minority students are also observable. For example,
at Cornell University in the early 1970's, half of all black students were on
academic probation. It is not that they were incapable of good academic
performance; their scores were in the upper twenty-five percent of all stu-
dents admitted to college, but the Cornell student body as a whole was in the
upper one percent. 171
The obverse of the devaluation of minority accomplishment is the built-
in excuse that affirmative action provides for those non-minorities who do
not succeed: they are encouraged to believe that their failure was due to
government-mandated affirmative action, rather than to some deficiency on
their part.' 72 In addition to sowing the seeds of race hatred, the end result is
that it becomes too difficult for minorities to take credit for their genuine
accomplishment and too easy for non-minorities to escape responsibility for
their genuine failure. '
7 3
C. lnstitutional Costs
Perhaps the greatest institutional cost is the conversion of what was
once thought to be a government of laws, not men, into a government of
men. When the integrity of the judicial and political processes is made
subordinate to a given social goal, good or bad, we cannot reasonably expect
respect for our governmental institutions to survive.
The greatest perversions of constitutional principle have probably come
from the judiciary, with the administrative bureaucracy not far behind.
Congress has been far from blameless, but more restrained due to the nature
of the institution. Chief Justice Burger has warned:
What Cardozo tells us is beware the "good result," achieved by
judicially unauthorized or intellectually dishonest means on the
appealing notion that the desirable ends justify the improper judi-
cial means. For there is always the danger. that the seeds of prece-
dent sown by good men for the best of motives will yield a rich
harvest of unprincipled acts of others also aiming at "good
ends." '
7 4
Complaints that the Court is rewriting the Constitution or sitting as a
continuing constitutional convention are usually met with the somewhat
condescending reminder that "it is a constitution we are expounding."'' 75
170. Id
171. Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 147.
172. Walker, supra note 153.
173. Sowell, supra note 150.
174. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
175. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in the original).
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That rather facile reminder is intended to calm any fears one might have
that the Court is acting in an improper manner when it construes the Consti-
tution in a way that runs counter to the intent of the framers (to the extent
that intent can be determined). Surely, it zs a constitution that is being ex-
pounded, and surely it should not have the prolixity of a legal code, and
surely situations arise which were not within the contemplation of the fram-
ers. When such unforeseen occurrences arise, however, the Court should not
then consider the constitutional provision a tabula rasa on which it may scrib-
ble according to its sense of what is wise social policy. Moreover, the
"amendment" of the Constitution by the judiciary is wholly out of keeping
with the spirit of article V of the Constitution, which makes constitutional
amendments rather difficult to pass. The argument that it is because of the
difficulty of the amending process that five of nine justices on the Supreme
Court have the right or obligation to change the meaning of the Constitu-
tion from the meaning it was originally intended to have is incompatible
with the amending process as originally conceived. The reason for requiring
ratification by three-fourths of the states was precisely to "guard. . .against
that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable."
1 76
A look at two landmark cases in fourteenth amendment construction-
Brown v. Board of Education 177 and Reynolds v. Sims, 178 both of which brought
new meaning to the fourteenth amendment-may be instructive. Arguably,
Brown is supportable using a historic approach. Although the framers of the
amendment did not intend the fourteenth amendment to outlaw segregated
schools, 179 the greatly increased importance of public schools in our society
may justify a change in the law. On the other hand, Reynolds v. Sims is im-
possible to reconcile with the intent of the framers. As discussed above,' 8 0
one of the very few clear principles that can be derived from the legislative
history of the amendment is that it was not intended to apply to voting; not
only did the framers not intend the amendment to apply to voting, they
intended it not to apply. Moreover, it cannot be argued that the importance
of voting had changed so much between the 1860's and the 1960's as to
justify the Court's departure from historical principles. Regardless of
whether one feels that the "one man, one vote" policy required by Reynolds is
wise social policy, it cannot be gainsaid that the route by which this policy
was achieved was harmful to institutional respect, at least among those who
feel that the means, not only the ends, are important.
In the area of statutory construction, a leading case exemplifying the
intellectual chicanery in which the Court is willing to engage is United Steel-
workers v. Weber. 18 ' In Weber, the Court was faced with an affirmative action
plan that reserved half the positions in a training program for black employ-
ees. The Court was also faced with the following language from Title VII:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organ-
176. J. MADISON, FEDERALIST No. 43.
177. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
178. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
179. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation DeciSion, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
180. See note 53 supra.
181. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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ization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or
other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to dis-
criminate against any individual because of his race .... ",182 Justice Bren-
nan, however, was not'deterred. First, he stated that Weber's "reliance upon
a literal construction [of the statute] . . . is misplaced."' 18 3 He continued,
stating that the prohibition against racial discrimination "must therefore be
read against the background of the legislative history of Title VII and the
historical context from which the Act arose."' 18 4 The "legislative history"
that the Court relied on was a collection of general statements about the
plight of the Negro in American society. The Court totally ignored, as Jus-
tice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissenting opinion, much more specific
language in the debates, such as Senator Humphrey's statement that "[i]t is
claimed that the bill would require racial quotas for all hiring, when in fact
it provides that race shall not be a basis for making personnel decisions."'
185
Justice Brennan also ignored an interpretative memorandum by Senators
Clark and Case, floor managers of the bill, which stated that "any deliberate
attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such balance may be, would
involve a violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance would
require an employer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of race."' 18 6 Their
memorandum continued: "[employers] would not be obliged--or indeed
permitted-. . . to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or. . . to give them
special seniority rights .... "187 Despite this clear legislative history, Jus-
tice Brennan announced that "an interpretation of the sections that forbade
all race-conscious affirmative action would 'bring about an end completely
at variance with the purpose of the statute' and must be rejected."'
88
Such a method of statutory construction certainly makes Congress' job
easier. Instead of beginning a statute with a statement of legislative purpose
and following with the substantive provisions of the law, now Congress need
only draft the purpose clause and the Court will provide the rest.
It is not the purpose of this paper to argue that Weber is wrong, though
it is; the more important criticism relevant here is that it is intellectually
dishonest, a consequence producing far higher institutional cost than mere
error. This decision can only be understood as arising out of a conviction
that equality of result is "the greater good," and therefore the attainment of
the end justifies the means employed. In addition to fostering a well-de-
served lack of respect for judicial processes, such intellectual dishonesty on
the part of the judiciary creates grave risks to the freedom of the nation,
189
for when laws are given a meaning different from that intended by those
who drafted them, we become the subjects of judicial despotism.
The extension of the ratification period for the Equal Rights Amend-
182. Id at 200 n.3.
183. Id
184. Id at 200-01.
185. Id at 238 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
186. Id at 239.
187. Id at 240.
188. Id at 202.
189. See text accompanying notes 194-232 in7fa.
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ment (ERA) is an example of the same "ends justify the means" reasoning
on the part of Congress that the Court has used.' 90 Even if one favors the
ERA, one must feel a trifle uneasy about the extension. The states that have
ratified the amendment approved the proviso that the amendment would be
void if not ratified by the necessary thirty-eight states by 1979. Congress
unilaterally extended the deadline (by a simple majority, not by the two-
thirds needed to propose a constitutional amendment), and the General
Services Administration now refuses to accept rescissions by states of their
ratifications. The entire purpose of having deadlines for ratification is to
ensure that approval by the necessary three-fourths majority of all states is
roughly contemporaneous. Those who favor the extension, however, do not
care. For them, the goal of equality justifies using improper means. If they
succeed, however, they may live to regret it. Principles established in this
controversy may also be applied to amendments now pending concerning
abortion, balanced budgets, and school busing-amendments of which those
who favor the ERA extension may not approve.
Probably no better statement could be found to illustrate the idea that
different legal principles are applicable depending upon the outcome desired
than the statement by Arthur Goldberg that "when the Supreme Court seeks
to overrule in order to cut back the individual's fundamental constitutional
protections against government interference, the commands of stare decisis
are all but absolute; yet when a court overrules to expand personal liberties,
the doctrine interposes markedly less restrictive caution."191
Governmental pronouncements that race is not to be a criterion for de-
cision-making are stripped of a great deal of their educative force by the
willingness to approve the use of race to favor minority groups. After a gen-
eration of being told by the Supreme Court that racial discrimination is "im-
moral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic
society," we are now told that it is "not a matter of fundamental principle
but only a matter of whose ox is gored."'
192
A democratic society cannot long endure a lack of respect for its govern-
mental institutions. Unless a society is to become totalitarian, where "might
makes right," government institutions must be perceived as being motivated
by guiding principles. The people need not feel that every government deci-
sion that affects their lives must be right-indeed, such could never be the
case. Yet, government must be perceived as legitimate and must Se guided
by some principle other than "it is right or wrong depending upon whose ox
is gored."
D. Political Costs
The foremost, or indeed the sole condition, which is required in
190. See Idaho v. Freeman, 50 U.S.L.W. 2392 (D. Idaho 1981) in which the court declared
that the extension was invalid and the rescission by the states was valid. See also Miller, The
ERA Ratifation Game. Changing the Ruies at Halftime, 8 STUDENT LAw. 9 (Jan. 1980).
191. A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE 74-75 (1971).
192. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975). For an example of the "gored
ox" theory at work, compare the treatment of racial gerrymandering in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960) with that in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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order to succeed in centralizing the supreme power in a democratic
community, is to love equality, or to get men to believe you love it.
Thus, the science of despotism, which was once so complex, is sim-
plified, and reduced, as it were, to a single principle. 193
As discussed above, 19 4 the New Equality is incompatible with free-
dom-the government must act as an ever-vigilant puppeteer, always ready
to pull the strings in order to equalize. The problem is that the strings are
attached to the people. Increasingly more decisions that used to be made by
the private sector are now made by government; increasingly more decisions
that used to be made by state governments are now made by the federal
government. True, there are not yet tanks rolling down the streets, and our
television sets do not yet look back at us; the diminution of our freedom has
been much more subtle. It might be wise, however, to pay heed to the words
of James Madison who stated: "Since the general civilization of mankind, I
believe there are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom of the
people by silent and gradual encroachments by those in power than by vio-
lent and sudden usurpations."' 195 A memorable quote from Justice Brandeis
points out the danger we face from the well-intentioned:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib-
erty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-
minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en-
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding. 1
96
Those who favor the subordination of freedom to equality probably do
not intend that our society be enslaved, but rather that only a small amount
of liberty be sacrificed for a greater amount of equality. Yet, any free soci-
ety, of which there are precious few, that puts any value above liberty,
whether it be equality, safety, or efficiency, cannot long be free. It is not true
that one's liberty should never be restrained; it must be restrained on occa-
sion to protect the liberty of others, but when liberty is sacrificed for a differ-
ent value, the result is a net decrease in the amount of liberty.'
9 7
The erosion of our liberty is manifested in many ways. One of the prin-
cipal ways is by the subversion of the judicial process, whereby courts are
willing to sacrifice principle in order to obtain the "good result,"' 98 thus
rendering the will of the people or their elected representatives nugatory
when that will conflicts with courts' conceptions of the New Equality.
It has not been primarily Congress-and certainly not the framers of
the Constitution-that has sponsored the New Equality. Rather, the New
Equality has been mandated by the courts and by the bureaucracy, the least
193. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 107, at 300-301.
194. See text accompanying notes 107-30 supra.
195. Speech by James Madison, Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788).
196. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
197. See generall J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Daniels, Equal Liberty and Unequal
Worth of Ltberoy, in N. DANIELS, READING RAWLS 253 (1975); Hart, Rawls on Ltberty and Its
Priority, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 534 (1973), reprinted in N. DANIELS, READING RAWLS 230 (1975).
198. See text accompanying notes 174-93 supra.
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politically responsible branches of government. 199 Robert Nisbet warns that
the growth of bureaucracy results in an invisible accretion of power and that
the liaison of what he calls the "New Despotism" with humanitarianism
makes for a peculiarly effective movement, this effectiveness most easily mea-
sured by the government's growing capacity for entering into the smallest
details of our lives.20° Wouldn't the framers of the Constitution and the
fourteenth amendment be surprised to learn that pinching a derriere in the
workplace is a federal offense?
2 01
Two areas where freedom is most greatly restricted are in private em-
ployment and in higher education admissions and employment. In employ-
ment, an obsession with disproportionate effects has greatly reduced the
extent to which relevant factors may be used in hiring and promotion deci-
sions. For example, although tests may be used by employers to screen po-
tential employees, if the tests have a disproportionate effect the employer
must demonstrate that the test is job-related. 20 2 Although this sounds like a
reasonable goal, the burden upon employers is great since they must prove
that the test is job-related. This "validation" of tests may cost $40,000 to
$50,000 2 0 3-a substantial deterrent to an employer considering the use of a
non-standardized test.
20 4
Similarly, an employer has a legitimate interest in whether a prospec-
tive employee is pregnant and will be taking pregnancy leave within a few
months of her hiring. Yet, to refuse to hire on that basis is sex
discrimination .
20 5
Even more ridiculous, it is also, in many cases, against the law to termi-
nate or refuse to hire someone because of a felony conviction. For example,
the EEOC stated that an employer's policy of automatic termination for any
"serious crime" was a violation of Title VII because a "substantially dispro-
portionate percentage of persons convicted of 'serious crimes' are minority
199. See Kurland, Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18.
200. Nisbet, The New DespotiSm, 59 COMMENTARY 31, 32 (June 1975).
201. See generally Berns, Tems of Endearment, 261 HARPERS 14 (October 1980); Polansky,
Sexual Harassment at the Workplace, 8 HUMAN RIGHTs 14 (Winter 1980).
202. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
203. This figure comes from Robert Guion, past president of the Industrial and Organiza-
tional Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association, quoted in N. GLAZER,
AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY at 57 (1975).
204. George Gilder argues that federal surveillance of employment practices has also been
counterproductive. G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 137 (1981). Because one of the results
of such surveillance is to encourage companies to protect themselves with paperwork, employers
tend to favor documented qualifications of women over drive and aggressiveness of men, despite
the fact that such diligence and motivation are, he argues, the most important contributors to
productivity. Moreover, historically the method used by the lower socioeconomic classes to
achieve upward mobility has not been to become educated, but to work harder than those in
the higher income classes. The current equal rights campaign fostered by administrative agen-
cies has caused discrimination "in favor of the credentials that the rich and middle classes can
buy over the competitiveness, hard work, and drive to get ahead that are the chief assets of the
classes below." Id. Because an employer can estimate aggressiveness and drive only subjec-
tively, he runs a real risk if he attempts to use these qualities in his employment decision. Per-
haps gone forever are the days when an employer could say "I like your spunk, kid; you're
hired," despite the fact that the "kid's" objective qualifications were not overly impressive.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1979).
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group persons ".... 206 Therefore, an employee who had been charged
with resisting an officer, assault with intent to kill, and carrying a concealed
weapon, and who pleaded guilty to resisting an officer, could not be dis-
charged because his crime had no bearing on his ability as a machine opera-
tor. This result was reached despite a showing by the employer that the
automatic termination policy was applied even-handedly with respect to
race. The EEOC stated that "[t]he sole permissible reason for discriminating
against actual or prospective employees involves the individual's capability
to perform the job effectively. This approach leaves no room for arguments
regarding inconvenience, annoyance or even expense to the employer."
20 7
Aside from the rather startling implication that questions of expense are not
involved in the determination of efficiency of job performance, the sugges-
tion that it is none of an employer's business whether one of his employees is
prone to violent acts is somewhat dismaying. Certainly, this concern is ra-
tional, and if the employer chooses to terminate such employees he should be
permitted to do so. 20 8 It is a rather queer state of affairs when an employer
can fire his employees for no reason at all (as long as there is no dispropor-
tionate impact on protected groups), but he cannot fire an employee for be-
ing convicted of a serious crime.
In response to the argument that the concerns of the employer are
largely economic and therefore not worthy of protection, one should heed
the following statement by Justice Stewart:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than
the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a "personal"
right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a
home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdepen-
dence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal
right in property. Neither could have meaning without the
other.
20 9
Thus, those who would advocate freedom in all areas of life, except with
regard to "capitalist acts between consenting adults, '2 10 are misguided; eco-
nomic freedom, like all freedoms, is worth protecting.
In the area of higher education, there is also warrant for concern. 21'
Indeed, Derek Bok, president of Harvard University, has identified
"Harvard's independence and freedom from governmental restraint" as the
206. 4 FEP Cases 849, 850 (1972). See also Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 1158 (8th
Cir. 1977).
207. 4 FEP Cases at 850 (emphasis added).
208. We may take only a little solace in the fact that even in Massachusetts "Inlarrow ques-
tions into whether a person can do, or is available for, the particular job for which (s)he applied,
may be appropriate." Schreiber, Employment Applicattons- What Massachusetts Employers. Can and
Cannot Ask, 65 MAss. L. REv. 69 (1980) (emphasis added).
209. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
210. Votaw, supra note 133, at 12.
211. On the question whether the freedom threatened is "academic freedom" or merely the
same general freedom as threatened by the burden of federal regulation of business, see McCor-
mack, Regulatory Problems in the Modern Unziersi y Setting, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 461.
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"critical issue for the next generation. '2 12 Kingman Brewster, president of
Yale University, has also warned of the "growing tendency for the central
government to use the spending power to prescribe educational policies.
'21 3
A clear example of the bureaucratic obsession with the New Equality is
the case of Grove City College v. Harrs.2 14 Grove City involves the attempted
application of Title IX regulations to a small liberal arts college in Penn-
sylvania. Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex. . . be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving federal financial assistance .... 215 Grove City
College has scrupulously avoided accepting federal financial assistance be-
cause of its desire to remain autonomous.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), however,
promulgated regulations defining "recipient" not only as an institution receiv-
ing federal funds, but also as an institution benefiting from federal funds.
2 16
Consequently, HEW claimed that Grove City fell within the ambit of Title
IX because some of its students received federal assistance in the form of
Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG) and Guaranteed Student
Loans (GSL).2 1 7 The college refused to execute an assurance of compliance,
contending that it was not subject to Title IX, whereupon HEW ordered
that BEOG's and GSL's of all Grove City College students be terminated.
This termination was ordered despite the fact that there was not "the slight-
est hint" of any failure to comply with Title IX, other than the college's
refusal to submit the assurance of compliance. The district court held that
the college was, indeed, subject to the provisions of Title IX, but that student
assistance could not be terminated.
2 18
The burdens on a college or university that falls within the purview of
Title IX are rather onerous. They include such obligations as requiring a
university to ensure that corporations that recruit on its campus do not dis-
criminate on the basis of sex,2 19 and that student-teacher programs in which
the college participates also do not practice sex discrimination. 220 In addi-
tion, schools face substantial record-keeping and compliance report require-
212. Harvard University Gazette, June 13, 1975 at 1, col. 2, quotedin O'Neil, God and Govern-
ment at Yale.- The Lnits of Federal Regulation of Hgher Education, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 525, 525
(1975).
213. Yale Alumni Magazine, April, 1975 at 34-35, quoted in O'Neil, supra note 212, at 525.
214. 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980). A similar case is that of Hillsdale College, a small
college in Michigan. A resolution by the college states:
Whereas, by the [Title IX] regulations, the Federal government now seeks to impose
its control over [our] freedom and independence through the subterfuge that a few of
the students at Hillsdale College receive federal aid through the medium of such pro-
grams as Veterans Benefits and the National Direct Student Loan Fund; . . .
. . .RESOLVED, that Hillsdale College will, to the extent of its meager re-
sources and with the help of God, resist by all legal means this and all other encroach-
ments on its freedom and independence.
Sex Discritznation Regulations, supra note 148, at 683.
215. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
216. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (1980).
217. 500 F. Supp. at 255.
218. Id at 273.
219. 45 C.F.R. § 86.51(a) (1980).
220. Id. § 86.31(b) (7).
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ments. 22' These requirements mandate the expenditure of a great deal of
money, reducing to a large extent the schools' ability to set their own priori-
ties. Judge Friendly has pointed out another danger of heavy regulation of
private schools; that is, as regulation increases, the difference between pri-
vate and public schools decreases. Since private donors contribute to private
institutions to preserve a diversity they deem important, a greater homogeni-
zation jeopardizes an important source of support.
222
With regard to the threat of federal control over curricula, Nathan
Glazer tells of a regional HEW representative demanding an explanation for
the absence of women and minority students in the Graduate Department of
Religious Studies at an Ivy League university. 223 Upon being told that a
reading knowledge of Hebrew and Greek was required, drastically limiting
applications to the program, the HEW representative advised orally: "Then
end those old-fashioned programs that require irrelevant languages. And
start up programs on relevant things which minority group students can
study without learning languages."2 24 Obviously, HEW has neither the stat-
utory authority nor the constitutional power to require that the curriculum
be changed, yet it certainly has the power to influence significantly (by
"raised eyebrow") such decisions because of its control over funding.225
Another example of bureaucracy's attempt to extend its power to en-
force the New Equality is the decision by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
to withdraw the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University because of its
racially discriminatory policies. 226 Because of a belief rooted in the Bible,
the sincerity of which is not questioned by the IRS, that sexual relations
between the races are wrong, the University has a policy of prohibiting inter-
racial dating and marriage among its students.2 27 The IRS argued that,
even though the policies are rooted in religious belief, it has the power to
withdraw the tax exemption-a rather frightening assertion. When a gov-
ernment agency has the power to pass on the acceptability of an organiza-
tion's religious beliefs and practices to determine whether they are in accord
with prevailing notions of social justice, religious freedom is far from
secure.
2 2 8
221. Id §§ 86.3(c), (d), 86.4, .8, .9. See generallv Hearings on Sex Discrimznation Regulatons Before
the House Subcomm. on Postsecondaqy Education, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1975).
222. H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUM-
BRA 29-30 (1970). &ee genra O'Neil, Prwate Uniersities and Pub/ic Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV.
155 (1970).
223.: N. GLAZER, supra note 203, at 161.
224. Id
225. Another example of government interference with the operation of the University is
shown by the incarceration of a professor of education for refusing to disclose how he voted in
the decision of a faculty committee that had declined to recommend tenure for a junior col-
league. Daniel Moynihan observed that "the curious thing is that the dog did not bark." Moy-
nihan, State v. Academe, 261 HARPERS 31 (December 1980). Of one thing we can be certain: if
the objective of the incarceration had been anything other than the New Equality, the nation
would have heard a resounding chorus of barks.
226. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
386 (1981).
227. Id at 149. See Note, Tax Exempton and Race Discrinination, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 415
(1980).
228. Congress has expressed its displeasure with such practices by the IRS. See Supplemen-
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In upholding the position of the IRS, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit stated that "certain governmental interests are
so compelling that conflicting religious practices must yield in their
favor." 229 So much for the first amendment protection of religious freedom
that was once called "the transcendent value." 230 (One wonders whether
the court would have eliminated as cavalierly first amendment protection of
racially derogatory speech.) This is not to suggest that there can never be
governmental restrictions on religious practices. Certainly, where such prac-
tices pose an imminent threat to the health, safety, or morals of the commu-
nity, some restriction is possible,23I even necessary, but absent compelling
circumstances-and abstract notions of fairness and equality are hardly
compelling-government.should not embark upon such a dangerous course.
What, after all, is different in principle from the IRS' action in BobJones
and a decision by the IRS to take away the tax-exempt status of the Catholic
Church because of its refusal to admit women to the priesthood? The deci-
sion of the court in Bobjones is as wrong as the hypothetical decision in the
Catholic Church case, for "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
' 232
CONCLUSION
It has not been the purpose of this paper to settle definitively the ques-
tions raised; that is beyond the scope of this article and probably an impossi-
ble task as well. The purpose has been merely to identify some issues that
should be of current concern.
tal Appropriations and Rescission Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-304, 94 Stat. 857, 903 (1980)
(funds appropriated by the Act could not be used in such a way that would cause the loss of tax-
exempt status to private schools).
It could be argued that the Bobjones situation is analogous to that presented in Harris v.
McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), in that the government is merely making the choice of one of two
constitutionally protected alternatives more desirable economically. See text accompanying
notes 114-19 supra. In McCrae, the Court stated that it was permissible for the government to
subsidize abortion and other medical services unequally, because although childbirth and abor-
tion are both constitutionally protected, the government may by unequal funding encourage
alternative activity deemed in the public interest. 448 U.S. at 315. The Court stated that the
constitutional freedom recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), did not prevent a state
from making "a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and ...implement[ing]
that judgment by the allocation of public funds." 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
The situation with respect to religion is quite different, however. If the religion clauses of
the first amendment mean anything, they mean that the government may not make a value
judgment favoring one religion over another. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[g]overnment
...must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice." Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968). Freedom of religion means that not only must the government
refrain from planting obstacles in the path of religious exercise, but that it must take a neutral
position in the removal of obstacles already there.
229. 639 F.2d at 154.
230. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973).
231. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). But see United States v. Bal-
lard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
232. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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There is a vast repository of power residing in Congress,2 33 granted by
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. An expansive view of congressional
power carries with it many dangers, chief among which is the threat to indi-
vidual freedom. The shift in emphasis from the Old Equality (equality of
opportunity) to the New Equality (equality of result) has brought with it the
subordination of the value of liberty to current conceptions of equality. The
definitions of liberty and equality used to justify this change are incompati-
ble with the ideals of liberty and equality upon which this country was built,
and the new definitions should be abandoned.
We are becoming a society that refuses to recognize the propriety of
differences. Consider, for example, the movement to subject women to the
draft and the extreme view that women should have the same combat re-
sponsibilities as men do. Proponents of such measures refuse to accept that
biological differences between men and women (primarily reflected in tem-
perament, rather than body strength) justify disparate treatment. The pur-
pose of the equal protection clause is to command a recognition of equality
when people are equal, not to command a declaration of equality when they
are not.
Regardless of whether one favors the New Equality, it is important to
recognize the tremendous price that is being paid for it. To the proponents
of the New Equality, all other social values, such as fairness, justice, effi-
ciency, and liberty are secondary. Whether the goals of the New Equality
are even possible is questionable, and we should bear in mind Edmund
Burke's observation that "those who attempt to level, never equalize.
' ' 234
233. See Orloski, The Enforcement Clauses of the Civil War Amendments. A Repositog of Legislatwe
Power, 49 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 493 (1975).
234. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 61 (1790).
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INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of clinical programs in American Bar Association (ABA) approved
law schools.' As clinical programs have expanded, so have state statutes al-
lowing for student practice.2 By 1978, over forty states had adopted some
form of student practice rule permitting clinical students to appear in court
under certain circumstances.
3
The development of clinical programs at many of the nation's law
schools has refueled the old debate between the traditional Langdellians,
who advocate the case method, and the "realists," who advocate greater em-
phasis on teaching practical skills. 4 It is recognized that the revolution in
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1, By 1979, 80% of the nation's ABA approved law schools reported that they offered
clinical education in their curriculum. Gee, Survey of Clinical Legal Education, in SURVEY AND
DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 1978-1979, at i.v (1979) [hereinafter cited as SUR-
VEY AND DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION]; see generally SECTION OF LEGAL EDU-
CATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA, LAWYER COMPETENCY; THE ROLE OF THE LAW
SCHOOLS (1979) (Commonly known as the "Cramton Report") [hereinafter cited as LAWYER
COMPETENCY].
2. J. KLEIN, S. LELEIKO & J. MAUITY, BAR ADMISSION RULES AND STUDENT PRACTICE
RULES 960-969 (1978).
3. Id
4. See generally Cantrall, Law Schools and the Layman. Is Legal Education Doing Its Job?, 38
A.B.A.J. 907 (1952); Gee &Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977
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legal education that began in 1871 with Dean Langdell's publication of A
Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts5 has achieved success now described as
"too complete." 6 The case method survives as the predominant method of
teaching in the main academic curricula of the nation's law schools, despite
the counter-revolutionary exhortations of Judge Frank,7 A. Cantrall, 8 and
Chief Justice Burger,9 all of whom have advocated a greater emphasis on
skills training. l0
It was to the traditional case study curriculum that clinical programs
have become attached, nurtured not by any interplay with the main aca-
demic curriculum, I I nor by the calls of reformers such as Frank and Can-
trail, but rather by the social forces of the late sixties and early seventies, and
the expansion of the sixth amendment right to counser by the United States
Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wanwrnght 12 and Argersinger v. Ham/tn. 13 That
clinical programs right have a part to play not only in the confines of the
law school but in the broader scheme of things was recognized by Justice
Brennan in a concurring opinion in Argersinger: "I think it plain that law
B.Y.U. L. REV. 695; Harum, Internship Re-examined" A "[Do" Program in Law School, 46 A.B.A.J.
713 (1960); Jackson, Training the Trial Lawyer. A Neglected Area of Legal Education, 3 STAN. L.
REv. 48 (1950); Kaufman, Advocacy as Craft-Law School is More than a "Paper-Chase", 60 A.B.A.J.
802 (1974); Stason, Legal Education.- Post-Graduaie Znternship, 39 A.B.A.J,_ 463 (1953).
5. See CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 231 (1918). See also Gee
& Jackson, supra note 4, at 733.
6. Grossman, Clincal Legal Education; Histog, and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 162, 165
(1974). See also Landman, The Curriculum ofthe Law School, 47 A.B.A.J. 156 (1961):
The case method has undergone a similar fate except that its undoing has been due to
its own inherent defects. A study of one hundred or so heterogeneous, truncated ap-
pellate court decisions can give no one a mastery of a legal subject. Langdell himself
realized this. He published his own textbook, a Summaly n/Contracts, as an appendage
to his case book. No two professors agree on the nature of the case method in opera-
tion because in its unadulterated form it is unworkable.
Id
7. Frank, What Constitutes Good Legal Education? 19 A.B.A.J. 723 (1933).
8. Cantrall, supra note 4, at 908.
9. Burger, The Future ofLegal Educatin, in SELECTED READINGS IN CLINICAL LEGAL EDU-
CATION 50 (1973). Chief Justice Burger has expressed his view that the failures of legal educa-
tion "to a large extent flow from treating Langdell's case method of study as the ultimate
teaching technique." Id at 52.
10. Cantrall specifically called for greater skills training so that graduating law students
would be competent to perform such routine lawyerly tasks as examining a title, writing a deed,
and instituting and prosecuting suits. Cantrall, supra note 4, at 909. Cantrall emphasized that
"[slociety looks to the law school to properly train young men and women to be upon gradua-
tion, lawyers to whom the people can look for adequate, competent lawyer-services." Id at 907.
11. Gee, supra note 1, made the following observation concerning the relationship between
clinical and "academic" professors at Harvard Law School:
[T]here was some expression of concern by some members of the Harvard Faculty that
any attempt to recruit professors for clinical programs may shift the balance of the
faculty from an academic to 'practical' mode-a reaction which may be questioned in
view of what some have called the second-class status of clinical teachers because the
law schools all too often do not grant tenure or its equivalent to clinical teachers.
Id at iviii.
12. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally Hardaway, Student Representation ofndgent Defendants
and the Sixth Amendment- On a Collision Course, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. (1981).
13. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). For an excellent history of the sixth amendment, see S. KRANTZ,
C. SMITH, D. ROSSMAN, P. FROYD & J. HOFFMON, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES
(1976). See also Justice Sutherland's review in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), of the
history of the sixth amendment prior to 1932. For a more modern history see Justice Douglas'
opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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students can be expected to make a significant contribution, quantitatively
and qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in many areas, including
cases reached by today's decision."
1 4
The historical background, rationale, and philosophical basis for the
law school clinic has little in common with that of the traditional curriculum
offering steeped in Langdell's view that "[f]irst, . . . law is a science; second
. . . all the available materials of that science are contained in printed
books."' 15 Such differences in traditional and clinical training methodology
account in large part for the present "dualism" in many of the law schools
offering clinical programs. The clinic, though "attached" to the law school,
is not "integrated" into the mainstream of the curriculum. While clinical
teachers usually have greater practical experience than the traditional class-
room teacher, they are not, with some exceptions, given tenure-track sta-
tus.1 6 This "second-class" status accorded clinical teachers is in stark
contrast to education in other professions such as medicine. The importance
of skills training in the medical clinic was recognized as early as 1766 by
Thomas Bond, 1 7 and emphasized as the heart of medical training by Abra-
ham Flexner in his 1910 report on medical education: "[I]n the end the final
test of a medical school is its outcome in the matter of clinicians."'"
There are many explanations for legal education's resistance to the pro-
posed reforms of the "practicalists" who have urged a greater emphasis on
skills training.' 9 First, there are many professors who regard as intellectually
14. 407 U.S. at 41.
15. Frank, supra note 7. This quote is also cited as an 1886 speech by Langdell to the
Harvard Law School Association in 2 WARREN, HISTORY OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 374
(1908). Jerome Frank tells the following revealing anecdote about Professor Langdell:
When Langdell was himself a law student he was almost constantly in the law library.
His fellow students said of him that he slept on the library table. At that time he
served for several years as an assistant librarian. One of his friends found him one day
in an alcove of the library absorbed in a black-letter folio, one of the year books. 'As
he drew near', we are told, Langdell looked up and said, in a tone of mingled exhilara-
tion and regret, and with an emphatic gesture, 'Oh, if only I could have lived in the
time of the Plantaganets!'
Frank, Why MoA  Clincal Lawyer School, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933). Frank also tells of a story
in which Langdell once referred to "a comparatively recent case decided by Lord Hardwick."
Id. at 907 n.1. Lord Hardwick was Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1733 to 1737.
16. See note II supra; David Barnhizer has noted that:
The position of clinical teacher requires the individual to meet virtually all the
responsibilities of law practice, but provides little of that system's rewards, whether
economic, self-conceptual, or status. At the same time, other faculty often possess dis-
tinctly different ideas of excellence. The result can be that the clinical teacher may
feel himself a form of half-breed, caught between the values of two very different
systems ...
Barnhizer, The Cliniial Method of Legal Instruction.- Its Theoy and Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 67, 138-39 (1979).
17. W. BELL & J. MORGAN, CONTINENTAL DOCTOR 143-44 (1965). After instituting
clinical lectures at the Pennsylvania College Medical School, Bond proclaimed that traditional
lectures and reading were insufficient in providing a complete medical training, and that
clinical education and "[i]nfirmaries (were the) grand theatres of medical knowledge." Id at
143-44.
18. A. FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 105 (1910).
See generally Hardaway, Legal and Medical Education Compared- Is It Ticne for a "Flexner" Report on
Legal Education, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 687 (1981).
19. For example, see Justice Powell's comments on clinical education in Powell, Clinical
Education in Law School, 26 S.C.L. REV. 389 (1974):
1982]
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unsatisfying the whole notion of law school skills training and practical expe-
rience. These critics either claim that skills training amounts to little more
than teaching "tricks of the trade,"'20 or else maintain that practical training
by its very nature cannot be taught in the law school and must therefore be
left to the organized bar after the students' graduation. 21 Although the lat-
ter notion has been vigorously attacked as a "classic case of locking the stable
door after the horse has escaped, that is, after a partly educated and un-
trained lawyer is given a license to practice law,"' 22 it remains the prevailing
view among many legal educators.
23
Second, the cost of clinical and skills training has been recognized as
staggering,24 prompting one critic to reject intensive clinical training after
The difficulty is that training in the practical skills cannot be accomplished without some
denigration of the historic commitment oflaw schools. In simplest terms this is the commitment
to build in each student the intellectual foundation for a lifetime in the law. Id at 393. In
Note, Modern Trends i'n Legal Education, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 710 (1964), the author states:
Most importantly, the "how to of thinking" rather than the "how to of doing" must be
the principal concern of legal education. Case study, problems analysis and exposi-
tion, a search for basic values and abstract principles of law, are clearly more impor-
tant and more within the practical competence of law schools than the knowledge of
where to file what in order to perfect a lien.
Id. at 721. For still another view see Kitch, The Model and Clinical Education, in A.A.L.S., CUR-
RICULUM STUDY PROJECT, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSIONALS OF THE LAW 220 (Pro-
posed Final Draft, Feb. 1971), cited in Brickman, CLEPR. and Clinical Education.- A Review and
Analysis, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 56 (1973):
[Cilinical training is no better for learning skills than is practice itself. What do stu-
dents do in a clinical program: They practice. What do they do when they graduate?
They practice. It is difficult to justify the substantial expenditures involved in operat-
ing a clinical program if its only effect is to advance by a year an experience a student
would have anyway.
Id. at 69. See also the comments of Justice Clark:
I shall argue that law school training is now effectively efficient, more so than other
types of professional education; that there is no real basis for the criticism implicit in
this pressure for practical training; that the latter is limited, partial and fragmentary
at best; and that the present-day legal education in problem analysis and exposition
and in thorough documentation of sources is much more important and valuable, as
well as more within the practical competence of the schools.
Letter to Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar of the ABA (Sept. 12, 1950),
pubhhedin 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 423, 423 (1951).
20. R. HUTCHINS, HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 43, 47 (1936):
The tricks of the trade cannot be learned in a university . . . and if they can be they
should not be. They cannot be learned at a university because they get out of date
and cannot keep up with current tricks, and because tricks can be learned only in the
actual situation in which they are employed.
21. According to one critic, "we can rely upon our students acquiring the local 'know how'
after graduation .. " Stason, supra note 4, at 466.
22. Pincus, Clinical Training in the Law School A Challenge and Primerfor the Bar and Bar Admis-
sion Authorities, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 479, 480 (1976).
23. See Stason, supra note 4, at 466.
24. See, LAWYER COMPETENCY, supra note 1, at 28: "Of necessity, new funding sources
must be developed if law schools are to undertake, even on a modest scale, expansion of present
training in basic skills or fields like trial advocacy."; see also P. SWORDS & F. WALWER, THE
COSTS AND RESOURCES OF LEGAL EDUCATION 11 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Costs and Re-
sources]. THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL.s--ABA COMMITrEE ON GUIDELINES
FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION (1980)
[hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION] cites the Swords and
Walwer data as indicating "the relatively high costs of clinical legal studies." Id. at 11. For an
excellent study of the costs of clinical education, see P. Swords, Including Clinical Education in the
Law School Budget, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 309 (1973). See also P.
Swords & F. Walwer, Cost Aspects of Clinical Education, in GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION, supra, at 133 [hereinafter cited as Cost Aspects of Clintcal Education]. This study notes
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the medical model on the grounds that the cost is "backbreaking, not merely
for the individual student, but also for the particular institution and its com-
munity involved."'25 A 1974 study by Swords and Walwer 26 revealed signifi-
cant financial problems facing the nation's law schools. Since that time, the
prospect of decreasing law school enrollments27 and reduction in federal
grants and student loan guarantees has increased financial pressures. It is
unfortunate that at a time when the need for clinical and skills training is
being recognized, 28 financial pressures are posing severe obstacles. As an
ABA section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar report recently
understated: "Legal education, with minor exceptions, is not adequately
funded today."
29
Third, there is suspicion in some quarters that resistance to clinical
changes in the law schools' present academic curriculum is the result of intel-
that "[t]he costs of clinical education excite attention ... particularly, when the costs of clinical
programs are compared with the costs of 'more traditional' programs", but emphasizes that the
cost differential between a clinical and traditional program depends on the "substantive natures
of various clinical programs." Id at 139-40. The study also provides an in depth analysis of the
costs of various types of clinical programs.
25. Clark, "Practical" Legal Training." An Illusion, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 423, 425 (1950).
26. Costs and Resources, supra note 24, at 11.
Between 1955 and 1970, per-student instructional cost increased 33% on the average,
i.e., average per-student instructional cost increased annually at a compound rate of
about 2.0% in excess of the general rate of inflation. This figure might be compared
with that set forth for higher education generally during the 1960's in the final report
of the Carnegie Commission of Higher Education. The Commission found that dur-
ing the 1960's the annual increase in cost per student rose from the historical rate of
cost of living plus 2.5% to a new cost of living plus 3.4% (5.0% for private instructions).
If the Commission's figures, which refer to total costs of education and not merely to
instructional cost, are assumed to be representative of instructional cost alone, it ap-
pears that legal education created by dollars spent on individual students--has not
fared as well as other branches of education in recent times.
Id. See also KITCH, in CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 20-27
(ed. 1970), for a discussion of clinical education financing. For an interesting study of clinical
costs at the University of Southern California, see Bellow &Johnson, Reftlctions on the University of
Southern California Clinical Semester, 44 S. CALIF. L. REV. 664, 678-81 (1971).
27. See generally DEAN'S CONFERENCE AND THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, ABA,
THINKING ABOUT THE FISCAL FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION (conference paper Houston
1980) [hereinafter cited as THINKING ABOUT THE FISCAL FUTURE]:
The dismal conclusion suggested by this fiscal logic is that some law schools will strive
to deal with the ravages of inflation by reducing the size of their full time faculty since
this is one part of the budget that lends itself to expendient control. Such a move
would at least enable the school to provide the remaining faculty with decent raises.
Many graduate schools have adopted such a course.
Id. at 5.
28. The ABA, in GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 24, at 6, ac-
cepted as a basic proposition that "clinical legal study offers a significant means of integrating
the various elements of an educational program, including professional responsibility and law-
yer competencies." See also LAWYER COMPETENCY, supra note 1.
29. LAWYER COMPETENCY, mpra note 1, at 28. The report further states:
Costs of higher education in general, and legal education in particular, are likely to
rise in response to general inflationary pressures much faster than new resources can be
found. New funding resources must become available if legal education is even to be
maintained at present levels of effectiveness. Of necessity, new funding resources must
be developed if law schools are to undertake, even on a modest scale, expansion of
present training in basic skills or fields like trial advocacy. Because it is evident that
the cultivation of new resources will fail to yield enough to meet all priority demands,
the legal profession and the law schools will be required to generate new efficiencies
and new methods of spreading existing resources to meet those demands.
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lectual inbreeding; that is, law teachers nurtured on Langdellian methodol-
ogy tend to produce students similarly nurtured, who themselves become law
teachers. Those students who reject the case methodology as irrelevant
30
tend not to become law professors. This phenomenon has produced another
kind of "dualism" within the legal profession itself-witness the endless de-
bates over theory versus practice at bar association conventions and symposi-
ums.3 1 In the end, it seems, theory is largely left to the law professor.
Thus, intellectual incompatibility has emerged as a primary obstacle to
true integration of clinical programs into the main academic curriculum.
Clinical programs have long co-existed with the main curriculum at many
law schools based on mutual accommodation. The mutual accommodation
is that the clinic is allowed to function unmolested as long as it does not
impinge on the traditional prerogative of those in the "main" sphere of the
traditional curriculum. The result in many instances has been a clear-cut
division of teaching methodology with neither sphere complementing or in-
tellectually supporting the other. Almost always it is the clinic that finds
itself "attached" to the law school, but nevertheless "separate and
unequal."
3 2
In 1979, the University of Denver College of Law Student Office faced
many of the problems associated with a non-integrated clinical program.
Largely through the energies of a new dean, and a reform-minded faculty
that was willing to experiment, a new integration model was implemented.
The purpose of this article is to examine the implementation of the integra-
tion model chosen at the University of Denver. This article will explain why
a particular model was chosen over other integration models and how the
implementation of this model resulted in an integrated clinical program.
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A. Goals
A statement of goals is a prerequisite to the establishment of any clinical
program. It is even more important to a plan of clinical integration. The
30. Chief Justice Burger is an excellent example:
[T]he appellate case method of teaching may have really been a form of escapism-a
simplistic effort to solve a complex problem in a tidy and comfortable way which
avoided the antiseptic odor of the jail house and the problem of the "unmarried
mother," of dependent children and the aged and infirm.
Burger, supra note 9, at 55.
31. Compare, for example, the comments of the former Dean of Harvard Law School,
Erwin Griswold, warning of the danger of clinical education's "limited usefulness and limited
relevance to the basic functions of the law school," Griswold, Hopes-Past and Future, 21 HARV.
L. SCH. BULL. 36, 40 (1979), with the comments of Charles Sieberman that "clinical experience
is crucial, not because it contributes to the development of skills but because it can contribute to
socialization into a professional model." Sieberman, Educatzonal Trends and the Law, in SE-
LECTED READINGS IN CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 142, 149-50 (1973).
32. Barnhizer, supra note 16, describes this condition:
The long period during which legal education has neglected many areas relevant to
the preparation of lawyers still has substantial effects on the attitudes of many faculty,
evidenced by a continuing failure to alter traditional concepts. This can perpetuate
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Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility has cautioned
that "the absence of some adequate definition of educational goals endan-
gers continued acceptance of clinical programs, as well as seriously impeding
efforts at solving practical problems."
'33
All too often, clinical programs are established not as the result of com-
prehensive planning in coordination with the traditional academic sphere,
but on a piecemeal basis as funding is provided. As a consequence, goals
and priorities of a law school's clinical program are not defined in the
broader context of legal education. In some clinical programs, a statement
of goals is purposely neglected to avoid needless friction with the traditional
curriculum. 34 In other instances, statements of goals have become blurred in
the process of "accommodation." The little dialogue that exists between the
clinical and traditional spheres often centers on the issue of whether the pri-
mary goal of the clinic is to provide service to the community 35 or to educate
the student. 36 In the late sixties and early seventies there was a greater em-
33. SURVEY AND DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 173. Spe-
cific goals of clinical education have been set forth in Barnhizer, supra note 16, at 75-79.
Barnhizer lists as goals:
1) Professional Responsibility: "The system of ethical proscriptions... Ethical phi-
losophy . . .Personal morality . . .Professional role . . . Institutional analysis . . .
Social consciousness ...Systemic Reform ..." (2) Educational Goals Involving
Judgment and Analysis. Issue Recognition and Analysis ...Understanding of strat-
egy, tactics and decision making ...Understanding of process and Procedure ...
Synthesis ... (3) Education Goals Involving Substantive Law: Substantive law
(4) Educational Goals Involving Technical Lawyering Skills ...Client inter-
viewing . . . Investigation . . . Client counseling . .. Negotiation . . . Legal Re-
search . . .Legal Writing . . .Trial Advocacy . . .Appellate Advocacy.
Id.
An internal memo from the subcommittee on goals to the University of Denver College of
Law Advocacy Skills Committee set forth the following goals of an integrated clinical program:
1) To provide a context for learning those advocacy knowledge or skills of lawyering
which cannot ordinarily be learned in a traditional law school classroom.
2) To prepare those students who elect the program, to effectively pursue a career in
litigation.
3) To provide an opportunity to integrate theory and practice.
4) To assist students to benefit from their subsequent professional experiences.
5) To expose all students to basic litigation competencies.
6) To fulfill the responsibility of the College of Law to provide an opportunity for all
students to learn basic law and skills related to advocacy.
34. See note 11 supra.
35. J. Ferren, The Teaching Mission of the Legal Aid Clinic, in SELECTED READINGS IN
CLINICAL EDUCATION 161 (1973) states: "Because of its far richer mixture of situations for
students to deal with, the office located away from the school and intended primarily for service
is a better vehicle for achieving the goals of field work than a law school clinic designed prima-
rily to educate." Id at 165.
36. See E. Johnson, Education Versus Service: Three Variations on the Theme, in CLINICAL EDU-
CATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 414 (1973), where it is maintained that the "real issue is not
'service' versus 'education.' No, what it boils down to is another dispute, one all to familiar to
those involved in the early history of the. . .Legal Services Program-'quantity' versus 'quali-
ty'." Id. at 417. See also Pincus, Legal Education in a Service Seting, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR
THE LAW STUDENT 27, 28 (1973): "The law school's primary interest and responsibility is edu-
cation, although it must provide service of the highest calibre in the educational process and be
responsible to the clients being served. In fact, teaching such a sense of responsibility to the
client is one of the educational objectives." GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION,
supra note 24, at 14 sets forth as the educational purpose of a Clinical Legal Studies curriculum:
The primary purpose of clinical legal studies is to further the educational goals of the
law school, rather than to provide service. Law school clinical legal studies may intro-
duce law students to client representation in the context of adversary proceedings and
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phasis on service. In recent years the trend has been towards the purely
educational aspects of clinical education. This has been due in part to the
experiences of some clinics with oppressive case loads, which justified the
fears of many that clinical education, under the burden of ever-increasing
case loads, was developing at the expense of quality legal education.
37
In defining the goals of its clinical program in 1979, the University of
Denver College of Law decided upon education as the primary goal and
service as a secondary by-product of the student law clinic. The result of this
priority was a commitment to a low case load and close supervision of stu-
dents by tenure-track faculty. The clinic was seen not as an end in itself or
as a mechanism for teaching practical skills per se. Rather, clinical supervi-
sion and instruction were seen in the context of a teaching methodology
38
the counseling of clients in the ordering of their personal, business, professional, and
public responsibilities.
37. Ferren, supra note 35, states that "[i]n making the decision whether to sponsor a neigh-
borhood office or to affiliate with a community-sponsored office," the law school should consider
whether "the caseload will always strain resources to a point where quality service of clients and
supervision of students are always in jeopardy; the law school may not want to be responsible
for a law office where sloppy habits can easily become tolerated." Id. at 174.
Johnson, supra note 36, at 417-18, notes that in the early days of the Legal Services Pro-
gram, there was a "mentality common among staff members" resulting in "caseloads that fre-
quently ranged between 1000 and 2000 per year, no opportunity to litigate and inadequate time
to handle any problem fully and properly." Applying this observation to the law school clini,
Johnson observed that:
Students trying to handle too many cases or undertaking representation without close
supervision provide low-quality service that violates the Canons. Their assistance
probably is not zealous, at least as that term is defined in the Code; it most certainly
does not meet ethical standards of competence. Nor will the representation be of suffi-
cient quality to gain the benefits to which individual clients or the client community
as a whole are entitled under the law. In the context of clinical education, there is
another serious "cost." Future lawyers learn unethical conduct and ineffective models
of practice that may well make them less qualified members of the profession. As
assistance to clients, it is dubious; as education for law students it is
counterproductive.
Id. at 419-420. See also Clark, Legal Services Programs-The Caseload Problems, or How to Avoid
Becoming the New Welfare Department, 47 U. DET. J. URB. L. 797 (1970); see also D. Stern, Delvey
of Legal Services: Clinical Education and Group Legal Services, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE
LAW STUDENT 214 (1973): "Just as law schools, lofty statements notwithstanding, have simply
dispensed information, so can clinical programs become a pyramiding network of individual
service projects; or worse, become a law school's shallow commitment to service under the guise
of education." Id at 219.
38. It has been suggested that the methodology of clinical education includes several peda-
gogic devices:
1) presentation, that is lectures, readings or direct reaction to student responses,
2) mutual inquiry and discussion, 3) demonstration and example, 4) role-playing
and other forms of simulated enactment. Basic to the learning consequences of these is
some combination of imitation and identification, trial and error, and information
assimilation, and the mediating effects of the style, values, and competency of both
instructor and learner and the social structure of the learning setting. We can make,
however, only some very tentative generalizations about when a particular device or
process is appropriate to a concrete situation.
G. Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers.- Some Prelmtina Reflections on Clinical Education as Methodology,
in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374, 388 (1973). Barnhizer suggests that the
clinical method should integrate three factors:
1. A substantial, but restricted, volume of actual client representation by the student.
2. The clear assumption by that individual student of 'primary' professional respon-
sibility for the process and outcome of that representation. 3. An individualized
teaching relationship between the student and clinical teacher, using the student's
clinical experiences as its focus.
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that allowed students to apply analytical thinking skills developed in the
classroom to real problems.39 In such a context, classroom skills were viewed
with new significance, as were the skills of interviewing and counseling, ne-
gotiation, drafting, information gathering and fact presentation. 40 The pri-
Barnhizer, supra note 16, at 72. Barnhizer suggests the following as examples of specific clinical
teaching techniques:
1. Socratic dialogue 2. Directed discussion 3. Free discussion 4. Lawyering per-
formance by the student 5. Immediate individualized feedback 6. Simulations
and role-playing 7. Observation 8. Evaluation 9. Videotape and audi-
otape 10. Analysis of case. 11. Research 12. Writing 13. Lecture technique
14. Problem technique 15. Student Presentations (teaching) 16. Structure.
Id. at 109. GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 24, sets forth the follow-
ing as methods used in clinical legal studies:
1. student observation of professor, clinical professor, supervising attorney, or cooper-
ating attorney acting as lawyer, or simulating the role of a lawyer.
2. student simulations of lawyers' roles.
3. student handling of live cases or problems in the client clinic.
4. individual discussions with students by professor, clinical professor, supervising at-
torney, or cooperating attorney; and
5. classroom instruction.
Id. at 20-21.
39. William Pincus observed: "Fortunate is the field of higher education which can test its
intellectual perceptions in the arena of real life; and which can, in the process, use all of the
energies of its students and teachers--intellectual, emotional, and physical. Truly this is educa-
tion of the whole man." Pincus, The Lawyer's Professional Responsibiliy, 22 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 14-
15 (1969). Pincus has also recognized that clinical education puts "the student in a practitioner-
client relationship as a normal part of his professional education" in the following ways:
a) It brings the student out of the classroom in a prolonged period of higher
education--serving as a half-way house, if you will, on the way to the outside world.
b) In so doing it makes educators view the student as a whole person, and also
view the effect of higher education on the person as well as the student.
c) It helps to offset the development of arrogance-a self-satisfied intellectual
elitism. It givens reality to other people whom the professional serves, and puts them
in the picture so to speak, as partners in life with worth of their own.
d) It teaches the necessity of persistence and application, and develops the fiber
to withstand the crushing effects of frustration. It develops the capacity for construc-
tive work for change of a sustained character, and lessens the emotional attractions of
instant destruction.
e) It diminishes the self-centeredness of higher education-the all-consuming
drive for credentials to cash in--by placing the professional-to-be in a helping rela-
tionship to another.
0 Finally, it helps to develop the judgment which instinctively leans toward the
real values over the spurious ones-reducing to proper proportions the natural attrac-
tion of the theatrical, the entertaining, the new, per se.
Pincus, The Clinical Component in University Professional Education, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 283, 290
(1971).
40. LAWYER COMPETENCY, supra note I, at 18, states: "The perceived deficiency of law
school training lay not in fundamentals-developing. . . analytical skills and familiarizing...
with the law in general--but in the techniques of making those fundamentals operational."
Professor Vetri has suggested that "the objectives of clinical work fall basically into five areas":
1) legal skills development, 2) legal and extra legal systems operation knowledge, 3) profes-
sional responsibility growth, 4) self knowledge, and 5) human relations understanding. Vetri,
Educating the Lawyer- Clinical Experience as an Integral Part of Legal Education, 50 OR. L. REV. 57, 60
(1970). Considered by the Planning Committee was the ANTIOCH SCHOOL OF LAW CRITERION
TASK RECORD (1978), where more specific skills were enumerated:
ORAL: 1. Use of mechanics of language 2. Express a thought with clarity and
economy 3. Express thoughts in an organized manner 4. Speak appropriately to a
given audience 5. Identify and use appropriate non-verbal aspects of communications
6. Perceive others' communications and actions 7. Communicate so as to advance
immediate and long-term objectives
LEGAL ANALYSIS: A. Analyzing Facts & Identifying Relevant Law 1. Identify
relevant facts 2. Identify inconsistencies among facts 3. Identify the reliability of as-
serted facts 4. Distinguish facts from conclusions of law 5. Determine rules of law
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mary goal of the University of Denver College of Law Clinical Program as
envisioned by the planning committee was to provide an opportunity to inte-
grate theory and practice. It was assumed that a clinic meeting high educa-
tional goals would necessarily also provide a quality service.4 1
B. Intellectual Content
One obstacle to clinical integration has been a fear on the part of those
in the traditional curriculum that clinical education is inferior to the tradi-
tional "Socratic" method of teaching. 42 As a result, the vigorous advocates
of legal service to the poor have warned that clinical programs must be "sub-
relevant to framing legal issues 6. Formulate legal rules appropriately or correctly
7. Determine trends in interpretation or application of laws 8. Identify discrete legal
issues B. Formulating Legal Theories 1. Group and categorize facts in terms of the
concepts or language of the law 2. Select aspects of the facts which appear to call for
the application of a legal rule or concept 3. Select aspects of a legal rule or concept
which appear to call for its application to the facts 4. Show why legal rule or concept
calls for extension, limitation, or rejection of another rule or concept 5. Separate,
combine, and sequence arguments and counter-arguments to formulate legal theory
6. Sequence a complete range of legal theories by an ordering principle
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: 1. Identify situational conflicts with the
CPR 2. Identify situational conflicts with other considerations 3. Identify and weigh
alternative courses of action, re conflicts 4. Act consistently with ethical decisions and
commitments
WRITTEN: 1. Use the mechanics of the language 2. Express a thought with clarity
and economy 3. Express thoughts in an organized manner 4. Write appropriately to
a given audience 5. Perceive communications of others 6. Write so as to advance the
immediate and long-term objectives ...C. Evaluating Legal Theories 1. Identify
predisposition of a particular decision-maker or class of decision-makers 2. Identify
compelling equities recognized by the law or inherent in the fact situation 3. Deter-
mine relative effectiveness of alternative legal theories by analysis and evaluation
PROBLEM-SOLVING: A. Identifying & Diagnosing Problems 1. Identify client
objectives and priorities 2. Identify obstacles and facilitating factors that bear on re-
alization of objectives and priorities 3. State alternative definitions of client's prob-
lem(s) 4. Identify and develop information and steps needed to clarify alternative
definitions of problem(s) 5. Make a tentative choice among alternative definitions of
the problem(s) B. Developing Solutions 1. Develop alternative solutions and strate-
gies 2. Assess and order the range of alternative solutions and strategies ...
C. Implementing Strategies 1. Formulate a work plan 2. Take the actions (or assure
that assigned others do) to carry out the work plan 3. Check results and adjust as
necessary 4. Seek and use counsel and advice in timely fashion
PRACTICE MANAGEMENT: I.- Allocate time, effort, and other resources neces-
sary to carry out case load tasks 2. Coordinate efforts with others 3. Work according
to applicable systems, rules and procedures governing handling of cases and files
4. Assess and design improvements in system, rules and procedures governing han-
dling of cases and files 5. Maintain a level of productivity that conforms with applica-
ble standards and expectations 6. Judge the point at which further commitments
cannot realistically be discharged competently 7. Supervise others.
41. See Pincus, supra note 36.
42. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. For a comparison of clinical legal education
with traditional socratic teaching, see Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. REV. 392
(1971). Stone observed that:
The crucial human attribute which the law school ignores, and indeed in many cases
defeats, is the student's sense of self-esteem. The problem can be seen by caricaturing
the typical emotional pattern of the not fabulously successful law student: intense
effort and anxiety during the first year; withdrawal, depression, and disengagement
from classroom involvement during the second year; renewed anxiety and concern
about occupational opportunity and ability during the third year. This pattern of
ever increasing disengagement from the formal educational process is to be contrasted
with the experience of the medical student who, during his last two years, is given
increasing professional responsibility in the clinic and ward.
Id at 426.
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jected to the most highly disciplined form of intellectual scrutiny."
'43 The
focus on "quantity" rather than "quality" has indeed given clinical educa-
tion a bad name in some quarters. 44 Lack of a complementary classroom
component has also contributed to the clinic's inferior educational image.
45
It is interesting to compare the attitude of many legal educators toward
the law school clinic with the attitude of medical educators toward the medi-
cal school clinic. 46 Clinicians in the nation's medical schools are highly
respected academicians. In fact, it would be unheard of for a professor of
medicine to teach surgery who had himself never performed an operation.
Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for a law professor who has never defended
a criminal case to teach criminal procedure.
4 7 The explanation for such a
difference in attitude is not that one is required to "think" in the medical
clinic but not in the law clinic. Rather, an explanation may be found in a
profound difference in their respective philosophies of professional
education.
48
If a student is engaging in an "intellectual" process in learning the the-
ory of, say, the fifth amendment, one may ask why the exposition of a consti-
tutional argument on the fifth amendment before a judge in a courtroom
setting is any less intellectually rigorous than a passive classroom inhalation
of a professor's lecture. The fact is that, like traditional curriculum offerings,
there are good and bad clinical programs. There are clinics that emphasize
the quantity of cases processed at the expense of solid preparation and a
strong theoretical foundation. However, there are also programs offering a
highly structured and strictly supervised experience in applying classroom
43. Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession-The Pub& Interest and Atbh& Interest
Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1005, 1030 (1970).
44. See note 36 supra.
45. GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL EDUCATION, supra note 24, at 22, states that:
[C]lassroom instruction provides the opportunity to:
a. teach the basic, introductory law which students will need to start to function in
the course
b. undertake and discuss simulation exercises
c. discuss cases, plan strategy, and evaluate results in the client clinic
d. discuss significant literature, cases, and problems related to issues the course is
covering; and
e. consider professional responsibility issues raised in simulation or live client cases or
problems.
46. Flexner, supra note 18, comments that:
The battle may indeed be lost before a shot is fired: . . . inferior laboratory training
will fatally prejudice even excellent clinical opportunities, for they rule out certain
essential features of clinical training on a modern basis .... Doctors have after a
fashion been made by experiences-i.e., their patients paid the price; further, some
graduates of every feeble school in the country have passed state board examinations
or obtained hospital appointments . . . ; it still remains true that to do full duty by
the young student of clinical medicine, his teachers need access to acute cases of dis-
ease in respectable number and variety; that the school which lacks such medical facil-
ities is in no position to teach modern medicine.
Id at 105.
47. See, e.g., the resumes of criminal procedure professors in DIRECTORY OF LAw TEACH-
ERS (West 1981).
48. Compare, for example, Langdell's philosophy that "law is a science ... all the available
materials of that science are contained in printed books," Frank, supra note 7, at 723, with that
of Flexner: "[In the end the final test of medical school is its outcome in the matter of clini-
cians." Flexner, supra note 18, at 105.
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theory to real life problems for the benefit of real clients. 49
In mapping its clinical integration plan, the long-range clinical plan-
ning committee of the University of Denver College of Law recognized that
intellectual "chauvinism" on the part of those in the main curriculum would
doom the clinical integration plan from the start, and that the intellectual
rigor of the teaching methodology depended not upon whether it was prac-
ticed in the classroom or the clinic, but rather on whether it required in-
quiry, analysis, thinking, and the logical application of law to facts. The
clinic was viewed not as a detraction from academic respectability, but as a
necessary component of a meaningful legal education.
50
The clinic planning committee recognized that the mental process in-
volved in applying legal principles to real facts is no less intellectually rigor-
ous than the process of applying legal principles to hypothetical facts or facts
which have already been the subject of a legal "post-mortem." To draw
another analogy from medicine, one may ask why a doctor diagnosing a
disease of a live patient should be considered to be performing a task intel-
lectually inferior to that of the pathologist doing an autopsy on a dead pa-
tient. The perception and acceptance of clinical education as an
intellectually equal component in legal education is an absolute prerequisite
to clinical integration. Equally important is the acceptance by clinicians of
the need for a sound theoretical groundwork in the classroom setting.
Clinicians, too, have been guilty of their own brand of chauvinism. The
attitude of some clinicians that classroom methodology somehow involves
meaningless exercises in useless abstractions is equally destructive to achiev-
ing true integration. Thus, Chief Justice Burger's observation that the fail-
ure of legal education is due to "treating Langdell's case method of study as
the ultimate teaching technique" would be clearly inapplicable to an inte-
grated program.
While ample literature in the field of clinical education now exists,
5 1
there is at present a pressing need to publicize some aspects of clinical educa-
tion through scholarly communication of case studies and histories. By re-
moval of obstacles to clinical integration, such as intellectual chauvinism of
traditional academicians and clinicians alike, opposition to use of non-ten-
ture-track clinical professors, and logistical and financial barriers, the schol-
arly literature should continue to flourish, thereby further enhancing the
status of clinical education as the intellectual equal of the traditional
curriculum.
52
49. See, e.g., Bellow & Johnson, supra note 26; Kadane, Stog, of Hofstra Law School's In-House
Clitw, CLEPR NEWSLETrER No. 9 (Feb. 1972); Leleiko, The Clinic and NYU, 24 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 429 (1972); Vetri, supra note 40; Woodruff & Falso, The Defender Workshop. A Clinical
Experiment in Criminal Law, 52 A.B.A.J. 233 (1966) (University of San Francisco).
50. Se Burger, supra note 9.
51. For an excellent list of 244 scholarly articles on clinical and skills training, see Synman,
A Proposal for a National Link-up of the New Legal Services Corporation Law Oftt and Law School
Clinical Training Programs, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43, 56-66 (1979).
52. See Leleiko, Clinical Education, Empirical Study, and Legal Scholarship, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC.
149 (1979). Professor Leleiko, while recognizing that "[c]ritics of clinical education allege that
clinical teachers do not contribute to the development of legal scholarship and students engaged
in clinical work are not confronted with the critical task of tough legal analysis," nevertheless
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C. Scope
One problem in clinical integration has been the narrowness and lim-
ited subject matter encountered in the existing law school clinic, 53 which
contrasts with the far broader range of subject matter in the traditional cur-
riculum. Some clinics confine their cases to minor criminal and traffic cases,
while others also take minor civil cases such as landlord-tenant, divorce and
welfare. The wide difference in scope between subject matter covered in the
classroom and the clinics creates serious obstacles to clinical integration, in-
asmuch as integration can only be accomplished in those areas common to
both the classroom and the clinic. Professor Leleiko has observed that: "Un-
less, over a period of time, clinical experiences are developed opening all
avenues of experience for students interested in all branches of law and all
segments of society it is doubtful that clinical programming will become a
significant feature of legal education."
'54
Some solutions were proposed to meet this problem. At the University
of Denver, there is a flourishing internship program, through which students
are placed in various outside agencies. There are, for example, natural re-
source, business planning, and even international law internships. Because
such internships are not under the direct supervision of a law school profes-
sor, however, it was recognized that such internships presented their own
special problems in the context of clinical integration, prompting some
members of the planning committee to urge that they not be considered as
suggests that " . . . clinical education has considerable potential for contributing to legal schol-
arship, and in its own right, can be a component of that process." Id at 149. Leleiko takes note
of Professor Carrington's observation that:
Almost ingrained in many lawyers is the assumption that reality is the world described
in judicial opinions. If the legal discipline is to be made a better companion for others,
so that what is known and knowable about our universe can be better used as a basis
for public decisions, it is important to move both students and teachers to be more
receptive, more willing to abide by the dictates, frustrations, and ambiguities of
science.
Id. at 152. Leleiko then suggests that clinical education is a peculiarly appropriate vehicle for
injecting relevance into legal scholarship:
First, it recognizes the role of interdisciplinary understanding, and the critical interre-
lationships between law and other professions . . . . Second, clinical education in-
troduces an empirical base to one's understanding of legal principles: The core of the
clinical experience is client representation in a real case within the legal system.
Clinical teachers and students are forced by the clinic's nature to see, understand, and
evaluate the law in action. The intellectual challenge is to understand and analyze
the legal system's performance in the context of the individuals and institutions it
affects.
This presents clinical teachers and students with both the opportunity and re-
sponsibility to plan and conduct studies on specific components of the legal system
with the objectives of contributing to our understanding of how the law actually oper-
ates and proposing reforms if necessary. It should stimulate an evaulation of the
premises and goals which laws and legal institutions are based on.
d at 152-53.
53. Alan Stone has observed:
It is probable . . . that few students in any conceivable form of a legal aid clinic will
ever be exposed to an antitrust or international law problem. . . . Since Professor
Freund wrote, however, legal aid clinics have gone through a considerable metamor-
phosis which has broadened their ambit. Nonetheless, to the extent that Professor
Freund is still correct, it can readily be conceded that the legal aid clinic is not a total
preparation for legal practice-but then what is?
Stone, supra note 42, at 430.
54. Leleiko, Legal Eduacaoiv Some Crucial Frontiers, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 502, 516 (1971).
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long term solutions to problems of scope in clinical integration.
55
Another proposed solution to this problem was to "re-create" the
clinical experience through simulation in areas unavailable to the clinic. It
was recognized that the use of simulation in conjunction with traditional
courses provided a logical entrance for the clinical professor into the main
curriculum, thus promoting integration. Nevertheless simulation itself was
not considered to be a true clinical component. It has been suggested that
there are three requirements to a clinical component:
1. A substantial, but restricted, volume of actual client represen-
tation by the student.
2. The clear assumption by that individual student of "primary"
professional responsibility for the process and outcome of that
representation.
3. An individualized teaching relationship between the student
and clinical teacher, using the student's clinical experiences as
its focus. 56
It is apparent from these clinical pre-requisites that simulation could
not be considered "clinical," regardless of what realism is interjected by use
of actual documents or role-players. Nevertheless, the use of "practicums" in
the curriculum was recognized as a useful transitional state in clinical
integration.
5 7
55. Swords and Walwer have noted that "Field-placement programs are cheapened be-
cause most of their costs are picked up by the legal services agencies in which the students are
placed for their field work... The chief attraction of the field-placement programs to law
schools would seem to be their inexpensive nature." Cost Aspects of Clitrnal Education, supra note
24, at 153.
Cheapness, however, may be outweighed by other considerations. See Barnhizer, supra note
16, at 100: "[Tlhe academic environment of the law school is a continual reminder that our
primary purpose is to teach. When clinical offices are not part of the law school, the teaching
mission can be over-ridden by other, powerful factions inconsistent with the best path to student
learning." J. Ferren lists several reasons why a fieldwork relationship with a community law
office may not be possible:
First, a community-sponsored program may not be politically independent or
committed to aggressive and creative approaches ....
Second is the question of quality control over student training. The relationship
of students to a community-sponsored office may be unsatisfactory because the staff
lawyers may underestimate, underutilize or undersupervise students . . . . Steps to
prevent this can, of course, be taken if the law school participates in or controls the
operation of the office....
Third, a community-sponsored program may not offer sufficient classroom and
research potential because the community office may lack a commitment to student
training and legal research of a sort which transcends pending cases ...
Finally, there are interrelated factors of faculty commitment and student morale.
The limitations on a community-sponsored program can have a dampening effect of
the law school's commitment to work with it.
Ferren, The Teachig Msion of the Legal Aid Clinic, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 48-49 (1969), reprinted in
COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INC. and INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL CENTER, SELECTED READINGS IN CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 156 (1973).
56. Barnhizer, supra note 16, at 72.
57. GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 24, at 23, describes simula-
tion in the clinical curriculum:
A. Components of a Simulation Course
A simulation course in the clinical legal studies curriculum should:
1. require all students to perform lawyer roles through simulation;
2. use simulation exercises as a principal teaching methodology;
3. require evaluation of student performances in the simulations by the profes-
sor or clinical professor;
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A long term solution, but presently beyond the capability of all but a
handful of law schools, including the University of Denver, was the newly
emerging concept of the "teaching law center"58 based on the medical model
of the "teaching hospital." Under this concept, legal aid and public de-
fender services are rendered through the law school's "law center." Staff
attorneys are hired by the county (or state) and the law school, and are re-
sponsible both for representing clients and for teaching law students. Private
attorneys may be hired as adjunct professors, be given office space in the law
center, and be paid to supervise students on cases in the area of the attor-
ney's expertise. By taking fee-generating cases, students are supervised in
areas not presently found in most law school clinics, such as probate, anti-
trust, and corporate. The implementation of the "teaching law school" con-
cept would, of course, require changes in student practice rules as well as the
acquiescense of the local bar which might be expected to object to such an
intrusion on possible sources of their livelihood.
The "teaching law center" is one possible long-range solution to the
problem of scope in clinical education. In the meantime, however, the plan-
ning committee felt that internships and simulations were the most cost ef-
fective means of accomplishing the initial stages of clinical integration.
D. Ftiances
It has long been recognized that clinical education is expensive,
59
largely because of the lower student-faculty ratio that is required. Langdel-
lian methodology, however, geared to the large classroom and a high stu-
dent-faculty ratio, has enabled law schools to function at relatively low
expense. 60 It has been noted that "any educational innovation which inci-
dentally allowed one man to teach even more students was not unwelcome
to university administrators." 6 ' Thus, Langdellian methodology meant that
"from the first [law schools] were expected to be self-supporting.
' 62
This vast difference in cost between traditional classroom teaching and
clinical training is a significant obstacle to clinical integration. It is one
thing to ask the traditional legal educator to accept the clinic as an intellec-
tual equal; it is another to ask him to finance its exceedingly high cost at the
4. consider a coherent set of lawyer competencies.
B. Equipment
The use of simulation exercises is enhanced by:
I. appropriate space in which to enact the simulations;
2. equipment to record and replay simulations, and to engage in programmed
learning experiences;
3. classrooms and offices in which replays of the simulations can be watched by
the class and student participant; and
4. access to the technological capability to produce and edit tapes.
58. See Hardaway, supra note 18.
59. See Cost Aspects of Climcal Education, supra note 24.
60. R. Stevens attributes the "underfunding of legal education . . . to the Langdellian
model": "[F]or [the] case method seemed to work as well with two hundred students as it did
with twenty. Indeed, Langdell's greatest contribution to legal education is the highly dubious
one of convincing all and sundry that law schools were cheap." Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870:





expense of the traditional curriculum. Demand for practical and clinical
skills training is coming at a time when law schools are facing broad
financial pressures63 and the possibility of a declining enrollment.
The problem of cost differential can only be overcome in the long term
by finding new sources of funding,64 both from conventional sources (gov-
ernment grants, private fund-raising, tuition increases), and from unconven-
tional sources (such as fee generation from a "teaching law center" or
reimbursement to the law school for student services in an internship).
Progress towards clinical integration can be made without such addi-
tional resources, however. Clinical professors can be promoted to, or re-
placed by, tenure-track professors with both clinical and classroom
responsibilities; 65 the number of traditional small-class seminars can be re-
duced to relieve pressures put on the student-faculty ratio by new clinical
course components; and finally, traditional class professors can be asked to
take on clinical responsibilities. As will be seen, all three of these alternatives
were considered in the University of Denver's plan for clinical integration.
E. Student Practice Rules
The expansion of clinical programs has depended in large measure
upon the enactment of student practice rules by the various states. 66 Al-
though numerous student practice rules have been enacted during the past
two years, the restrictions and limitations on student practice vary widely
from state to state.67 To a large extent, expansion of existing clinical pro-
grams and clinical integration depends on the continued broadening of ex-
isting student practice rules, and enactment of student practice rules where
none now exist. As already observed, the success of clinical integration de-
pends upon the ability of the clinic to offer clinical experience in more of the
areas covered in the main academic curriculum. Successful long term inte-
gration cannot be achieved as long as the clinical experience is limited to
narrow areas of the law such as defense of minor misdemeanors, divorce,
landlord and tenant, and welfare.
Several factors have worked to inhibit the vertical expansion of student
practice. First, there has been considerable concern expressed in some
quarters about the general competency of the unlicensed student. As one
appellate judge has observed:
63. See generally THINKING ABOUT THE FISCAL FUTURE, supra note 27.
64. LAWYER COMPETENCY, supra note I, at 30. The 1979 ABA Task Force on Lawyer
Competency reported:
New funds are needed for two quite different kinds of activities: 1) for the extension
and improvement of existing skills training, such as that provided at many law schools
in trial advocacy, and 2) for the development of teaching materials of established
quality, easily replicable in a number of law schools, for teaching other aspects of
lawyer competency such as interviewing and fact investigation.
Id at 28.
65. GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 24, at 107 recommends that
"the whole faculty should be involved in all aspects of the curriculum .... Such involvement
will assist in the integration of clinical legal studies and contribute to faculty understanding of
differing teaching methods and perspectives."
66. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
67. See Klein, supra note 2; see also Hardaway, supra note 12.
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An experienced trial judge can only watch with horror as a neo-
phyte destroys his own case by inept questioning. The immediate
presence of the experienced lawyer cannot undo the harm done by
a single disastrous question. He cannot unring the bell; he cannot
rehabilitate the effect of a clumsy or disastrous answer of a difficult
witness. There may be but one moment of time in the course of a
trial when the right act, word or decision can be made and the case
won. A reasonable doubt may be created. If that moment of op-
portunity passes no amount of post verdict advice to or critique of
the law student's performance will give solace to a defendant in
prison.
68
The problem with such criticisms of a student attorney is that it can be
applied to any neophyte lawyer, and to many "experienced" counsel as well.
The experience of many student clinics, however, has been that the diligent
preparation of a case by a student under the strict supervision of a licensed
and seasoned attorney is often able to make up for the student's lack of expe-
rience.69 The prepared and closely supervised student is certainly a match
for the newly-licensed neophyte attempting to go it alone, and often a match
for a more-seasoned, but less prepared attorney. Despite constitutional, as
well as other challenges to student practice, 70 student practice rules are gen-
erally being upheld.7 ' Nevertheless serious constitutional questions remain
72
which will require resolution before long term clinical integration can be
achieved.
68. People v. Perez, 82 Cal. App. 3d 45, 53, 147 Cal. Rptr. 34, 42 (1978).
69. Judge Shirley Levittan of the City of New York Criminal Court, who has observed
many students practicing in her courtroom, has noted that a "student's ability to devote time to
a problem and the high level of preparation that he can bring to a case overrides any inepti-
tudes that might result from his inexperience." S. Levittan, The Chncal Program for Law Stu-
dents-A Viewfrom the Bench, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 279, 287 (1973).
Judge Levittan further observed that:
Mostly the students do wonderfully well. They are well prepared; they have tried to
prepare their witnesses and they have researched the issue involved. In a jury case
tried by a clinic participant, she presented me with 17 pages of requests to charge-in
a shoplifting case. While a great number of the requests were "boilerplate" (to me, not
the student), it was clear that this attorney-in-training had done her homework. And
what she had done herself would remain with her far longer than a reading of an
account of what had been done or a lecture exposition of what should be done. In
another jury case, a student submitted several mini-trial briefs on specific points at
issue. In this close and vigorously contested assault case before a jury, the clinic par-
ticipant was able to win a verdict by his skillful and thoughtful tactics. Satisfying, too,
was the fine brief handed to the Court after a Huntley hearing by the student-lawyer
who conducted it, covering the issue of the validity of a waiver of counsel after full
Miranda warnings, by a 17-year-old infant defendant, detained without parent, friend
or counsel for seven hours. As a point of departure, that student used an Indiana
precedent just handed down a week previously. These instances of student ability are
particularly significant in my court. Obviously, because of the enormity of our work-
load, written submissions are frequently waived; this is a necessity for the attorneys of
The Legal Aid Society who carry an incredibly cumbrous number of cases. Some-
times, because of this, I am afraid that students may fall into sloppy practices; it is
encouraging to find the contrary prevails.
Id at 288-89.
70. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 594 P.2d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1979); State v.
Daniels, 346 So.2d 672 (La. 1977); People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 228 N.W. 2d 489
(1975); State v. Cook, 84 Wash. 2d 342, 525 P.2d 761 (1974).
71. In particular, see People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 594 P.2d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1979).
72. See Hardaway, sopra note 12.
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For example, in the area of student representation of indigent defend-
ants, the question of whether student representation meets sixth amendment
requirements, or whether it is permissible only upon waiver of sixth amend-
ment rights, has thus far been left unresolved by the cases in which the legiti-
macy of student representation has been challenged. The lack of clear
standards of effective assistance of counsel, 73 and the lack of state procedures
for the ascertainment of moral character of student attorneys 74 and mecha-
nisms for student attorney discipline, 75 as well as ambiguities in the division
of professional responsibility between the student and supervising attorney,
have all contributed to sluggishness in the expansion of student practice.
The implementation of more specific standards for student practice,
and procedures for a "limited license" issued to students after a certification
process, will meet many of the objections now being made to student repre-
sentation. 76 A proposed change in the ABA law school standard for clinical
education would require an approved law school to offer a clinical experi-
ence involving direct responsibility to a client by a student. If approved, this
change should provide an additional impetus to clinical integration.
The University of Denver College of Law Clinical Program was fortu-
nate in that it functioned pursuant to one of the most liberal student practice
rules in the nation.7 7 In this respect, the existing student practice rule in
Colorado was a relatively minor factor in the University of Denver College
of Law's plan for clinical integration.
II. THE PROCESS OF CLINICAL INTEGRATION
A. The Are-lntegration Clinic
The University of Denver College of Law Legal Dispensary was estab-
lished at the law school's opening term in 1904 as the nation's first law school
clinical program. The nation's first student practice rule was promulgated
shortly thereafter, which authorized students to appear in any state district,
county or municipal court as if licensed to practice law "provided that such
representation be with the approval of the lawyers in charge of the said legal
aid clinic, and the judge of the court in which the student appears."
78
The 1906 edition of the University of Denver yearbook, the Knewisbok,
describes the first seven months of the newly established law school clinic:
[Tjhe Dispensary has had, from worthy persons, ninety-eight appli-
73. See Krantz, supra note 13, at 170.
74. See discussion of student practice rules in this regard in Hardaway, supra note 12.
75. Id
76. Id.
77. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-5-116 (1973) provides:
Students of any law school which has been continuously in existence for at least ten
years prior to April 23, 1909, and which maintains a legal-aid dispensary where poor
persons receive legal advice and services shall, where representing said dispensary and
its clients and then only, be authorized to appear in court as if licensed to practice law.
Rule 226 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure also provides for student representation in
district, municipal, and county courts of the state "provided such representation shall be with
the approval of the lawyers in charge of the said legal clinic and the judge of the court in which
the student appears."
78. CoLO. R. Civ. P. 226.
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cations, all of which have been handled successfully. Nearly one-
third of the cases have gone to trial, resulting in a large majority of
victories for the Dispensary. The total number of cases handled by
the Dispensary for the year will reach one hundred and fifty. Only
meritorious cases of poor persons who are unable to pay attorney's
fees are taken. No fee is charged for services and only actual court
costs are collected.
79
From 1904 through the mid-1940's, with some interruptions, the Uni-
versity of Denver clinic handled both civil and criminal cases under the di-
rect supervision of adjunct and part-time professors.8 0 A mock-trial program
was also initiated during this period under which each student was required
to prepare a civil or criminal case.
During the 1960's the clinical activities were conducted from the law
school under the supervision of a full-time faculty member and subordinate
staff attorneys. The volume of students and cases was high during this pe-
riod. As a result students practiced with a minimum of direct supervision.
At this time there was little contact between the clinic and the main curricu-
lum, with little or no exchange of ideas.
Finally, during the mid-1970's, the clinic became organized in a manner
now common among law school clinics: clinical staff attorneys were hired to
perform supervisory duties exclusively in the clinic. The staff attorneys were
hired under one year contracts, were not given tenure-track status, and,
while permitted to observe faculty meetings, were not permitted to vote.
The pay for staff attorneys was less than half that of tenure-track professors.
As a result, turnover was high, and there was little continuity in the pro-
gram. Supervision of students was strict, however, and staff attorneys were
expected to accompany students during all court appearances.8 1 There was
also a favorable student-faculty ratio of approximately 5:1.
Although the clinic itself functioned well, largely due to the dedication
of the staff attorneys, the clinic was isolated from the mainstream of the law
school. There was no coordination of courses or materials, and a minimum
exchange of ideas between clinical and classroom professors. A significant
"burn-out" factor due to high case load and lower pay contributed to the
high turn-over of clinical staff attorneys.
79. KYNEWISBOK (1906), reprinted in UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW, ADVO-
CACY SKILLS PROGRAM BULLETIN I (1980).
80. The history of the University of Denver student law clinic during this period is some-
what hazy. P. Stolz notes that A. Reed in his 1928 Carnegie Foundation Report stated that
"The University of Denver Law School operated a legal aid clinic program for academic credit
for a period of six years beginning in 1904. The program was terminated because of the heavy
expense and operational difficulties." A. REED, PRESENT DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA 216-18 (Carnegie Foundation Bull. No. 21, 1928), cited in Vetri, supra note
40, at 58 n.3. Assuming the accuracy of Reed's comments, there was obviously a resurrection, as
the University of Denver clinical program is presently a thriving component of the curriculum.
81. Although the Colorado student practice rules do not require in-court supervision by a
staff attorney or faculty advisor, such supervision by the University of Denver staff attorneys
was in compliance with the ABA MODEL STUDENT PRACTICE RULE, § II(A) which provides
that where an eligible law student appears in "any criminal matter in which the defendant has
the right to assignment of counsel under any constitutional statute or rule . . . the supervising
lawyer must be personally present throughout the proceeding."
1982]
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In 1978, Daniel Hoffman assumed the duties of Dean at the University
of Denver College of Law. Dean Hoffman, a former president of the State
Bar Association with extensive experience in both civil and criminal litiga-
tion, became concerned about the isolation and lack of interaction between
the law clinic and the main curriculum. A long range planning committee
was set up to make recommendations concerning the student law office, and
to make proposals for integrating the clinical program into a comprehensive
advocacy skills program that would include courses in the traditional
curriculum.
Several clinical integration models were considered by the committee:
1) the Rotation Plan;8 2 2) the "Laboratory" Plan;83 and 3) the expanded
internship model.
B. The 'Rotatton" Plan
Under this plan, it was proposed that clinical integration could be
achieved by personnel rotation. Professors teaching traditional classes would
be assigned as faculty advisors in the clinic for one quarter per year. It was
suggested that such rotation would accomplish the dual purpose of bringing
the clinical professor into the classroom, and the classroom teacher into the
82. An internal memorandum from the Chairman of the Advocacy Skills to the Commit-
tee on Advocacy Skills Program (March 15, 1979), proposed to:
Maintain the Student Law Practice courses as they now exist with a faculty rotation
type of supervision. Assign three law professors for each quarter supervisor. They
would each have five to eight students with four or five cases per student. The supervi-
sors would stay with their students until the completion of the assigned cases. This
assumes some cases would extend beyond one quarter.
The memorandum acknowledged that certain problems were left unresolved:
a) What amount and type of teaching credit would professors earn?
b) What training should law professors have?
c) Who should have overall responsibility?
d) Should the program expand its use of student coordinators?
e) Should faculty be on a once a year rotation?
Id
83. The memorandum also suggested:
Simulated Aactice and Traditional Courses
Maintain the Trial Tactics, Trial Moot Court, Interviewing and Counseling and Ne-
gotiation courses essentially as they are now. The traditional courses in Procedure,
Evidence and Professional Responsibility continue as they are now with some course
credit changes. Add at least two or more "paired" practicum or laboratory courses to
the present curriculum. Examples of these simulated problem courses would be Civil
Procedure Practicum and Evidence Practicum.
A. Civil Procedure Practicum (2 credits-2 professors). Students would work on
problems of case preparation and pre-trial motion practice. They would in a
simulated problem actually investigate and gather information for preparation of
a law suit. They would prepare the documents and make oral arguments for pre-
trial motions and conduct discovery.
Evidence Practicum (2 credits-2 professors). Students would work on problems
of evidence evaluation and court presentation. They would in a simulated court-
room setting examine witnesses and present real evidence.
Id Left unsolved were the following questions:
Should there be a Professional Responsibility Practicum or ethical problems built into
the other courses?
What other traditional courses should have a practicum course?
What teaching credit should be assigned the practicum course?
If a practicum course were paired with the traditional Procedure and Evidence
courses, the student credit hours could be reduced by one hour each. Could this be
done for other traditional courses?
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clinic. Both would learn from this new environment and, by teaching from
an entirely new perspective, gain new insights into the teaching of law. The
traditional classroom theorist might bring theoretical insights into the clinic
which might otherwise be lost under pressure of the clinic caseload; likewise,
the clinical professor might bring a new measure of practicality and rele-
vance to the socratic dialogue of the classroom.
It was recognized that there would be problems in implementing such a
plan. Clinical professors might be lacking in the academic credentials
deemed necessary for classroom teaching, such as postgraduate degrees, high
academic achievement, and scholarly publications. Further, traditional
classroom professors with little or no practical experience might be reluctant
to venture into the unknown waters of the clinic where there are less peda-
gogic controls and fewer ego-protecting barriers. The committee hoped that
the very process of rotation would solve this problem. Under the Rotation
Plan, clinical professors would begin to write more scholarly articles and
classroom professors would use their clinical experience to inject a practical
note into their class lectures.
In a law school on the quarter system a rotation system could function
as follows: assuming a rotation "pool" of twelve faculty members, three
faculty members would supervise students in the clinic in any one quarter.
Those three would then move back to classroom teaching in the following
quarter. The clinic would be administered on an annual rotation by a de-
partment head. Integration would be achieved not only by exposing the
clinic to traditional "theorists," and the classroom to the "realists," but more
importantly, by permitting students to learn from the same professor, both
the theoretical and practical aspects of a given area, thereby achieving some
interaction between the two. Professors, required to teach at both ends of
the theory-practice spectrum, would provide the catalytic spark to
interaction.
It was suggested that the rotation system of integration would least dis-
rupt the existing curriculum structure. It was recognized, however, that it
might be necessary to start from scratch at the clinical end; that is, clinical
staff attorneys would not have their contracts renewed, but would be permit-
ted to apply for regular tenure-track positions on an equal basis with other
applicants. All applicants for existing vacancies in the rotation pool would
be evaluated on the basis of both practical experience as well as scholarly
achievement and academic credentials.
It was also noted that the transitional phase to the rotation plan might
be difficult due to short-term problems with personnel continuity in the
clinic. The committee hoped, however, that in the long term there would be
more continuity due to tenure-track pay, a lower burn-out factor, and
greater opportunity for advancement. New professors coming in to supervise
students would have to learn the procedures of local courts and the adminis-
trative procedures of the clinic. During this period, much time might be lost
while professors rotating into the clinic familiarized themselves with the new
procedures. All these problems, however, were seen as short-term rather
19821
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than long term problems in implementing a rotation plan.84
C. The "Laboralogy" Plan
It was envisioned that the "Laboratory" Plan would have the advan-
tage of not presenting the short-term continuity problems associated with the
rotation model, but would require some restructuring of the curriculum.
Under the Laboratory Plan, courses could be "paired" in a way that con-
nected theoretical and practical courses in the same general area of the law.
The rationale of pairing would be similar to that of the "laboratory" in med-
ical school. There, the laboratory provides a setting for controlled experi-
ments where a purely clinical setting is either unavailable, or inappropriate
for experiment. Thus, just as a medical student who takes a classroom
course in biology is also required to attend a biology laboratory, so in an
integrated clinical-advocacy skills program, academic courses in the pro-
gram would be "paired" with a clinical program where possible, and with a
simulation course in all other cases. In every instance the academic course
and the "laboratory" would be planned as a unit, with a common syllabus.
Parts of the laboratory model could be combined with the rotation model.
At least in the transitional phases of integration, the professor with a sub-
stantial practical background might find it easier to break into the main
curriculum via the "laboratory" rather than the traditional classroom.
An example of a laboratory component might be a simulation course in
trial and evidence paired with a classroom course in evidence.8 5 While cases
on hearsay, for example, are being discussed in the classroom, the laboratory
would offer practical exercises in direct examination and cross-examination
where each student would be expected to make and argue proper hearsay
objections in a mock court setting.
The laboratory could be extended to virtually every area of the curricu-
lum. In a "contracts" laboratory, for example, students could draft and ne-
gotiate contracts in a mock setting; in a wills and trusts laboratory, students
would draft wills and trust instruments and argue cases in a mock probate
hearing.
It was expected that such a laboratory plan would go far in meeting
many of the criticisms that have been made against the traditional law
school curriculum.
8 6
84. It is interesting to note that the GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra
note 24, at 107, published after the University of Denver integration plan was initiated, recom-
mended that:
[AIll or almost all faculty should rotate through the clinic, such involvement usually
occurs when traditional and clinical faculty get to know each other personally and
develop confidence in each other. This indicates the crucial importance of creating an
atmosphere in which traditional faculty are welcome in the client clinic and clinical
teachers are integrated into the full life of the law school. Collegial interaction is a
critical vehicle for bringing people together.
The report also acknowledged that four law schools have significant clincal involvement by
traditional faculty: "Cleveland-Marshall, University of Maine, Pepperdine, and Southwestern
University." Id at 107 n.140.
85. See note 57 supra.
86. Id
[Vol. 59:3
PROBLEMS IN CLINICAL INTEGRATION
D. Coordinated Internships
The planning committee considered the lack of interaction between the
existing internship program and regular academic course as a major prob-
lem to be corrected. Under the existing internship program, students were
placed in a variety of firms and agencies. Supervision by personnel at the
agencies, rather than by faculty members, was at best uneven. It was hoped
that any plan of integration would include coordination of existing intern-
ships with academic courses that covered the area of law practiced in the
agency sponsoring the internship. It was also suggested that professors be
assigned as internship supervisors, that regular seminars be coordinated with
internship activities and that a substantial writing component be attached to
any internship experience.
III. THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW PLAN
OF CLINICAL INTEGRATION
In the Fall of 1979, a plan of clinical integration was implemented at
the University of Denver College of Law, incorporating components of the
several models considered. Some elements of the considered models were
excluded due to cost or other factors.
The essential elements of the rotation model were implemented as the
first phase of clinical integration. The contracts of the four acting clinical
supervisors were not renewed. However, each staff attorney was invited to
apply on an equal basis for the three tenure-track positions. These positions
were made possible both by the elimination of the four staff attorney posi-
tions, and by additional attrition in the faculty at that time. Applicants for
the new positions were expected to meet all traditional academic, scholarly,
and teaching experience requirements for tenure-track positions, but were
also expected to have had at least some experience in law practice, and to be
qualified to serve as faculty advisor in the clinic for one quarter of each
academic year. After initial screening of numerous applications, twelve ap-
plicants were invited to the law school to make a scholarly presentation to
the faculty in a particular area of the law, and to interview with individual
faculty members.
One of the clinical staff attorneys and two of the outside applicants were
hired, and formed the nucleus of a "rotation" pool. A tenured faculty mem-
ber, whose area of expertise was civil procedure and trial practice, was ap-
pointed to head a newly formed department of Advocacy Skills. Other
tenured faculty members in such diverse areas as corporations, contracts,
torts and property were asked to supplement the rotation pool and serve one
quarter in the clinic supervising four to five students each. Each student was
normally assigned five misdemeanor cases ranging from simple traffic in the
basis litigation clinic, to assault and battery, drug possession, and drunk
driving in the advanced litigation clinic.
The student law clinic became the nucleus of the new department of
Advocacy Skills. Advocacy Skills was formalized as an area of emphasis,
requiring students in the program to complete twenty hours of credit in Ad-
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vocacy Skills courses, including six hours of "laboratories," or "practicums."
Three new "practicums," a criminal procedure practicum, a trial and evi-
dence practicum, and a pretrial procedure practicum were added to the cur-
riculum to supplement the existing practical courses in trial tactics, trial
preparation, and moot court.
Thus the rotation model and some elements of the laboratory model
were combined. Financial and logistical problems prevented total imple-
mentation of the laboratory model. It was simply not possible with the ex-
isting student-faculty ratio to introduce practicums for every academic
course in light of the practicum size limit of twenty students.
All practicums were designed to allow each student to participate in
practical experiences. Faculty members with clinical and practical back-
grounds were assigned to teach both a practicum and a paired academic
course. The professor teaching the large trial and evidence class, for exam-
ple, also taught the trial and evidence practicum. Because the class consisted
of sixty to ninety students, however, it was not possible to make the practi-
cum available to all those students. Although the original objective of a
common syllabus was not achieved, it was felt that the additional practicums
did help in the overall plan of integration. The existing internships were also
brought into the new Advocacy Skills Program and coordinated by an in-
ternship advisor.
In the opinion of the Law School Dean and the Director of the Advo-
cacy Skills Program, the clinical integration plan has been largely successful
during the eighteen months since its implementation. The primary goal of
eliminating barriers between clinical and academic faculty has been com-
pletely achieved by faculty rotation and tenure-track status for Advocacy
Skills professors. The prospects for long term continuity are now promising.
There has been no turnover in Advocacy Skills faculty and regular faculty
members who rotated into the clinic for the first time have received valuable
practical experience. There have been a few faculty members who, after one
quarter in the clinic, have declined to return. It was not expected, however,
that all faculty members assigned to the clinic would volunteer for perma-
nent rotation duty.
There have been some problems experienced in faculty availability to
students in the clinic inasmuch as faculty advisors retained their office loca-
tions in the law school building while supervising in the clinic (staff attorney
offices in the pre-integration clinic have been located in the clinical offices).
This problem has been largely, though not completely, overcome by the ex-
panded use of paid student coordinators who are available in the clinical
office for helping students in routine matters. An experiment under which
faculty advisors were required to spend a certain number of hours in the
clinic offices was abandoned, but advisors are now making extra efforts to be
available to clinical students in their offices at stated times. This has proved
to be less of a problem with Advocacy Skills professors.
CONCLUSION
The University of Denver College of Law experiment in clinical integra-
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tion has shown that clinical legal education can be an integral, rather than
separate component of the law school curriculum. Moreover, some degree of
integration can be accomplished without an increased financial burden to
the law school. It has been recognized that complete integration would en-
tail increased expenditure in the area of student-faculty ratios, expanded fa-
cilities (particularly trial moot court rooms), and less reliance on the large
classroom. Nevertheless, even under prevailing financial conditions, the first
steps toward clinical integration can be taken through faculty rotation and
the expansion of practicums in the law school curriculum.
Clinical education now faces a crisis, brought on by reduced funding for
clinical education in particular, and legal education in general. Survival of
clinical education depends on whether it can be successfully integrated into
the main academic curriculum of the nation's law schools. The University of
Denver's plan of clinical integration and its experience with the implementa-
tion of that plan should provide insights into the problems associated with
clinical integration and serve as a model for clinical integration programs at
other law schools.
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INTRODUCTION
The major environmental legislation of this past decade has failed to
address sufficiently what may be this country's most pressing environmental
problem--soil erosion. Erosion of topsoil has reached more than five billion
tons per year.' The loss of topsoil seriously affects not just the productive
capacity of the land but also the quality of the water into which much of this
soil flows. Wind and water caused erosion is twenty-five to thirty-five per-
cent worse than during the Dust Bowl days fifty years ago.2 In addition,
today's agricultural runoff contains many nutrients from fertilizers and pesti-
cides. Thus, as well as threatening agricultural productivity, topsoil erosion
is a major pollutant of our waterways.
Property tax incentives are a possible technique for promoting partici-
pation in soil conservation programs3 if methods can be found to overcome
1. Rocky Mountain News, Nov. 22, 1981, at 43, col. 1; The Capital Times, Nov. 19, 1981,
at 46, col. 1.
2. The Capital Times, Nov. 19, 1981, at 46, col. 1.
3. Other types of tax incentives that may be used to promote the implementation of soil
conservation programs include reductions in federal and state income taxes and reductions in
federal estate and state inheritance taxes. For a discussion of direct cost-sharing under the agri-
cultural conservation program (ACP) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and federal in-
come tax incentives as alternative means or policy instruments for influencing farmer decisions
to invest in soil conservation programs, see Boxley & Anderson, An Evaluatzon of Subsidy Formsfor
Soi and Water Conseratzn,JoINT ECONOMIc CoMM., 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., THE ECONOMICS OF
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the requirements in state constitutions that property taxation be "uniform
and equal."'4 The constitutions of forty-three (possibly forty-five)5 states
contain provisions, described as "uniformity clauses," which limit the legisla-
tive power to give favorable tax treatment to certain lands for implementing
conservation practices. 6  Some state constitutions allow classification of
property or subjects for tax purposes, but provide for uniformity within the
same class.
7
All but two states have adopted enabling legislation permitting differen-
tial assessments granting property tax relief in one form or another to pre-
serve agricultural, forest, recreational, and open space lands either by using
constitutional authority to classify property or by amending the state consti-
tutions to permit exceptions to the uniformity rule.8 Of all the available
methods for providing exceptions to the constitutional uniformity clauses,
differential assessment or land preservation statutes probably will be the
most commonly used for initiating property tax incentives to implement con-
servation programs.
This article describes how property tax incentives can be used to imple-
ment soil conservation programs on agricultural and open space lands under
the differential assessment statutes and other exceptions to constitutional
limitations on taxation powers. Because of their importance as a method of
implementing conservation programs, differential or use-value assessments
are emphasized. First, the article describes restrictions imposed on taxing
powers by the constitutional uniformity clauses and methods for circum-
venting those limitations; various property tax incentives available for con-
servation programs; types of differential or use-value assessments providing
property tax relief for farm, forest, and open space land preservation; eligi-
bility of lands for differential assessments; methods available to landowners
for participation in differential assessments; and determination of value
under differential assessment. The article next details how each of the three
FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 953 (Comm. Print 1973) (hereinafter cited as FEDERAL SUBSIDY
PROGRAMS]. See A. DAUGHERTY, OPEN SPACE PRESERVATION: FEDERAL TAX POLICIES EN-
COURAGING DONATION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (1978) [reprinted as U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, NAT'L TECH. INFO. SERV. PUB. No. PB-284 960] for a discussion of federal in-
come, capital gains, estate, and gift tax policies as incentives for encouraging donations of con-
servation easements to preserve open space and the economic effects these incentives have on
grantors of easements. See also Daugherty, Preservtng Farmland Through Federal Income Tax Incen-
tives, 33 NAT'L TAX J. 111 (1980) for a discussion of federal income taxes as an incentive to
participate in conservation programs.
4. See W. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXA-
TION 3 (1959) for a discussion of the constitutional limitations on taxing powers.
5. Rhode Island and Vermont constitutions have "uniformity clauses" providing only for
a fair distribution of governmental expenses. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 9.
See W. NEWHOUSE, supra note 4, at 10-11, 47-48, 591-94.
6. W. NEWHOUSE, supra note 4, at 3. See id. at 9-11 for a classification of the various types
of uniformity clauses. Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, and New York do not have uniform-
ity clauses in their constitutions. Id. at 11, 48, 595-600. The Alaska Constitution provides, for
example, that assessment standards are prescribed by law. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 3.
7. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3; DEL. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; KY. CONST. § 171; MD. CONST. art. XV; MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. V,
§ 2(3); OR. CONST. art. I, § 32; WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
8. See B. DAVIES & J. BELDEN, SURVEY OF STATE PROGRAMS TO PRESERVE FARMLAND
4 (1979).
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primary types of differential or use-value assessment statutes for farm, forest,
and open space land preservation provides exceptions to the uniformity
clauses for property tax incentives to implement soil conservation programs.
The three types of differential assessments-and the state used as an example
of each-are 1) preferential property tax assessment (Colorado); 2) preferen-
tial property tax assessment with deferred taxation (Maryland); and 3) pref-
erential taxation with restrictive agreements (Wisconsin). 9 Other methods
available for providing exceptions to the uniformity clauses to permit prop-
erty tax incentives also will be described for each of the three states. Each of
these states has statutes giving favorable tax treatment to certain types of
property, such as pollution abatement equipment, alternative energy pro-
ducing devices, and even country clubs. These statutes can be used as exam-
ples of finding a constitutional method for providing favorable tax treatment
to promote participation in soil conservation programs.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY LIMITATIONS ON
PROPERTY TAXATION
There were essentially nine types of basic constitutional "uniformity
clauses" relating to property taxation in existence prior to many of the
changes permitting differential assessments to preserve agricultural and for-
est lands.' 0 Their distinguishing characteristics relate to the manner in
which the words "uniform" and "equal" are used. The nine types of uni-
formity clauses are: (1) property shall be taxed according to its value;"
(2) property shall be taxed in proportion to its value; 12 (3) the legislature
may impose proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes upon
all persons and estates within the state; 13 (4) there shall be a uniform rule of
taxation; 14 (5) taxation of property shall be equal and uniform; 15 (6) the
legislature shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of assessment
and taxation;' 6 (7) taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects;'
7
9. See T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, STATE PROGRAMS FOR THE DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT
OF FARM AND OPEN SPACE LAND 2-3 (1974) for a classification of the types of differential
assessment.
10. W. NEWHOUSE, supra note 4, at 9-11. Even though many of the constitutions were
amended to permit differential assessments of farm and forest lands, the basic uniformity provi-
sions of the constitutions remain the same; the differential assessment amendments merely pro-
vided exceptions to the uniformity clauses.
11. ARK. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 28.
12. ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 211; CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; NEB.
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 2.
13. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, art. IV; N.H. CONST. pt. 2 art. V.
14. MICH. CONST. art. X, § 3; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, 1(a) (1947, amended 1963);
OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1851, amended 1929); Wis. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1848, amended
1961).
15. MIss. CONST. art. IV, § 112 (1890, amended 1960); TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; W.
VA. CONST. art. X, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 28, art. XV, § 11.
16. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 2; IND. CONST. art. X, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. XI, § .1; NEV.
CONST. art. X, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. X, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 3 (1896, amended 1930).
17. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3; DEL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1, 3;
IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 5; LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(A); MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1; Mo.
CONST. art. X, § 3; MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 11; N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1912, amended
1914); OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 5; OR. CONST. art. I, § 32, art. IX, § 1; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1;
VA. CONST. art. XIII, § 168.
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(8) taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property;1 3 and (9) there
shall be a fair distribution of governmental expenses.19 Five states, Alaska,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, and New York, do not have uniformity clauses
pertaining to property taxation.
Uniformity clauses involve two potential limitations on the exercise of
legislative power to tax real property. These two limitations must be ana-
lyzed separately because they impose significantly different restrictions.
20
The first limitation involves the uniformity required in taxing the property
itself, which concerns the degree to which state legislatures are free to pick
and choose among classes of property for taxation. It is essentially a question
of "universality," that is, whether all classes of property within a taxing au-
thority's territory must be selected for taxation imposed by that authority or
whether the constitution permits the legislature to exempt certain classes of
property completely from taxation, A requirement of "universality of taxa-
tion" exists if all property must be selected for taxation and no property is
exempt.
21
The second limitation concerns the uniformity required for the effective
rate of property taxation, which is a combination of the assessed value and
the tax rate on that assessed value. Once the taxable property is ascertained,
two questions arise as to the legislative power to deal with that property:
(1) may the ratio of assessed valuation, that is, the percentage of actual value
at which the property is entered on the tax rolls, be varied from class to class
even though the rate of taxation imposed on all classes is uniform?; and
(2) may different rates of taxation be imposed on the various classes of prop-
erty even when the assessed valuation of the property is determined by a
uniform ratio? If the answer to both questions is in the negative, then there
is an "absolute uniformity as to effective rate;" and the uniformity require-
ment does not operate merely within the classes of taxable property, but
requires that all classes be treated uniformly. 22 Mississippi is an example of
an "absolute uniformity" state.2 3 Prior to the constitutional amendments in
Wisconsin permitting differential assessments for agricultural and forest
lands preservation,2 4 absolute uniformity was required as to the effective rate
of property taxation because both the ratio of assessed valuation and the
applied rate of taxation had to be uniform.25 However, because classes of
property may be exempted from taxation by the legislature there is no re-
quirement of "universality of taxation" in Wisconsin.
26
18. ARiz. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 171 (1891, amended 1915); MD. CONST. art.
XV (1867, amended 1915); N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(3) (1868, amended 1935); N.D. CONST. art.
XI, § 176 (1889, amended 1919); S.D. CONsT. art. VI, § 17, art. XI, § 2 (1889, amended 1913);
WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1899, amended 1930).
19. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. IX.
20. Note, The Uniformity Clause, Assessment Freeze Laws, and Urban Renewal. A Critical View,
1965 Wis. L. REv. 885, 889-90 [hereinafter cited as Uniformity Clause].
21. W. NEWHOUSE, supra note 4, at 6-7; Uniforuity Clause, supra note 20, at 890.
22. Uniformity Clause, supra note 20, at 890; see W. NEWHOUSE, supra note 4, at 7.
23. MIss. CONST. art. IV, § 112.
24. WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1848, amended 1907).
25. W. NEWHOUSE, supra note 4, at 247-48; Unformity Clause, supra note 20, at 890.
26. W. NEWHOUSE, supra note 4, at 247-48; Uniformity Clause, supra note 20, at 890. See
WIs. STAT. § 70.11 (1977) for the property exempted from taxation by the legislature.
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Several methods may be available, depending on the state, to overcome
constitutional uniformity clauses, thereby permitting property tax incentives
for promoting participation in soil conservation programs. The most direct
method of removing any question of constitutional validity is simply to pass
a constitutional amendment permitting a separate classification of property
for tax treatment based upon the implementation of a soil conservation pro-
gram. This specific classification approach to the strict uniformity rule is the
one taken in the Wisconsin Constitution for merchants' stock-in-trade, man-
ufacturers' material and finished products, and livestock.
27
A second method that also removes any question of constitutional valid-
ity is to pass a constitutional amendment exempting agricultural, forest, and
open space lands from the uniformity of taxation requirement. 28 Such an
approach, giving explicit exceptions to the strict uniformity rule for agricul-
tural, forest, and open space lands and permitting assessment on a use-value
basis, has been taken by several states.29 Once agricultural, forest, and open
space lands are exempt from the uniformity clause, property tax incentives
for promoting participation in soil conservation programs can be tied to dif-
ferential or use-value assessments. 30 The most common method is to require
the implementation of a soil conservation program as a prerequisite for tak-
ing advantage of use-value assessment.
The third method of overcoming uniformity clauses is to amend those
clauses to allow legislatures to classify property permitting different ratios of
assessed valuation or tax rates as applied to assessed value among classes of
property, but requiring uniform treatment within each class.3 ' This type of
amendment gives legislatures flexibility to use various differential assessment
devices without the necessity of amending the constitution specifically for
farmland, forest land, or open space. A number of states permit a general
classification of this type under their uniformity clause,3 2 while others only
permit agricultural land to be separately classified.
33
Two other possible methods may be available for achieving property
tax incentives to implement soil conservation programs. One is to consider
conservation structures as improvements and in those states where improve-
27. WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. Uniformity of treatment within each of these classifications
is required. -
28. Uniformity Clause, supra note 20, at 904.
29. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4(a); ME. CONST. art. IX, § 8; TEx. CONST. art. VIII,
§ I-d-1; UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 3; Wis. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
30. See text accompanying notes 41-42, infra for the available types of property tax
incentives.
31. Uniformity Clause, spra note 20, at 904. This would re-establish an earlier position taken
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court when it held that the legislature had wide discretion to classify
property for tax purposes and to prescribe a separate rule of taxation for each classification just
as long as there was uniformity within each classification. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. State, 128
Wis. 553, 108 N.W. 557 (1906).
32. Set, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3; DEL. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; Ky. CONST. § 171; MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1; MO. CONST. art. X, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. V,
§ 2(3); PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. VII, § t.
33. Se.e TENN. CONST. art. II, § 2, for a good example. The same property tax incentives
may be used with this type of constitutional amendment as with an amendment specifically
exempting agricultural, forest, and open space lands from the uniformity clause. See text ac-
companying notes 41-42 infa.
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ments may be assessed separately from real property, treat them as items
that may be exempted from taxation. This device is helpful to counteract
increases in assessed valuation caused by the implementation of conservation
practices. The other method follows the example recently undertaken by
some states either to exempt equipment purchased or constructed for pollu-
tion abatement purposes from property taxation or to provide state income
tax credits for property taxes paid on such equipment. 34 Legislatures could
expand those statutes to include certain soil conservation practices or
structures.
II. PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVATION PROGRAMS
Soil conservation programs on agricultural land are justified because
sediment resulting from erosion of such land is the major nonpoint source of
pollution. Runoff from agricultural land also increases levels of bacteria,
nutrients, and pesticides in surface water. Rainfall patterns, natural er-
odibility of the soil, physical features of slopes, and other natural factors in-
fluence erosion, but land use practices are usually more important in
determining soil loss than all other factors combined.
35
Conservation programs are designed to conserve soil resources and pre-
vent and control soil erosion. Such programs may involve the construction
of structures, such as terraces, sediment traps, ponds, and diversions; the ob-
servance of cultivation practices, such as contour plowing, no-tillage plant-
ing, and strip-cropping; the planting of grass and trees; and the retirement of
highly erosive areas from cultivation. Various structures and practices may
be used singly or in combination with each other. The establishment of soil
conservation programs to date is done primarily through farmers' voluntary
initiative or under statutory requirements. Governments' promotion of soil
conservation takes place mainly through educational efforts, technical assist-
ance of the Soil Conservation Service (SCS), and cost-share funds under the
Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) which assist with installing struc-
tures and establishing practices.
Property tax incentives may be a new approach for promoting partici-
pation in soil conservation programs. Such incentives are not likely to be
effective unless they are sufficient to reimburse the landowners for their addi-
tional net expenses in implementing soil conservation programs. On the
other hand, if the incentives are sufficient for landowners to implement pro-
grams, the reduction in tax receipts may be too costly and burdensome for
the local governments. Reduction of the tax base of the taxing jurisdiction,
thereby reducing local government revenue in the area, and shifting the tax
burden to other landowners are two side effects of property tax incentives for
conservation programs. 36 The seriousness of these side effects will depend to
34. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-5-131 (Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT. § 70.11(21) (1977).
35. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-THE NINTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 118, 119,122 (1978). [here-
inafter cited as THE NINTH ANNUAL REPORT].
36. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 13; Lapping, Bevins & Herbers, Differential
Assessment and Other Techn ques to Presere Missounr's Farmlands, 42 Mo. L. REV. 369, 386-87 (1977).
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some extent upon the local government's reliance on property taxes as a
source of revenue.3 7 Studies conducted in some states adopting differential
assessment statutes have not indicated substantial reductions in the tax
base3 8 or major shifts in the tax burden to other landowners. 39 New York
and California provide state aid to local governments or school districts to
partially reimburse the local jurisdictions for the revenue they lose when
farmland or open space lands are differentially assessed and to finance the
admihistrative costs of such programs. 4°
Several possible types of property tax incentives may be available for
implementing soil conservation programs depending upon the exceptions
permitted to the constitutional requirement of uniformity in property taxa-
tion and the type of enabling legislation allowing for differential or use-value
assessments of farm, forest, and open space lands. Some state enabling legis-
lation authorizing differential or use-value assessments for farm or forest
lands requires the preparation and implementation of soil conservation man-
agement programs as a condition to reduced assessments.41 Statutes in states
authorizing differential assessment of farm and forest lands, but not requir-
ing the implementation of soil conservation management programs, could be
easily amended to require the implementation of such programs and the use
of recommended conservation practices. A deferred taxation or "rollback"
provision could be inserted in the statutes requiring landowners who later
converted their lands to noneligible uses or failed to maintain conservation
management programs, but who wanted to take advantage of differential
assessment, to repay some or all the taxes which they were excused from
paying for a number of years prior to conversion or while maintaining a
conservation program. This method of promoting participation in conserva-
tion programs is the preferred method and would not be subject to challenge
under constitutional uniformity restrictions. In addition, combining conser-
vation programs and differential assessment would be the least costly alter-
native for local governments. Owners would not receive tax incentives for
implementing conservation programs and at the same time maintaining
land in farm, forest, or open space uses.
Another possible type of property tax incentive is to provide an adjust-
37. See Currier, Exploring the Role of Taxation in the Land Use Planning Process, 51 IND. L.J. 27
(1975) which states that there is a great disparity among states as to how much property tax is
relied upon as a revenue source, ranging in 1973 from 14.8% of total receipts in Alabama, to
59.1% of total receipts in New Hampshire. Id at 44.
38. See T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 13-14; P. HOUSE, DIFFERENTIAL ASSESS-
MENT OF FARMLAND NEAR CITIES, EXPERIENCE IN MARYLAND THROUGH 1965, at 24 (1967);
Carman & Poison, Tax Shifls as a Result oJDe9rential Assessment of Farmland- Califorua, 1968-69,
24 NAT'L TAX J. 449, 455-56 (1971).
39. See Fellows, The Impact of Public Act 490 on Agriculture and Open Space in Connecticut, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON TAXATION OF AGRICULTURAL AND OTHER OPEN LAND
48, 52-53 (1971); Garrison, Problems and Impact of the Newersey Farmland Assessment Act of 19641, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON TAXATION OF AGRICULTURAL AND OTHER OPEN LAND
35, 46 (1971); Lapping, Bevins, & Herbers, supra note 36, at 387.
40. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51283.1(e) (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW
§ 305(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
41. See, e.g., MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 5-301 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-36-20
(1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-277.2(2) (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-27-4 (1980); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 84.34.050 (Supp. 1980-198 1).
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ment in the assessed valuation or tax rates applied to the assessed value on
lands where the owners have implemented soil conservation programs.
Other possible types of property tax incentives include: (1) considering con-
servation structures to be improvements and exempting such improvements
from property taxation; (2) providing that additional property taxes paid on
land due to the implementation of soil conservation practices and erection of
structures be credited against state income taxes; and (3) providing credits
in a specified amount against property taxes levied by a local government
while the owner is maintaining a soil conservation program. Each of these
incentives is subject to constitutional challenge depending upon a particular
state's exceptions to the uniformity clause and available enabling legisla-
tion.42 Regardless of the incentive used, district conservationists employed
by SCS at the county level under an agreement with the soil and water
conservation districts could assist in determining compliance with conserva-
tion programs and certify eligibility for tax incentives to the local taxing
body. ACP cost-share funds would be used in conjunction with property tax
incentives.
43
Any property tax incentives enacted by state legislatures should at least
counteract an increase in assessed value of land due to the implementation of
a soil conservation program if the land remains in agricultural or open space
use.44 Soil conservation programs are an improvement to land; therefore,
land upon which conservation practices or structures are established is more
valuable than land without such practices and structures and has a higher
assessed value. Landowners implementing conservation practices or estab-
lishing structures may find themselves paying higher property taxes than
landowners doing nothing. Without property tax incentives, landowners
may not be inclined to implement soil conservation programs.
III. DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENTS FOR LAND PRESERVATION
Since Maryland enacted the first statute in 1957 providing for farmland
property tax reduction,4 5 all other states except Georgia 46 and Missis,-
42. See text accompanying notes 27-34 supra for methods of circumventing the constitu-
tional uniformity clause.
43. For a discussion of ACP cost-share funds see FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS, supra note
3.
44. Landowners would be expected to pay any increase in property taxes if the installation
of a conservation structure resulted in, for example, a residential subdivision with a small
recreational lake.
45. 1957 Md. Laws ch. 680 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b) (1957 & Supp.
1981)); see MD. CONST. art. XV; MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-501 to -515 (Supp. 1981); MD.
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 5-301 to -308 (1974 & Supp. 1981). For a history of the Maryland
farmland preservation statute see Ishee, The Maryland Farmland Use- Value Assessment Law, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON TAXATION OF AGRICULTURAL AND OTHER OPEN LAND 23, 23-
29 (1971); Nielsen, Preservation of Matyland Farmland: A Current Assessment, 8 U. BALT. L. REV.
429, 431-38 (1979).
46. The Georgia Constitution requires that all taxation be uniform upon the same class of
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1,
3; see GA. CODE ANN. § 91A-1002 (1980) which required all real property be taxed. The uni-
formity rule of taxation requires that all property of the same class not absolutely exempt be
taxed alike. Hutchins v. Howard, 211 Ga. 830, 830-31, 89 S.E.2d 183, 186 (1955). Actual pres-
ent "use" of the subject property may be considered one of the factors in determining fair mar-
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sippi47 have adopted legislation granting some kind of differential assess-
ment treatment for agricultural or other types of undeveloped land.48 Some
states have had to amend their constitutions before they could adopt legisla-
tion permitting differential assessments. 49 Virtually all states adopting stat-
utes for differential treatment of farmland employed the use-value
assessment concept. 50 Most state statutes are similar in that each uses a
state-level tax policy designed to reduce the burden of farmland property
taxes and to slow or prevent the conversion of farmland to developed uses.
5 1
The original Maryland statute providing for farmland property tax re-
duction was typical of those of several states and provided simply that
"[l]ands which are actively devoted to farm or agricultural use shall be as-
sessed on the basis of such use, and shall not be assessed as if subdivided
"52 These statutes have been termed "preferential" tax laws because
of the preferential assessment provisions accorded agricultural land. Prefer-
ential tax statutes were criticized because they provided tax relief to land
speculators and failed to alter the pattern or pace of agricultural land con-
version.5 3 These failures led to a second generation of agricultural land tax-
ket value. Martin v. Liberty County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 152 Ga. App. 340, 342, 262 S.E.2d
609, 612 (1979). Lands in Georgia may be assessed based upon their value for agricultural
purposes. Burkhart v. City of Fitzgerald, 137 Ga. 366, 367, 73 S.E. 583, 584 (1912).
47. Taxation shall be uniform and equal throughout Mississippi and property shall be
taxed in proportion to its value. Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 112. The Mississippi legislature has
exempted numerous real properties from advalorem taxes. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 27-31-1 to -117
(1972 & Supp. 1980).
48. B. DAVIES & J. BELDEN, supra note 8, at 4. See also J. KEENE, D. BERRY, R. COUGH-
LIN, J. FARNHAM, E. KELLY, T. PLAUT & A. STRONG, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 2, 4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as UNTAXING OPEN SPACE]. The Arkansas statute
providing for differential tax assessment of farmland was declared unconstitutional. ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 84-483 (1980); Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Pulaski County Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 266 Ark. 64, 582 S.W.2d 942 (1979). The court held that because farm, agricultural, and
timber lands were taxed under the statute according to the use made of the property and not
the market value, which is a requirement of the constitution, the statute is unconstitutional. Id
at 81-82,-582 S.W.2d at 949-50. But see ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
49. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 217 (1901, amended 1978); DEL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1897, amended 1976); KAN. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 12 (1861, amended 1974, 1976); LA. CONST.
art. VII, § 18; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (1820, amended 1978); NEV. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1864,
amended 1978); OHIO CONST. art. II, § 36, art. XII, § 2 (1851, amended 1974); S.C. CONST. art.
X, § 1 (1895, amended 1977); TENN. CONST. art. II, § 28 (1870, amended 1972); TEx. CONST.
art. VIII, §§ 1, 1-d-1 (1876, amended 1978); WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1848, amended 1974).
For a discussion of the constitutional considerations associated with adopting differential assess-
ment statutes see Malone & Ayesh, Comprehensive Land Use Control Through Differential Assessment
and Supplemental Regulation, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 432, 444-45 (1979).
50. Se R. GLOUDEMANS, USE-VALUE FARMLAND ASSESSMENT: THEORY, PRACTICE AND
IMPACT 15-19 (1974).
51. For a discussion of the state statutes see B. DAVIES & J. BELDEN, supra note 8, at 5-32;
R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 50, at 15-25; T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 17-65; Currier,
An Analysis of Differential Taxation as a Method of Maintaining Agnudtural and Open Space Land Uses,
30 U. FLA. L. REV. 821 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Currier, Differential Taxation and Land Use];
Ellingson, Differential Assessment and Local Governmental Controls to Preserve Agricultural Lands, 20 S.D.
L. REV. 548 (1975); Lapping, Bevins, & Herbers, supra note 36, at 369; Malone & Ayesh, supra
note 49, at 432; Myers, Open Space Taxation and State Constitutions, 33 VAND. L. REV. 837 (1980);
Nelson, Differential Assessment of Agrzultural Land in Kansas: A Discusson and Proposal, 25 KAN. L.
REV. 215 (1977); Comment, PreferentialAssessment of Agricultural Property in South Dakota, 22 S.D.
L. REV. 632 (1977).
52. 1957 Md. Laws ch. 680, (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b) (1957 &
Supp. 1981)).
53. See R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 50, at 38-51; T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at
[Vol. 59:3
19821 PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES FOR SOIL CONSERVATION 495
ation statutes, termed "deferred" taxation statutes because all or part of the
tax reduction would be repaid upon conversion of the land to nonagricul-
tural use.54 The benefits to speculators were reduced, but the pace of land
use conversions was not greatly affected.5 5 The failure of deferred taxation
statutes to affect land use decisions significantly led to a third generation of
laws combining use-value assessment with restrictive agreements to prevent
nonagricultural uses of the properties granted tax relief.56 Basically, the
three types of differential assessments are preferential tax laws, deferred tax-
ation, and restrictive agreements.
5 7
A. Types of Differential Assessments
1. Preferential Property Tax Assessments
Under the preferential assessment or use-value approach, agricultural
lands and other eligible open space lands specified by the enabling legisla-
tion are assessed for property taxation purposes on the basis of their value for
agriculture or open space uses, as long as the land is used for those qualifying
purposes. 58 Other potential "highest and best" uses for the land, such as
urban purposes, are not to be considered in establishing the property tax
appraisal.5 9 The criterion in preferential assessment valuation is that land is
valued at its current agricultural or open space use rather than at its market
value or for potential alternative uses that may incorporate potential gains
from converting the land to developed uses.60 Landowners are not penalized
if at any time in the future they convert their eligible land to a nonqualify-
ing land use.6 ' Sixteen states now have preferential property tax assessment
statutes.
62
10-13; Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, Use- Value Assessment Legislation in the United States, 49 LAND
ECON. 206, 209-12 (1973).
54. Some states, including Maryland, changed their preferential tax laws to deferred tax
laws after the preferential laws failed to achieve the results anticipated when enacted. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b) (1957 & Supp. 1981). Other states, including New Jersey and most
of the states which later passed deferred tax laws, were well aware of the earlier experience with
preferential assessment when they chose to enact deferred tax laws. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 54:4-23.1, .2 (West Supp. 1980); Garrison, supra note 39, at 35-47.
55. See note 53 supra; Garrison, supra note 39, at 41-47.
56. See Collin, The California Land Consevation Act: The Easement and Contrast Approach to Open
Land Planning, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON TAXATION OF AGRICULTURAL AND
OTHER OPEN LAND 55-66 (1971) for a summary of the arguments that resulted in the restrictive
agreement provisions of the California statute.
57. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 2;see B. DAVIES &J. BELDEN, supra note 8, at 4;
Barlowe, Ahi, & Bachman, supra note 53, at 206. For a discussion of each type of differential
assessment see T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 2-4: Currier, DLferentlz Taxation and Land
Use, supra note 51, at 826-31; Ellingson, supra note 51, at 555- 70; Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49,
at 446-51; Nelson, supra note 51, at 221-27.
58. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 2; Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, supra note 53, at
206-07; Currier, DLfferential Taxation and Land Use, supra note 52, at 827; Nelson, supra note 51, at
221.; Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 446.
59. Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, supra note 53, at 207; Nelson, supra note 51, at 221.
60. Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, supra note 53, at 207; Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at
446; Nelson, supra note 51, at 221.
61. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 2; Currier, Dierential Taxation and Land Use,
supra note 51, at 827; Ellingson, supra note 51, at 555; Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 446;
Nelson, supra note 51, at 222.
62. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-136, -227 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-479, -480, -483
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Generally, a pure preferential assessment program is the most advanta-
geous one to landowners. Since this type of program provides an abatement
of taxes which would have been imposed on the difference between assessed
value based on fair market value and the assessed value based on agricul-
tural or open space use-value, 63 preferential assessment gives eligible land-
owners a pure tax break or preference. 64 In addition, the tax benefit is
received without any promise from landowners to maintain their land in
current qualifying uses. 65 This lack of penalty allows landowners to pay
taxes upon use-value and realize a windfall gain when the land is urbanized
or developed. 66 Another problem with the preferential assessment approach
is the lack of participation by local governments. States merely dictate, that
lands will be assessed at use-value as long as they are used for designated
purposes,6 7 giving local governments no choice but to grant the assessment if
the landowners meet the requirements of the statutes.
2. Preferential Property Tax Assessments With Deferred Taxation
Deferred taxation statutes add another feature to preferential assess-
ments by imposing a sanction requiring owners of qualifying lands who con-
vert the lands to nonqualifying uses to pay a part or all of the taxes for the
years they were excused from paying prior to conversion.68 Sometimes two
(1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-103 (1973 & Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 8328-
8344 (1975 & Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1977); IDAHO CODE §§ 63-105CC, -202
(Supp. 1981); 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 240, § 1; IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-4-13 (Burns 1978);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 441.21 (West Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:2301-:2309 (West
Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 137.017-.026 (Vernon Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-36-
20 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 40-51.2-06, -07, -16, 57-02-27 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 21-109 (West 1978); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 5-5-10.1 to -10.4 (Supp. 1980); W. VA.
CODE §§ 11-3-1 to -8-5 (1974 & Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. § 39-2-103 (1977); see B. DAVIES & J.
BELDEN, supra note 8, at 4; UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 4 for a list of the states.
For a brief summary of the statutes see B. DAVIES & J. BELDEN, supra note 8, at 5-10; T. HADY
& A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 17-65; Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 458-73.
63. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 3.
64. Ellingson, supra note 51, at 557; Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 447; Nelson, supra
note 51, at 223. Preferential assessments satisfy one goal of states in adopting differential assess-
ment statutes, which is to provide tax relief to farmers. Use-value assessment may not always
reduce the assessed value of agricultural land because there may be little non-farm demand for
agricultural land in some rural areas and farmland may already be assessed at its use-value in
other areas. In the first case, market value may be identical to agricultural use-value, and in the
second case, agricultural land may be underassessed relative to other types of property. See R.
GLOUDEMANS, supra note 50, at 28-30 for a discussion of underassessment of farmland. For
examples of use-value assessment resulting in increased farmland assessments in Connecticut,
see Fellows, supra note 39, at 51-54.
65. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 2; Currier, supra note 51, at 827; Ellingson, supra
note 51, at 555; Lapping, Bevins, & Herbers, supra note 36, at 371; Malone & Ayesh, supra note
49, at 446-47.
66. Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 447. Preferential assessments may not satisfy the
second goal of differential assessment statutes to preserve agricultural and open space land be-
cause of the counterbalancing effects of land speculation. See Ellingson, supra note 51, at 557.
67. Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 446; Ellingson, supra note 51, at 555.
68. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 2; UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 3;
Currier, Diffrential Taxation and Land Use, supra note 51, at 828; Ellingson, supra note 51, at 558;
Lapping, Bevins, & Herbers, supra note 36, at 377; Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 447-48;
Nelson, supra note 51, at 223.
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assessed values are determined annually for each qualifying parcel of land.
69
The value at which the land is assessed on the tax rolls corresponds to its use-
value in its current qualifying use, as in preferential assessment. 70 A second
value representing the assessed value that would have been assigned to the
land in the absence of a deferred taxation statute, which means an assess-
ment according to the land's current market value, is also recorded. 7 1 Taxes
are paid on the basis of the land's use-value assessment as long as it is being
used for qualifying purposes under the statute. 72 When the land is sold or
converted to a nonqualifying use, the state or local government recaptures
all or part of the difference between the use-value taxes paid and the taxes
that would have been paid under a market value assessment. 73 Twenty-five
states currently have deferred taxation statutes.
7 4
Deferred or "rollback" tax payments when land is transferred from a
qualifying to a nonqualifying use vary from state to state. 75 Such payments
are ordinarily limited to a given percentage of the deferred taxes or to a
rollback for a limited number of years. 76 The number of years' benefit that
will be recaptured ranges from two 77 to ten78 with an average of about five
69. Se-, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 13 2 .45 0 (2)(g) (Supp. 1980); see Currier, Differentia/ Taxation
and Land Use, supra note 51, at 828.
70. Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, supra note 53, at 207; Ellingson, supra note 51, at 558; Ma-
lone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 447.
71. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 2; Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, supra note 53, at
207. The assessor in other programs need not make a yearly calculation of the fair market value
of all enrolled land. Rather, the assessor determines the fair market value at the time of conver-
sion to a nonqualifying use and a charge is levied based upon the current difference between the
fair market value and the use-value. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 308.397 (1977); see Currier,
Differential Taxatton and Land Use, supra note 51, at 829.
72. Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, supra note 53, at 207.
73. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 2; Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, supra note 53, at
207; Ellingson, supra note 51, at 558; Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 447-48.
74. ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 217 (1901, amended 1978); ALA. CODE § 40-8-1 (Supp. 1981);
ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.035 (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-131c to -131k, 12-63, -107a to
-107e (1972 & Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 501, 501a to 50la-3, 501e to 501h-l,
621.02 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); KAN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 132.010, .020,
.450, .454 (1970 & Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 1101-1118 (1964 & Supp.
1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 19(b)-(f) (1980 & Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 61A,
§§ 1-24 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 273.111,.112,.12,.13(6) (West
1969 & Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-6-133, -7-201 to -215 (1979); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 77-1343 to -1348 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 361A.010-.280 (1977); NJ. $TAT. ANN.
§§ 54:4-23.1 to .23 (West Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-277.2 to .7 (1979 & Supp. 1981);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5713.30-.99 (Page 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 215.203, 308.345-.406
(1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5490.1-.13 (Purdon Supp. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 44-5-12,
-39, 44-27-1 to -6 (1980 & Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE §§ 12-43-220 to -230 (1976 & Supp. 1980);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-611, -650 to -658 (1976 & Supp. 1980); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
arts. 7174A, 7174B (Vernon Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-5-86 to -105 (1953 & Supp.
1981); VA. CODE §§ 58-769.4 to -769.15:1 (1974 & Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 84.34.010-.922 (Supp. 1981); see B. DAVIES & J. BELDEN, supra note 8, at 4; UNTAXING OPEN
SPACE, supra note 48, at 4 for a listing of states. For a brief summary of the statutes see B.
DAVIES & J. BELDEN, supra note 8, at 11-26; T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 17-65;
Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 458-73.
75. Currier, D6erentI'al Taxatian and Land Use, supra note 51, at 828-29; see UNTAXING OPEN
SPACE, supra note 48, at 4.
76. Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, supra note 53, at 207.
77. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.8 (West Supp. 1980).
78. OR. REV. STAT. § 308.404 (1977).
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years. 79 A recent trend, particularly in states such as Connecticut8 ° that
have modified an existing preferential assessment statute, has been to base
the "rollback" or penalty tax on the market value of the land in the year of
conversion rather than on deferred taxes. 8' Some states require that interest
be paid on the amount of rollback taxes,
82 while others do not. 83
3. Preferential Taxation with Restrictive Agreements
The third type of differential assessment, used by eight states (Penn-
sylvania has both deferred taxation and restrictive agreements), are restric-
tive agreements. 84 This approach requires landowners, if they desire to
receive tax concessions, to contract voluntarily with the appropriate govern-
mental unit usually for a term of ten years8 5 to keep their lands in a qualify-
ing use.8 6 Generally, either party must give several years' notice if they
intend to change land use. After notice is given, the land either reverts to
standard taxation or some type of charges are imposed.8 7 Changing the use
of the land prior to termination of the agreement or without giving proper
notice of termination is a breach of the agreement and will lead to the impo-
sition of either rollback taxes or a penalty.
88
Usually, landowners are required to petition the state or local govern-
ment to receive the tax relief. In evaluating petitions, the state or local gov-
ernment balances the general welfare interests in preserving the land in its
present condition against the loss of revenue that will result from reduced
taxes. In granting restrictive agreements, state or local governments may
choose the area or land they want to preserve and contract with a limited
number of landowners. Moreover, this contract participation allows state
79. Currier, Differential Taxaton and Land Use, supra note 51, at 828-29; see UNTAXING OPEN
SPACE, supra note 48, at 4.
80. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-504a (Supp. 1981).
81. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 2.
82. Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Utah, and Washington require that interest be paid on the rollback taxes. See UNTAx-
ING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 4.
83. Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah do not require that interest be paid on
the amount of the rollback. See UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 4-5; Barlowe, Ahl, &
Bachman, supra note 53, at 209.
84. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51295 (West Supp. 1981); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§ 421-430.5, 431-439.4 (West Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 246-10, -12 to -12.2 (1976 &
Supp. 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.701-.719 (Supp. 1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 79:1-:29, 79-A:1-:26 (1970 & Supp. 1979); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTs. LAw §§ 300-307 (McKinney
1972 & Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11941-11947 (Purdon Supp. 1980); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 3751-3760 (Supp. 1981); WIS. STAT. §§ 71.09(11), 91.01-79 (Supp. 1981). For a
brief summary of the statutes see B. DAVIES & J. BELDEN, supra note 8, at 27-32; T. HADY & A.
SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 17-65; Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 458-73.
85. See UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 4.
86. Currier, Diferential Taxation and Land Use, supra note 51, at 829. Se a/ro T. HADY & A.
SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 3; UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 5; Malone & Ayesh, supra
note 49, at 449. Basically, these agreements prohibit the development of agricultural, forest, or
open space lands for a specified period of time.
87. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 3.
88. Id ; Currier, Differential Taxation and Land Use, supra note 51, at 829; Malone & Ayesh,
supra note 49, at 449.
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and local governments to monitor the program to minimize abuses. 89
Traditional market value assessment need not be abandoned under re-
strictive agreements. In appraising land at its "highest and best" use, tax
assessors would consider the restrictions placed in the agreement on use of
the land. Such restrictions would in effect preclude the assessor from consid-
ering the land's development potential because development is prohibited.
As a result, assessment for tax purposes is based on the land's allowable use,
such as farming, forestry, or open space. If the agreement is breached, an-
nual rollback taxes would equal the difference between the highest and best
use assessment with the restriction (farming, forestry, or open space) and the
highest and best use assessment without it (urban development).9o However,
because of a possible breach, assessors still must determine the use-value as-
sessment of the land for development purposes either annually or at the end
of the agreement, to calculate rollback taxes.
B. Eligibility for Dierential Assessments
The use-value assessment statutes of the various states vary considerably
on land uses permitted under differential assessment, minimum parcel size
for eligibility, and prior use and productivity requirements.9 1 All differen-
tial taxation programs include land used for agricultural purposes among
those land uses eligible for special tax treatment.9 2 Qualifying agricultural
uses are usually broadly defined in the legislation creating the differential
taxation program. 93 Some state statutes leave the meaning of "agricultural
use" largely to the local assessor's judgment,94 while other states attempt to
define it.
9 5
Forest lands are eligible for differential assessment in several states
96
89. Malone & Ayesh, supra note 51, at 449-50; Nelson, supra note 51, at 225-26.
90. Malone & Ayesh, supra note 51, at 450.
91. See T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 2-5; Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, supra note
53, at 207-09. For a complete description of the provisions of various laws, see B. DAVIES & J.
BELDEN, supra note 8, at 5-32.
92. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 4; Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, supra note 53, at
208; Currier, Differential Taxation and Land Use, supra note 51, at 824. Some states restrict the
program strictly to agricultural use of the land. See UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 4.
93. Currier, Diffirential Taxation and Land Use, supra note 51, at 825. For example, differen-
tial taxation is available in Florida only on land used primarily for bonafide agricultural pur-
poses. The phrase is defined to mean "good faith commercial agriculture use of the land." FLA.
STAT. § 193.461(3)(b) (1977).
94. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b)(1) (1975). In October 1960, the Maryland De-
partment of Assessments and Taxation listed 29 criteria which local assessors could use to judge
whether land was actively devoted to agricultural use. See Ishee, supra note 45, at 26-27.
95. Se, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 215.203(2)(a) (1977) which defines "farm use" as "the cur-
rent employment of land including that portion of such lands under buildings supporting ac-
cepted farming practices for the purpose of obtaining a profit in money by raising, harvesting
and selling crops or by the feeding, breeding, management and sale of, or the produce of, live-
stock, poultry, fur-bearing animals or honeybees or for dairying and the sale of dairy products
or any other agricultural or horticultural use or animal husbandry or any combination thereof."
96. Several states have statutes specifically including forestry as an eligible use. See, e.g.,
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-136(A)(1)(e) (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. § 193.461(5) (1977); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.3 (West Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-36-20(B) (1978); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 59-5-88 (1953). Some states also have separate statutory provisions for taxing forest
lands that provide greater benefits to landowners than the differential assessment statutes. See,
e.g., WIs. STAT. §§ 77.01-.14, .16 (1977 & Supp. 1981).
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while other states provide some coverage for undeveloped land of scenic, en-
vironmental, ecological, or historical significance. 97 Still other states allow
tax relief for open space land 98 and land in certain recreational uses. 99 The
primary beneficiary of recreational use eligibility has been country clubs.1°°
Definitional problems become especially acute if the legislation at-
tempts to distinguish between "bonafide farmers" and "speculators," as ap-
plied to the conferment of benefits. To make this distinction, several
approaches have been devised.' 0 ' One approach is to establish a minimum
acreage requirement. Among those states that do specify a minimum, most
require tracts of five or ten acres.1 0 2 Another approach is to require that
some proportion of the landowner's income derive from farming. One state
mandates that at least ten percent of the landowner's income be from farm-
ing.'0 3 An alternative to the proportion of income requirement is to require
that a minimum value of agricultural products be produced from the land
over a time period or annually per acre. 104
Differential assessment statutes generally require that eligible lands
have prior histories of agricultural or open space use.' 0 5 Delaware, New
Jersey, and Utah, for example, require that the land have been used for
agricultural purposes during the preceding two years;10 6 Texas for five of the
last seven preceding years; 10 7 and South Dakota for the five preceding
years. ' 08 A variation of the agricultural use history provision limits eligibil-
ity by requiring that the land be owned by the owner or his family. Minne-
sota, for example, requires that the farm either be the owner's homestead or
be owned by family members related to each other within the third degree of
kindred. 109
97. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-136(A)(7) (Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
36, §§ 1102(6), 1103, 1105, 1111 (1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.702(8), .706 (Supp.
1980); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 361A.040, .050, .170-.250 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-
A:2(VII), :5 (Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 44-5-12, 44-27-2(c), -5 (1980 & Supp. 1981); VA.
CODE §§ 58-769.4, .5(d), .9 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 84.34.010, 020(1), .030 (Supp.
1981); see T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 4; UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 4.
98. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-107b(c), -107e, -107f (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 11941(4), 11943 (Purdon Supp. 1980); see T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 4-5; UN-
TAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 4.
99. Eg., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-136 (Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. § 193-501 (Supp.
1981); see Currier, Diffirenia/ Taxation and Land Use, supra note 51, at 825-26.
100. Eg., MD. CODE ANN. art. 81, § 19(e) (1980); see T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 10,
at 39. Currier, Diferential Taxation and Land Use, supra note 52, at 826.
101. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 4-5.
102. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8329 (Supp. 1980).
103. ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.035(c) (Supp. 1981).
104. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.111(6) (West Supp. 1981) (gross of $300 plus a $10 mini-
mum value of production per tillable acre); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 137.017(4) (Vernon Supp. 1981)
($2,500 annually over a five year period); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.5 (West Supp. 1980) (gross
production averaging at least $500 per year during the two year period immediately preceding
the application); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.34.020(2) (Supp. 1981) (minimum of $100 per
acre for three of the five preceding calendar years).
105. See UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 49, at 4.
106. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8329 (Supp. 1980); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.5 (West Supp.
1981-1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-5-87(1) (Supp. 1981).
107. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7174A(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
108. S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 5-5-10.1(3) (Supp. 1980).
109. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.111(3) (West Supp. 1981).
[Vol. 59:3
1982] PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES FOR SOIL CONSERVATION 501
C. Participation i'n Differential Assessment Programs
In several states, use-value assessment applies automatically to all quali-
fying lands whether or not the owner seeks use-value assessment. 10 In other
states, such as California, Minnesota, and Rhode Island, owners must apply
to have their lands classified for use-value assessment.I 1 ' Applications must
be submitted annually for use-value assessments in some states."12 Gener-
ally, use-value assessment is automatic in preferential assessment states, but
must be applied for by landowners in deferred taxation and restrictive agree-
ment states."1 3 Local governments, however, ordinarily do not have a choice
in granting a differential assessment to landowners if they apply and the
property meets the statutory definitions of agricultural, forestry, or open
space use.'
14
D. Valuation for Djfferentzal Assessments
Systems for determining use-value of agricultural, forest, and open
space lands under differential assessment vary considerably from state to
state. Some states leave the method of determining use-value completely to
the assessor's discretion.' 5 Other states specifically list the criteria for assess-
ment," t 6 while in many states the responsibility for preparing assessment
guidelines is delegated to state tax commissions." 7 The favored methods for
determining use-value vary, falling into two main groups." t8 Sale prices of
comparable lands in agricultural use are used in some states." 9 In the ab-
sence of comparable sales, some states use the capitalization of income
method or a soil productivity rating system.12
0
E. Circuit-Breaker to Determine Tax Relief
A variation on the restrictive agreement approach is exemplified by
Michigan and Wisconsin, which combine such agreements with "circuit-
110. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-227(B) (Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-
103(5) (1973 & Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 40-51.2-06, 57-02-27; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 21-109; Wyo. STAT. § 39-2-103(b) (1977).
111. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51241 (West Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.111(8) (West
Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 44-27-3 to -5 (1980).
112. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-107c(a), 107d(c), 107e(b) (Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 9, § 8336 (Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.6(c) (West Supp. 1981-1982);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.34.030 (Supp. 1981).
113. See UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 4.
114. T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 3.
115. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 441.21. (West Supp. 1980).
116. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 193.461(6)(a) (Supp. 1981); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 5-5-10.3
(1980).
117. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 8335(a), 8337 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-36-
20(D) (1978).
118. Currier, Differentzal Taxation and Land Use, supra note 52, at 823.
119. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 308.345(2) (1977).
120. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-103(5)(a) (Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 137.026
(Vernon Supp. 1981); see R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 50, at 15-17. The capitalization of in-
come method yields a use-value assessment when the annual income from the use of the land is
divided by a capitalization rate that represents a reasonable return on the landowner's invest-
ment. Soil productivity rating systems involve valuation based on the quality of the land for
agricultural purposes.
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breaker" tax relief.'2 1 Under this variation, property taxes exceeding certain
income percentages, the "threshold" income, are deducted from state income
taxes or rebated directly to the taxpayers.1 22 The Michigan law provides
that an owner of eligible farmland may deduct from his state income tax
liability the amount by which his property tax exceeds seven percent of
household income.1 23 On farms between five and forty acres, gross sales of
agricultural products must total at least $200 per acre per year in order for
the landowner to be eligible, and on farms greater than forty acres the land
must be devoted primarily to agricultural use. ' 24 If the landowner wishes to
participate, he must sign a ten-year agreement in which the land is restricted
to agricultural use.'
25
IV. TAX INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVATION PROGRAMS UNDER
PREFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT
Colorado, the state chosen as an example of preferential property tax
assessment, enacted legislation in 1967 allowing agricultural lands to be as-
sessed at their use-value.' 26 Later statutes gave various types of favorable
tax treatment to certain open space lands,' 27 historic properties,' 28 agricul-
tural equipment 12 9 and supplies,130 alternative energy source systems, '31 for-
ests,' 3 2 and land and facilities used to produce alcohol for motor fuel.
133
Taxes paid on certain types of pollution control property qualify for credit
against state income taxes.'
3 4
121. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.710 (Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT. § 71.09(11) (Supp.
1981). "Circuit-breakers" on farm property taxes are based on the assumption that the gross (or
net) farm receipts are a measure of the farm's ability to pay these taxes and that the gross (or
net) tax rate of each farm is a yardstick in determining the eligibility for and the amount of
property tax relief. Lockner & Kim, Circutl-Breakers on Farm-Property-Tar Overload: A Case Study,
26 NAT'L TAX J. 233, 235 (1973).
122. Lockner & Kim, supra note 121, at 235-36; Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 451.
Circuit-breakers are a feasible means of alleviating the impact of farm property taxes. When-
ever an individual farm's property taxes with reference to its gross or net receipts exceed the
ceiling gross or net tax rate determined by state policy makers, the excess amount is regarded as
a "farm-property-tax overload" which is subject to tax relief. The farm-property-tax overload
can be then alleviated by means of a rebate from the state government to the farmer or a credit
subtracted from the farmer's state income tax liability otherwise payable. Lockner & Kim, supra
note 121, at 233.
123. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.7 10(1) (Supp. 1980).
124. Id §§ 554.702(6)(a), (b).
125. Id. § 554.704(1).
126. 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 424, § 4, as amended by 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 335, § 1,
1973 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 408, § 1, 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 336, § 1, 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws ch.
154, § 3,1977 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 494, § 2 (codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 39-1-103(5) (a), (6)
(1973 & Supp. 1980)); see B. DAVIES & J. BELDEN, supra note 8, at 4-5; T. HADY & A. SIBOLD,
supra note 9, at 2, 24; UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 48, at 4.
127. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-103(7) (Supp. 1980).
128. Id § 39-1-104(5).
129. Id § 39-1-104(7).
130. Id § 39-1-104(8).
131. Id § 39-1-104(6).
132. Id 39-3-103 (1973).
133. Id §§ 39-1-104(13)(b), 14(b) (Supp. 1980).
134. Id § 39-5-131.
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A. Uniformity of Property Taxation
Colorado's constitutional uniformity clause provides that taxes shall be
uniform upon each of the various classes of real and personal property lo-
cated within the territorial limits of the tax levying authority.' 35 In addi-
tion, the clause provides that taxes shall be levied and collected under
general laws which shall prescribe regulations that secure a just valuation for
taxing all real and personal property.'
36
The uniformity clause permits the legislature to define various classes of
real and personal property and divide such property into separate and dis-
tinct classes for purposes of taxation 137 if the classification is reasonable and
not palpably arbitrary.138 A classification system conforms to the uniformity
clause and equal protection provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution if it is based upon the nature and use of the prop-
erty justifying the classification, 139 bears some reasonable relationship to a
legitimate public purpose or policy,' 40 rests upon some substantial differ-
ences having a reasonable relation to the property or persons dealt with,'
4 1
and the same means and methods are applied impartially to all the constitu-
ents within each class so that the classification system operates equally upon
all persons and corporations in like circumstances. 142 Different methods
may be used to assess value for different classes of property and different
135. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3. This section requiring uniformity of all taxes is the only
constitutional limitation upon the taxing power of the state. City & County of Denver v. Lewin,
106 Colo. 331, 339, 105 P.2d 854, 860 (1940). See W. NEWHOUSE, supra note 4, at 10, 350-59 for
a discussion of the classification and uniformity provisions of the Colorado Constitution.
136. Board of County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mountain News Printing Co., 15 Colo. App. 189,
196, 61 P. 494, 497 (1900).
137. Each of the various classes of property may be taxed for a specific purpose. District 50
Metropolitan Recreation Dist. v. Burnside, 167 Colo. 425, 430, 448 P.2d 788, 790 (1968).
138. American Mobilehome Ass'n v. Dolan, 191 Colo. 433, 438, 553 P.2d 758, 762 (1976);
Western Elec. Co. v. Weed, 185 Colo. 340, 353-54, 524 P.2d 1369, 1376 (1974); District 50
Metropolitan Recreation Dist. v. Burnside, 167 Colo. 425, 430, 448 P.2d 788, 790 (1968); Foster
v. Hart Consol. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 471, 122 P. 48, 52 (1912); Ames v. People ex re.
Temple, 26 Colo. 83, 103, 56 P. 656, 663 (1899); People ex ret Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Hender-
son, 12 Colo. 369, 375, 21 P. 144, 146-47 (1888). Except for the constitutional provision prohib-
iting the taxation of ditches, canals, and flumes separately from the land they irrigate if the
same person owns both the structures and land, the legislature is "wholly unrestricted in divid-
ing property into classes for purposes of taxation." Ames v. People cx rel Temple, 26 Colo. at
103, 56 P. at 663, The court in People ex ret. Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Henderson stated:
The uniformity required is a uniformity of taxes, not a uniformity of procedure, or of
rules or regulations to govern the levy thereof. To demand absolute uniformity in the
later regard would tend strongly to defeat the prior and supreme requirement. The
constitution leaves this matter with the legislature, simply directing that the regula-
tions shall be made by general law, and shall secure just valuations.
12 Colo. at 375, 21 P. at 147.
139. Foster v. Hart Consol. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 471, 122 P. 48, 52 (1912); Ames v.
People rx ret Temple, 26 Colo. 83, 103, 56 P. 656, 663 (1899).
140. American Mobilehome Ass'n v. Dolan, 191 Colo. 443, 438, 553 P.2d 758, 762 (1976);
Western Elec. Co. v. Weed, 185 Colo. 340, 353-54, 524 P.2d 1369, 1376 (1974); District 50
Metropolitan Recreation Dist. v. Burnside, 167 Colo. 425, 431, 448 P.2d 788, 791 (1968).
141. American Mobilehome Ass'n v. Dolan, 191 Colo. 433, 438, 553 P.2d 758, 762 (1976);
District 50 Metropolitan Recreation Dist. v. Burnside, 167 Colo. 425, 431, 488 P.2d 788, 791
(1968).
142. Western Elec. Co. v. Weed, 185 Colo. 340, 353-54, 524 P.2d 1369, 1376 (1974); Ames v.
People tx ret. Temple, 26 Colo. 83, 103, 56 P. 656, 663 (1899).
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rates of taxation may be applied to different classes 14 3 provided that the
assessment method prescribed for a particular class or rate applied imposes a
uniform burden of taxation within the class, 14 4 is just and equitable, and
does not exempt the class from bearing its fair proportion of the tax burden
as compared with other classes of property.145 Courts will not interfere with
a classification system unless it is based on an unreasonable distinction or
difference with reference to similar kinds of property 146 or is calculated to
produce gross inequality and nonuniformity in the assessment of different
property belonging to the same class.
14 7
Publicly-owned property as well as property used exclusively for reli-
gious, educational, and charitable purposes is specifically exempt from taxa-
tion under the constitution.148 The constitution further provides that the
legislature may not exempt any other property from taxation. 149 This provi-
sion, however, does not prevent the legislature from exempting increases in
value to the property due to, for example, planting trees.1
5 0
B. Valuation for Tax Assessment
The actual value of all real' 5' and personal' 52 property, other than ag-
ricultural lands exclusive of building improvements on it 15 3 and land used
for open space-residential purposes, 154 is determined by the assessor of the
county where the property is located. The assessor takes several factors into
143. American Mobilehome Ass'n v. Dolan, 191 Colo. 433, 438, 553 P.2d 758, 761 (1976);
Foster v. Hart Consol. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 471, 122 P. 48, 52 (1912).
144. Foster v. Hart Consol. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 471, 122 P. 48, 52 (1912). The uni-
formity which is required is that all persons who are members of any class, or all property
logically belonging in a given classification, shall receive treatment equal to that accorded all
other persons or properties in the same class. District 50 Metropolitan Recreation Dist. v. Burn-
side, 167 Colo. 425, 430, 448 P.2d 788, 790 (1968).
145. Foster v. Hart Consol. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 471, 122 P. 48, 52 (1912).
146. Citizens' Comm. for Fair Property Taxation v. Warner, 127 Colo. 121, 130, 254 P.2d
1005, 1010 (1953); People ex re. Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Henderson, 12 Colo. 369, 375, 21 P.
144, 146-47 (1888).
147. City & County of Denver v. Lewin, 106 Colo. 331, 336, 105 P.2d 854, 858 (1940);
Foster v. Hart Consol. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 468, 122 P.2d 48, 51 (1912). The court in
Ames v. People ex rel. Temple, 26 Colo. 83, 105, 56 P. 656, 663 (1899), stated: "In the method of
laying a tax, either as to the assessment or the apportionment, the general assembly is not re-
stricted by the constitution, and, unless the legislature is palpably unjust, oppressive or inade-
quate, courts will not substitute their judgement for that of the legislature."
148. COLO. CONsT. art. X, §§ 4, 5. See Crockett, The Problem of Tax Exempt Property in Colo-
rado, 19 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 22 (1946) for a discussion of tax-exempt property.
149. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 6; see Carlisle v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 8 Colo. 320, 324, 7 P.
164, 166 (1885), which held that the constitution and laws passed pursuant to it subject to
taxation all real and personal property within the state that is not expressly exempted by law.
150. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-3-103 (1973). See also id § 39-1-104(5) (Supp. 1980) which
provides that the inclusion on the state register of historic properties adds no value to the as-
sessed value of the property.
151. Real property includes all interests in land and improvements. Id § 39-1-102(14)
(1973).
152. Personal property means everything which is the subject of ownership and which is not
included within the term "real property." Id. § 39-1-102(11).
153. See id §§ 39-1-103(5)(a), (6) (1973 & Supp. 1980). See id. § 39-1-103(6) (1973 & Supp.
1980) for a definition of agricultural lands.
154. See id § 39-1-103(7) (Supp. 1980). Land used for open space-residential purposes
means land up to 35 acres in size that the owner uses partly for residential and related purposes
and partly for open space. Id § 39-1-102(7.5).
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consideration, 55 including the property's location and desirability, func-
tional use, 156 current replacement cost less depreciation, comparison with
other properties of known or recognized value, market value in the ordinary
course of trade, earning or productive capacity, and, if practicable, the ap-
praisal value for loan purposes on comparable properties. 15 7 The value of
unimproved land, 15 3 except for portions used for open space, is determined
by taking into account the same factors as for other nonagricultural property
in addition to considering the amount of time ne&ssary to realize potential
future values.1
59
The actual value of agricultural land, exclusive of building improve-
ments,160 is determined by considering the earning or productive capacity of
the land during a reasonable period of time, capitalized at a rate of eleven-
and-one-half percent. 16 1 Determination of the actual value of land used for
open space-residential purposes is dependent upon the parcel's size and the
use made of the parcel. 162 The actual value of small parcels used for residen-
tial and related purposes is determined by the same method as that used to
determine the actual value of nonagricultural land,' 63 while the actual value
of larger parcels used for open space purposes is a certain percentage, de-
pending upon its size, of the actual value determined in the same manner as
used for small parcels.' 64 Increases in the value of private lands because of
the planting of trees are not to be taken into account when determining the
actual value of the land for thirty years from the date of planting.
165
Valuation for assessment of all taxable property, except for agricultural
equipment and supplies, land, facilities used to produce alcohol for motor
fuel, and historical property, is thirty percent of the actual value as deter-
mined by the assessor. 66 The assessment must be applied uniformly to the
actual value of the various classes and subclasses of real property located
within the territorial limits of the tax-levying authority. 67 For each year
155. Id § 39-1-103(5)(a).
156. Assessors must take applicable land use laws or regulations which limit the use of the
land into consideration when determining functional use. Id § 39-1-103(5)(b) (Supp. 1980).
157. Id § 39-1-103(5)(a).
158. Unimproved land is land with no buildings or structures suitable for residential, com-
mercial, or industrial use and that the owner does not use for commercial or industrial purposes.
Id
159. Id
160. Agricultural building improvements are not valued and appraised as agricultural land,
but as other real property. See id..
161. Id To qualify land for assessment as agricultural land, the owner must have used the
land for the previous two years, and be currently using it, primarily for profit by raising and
selling crops or livestock or their products or for horticultural use. Id § 39-1-103(6)(a)(I) (Supp.
1980). In addition, the land must continue to have been in actual agricultural use. Id § 39-1-
103(6)(a)(II) (1973).
162. See id. § 39-1-103(7) (Supp. 1980).
163. Id. § 39-1-103(7)(a).
164. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 39-1-103(7)(b) (Supp. 1980). The percentage is 50 for parcels 4
acres or less and 25 for parcels between 4 and 30 acres.
165. Id. § 39-3-103 (1973).
166. Id § 39-1-104(1).
167. Id Valuation fdr assessment need not equal full valuation; however, it must be equal
and uniform. People ex rel. Colorado Tax Comm'n v. Pitcher, 56 Colo. 343, 350, 138 P. 509, 512
(1914).
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after 1980, the valuation for assessment of all agricultural equipment is five
percent of actual value. 168 For each year after 1977, the assessed value of
agricultural supplies is five percent of actual value. 16 9 Assessed value of
property used to produce alcohol utilized in motor fuel for the taxable years
1980 through 1984 is two percent of actual value in the first year of assess-
ment, nine percent in the second year, sixteen percent in the third year,
twenty-three percent in the fourth year, and thirty percent thereafter. 17 0
Certain factors are prohibited by statute from increasing the assessed
value of property. Any increase in the valuation of structures, buildings, or
improvements in or on which an alternative energy device is installed, which
is attributable to that device, will not be included in determining the as-
sessed value of the structures, buildings, or improvements. 17' Also, a prop-
erty's assessed value may not be increased when the property is added to the
state register of historic properties.172
Improvements 1 73 are generally appraised and valued by the assessor
separately from the land. 174 The exception to that rule is improvements
other than buildings on land, such as water rights and fences, which are used
solely and exclusively for agricultural purposes. These types of improve-
ments are appraised and valued with the land as a unit.' 75 A constitutional
provision provides that ditches, canals, and flumes owned and used by indi-
viduals or corporations for irrigating land are not to be taxed separately so
long as they are owned and used exclusively for such purposes.
1 76
C. Implementation of Tax Incentives for Conservation Programs
The Colorado uniformity clause, which allows general classification of
property by the legislature,' 77 may permit a variety of property tax incen-
tives for implementing soil conservation programs. Such programs may be
used in conjunction with preferential or use-value assessments for agricul-
tural or open space lands by requiring the establishment of conservation
practices as a prerequisite to the favorable tax treatment. Possibilities also
exist under the constitution for adjusting the assessed valuation or tax rates
applied to the assessed value in order to implement soil conservation pro-
grams, exempting from property taxation improvements due to conservation
168. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-104(7)(a) (Supp. 1980).
169. Id § 39-1-104(8).
170. Id §§ 39-1-104(13)(b), (14)(b).
171. Id § 39-1-104(6)(d).
172. Id § 39-1-104(5).
173. Improvements include all structures, buildings, fixtures, fences erected upon the land
and water rights fixed to the land. Id § 39-1-102(7) (1973).
174. Id § 39-5-105(1) (Supp. 1980).
175. Id
176. COLO. CONsT. art. X, § 3. This provision prevents double taxation by forbidding val-
uation of ditches, canals, and flumes as "improvements" separately from the water they carry
since the value of a water right and the structures carrying the water are already reflected in the
assessment of the land they irrigate. Empire Land & Canal Co. v. County Treasurer, 1 Colo.
App. 205, 212, 28 P. 482, 484 (1891), rev'd, 21 Colo. 244, 40 P. 449 (1895).
177. See COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3. Colorado, unlike some other states, does not have an
exemption specifically for farmland or open space land, but such lands may be exempt from the
uniformity of taxation by the general classification provisions.
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programs, and crediting additional property taxes caused by implementing
soil conservation programs against state income taxes.
1. Differential Taxation of Lands
Colorado's statute authorizing preferential assessment for agricultural
lands 178 and certain open space-residential lands' 79 could be easily amended
to require the implementation of recommended soil conservation programs
as a condition to eligibility for use-value assessment. Owners failing to main-
tain recommended soil conservation programs would lose eligibility to have
their lands valued for agricultural or open space-residential uses. Instead of
use-value assessments being automatic, the soil conservation districts, with
the assistance of the SCS district conservationists, could certify on an annual
basis the eligibility of agricultural or open space-residential lands for prefer-
ential assessments based on the maintenance of recommended soil conserva-
tion programs.180 Such an amendment to the preferential assessment statute
would not conflict with the uniformity clause of the constitution because the
amendment does not create a new class of property, but rather adds a fur-
ther restriction for eligibility into the agricultural or open space classes.
Even if a new class of property is created, the Colorado Supreme Court has
held that the legislature is wholly unrestricted in dividing property into
classes for purposes of taxation so long as the classification is based upon the
nature and use of the property justifying it.' 8 1
The implementation of conservation programs as a prerequisite to pref-
erential assessment has the effect of forcing such programs on those otherwise
legitimately involved in an agricultural or open space enterprise. Force can
be justified because one of the purposes of preferential assessment statutes is
to maintain land in productive agricultural use. 18 2 Another purpose is to
control the nonpoint source pollution problems associated with soil erosion
from agricultural lands. 18 3 Conservation programs are essential for main-
taining land in good agricultural use. Statutes relating to the possible en-
forcement of conservation programs upon landowners are not new in
Colorado. Soil conservation districts may adopt and enforce land use regula-
tions,184 and subdividers are required to consider conservation programs as a
prerequisite for subdivision plat approval. 18 5 Soil conservation district
boards review such plats and make recommendations regarding soil suitabil-
ity, floodwater problems, and watershed protection.'88 Landowners may be
faced with undue financial hardship if they are required to erect structures
178. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-103(6)(a)(1) (Supp. 1980).
179. Id. § 39-1-103(7).
180. The powers and duties of the soil conservation district may have to be expanded. See
id § 35-70-108 (1973).
181. Foster v. Hart Consol. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 471, 122 P. 48, 52 (1912); Ames v.
People ex rel. Temple, 26 Colo. 83, 103, 56 P. 656, 663 (1899).
182. ee Currier, Differental Taxation and Land Use, supra note 51, at 830; Ellingson, supra note
51, at 553-54; Malone & Ayesh, supra note 49, at 432-35, 443-44.
183. See THE NiNTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 118-19, 122.
184. COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-70-109 (1973).
185. see ad § 30-28-133 (1973 & Supp. 1980).
186. Id § 30-28-136(1)() (1973).
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to comply with the conservation requirements for preferential assessment.
Such hardships may be alleviated by inserting a provision in the statute
which provides that compliance with certain programs is not required unless
ACP cost-share funds are available to assist the landowner.
2. Adjustments in Assessed Valuation or Tax Rates
Adjustments in the assessed valuation of land or in the tax rate applied
to the assessed value may provide incentives for implementing soil conserva-
tion programs. Assessed valuation or tax rates may be set at different levels
for lands upon which qualifying programs have been implemented. In en-
acting legislation setting the level of adjustment, a state has to determine
how much promoting soil conservation is worth financially and whether it is
in the best public interest to lower taxes on land with a conservation pro-
gram. Adjustments would have the effect of lowering taxes for activities
which increase land values. A way around this problem would be to have
the adjustment in assessed valuation or tax rate apply only to the increase in
land values due to the conservation programs.
Two examples exist under Colorado statutes that may be used as mod-
els for a tax incentive involving an adjustment in assessed valuation or tax
rates to promote conservation. The valuation for assessment on certain real
and personal property used exclusively to produce alcohol for use in motor
fuels, where the alcohol is derived from agricultural commodities, forest
products, hydrocarbon or carbon-containing by-products, or waste products,
is a certain percentage of actual value depending upon the number of years
the facility has existed.' 8 7 The assessed valuation of agricultural supplies
and equipment is a very small percentage of actual value. 188
Agricultural land is assessed at thirty percent of its actual value. ' 89 Col-
orado statutes could be amended to provide that the assessed value of agri-
cultural land upon which soil conservation programs are established could
be lower than thirty percent of actual value. Such an amendment would
require the creation of two classes of agricultural land--one class for land
upon which soil conservation practices have been implemented and the
other class for land upon which such practices have not been implemented.
The valuation for assessment or tax rate of assessed value for each class could
differ. Agricultural land could move from one class to another depending
upon the implementation of a soil conservation program.
Dividing agricultural and open space lands into two classes with the
implementation of a soil conservation program as the criteria for the division
conforms to the constitutional uniformity clause on property taxation, just as
creating a separate class of property by giving preferential tax treatment for
land and facilities used to produce alcohol for use in motor fuel does. 1 90 The
legislature is free to classify property for taxation so long as the discrimina-
187. Id §§ 39-1-104(13)(b), (14)(b) (Supp. 1980). See text accompanying note 170 supra.
188. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-1-104(7), (8) (Supp. 1980). See text accompanying notes 168-
69 supra.
189. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-104(1) (1973).
190. See id §§ 39-1-104(13)(b), (14)(b) (Supp. 1979).
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tion is based on the nature and use of the property justifying the discrimina-
tion, the classification is reasonable, and the classification bears some
reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest or policy. 19 1 A state
interest can justify soil conservation programs in the same manner as it justi-
fies the classification of alcohol-producing facilities. Different rates of taxa-
tion and different assessment methods may be used for different types of
property,1 92 as long as the same rates and methods are uniformly applied to
all property within the same class.' 93
3. Exemptions of Improvements from Taxation
Considering soil conservation programs, particularly structures, as im-
provements to the land and exempting these improvements from taxation
involves two closely related issues-the definition of improvements and the
authority to exempt improvements from taxation. Unlike some other state
constitutions, the Colorado Constitution specifically exempts certain types of
property from taxation 194 and forbids the legislature from exempting any
type of property not listed. 195
Ditches, canals, and flumes illustrate the close relationship between as-
sessing improvements separately from land and exempting improvements
from taxation. Such improvements or structures, if owned and used by indi-
viduals or corporations for irrigating land owned by the same individuals,
corporations, or individual members of the corporations, are not to be taxed
separately from the land under the state constitution as long as they are
owned and used exclusively for such purposes.' 96 Even though the constitu-
tion forbids the legislature from exempting any types of property from taxa-
tion other than those listed (ditches, canals, and flumes do not fall under any
categories of exempt property), the legislature totally exempted ditches,
canals, and flumes owned and used by any persons for irrigating their
land.' 97 Courts have interpreted the constitutional provision and statute not
as a true exemption of ditches, canals, and flumes from property taxation,
but rather as preventing double taxation by forbidding their valuation as
"improvements" separately from the land. The reasoning is that the value of
water rights and the structures carrying the water are already reflected in the
191. American Mobilehome Ass'n v. Dolan, 191 Colo. 433, 438, 553 P.2d 758, 762 (1976);
Western Elec. Co. v. Weed, 185 Colo. 340, 353-54, 524 P.2d 1369, 1376 (1974); District 50
Metropolitan Recreation Dist. v. Burnside, 167 Colo. 425, 430, 448 P.2d 788, 790 (1968); Foster
v. Hart Consol. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 471, 122 P. 48, 52 (1912); Ames v. People ex rel.
Temple, 26 Colo. 83, 103, 56 P. 656, 663 (1899).
192. American Mobilehome Ass'n v. Dolan, 191 Colo. 433, 436-37, 553 P.2d 758, 761
(1976).
193. District 50 Metropolitan Recreation Dist. v. Burnside, 167 Colo. 425, 430, 448 P.2d
788, 790 (1968); Foster v. Hart Consol. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 471, 122 P. 48, 52 (1912);
Ames v. People ex rel. Temple, 26 Colo. 83, 103, 56 P. 656, 663 (1899); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Rocky Mountain News Printing Co., 15 Colo. App. 189, 196, 61 P. 494, 497 (1900).
194. COLO. CONST. art. X, §§ 4-6.
195. Id. § 6; see Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, I10 Colo. 253, 260, 133 P.2d 530, 533 (1943),
which held that statutes exempting property from taxation, other than property specified in the
constitution, were an unauthorized exercise of legislative power and unconstitutional.
196. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3.
197. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-3-I01(I)(c) (1973).
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assessment of the land they irrigate. 198
Property tax incentives cannot be established by designating soil conser-
vation structures as "improvements" to be assessed with the land as a unit or
as "improvements" to be exempt from taxation. Improvements assessed
with the land as a unit only prevent double taxation and therefore really do
not offer a tax incentive, and conservation structures are not exempt prop-
erty under the constitution. Therefore, a method must be found of classify-
ing soil conservation structures that has the effect of designating them as
"improvements" assessed separately from the land and exempting them
from property taxation.
Colorado has some statutes that have the effect of exempting improve-
ments from taxation. These statutes can be used as models for soil conserva-
tion structures. One example is that any increase in the value of private
lands arising from planting trees is not taken into account in determining the
actual value of the land until thirty years after the date of planting. 99 In
another example, the state legislature gives a temporary financial incentive
for the purchase of alternative energy devices2° ° by providing that the instal-
lation of such devices will not cause an increase in the valuation for assess-
ment for property tax purposes from 1980 to 1989.201 Any increase in the
valuation of structures, buildings, or improvements in or on which an alter-
native energy device is installed shall not be included in determining the
actual value of the structures, buildings, or improvements. 20 2 A third exam-
ple provides that the inclusion of property on the state register of historic
properties does not increase the valuation for assessment of the property.
20 3
New legislation could be adopted in Colorado to provide tax incentives
for soil conservation structures by exempting from the assessed valuation any
increase in value caused by the structures. The same justification could be
made for soil conservation structures as was made for forestry and alterna-
tive energy devices. 2° 4 Technically, a new classification may have to be cre-
ated to accommodate property with soil conservation structures. This would
not be contrary to the uniformity clause because the state supreme court
198. Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 263, 133 P.2d 530, 534 (1943); Shaw v.
Bond, 64 Colo. 366, 370-71, 171 P. 1142, 1144 (1913); Empire Land & Canal Co. v. County
Treasurer, 1 Colo. App. 205, 211-12, 28 P. 482, 484 (1891), rev'd, 21 Colo. 244, 40 P. 449 (1895).
199. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 39-3-103 (1973).
200. An alternative energy device is a system, mechanism, or device using solar energy or
geothermal, renewable biomass, or wind resources, including any passive structural design ele-
ment that is an integral part of the system, mechanism, or device. The term does not include
any system, mechanism, or device for the direct combustion of wood. Id § 39-1-104(6)(b)
(Supp. 1980).
201. Id § 39-1-104(6)(c). The legislature found that alternative energy sources reduce the
consumption of irreplaceable fossil fuels; reduce the need for capital, land, water, and other
resources used in conventional energy systems; reduce air and water pollution from conven-
tional energy systems; offer the potential for increased jobs and new business opportunities; and
reduce oil and gas imports. Id §§ 39-1-104(6)(a)(I)(A)-(E) (Supp. 1980).
202. Id § 39-1-104(6)(d).
203. Id § 39-1-104(5).
204. The purpose of the legislation concerned with alternative energy devices was to pro-
mote public health, safety, and welfare by providing a temporary financial incentive for the
purchase of such devices through reducing the financial barriers which might inhibit rapid
development and utilization of alternative systems. Id § 39-1- 104(6)(a)(11).
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held that except for the constitutional provision prohibiting the taxation of
ditches, canals, and flumes separately from the land they irrigate, the legisla-
ture is wholly unrestricted in dividing property into classes for purposes of
taxation.2 0 5 In addition, there is no constitutional requirement that taxes be
levied under a plan which secures full valuation. Therefore, a valuation,
however low, which is equal and uniform, is a just valuation and meets the
constitutional requirement.
20 6
4. Property Tax Credits Against Income Taxes
Colorado could follow the example it established for pollution control
property 20 7 and provide that property taxes paid on certain types of soil
conservation practices and structures be credited against the landowners' or
lessees' state income taxes. After an owner or lessee applies for the tax credit,
the Colorado Department of Health certifies the property's eligibility as
"pollution control property" and its qualification for tax credits. 20 8 When
the property taxes levied upon pollution control property have been paid,
and upon request of the owner, the assessor endorses the receipt of that por-
tion of the taxes the owner is entitled to credit against income taxes.209 Tax-
payers are entitled to a state income tax credit equal to thirty percent of the
amount of general property taxes. 210 If the tax credit exceeds the tax due,
the taxpayer may carry it over and apply it against the taxes due in each of
the five succeeding years.2" The amount of the income tax credit could be
either the additional property taxes paid on the land due to increased as-
sessed value because of the implementation of a conservation program, or a
certain percentage of general property taxes similar to those the state uses for
pollution control property. Constitutional problems associated with credits
against income taxes for the erection of conservation structures are no
greater than for the installation of pollution control property.
V. TAX INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVATION PROGRAMS UNDER
DEFERRED TAXATION
Maryland, the state chosen as an example of a state having preferential
property tax assessment with deferred taxation, was the first state to enact a
205. Ames v. People rx rel Temple, 26 Colo. 83, 103, 56 P. 656, 663 (1899).
206. People ex rel Colorado Tax Comm'n v. Pitcher, 56 Colo. 343, 350, 138 P. 509, 512
(1914).
207. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 39-5-131(7) (Supp. 1980). Pollution control property includes
all owned or leased property acquired or first used after January 1, 1970, that is installed, con-
structed, or used for the primary purpose of eliminating, reducing, or preventing the release of
pollutants into the air or water. Such property includes any treatment works, control devices,
disposal systems, machinery, equipment, structures, land, or other property installed, con-
structed, or used for the primary purpose of reducing, controlling, or disposing of air and water
pollutants. Id § 39 -1-102(12.1)(a)(I), (II) (Supp. 1980).
208. Id §§ 39-5-131(1)-(3) (Supp. 1980). The department may certify all or part of the
property as eligible pollution control property for tax credits. Id § 39-5-131(3) (Supp. 1980).
See id. §§ 39-5-131(1)-(5) (Supp. 1980) for certifying procedures.
209. Id § 39-5-131 (7). The credit also applies to that portion of any lease payment provid-
ing revenue for a payment in lieu of taxes. Id.
210. Id § 39-22-508(l).
211. Id § 39-22-508(3).
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differential assessment statute for agricultural land. 21 2 After the Farm As-
sessment Act, 21 3 enacted in 1956 as a pure preferential assessment statute,
was declared unconstitutional as being in violation of the uniformity clause
on property taxation,21 4 both the constitution 21 5 and statute 2 16 were
amended. The amended statute provides for a deferred or "rollback" tax to
discourage conversion of agricultural land enjoying preferential assessment
to other uses.21 7 Taxes currently being levied against agricultural lands, 2 ' 8
woodlands, 2 19 country club lands,220 and planned development lands2 2 1 are
based upon their use-value subject to a deferred tax if the lands are con-
verted to a nonqualifying use. In addition, before owners of woodlands
222
and country club lands223 can take advantage of use-value assessments the
owners must sign agreements restricting the use of such lands for a number
of years. Maryland also created the Agricultural Land Preservation Pro-
gram in 1974 to preserve the character of agricultural lands and wood-
lands.2 2 4 Tax credits can be given for lands preserved under this program if
approved by local resolution or ordinance.
2 25
A. Uniformity of Propery Taxation
Since a 1960 constitutional amendment,226 Maryland's constitutional
uniformity clause has permitted separate assessment for land and improve-
ments on land and the classification and subclassification of both land and
improvements. All taxes levied, however, must be uniform within each class
or subclass of land or improvements. 22 7 Another 1960 constitutional amend-
212. 1956 Md. Laws ch. 9, § 1, as amended by 1957 Md. Laws ch. 680, § 1; 1960 Md. Laws ch.
52, § 1; 1961 Md. Laws-ch. 455, § 1; 1969 Md. Laws ch. 433, § 1; 1972 Md. Laws ch. 75, § 1;
1973 Md. Laws ch. 714, § 1; 1974 Md. Laws ch. 176, § 5, ch. 705, § 1; 1975 Md. Laws ch. 39,
§ 1, ch. 731, § 2; 1977 Md. Laws ch. 900, § 1; 1978 Md. Laws ch. 84, § 1, ch. 902, § 1; 1980 Md.
Laws chs. 394, 410, 463 (codified in MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b) (1980)).
213. 1956 Md. Laws ch. 9, § 1, as amended by 1957 Md. Laws ch. 680, § 1 (current version at
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 17 (1980)).
214. State Tax Comm'n v. M.A. Wakefield, Jr., Inc., 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960); see
MD. CONsT. art. XV.
215. 1960 Md. Laws ch. 64, § I (amending MD. CONST. art. XV). See also 1960 Md. Laws
ch. 65, § 1 (amending MD. CONST. art. XLIII).
216. 1960 Md. Laws ch. 52, § I (amending MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b)). See 1961 Md.
Laws ch. 455, § 1.
217. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b)(2)(B)(i) (1980). For a discussion of the farmland pres-
ervation statute in Maryland, see B. DAVIES & J. BELDEN, supra note 8, at 13; T. HADY & A.
SIBOLD, supra note 9, at 37-40; Ishee, supra note 45, at 23-34; Nielsen, supra note 45, at 429-60.
218. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b) (1980). Seealso MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-501 to -
508 (Supp. 1980).
219. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(d) (1980). See also MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 5-301
to -310 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
220. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(e) (1980).
221. Id § 19(0.
222. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 5-302 (Supp. 1980).
223. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(e)(5) (1980).
224. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-501 to -508. For a discussion of the program, see Nielsen,
supra note 45, at 438-47.
225. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 12E-I(c) (1980).
226. 1960 Md. Laws ch. 64, § I (amending MD. CONST. art. XV).
227. MD. CONST. art. XV; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 14(a)(2)(i), 19(a)(1) (1980). See
also Weaver v. Prince Georgia's County, 281 Md. 349, 355, 379 A.2d 399, 402 (1977); State
Dep't of Assessments & Taxation v. Greyhound Computer Corp., 271 Md. 575, 590, 320 A.2d
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ment permits the separate classification and assessment of land actively de-
voted to farm or agricultural use, and further provides that such land is to be
assessed on the basis of farm or agricultural use and not assessed as if
subdivided.
221
Maryland's legislature can always classify and subclassify improvements
on land and personal property if the classification and subclassification is not
arbitrary or unreasonable. 229 The classification itself must be based upon
natural reasons inherent in the subject matter and real differences existing
between the classes. 230 Improvements on land and personal property may
be classified for the purpose of both assessed value and tax rates since the
actual tax is the product of these two figures.2 3 1 The appropriate test is "the
reasonableness of the classification rather than the method by which a differ-
ence in the amount of taxes is effected-whether by a difference in percent-
age of assessment or by a difference in the rate of taxation applicable to the
respective classes."'2 32 A county may be divided into taxing districts by the
legislature and each county or taxing district may have its own rate of taxa-
tion without violating the uniformity clause.
23 3
B. Valuation for Tax Assessment
1. Agricultural Lands
Lands actively devoted to farm or agricultural use must be assessed on
the basis of such use and not as if they were subdivided.2 34 Such lands are
valued at their full cash value2 35 less an allowance for inflation of fifty per-
cent of the current value.236 Owners of agricultural lands need not make an
application to have their farmland assessed in accordance with its use-
value. 237 The State Department of Assessments and Taxation has estab-
lished criteria for determining whether lands appearing to be actively de-
voted to farm or agricultural use are in fact bonafide farms and qualify for
assessment as agricultural land.238 Statutes require the department to con-
sider at least the following criteria: (a) zoning classification of the land;
239
40, 48 (1974); Marco Associates v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 265 Md. 669, 673-74, 291 A.2d
489, 492 (1972).
228. 1960 Md. Laws ch. 65, § I (codified in MD. CONsT. art. 43).
229. State Tax Comm'n v. M.A. Wakefield, Jr., Inc., 222 Md. 543, 549-50, 161 A.2d 676,
679 (1960). See W. NEWHOUSE, supra note 4, at 557; Lewis, The Tax Articles of he Maryland
Declaraton of Rights, 13 MD. L. REv. 83, 94-109 (1953).
230. Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 483, 13 A.2d 763, 768 (1940).
231. National Can Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 220 Md. 418, 428-29, 153 A.2d 287, 293
(1959).
232. Id. at 429, 153 A.2d at 293.
233. Rogan v. County Comm'rs, 194 Md. 299, 309, 71 A.2d 47, 51 (1950).
234. MD. CONST. art. XLIII; MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b)(1) (1980).
235. Full cash value means current or market value, which is the value a willing purchaser
will pay a willing seller in an open market, eliminating exceptional and extraordinary condi-
tions giving the property a temporary abnormal value. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 14(b)(l)(ii)(1) (1980); Rogan v. County Comm'rs, 194 Md. 299, 311, 71 A.2d 47, 52 (1949).
236. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 14(b)(2) (1980).
237. Id. § 19(b)(1).
238. Id. § 19(b)(1). See Ishee, supra note 45, at 26-27 for the department's list of 29 criteria
for assessors to use in establishing whether land is actively devoted to farm use.
239. Id § 19(b)(1)(i).
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(b) present and past uses of the land, including land under the soil bank
program of the Agricultural Stabilization Act;2 40 and (c) productivity of the
land, including timberlands and lands used for reforestation. 24 ' Lands not
eligible for assessment as farmland include land zoned for industrial, com-
mercial, or multifamily residential use as of July 1, 1972, if zoned at the
request of the present or previous owner; 242 land rezoned after July 1, 1972,
to a more intensive use if the landowner requested the rezoning;243 and land
subdivided into lots or parcels after July 1, 1972.244 However, except for the
dwelling house and one acre surrounding it, which must be assessed at fair
market value, any parcel of twenty acres or more that the owner conveys to
another party is not automatically ineligible for assessment as farmland as a
result of that subdivision.
245
A landowner whose land is assessed on the basis of agricultural use may
not develop the land for any nondgricultural use, other than for the residen-
tial use of the owner or the owner's immediate family, without first paying a
development tax equal to ten percent of the difference between the most
recent agricultural use assessment and the current nonagricultural use assess-
ment.246 The local government collects the development tax as a lien in the
same manner as it does for real property taxes. 24 7 Two-thirds of the devel-
opment tax collected by the local government is paid to the state for deposit
in the Maryland Agricultural Preservation Fund. 248 The local government
retains one-third of the tax (two-thirds in Montgomery County if it contin-
ues to impose a transfer tax) to be used for its own agricultural land preser-
vation program, including bond annuity funds or matching funds.
249
2. Woodlands
Owners of five or more contiguous acres of woodland may contract with
the State Department of Natural Resources (DNR) for a minimum period of
ten years to place the parcel under a forest conservation and management
program. 25 0 When placed under such a program woodlands are valued at
240. I § 19(b)(l)(ii).
241. Id § 19(b)(l)(iii).
242. Id § 19(b)(2)(A)(i).
243. Id § 19(b)(2)(A)(ii). The court has held that land zoned industrial, commercial, or
multifamily residential at the instance of its owner, even though being farmed, will not continue
to be used for farming and is not entitled to assessment based upon such use. Supervisor of
Assessments v. Ely, 272 Md. 77, 84, 321 A.2d 166, 170 (1974).
244. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1980).
245. Id.
246. Id. § 19(b)(2)(B)(i). Land is reassessed when its use is changed from agricultural to
nonagricultural as determined by the State Department of Assessments and Taxation regula-
tions or when the owner or other person having a property interest in the land commences or
engages in the construction of improvements for nonagricultural use, other than for residential
use of the owner or his immediate family, or records a plat. Id § 19(b)(2)(B)(ii). When a farm
owner conveys lands assessed for agricultural use to a new owner who does not maintain the
agricultural use, the original owner is liable for the development tax. 57 Op. Md. Att'y Gen.
696 (1972).
247. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b)(2)(B)(v) (1980).
248. Id. § 19(b)(2)(B)(iii). See MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2-505 (Supp. 1980) for permitted
expenditure of moneys from this fund.
249. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b)(2)(B)(iv) (1980).
250. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 5-302 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
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their full cash value less an allowance for inflation of fifty percent of the
current value.25 ' The assessed valuation during the contract period may not
be increased.252 Woodlands sold or removed in part or totally from the for-
est conservation and management contract are subject to a deferred or
"rollback" tax. 25 3 Deferred taxes are based.on the difference between the
valuation for assessment at the time of the removal or sale and the valuation
for assessment at the time of the contract, 254 computed in approximately
equal annual steps covering the number of years elapsing between the two
valuations.255 The amount of taxes owed is computed by the annual in-




Country clubs2 57 actively devoted to use as country clubs may enter
into an agreement with the State Department of Assessments and Taxa-
tion 258 for a minimum term of ten years259 permitting the land to be as-
sessed on the basis of club use and not as if subdivided or used for any other
purpose.2 60 Country club lands are valued at their full cash value less an
allowance for inflation of fifty percent of the current value. 261 Deferred or
"rollback" taxes are due if part or all of the country club property is con-
veyed to a new owner 262 or the property ceases to be used or no longer quali-
fies as a country club prior to the expiration of the agreement or its
extension. 263 The amount of deferred taxes due is determined for each year
by applying the appropriate tax rate against the difference between the as-
sessed value at the beginning of the agreement and the assessed value at the
time the land ceases to be used for country club purposes, and adding the
251. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 14(b)(2) (1980).
252. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 5-303 (1974). See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(d)
(1980) for statutory authority to provide preferential assessment for woodlands.
253. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 5-306 (Supp. 1980). Deferred or "rollback" taxes are not
due if the seller assigns and transfers the contract to the buyer and the buyer assumes its obliga-
tions, or the woodlands are taken by eminent domain or other involuntary proceedings. Id.
§§ 5-305(a), -308.
254. See id § 5-302-304. The original valuation takes into consideration that the assessed
value is only 50 percent of the current value. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 14(b)(2) (1980).
255. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 5-306 (Supp. 1980).
256. Id
257. To qualify for use-value assessment, a country club must have at least 50 acres on
which is maintained a regular or championship golf course of nine holes or more and a club-
house. The country club must have a dues-paying membership of at least 100 persons who pay
dues averaging at least $50 annually per member, with the use of the club restricted primarily
to members, their families and guests. In addition, the club may not practice discrimination in
granting membership or guest privileges. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(e)(4)(i) (1980).
258. Id § 19(e)(1).
259. Id. § 19(e)(5).
260. Id § 19(e)(2).
261. Id § 14(b)(2).
262. An agreement may be assigned and transferred to the buyer of all or pars of the land,
and if the buyer assumes the obligations under the agreement, deferred taxes are not due. Id
§ 19(e)(9).
263. Id. § 19(e)(7). If the owner conveys only pars of the property and the remaining prop-
erty still qualifies as a country club deferred taxes are only due on the property actually con-
veyed. Id. § 19(e)(8).
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taxes for each year2 64 with a limit of ten years.
265
4. Planned Development Lands
Planned development lands are eligible for special assessment as active
agricultural land.266 As with agricultural lands, planned development lands
are valued at their full cash value less an allowance for inflation of fifty per-
cent of the current value.267 Whenever planned development lands have a
full cash value in excess of their special assessment as active agricultural
land, they are assessed on the basis of their full cash value and both the full
cash value and agricultural value are recorded.
268
Owners of land must apply to the county supervisor of assessments for a
determination of whether their lands meet the criteria for planned develop-
ment.26 9 Planned development lands to be designated as such must consist
of at least 500 acres or more in a contiguous tract 270 and be primarily unde-
veloped at the time they are placed in the planned development zoning clas-
sification. 27' The land must be situated in an area designated for planned
development on a current master plan or general or regional plan adopted
by the governmental authority having planning or zoning jurisdiction, or be
designated for development as a new town, city, or satellite city. 27 2 In addi-
tion, the land must be located in a zoning classification that permits develop-
ment only in compliance with the master plan or general or regional plan,
requires a land use plan and a comprehensive site development or subdivi-
sion plan, and requires the landowner to provide public works and improve-
ments that the local government normally provides under other zoning
classifications.
2 73
Taxes are not due on the full cash value assessment unless there is a
change in land use. 2 7 4 Special assessments for that portion of land subdi-
vided by recording a plat or improved by construction of permanent build-
ings are terminated and that portion is thereafter assessed at full cash
value.2 75 If the lands subject to special assessments are rezoned, at the re-
quest of the owner, to a classification that does not meet the requirements of
planned development lands, the special assessment terminates for that por-
tion of the land rezoned and a deferred tax is due. The tax equals the differ-
ence between the tax based on the special assessment and the tax based on
full cash value for each year of special assessment, not to exceed ten percent
264. Id § 19(e)(2),(3),(7).
265. Id § 19(e)(7)(A).
266. Id § 19(0(1),(3). This special assessment applies whether or not such land would qual-
ify for agricultural use assessment.
267. Id § 14(b)(2).
268. d § 19(0(4).
269. Id § 19(1)(3).
270. Id § 19()(2)(C).
271. Id. § 19(0(2)(D).
272. Id § 19(l)(2)(A).
273. Id § 19(i)(2)(B).
274. Id § 19()(4).
275. Id § 19(l)(5). The remaining portion of the land continues to be entitled to special
assessment even though its area is less than 500 acres if it continues to meet the criteria.
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of the full cash value assessment in effect at the time of rezoning.
2 76
5. Agricultural Land and Woodland Easements
County governing bodies and the city council of Baltimore City may by
resolution or ordinance provide credits up to seventy-five percent against
taxes imposed upon any real property if the owner permanently conveys or
assigns an easement or interest in the land to the Maryland Agricultural
Land Preservation Foundation 2 77 to preserve the land's character as agricul-
tural land or woodland. 278 Valuation and assessment of the agricultural
land or woodland before granting a tax credit is similar to any other real
property in the taxing subdivision.
279
Easements may not be acquired by the Foundation in agricultural lands
or woodlands unless a county agricultural preservation district has been cre-
ated and such lands are located within that district. 280 To be located within
an agricultural preservation district, land must meet productivity, acreage,
and locational criteria that the Foundation determines are necessary for con-
tinuation of farming the land.28 1 The Foundation, in acquiring easements,
attempts to preserve the minimum number of acres in a given district that
will reasonably promote the continued availability of agricultural supplies
and markets for agricultural goods.
28 2
C. Implementation of Tax Incentives for Programs
Maryland's constitutional uniformity clause, which allows classification
of land and permits farmland devoted to such use to be assessed on the basis
of farm use and not as if subdivided, 28 3 permits the legislature to enact a
variety of property tax incentives for implementing soil conservation pro-
grams. Such incentives can be used in conjunction with the preferential or
use-value assessment for agricultural, wood, country club, and planned de-.
velopment lands or credits against property taxes granted for selling agricul-
tural land and woodland easements to the state and local governments.
Assessed valuation or tax rates on assessed valuation may be adjusted for
implementing conservation programs. In addition, the constitutional uni-
formity clause permits the separate assessment and classification of improve-
ments on the land;284 thus, it may be possible to exempt conservation
276. Id. § 19()6.
277. The Foundation is within the Department of Agriculture and is governed and adminis-
tered by an 11 member board of trustees. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-502, -503(a) (Supp.
1980).
278. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 12E-l(c) (1980). See id. § 12E-l(a). See Nielsen, supra note
45, at 438-47, for a discussion of the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Program.
279. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 12E-l(b) (1980).
280. See MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2-509(b) (Supp. 1980) for procedures to establish county
agricultural preservation districts. Such districts are governed by a county agricultural preser-
vation advisory board. See id § 2-504.1 for the creation, composition, and duties of the advisory
board.
281. Id § 2-509(c)(1).
282. Id § 2-509(c)(2). See CODE OF MARYLAND REGULATIONS § 15.17.01 for procedures to
acquire easements.
283. MD. CONST. arts. XV, XLIII.
284. Id art. 15.
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structures from taxation.
1. Differential Taxation of Lands
Statutes permitting preferential or use-value assessments for certain ag-
ricultural, wood, country club, and planned development lands28 5 could be
easily amended to require the implementation of recommended soil conser-
vation programs as a prerequisite for classifying land into categories eligible
for use-value assessment. Such amendments to the preferential assessment
statutes will not conflict with the constitutional uniformity clause because
the suggested amendments do not create new classes of land, but rather add
further eligibility restrictions for the agricultural land, woodland, country
club land, and planned development land classes.
Maryland requires the payment of deferred or "rollback" taxes when
the lands cease to be used for the purposes that made them eligible for pref-
erential assessments.28 6 In addition, land has to be kept in woodland and
country club use for a specified number of years under restrictive agree-
ments.28 7 Deferred taxation provisions could be amended to require the
payment of a certain amount of rollback taxes for failure to maintain a rec-
ommended soil conservation program on the land just as if the land use was
changed to a nonqualifying use. Failure to maintain conservation programs
on woodlands or country club lands would be a breach of the restrictive
agreements and would require the payment of deferred taxes. Soil conserva-
tion districts, with the assistance of the SCS district conservationists, can cer-
tify the eligibility of lands for preferential assessment and maintenance of a
soil conservation program.
Under certain circumstances, owners of agricultural lands and wood-
lands may convey easements to the federal, state, or local government that
preserves natural, agricultural, and woodland characteristics of such lands.
Owners conveying such easements are given credits against their property
taxes if local governments adopt resolutions or ordinances authorizing such
credits. 28 Convenants may be inserted in the easement instrument requir-
ing the implementation of soil conservation programs.
2. Adjustments in Assessed Valuation or Tax Rates
Assessed valuation on property or tax rates on the assessed value may be
adjusted for owners implementing soil conservation programs. A precedent
exists in the Maryland statutes to reduce the valuation for assessment on
certain real property. Agricultural lands, woodlands, country club lands,
and planned development lands are valued at their full cash value less an
allowance for inflation of fifty percent of current value. 289 The statute could
285. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 19(b), (d)-(f) (1980); St MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 5-
301 to -308 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
286. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b)(2)(B)(i), (e)(7), (0(6) (1980); MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 5-306 (Supp. 1980).
287. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 5-302 (Supp. 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 19(e)(1),
(5) (1980).
288. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 12E-1(c) (1980).
289. Id § 14(b)(2); set id § 19(b),(d)-(0.
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be easily amended to adjust that percentage figure based on the implementa-
tion of soil conservation programs.
An adjustment in assessed value or tax rates to encourage soil conserva-
tion programs requires subclassification of real property with the implemen-
tation of such programs as the criteria for the classification system. Such
classification or subclassification of land is permitted by the constitutional
uniformity clause on property taxation, provided the taxes levied are uni-
form within each class or subclass. 29° The primary requirement under the
constitution is that the classification be reasonable and not arbitrary and be
based on natural reasons inherent in the property and real differences ex-
isting between the classes. 29 1 The application of soil conservation practices
on some land and not on other land would serve as a sufficient distinction
between the two parcels of land to justify two separate classes.
3. Exemptions of Improvements from Taxation
Maryland's constitutional uniformity clause on property taxation pro-
vides that improvements on the land are to be assessed separately from the
land and can be classified and subclassified so long as the assessments on the
improvements are uniform within each class or subclass. 292 Soil conserva-
tion structures may be considered as improvements on the land. They are
sufficiently different from other improvements to justify putting them into a
separate class or subclass. Such improvements may be assessed at a lower
value or taxed at a lower rate than other improvements if the taxes levied are
equal and uniform upon all structures within the same class or subclass.
293
In addition, each county or taxing district may establish its own rate of taxa-
tion without violating the constitutional uniformity clause.
294
Another possibility exists whereby Maryland could amend its statutes
and exempt improvements consisting of soil conservation structures from
taxation. The legislature has the power to fully exempt property from ,taxa-
tion without violating the uniformity clause where the exemption is reason-
able and for a public purpose even though there is no express constitutional
authorization. 295 An exemption is valid if it is justified by public policy, it is
within reasonable limits and not arbitrary, and it applies to an entire class of
property. 296 A recent case held that exemptions of a reasonably defined
class of property in furtherance of a public good and rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose do not offend the uniformity clause. 29 7 Currently,
290. MD. CONsT. art. XV.
291. State Tax Comm'n v. M.A. Wakefield, Jr., Inc., 222 Md. 543, 549-50, 161 A.2d 676,
679 (1960); Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 483, 13 A.2d 763, 768 (1940).
292. MD. CONST. art. XV.
293. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation v. Greyhound Computer Corp., 271 Md. 575,
590, 320 A.2d 40, 48 (1974).
294. Rogan v. County Comm'rs, 194 Md. 299, 309, 71 A.2d 47, 51 (1950).
295. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40-42 (1933); Aero Motors, Inc. v. Motor
Vehicle Administration, 274 Md. 567, 593, 337 A.2d 685, 701 (1975); State Tax Comm'n v.
M.A. Wakefield, Jr., Inc., 222 Md. 543, 548, 161 A.2d 676, 678 (1960).
296. Mayor of Baltimore v. Minister of the Starr Methodist Protestant Church, 106 Md.
281, 286, 67 A. 261, 264 (1907).
297. Ballard v. Supervisor of Assessments, 269 Md. 397, 406, 306 A.2d 506, 511 (1973).
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Maryland exempts various governmental, religious, cemetery, charitable, ed-
ucational, natural preserve, and housing authority property from
taxation.
298
4. Credits of a Specified Amount Against Property Taxes
Local governments adopting ordinances or resolutions may give credits
in amounts up to seventy-five percent against property taxes imposed by
political subdivisions on certain woodlands and agricultural lands where the
owners have conveyed easements to the federal, state, or local governments
that preserve the character of such lands. 299 Maryland could expand this
program and enact legislation giving credits against property taxes for im-
plementing soil conservation practices. The amount of the credit could be
based on the type of practice implemented or on the cost of implementing
the practice amortized over a number of years. As Maryland has a prece-
dent for deferred or "rollback" taxes, such a provision could also be inserted
for owners failing to maintain conservation practices.
VI. TAX INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVATION PROGRAMS UNDER
RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS
Wisconsin, the state chosen as an example of a state that uses preferen-
tial property tax assessment with a restrictive agreement, adopted the Farm-
land Preservation Act in 1977300 that provides property tax credits against
state income taxes. A farmer may apply for a farmland preservation agree-
ment under this act if the land is located in an area zoned for exclusive
agricultural use or is located in a county that has a certified agricultural
preservation plan. 30 1 Woodlands and forest croplands are also given prefer-
ential tax treatment if the landowners agree to keep them in woodland or
forest use for a certain number of years.3 0 2 In addition, certain pollution
abatement equipment is exempt from property taxation in Wisconsin.
303
A. Unifonnzy of Property Taxation
The Wisconsin Constitution requires a uniform rule of taxation.
30 4
Each type of real property must be taxed the same under the uniformity
clause unless the clause has been amended to provide otherwise. 30 5 Several
298. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, 9(b)-(e), (e-I), (0, (g)( 2 ), (h), (i), (L)-(L-3), (n)-(p) (1980).
299. Id § 12E-I(c).
300. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 29, § 982m, ch. 169, §§ 1-21, ch. 418, §§ 579c, 5 79 g, 579L, 5 79 p,
579t-579v, 579x-580e, 580L, 580p-580x, ch. 447, § 119 (codified in Wis. STAT. §§ 20.115(6)(a),
71.09(11), 91.01-.79 (1977)).
301. WIs. STAT. §§ 91.11(1)(a), (b) (1977).
302. Id §§ 77.01-.14, .16 (1977 & Supp. 1981).
303. WIs. STAT. § 70.11(21) (1977).
304. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; W. NEWHOUSE, supra note 4, at 10.
305. See Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1962), which held
that there can be but one constitutional class of property for taxation purposes under the uni-
formity clause. The court summarized the requirements of the constitutional uniformity provi-
sion as follows: (a) all property within that class must be taxed on a basis of equality so far as
practicable and all property taxed must bear its burden equally on an ad valorem basis; (b) all
property not included in that class must be absolutely exempt from property taxation;
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amendments have been made to the constitution permitting the legislature
to classify the various types of real property on the basis of use for the pur-
pose of determining value. 30 6 A 1927 amendment required the legislature to
establish a classification system for forest and mineral lands. 30 7 An amend-
ment in 1961 provided that the taxation of merchants' stock-in-trade, manu-
facturers' materials and finished products, and livestock need not be uniform
with the taxation of real property and other personal property, but the taxa-
tion of all objects within the same class must be uniform. 30 8 The latest
amendment provides: "Taxation of agricultural land and undeveloped
land, both as defined by law, need not be uniform with the taxation of each
other nor with the taxation of other real property." 30 9
B. Valuation for Tax Assessment
Real property in Wisconsin, which includes the land and all buildings
and improvements on it and attached fixtures, rights, and privileges, 310 is
valued at the full value which would ordinarily be obtained at a private
sale. 3 1 t In determining the value for each parcel, the assessor must consider
the advantage or disadvantage of the parcel's location; soil quality; quantity
of standing timber; and the value of water privileges, mines, minerals, quar-
ries, and other deposits. 3 12 Assessors must value land separately from im-
provements and classify each parcel as residential, mercantile,




The purpose of the Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Act 3t 4 is to assist
local governments desiring to preserve farmland through local planning and
zoning and to provide property tax relief in the form of credits against state
income taxes for farmers who participate in the local program by signing
(c) privilege taxes are not direct taxes on property and are not subject to the uniformity rule;
(d) while there may not be a classification of property for different rules or rates of taxation, the
legislature may classify property as either taxable or wholly exempt, and the test of such classifi-
cation is reasonableness; and (e) there may be variations in the mechanics of property assess-
ment or tax imposition as long as the resulting taxation is borne with as nearly as practicable
equality on an advalorem basis with other taxable property. Id at 424, 108 N.W. at 641-42; see
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. State, 128 Wis. 553, 603-04, 108 N.W. 557, 567 (1906).
306. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. §§ 20.115(6)(a), 70.32(2), (3), .525, .995, 71.09(11), 77.01-.14, .16,
91.01-.79 (1977); see Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 426, 147 N.W.2d 633, 642
(1967), which stated the viability of the uniformity clause is attested to by the series of constitu-
tional amendments that have been necessary to avoid its proscription.
307. Wis. J. Res. 62 (1925); Wis. J. Res. 13 (1927) (codified in WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1848, amended 1927)).
308. Wis. J. Res. 78 (1959); Wis. J. Res. 13 (1961) (codified in WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1848, amended 1961)).
309. Wis. J. Res. 39 (1971); Wis. J. Res. 29 (1973) (codified in WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1848, amended 1973)).
310. WIs. STAT. § 70.03 (1977).
311. Id. § 70.32(1).
312. Id.
313. Id §§ 70.32(2)(a)-(c).
314. Id §§ 20.115(6)(a), 71.09(11), 91.01-.79.
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agreements restricting the use of their lands to agriculture.3 1 5 The act pro-
vides for an initial five-year program and a permanent program.
a. Initial Program
Under the initial program, qualified farmland owners can voluntarily
sign an agreement or contract with the state for a period of five years or less
that provides for the farmland to remain in agricultural use. In return, the
owners are eligible for state income tax credits under a "circuit-breaker
formula" if their property taxes are "excessive" under criteria set by the
act.3 16 Initial farmland preservation agreements may not be made after
September 30, 1982, and they all expire on that date.3 1 7
Farmers are eligible for an initial agreement only if their land has been
in "agricultural use"'31 8 for at least twelve consecutive months during the
preceding thirty-six months,31 9 consists of thirty-five acres or more of contig-
uous land in one parcel, and produced farm products valued at $6,000 or
more in the preceding year or $18,000 over the past three years. 320 In addi-
tion, the lands must be covered by a farm conservation plan prepared or in
the process of being prepared by the soil and water conservation district.32 1
However, land to be covered by an initial farmland preservation agreement
need not be located in a county with a certified agricultural use under a
certified zoning ordinance.
322
Applications for farmland preservation agreements must be approved
by the local governing body having jurisdiction over the land. 323 Applica-
tions approved by the local governing body are submitted to the Wisconsin
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection for signa-
ture.324 This signed initial farmland preservation agreement stays with the
315. The act complies with an opinion of the attorney general. See 66 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen.
337, 341 (1977) which states: "Although the uniformity clause now permits the taxation of
agricultural land on a different basis, there is serious doubt as to whether it allows for
nonuniformity of treatment within the classification for agricultural land. In other words, even
though agricultural land does not have to be taxed on a uniform basis with nonagricultural
land, nevertheless, all agricultural land must be taxed alike. As a class, all agricultural land
could be exempt."
316. WIS. STAT. §§ 91.13, .31 (1977).
317. Id §§ 91.31, .35(2).
318. "Agricultural use" means beekeeping; commercial feedlots; dairying; egg production;
floriculture; fish or fur farming; forest and game management; grazing; livestock raising;
orchards; plant greenhouses and nurseries; poultry raising; raising of grain, grass, mint, seed
crops, vegetables, fruits, nuts, and berries; and sod farming. Id § 91.01(1).
319. Id § 91.01(5).
320. Id §§ 71.09(11)(a)(3), 91.01(6) (1977 & Supp. 1981). The value of farm products
means the gross receipts, excluding rent, from the land's agricultural use less the cost or other
basis of livestock or other items which are purchased for resale and which are sold or disposed of
during the year. Id § 71.09(l1)(a)(3m) (1977).
321. Id § 91.35(1) (1977).
322. Id § 91.31.
323. Id § 91.13(4). Generally, the county board has jurisdiction; however, if the land is
located in a city, village, or town that has adopted an exclusive agricultural zoning ordinance
certified by the State Agricultural Lands Preservation Board, the city council, village board, or
town board has jurisdiction. Id § 91.01(8). See id § 91.13 for the approval procedure.
324. Id § 91.13(5). The department signs an agreement with the farmer unless it deter-
mines that the land is not eligible farmland for an agreement. Id § 91.13(6); see id § 91.01(6)
(1977), which states that land is ineligible if it is not devoted primarily to agricultural use, it did
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land even if it is sold to a different owner.
325
Owners who sign an initial farmland preservation agreement are eligi-
ble to receive tax credits against their state income taxes for "excessive"
property taxes as calculated under a "circuit-breaker" formula.3 26 The cir-
cuit-breaker formula relieves farmland owners from paying excessive prop-
erty taxes under a "threshold" concept; "excessive" property taxes are that
amount of the property tax bill exceeding a certain threshold percentage of
household income. 32 7 Threshold percentages vary with the household in-
come so that greater threshold percentages are assigned to larger household
incomes. Excessive property taxes, up to a maximum of $6,000, are com-
puted by subtracting a certain threshold percent of the household income
from the accrued property taxes.3 28 Farmland owners who sign initial agree-
ments are eligible for state income tax credits equal to fifty percent of the
potential credit calculated for farmland owners under a permanent pro-
gram. 329 Higher levels of tax credit are available to farmers who, in addi-
tion to signing the agreement, live in areas with farmland preservation plans
or exclusive agricultural zones, 33 0 up to a maximum potential tax credit of
$4,200.
3 3 1
A lien attaches to the property for the full amount of all tax credits
received, plus interest from the date of the credits, if the landowner cancels
an agreement prior to the termination date.332 When the initial agreement
expires and the owner does not apply for a renewa 3 33 or does not sign a new
permanent land preservation agreement, 334 a lien attaches to the property,
without interest, for the tax credit received for the last two years the land
was eligible for such credit. This is provided that the land is not subject to a
certified exclusive agricultural use zoning ordinance and either the county in
which the land is located has not adopted a certified agricultural preserva-
tion plan or, if such a plan is adopted, the farmland would not be eligible for
not produce the required value of agricultural product, or the acreage did not meet the 35-acre
minimum.
325. Id. § 91.17(1).
326. Id § 91.13(8)(e). To be eligible for the tax credit, a landowner must have been a resi-
dent of Wisconsin for the entire year, owned the farmland at the close of the year for which the
credit is claimed, and not claimed income tax credit for a homestead. Id §§ 71.09(11)(a)(1),
(a)(l)(b). In case the tax credit formula is changed so that the credit is reduced, the owner is
guaranteed, at a minimum, the credit under the formula at the time he signs the agreement. Id
§ 71.09(l1)(b)(2) (1977) (Supp. 1981).
327. See WIS. STAT. § 71.09(11)(b) (1977). A household includes the landowner, spouse,
and all minor dependents. Id § 71.09(1 l)(a)(4). Household income includes the net farm in-
come and all nonfarm income, such as nonfarm wages, salaries, and tips, in excess of $7,500. Id
§ 71.09(11)(a)(5), (6)(a).
328. Id § 71.09(11)(b)(1) (1977 & Supp. 1981). Percentages vary from 5% of the second
$5,000 of income to 35% of household income in excess of $30,000. See also WIs. STAT.
§ 71.09(11)(a)(7) (1977 & Supp. 1981).
329. WIs. STAT. § 71.09(1 1)(b)(3)(0 (1977 & Supp. 1981); set id § 71.09(1 1)(b)(2).
330. WIs. STAT. § 71.09(11)(b)(3)(d), (e) (1977).
331. Id § 71.09(11)(b)(2) (1977 & Supp. 1981).
332. WIs. STAT. § 91.37(1) (1977); see id §§ 91.19(9)-(12).
333. Set id § 91.39 for renewal procedure. Agreements may be renewed for a single one-
year period only if an agricultural preservation plan is adopted by the county in which the
farmland is located and the farmland is eligible for a permanent land preservation agreement.
334. St id §§ 91.11-.23 for permanent land preservation agreements.
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an agreement under the terms of the agreement.33 5 If, however, the owner is
eligible to renew the initial agreement or sign a new permanent agreement,
but declines, and the land is eligible for a permanent agreement because of
an agricultural preservation plan, but is not located in an exclusive agricul-
tural zone, the lien or rollback applies to all tax credits received plus interest
compounded from the initial expiration date.
33 6
b. Permanent Program
Owners are eligible for permanent farmland preservation agreements
after the initial program expires in 1982 only if the local government adopts
either a certified agricultural preservation plan or an exclusive agricultural
zoning ordinance. 337 To be eligible, land in urban counties 338 must be lo-
cated within an area zoned for exclusive agricultural use under an ordinance
certified by the State Agricultural Lands Preservation Board,339 and the
town in which the land is located must have approved the ordinance.
340
Rural county land 34 1 is eligible for permanent program agreements if the
county has adopted an agricultural preservation plan certified by the state
board342 or an exclusive agricultural zoning ordinance certified by the state
board343 and the land is located within one of those areas.344 If any city,
town, or village has adopted its own certified exclusive agricultural zoning
ordinance or a town has approved a similar county zoning ordinance, eligi-
ble land must be within the area zoned for agricultural use.
34 5
Landowners apply for permanent farmland preservation agreements in
the same manner in which they apply for initial agreements, 346 with the
additional requirement that the application for a permanent agreement
must contain the soil classification of lands sought to be covered. 34 7 The
provisions of initial and permanent agreements are the same, except that
under a permanent agreement an approved farm conservation plan must be
in effect. 348 Deviation from the conservation plan is permitted if SCS or
district personnel are unavailable to lay out the suggested practices on the
land or if the practices are not economical for the owner to adopt.34 9 Land-
owners are ineligible for tax credits if they have been notified of a violation
335. d § 91.37(2); see id §§ 91.19(9)-(12).
336. Id §91.37(3).
337. Id §91.11(1).
338. An urban county is one with a population density of 100 or more persons per square
mile. Id § 91.11(3) (1977 & Supp. 1981).
339. WIs. STAT. § 91.78 (1977).
340. Id. § 91.11(3) (1977 & Supp. 1981).
341. A rural county has a population density less than 100 persons per square mile. Id
§ 91.11(2).
342. WIs. STAT. § 91.61 (1977).
343. Id § 91.78.
344. Id § 91.11(2) (1977 & Supp. 1981). Towns in which the land is located need not ap-
prove the ordinance.
345. Id § 91.11(4).
346. See WIs. STAT. § 91.13 (1977).
347. Id § 91.13(1).
348. Id § 91.13(8)(d). An initial agreement only requires that a soil and water conservation
district plan be in effect or under development. Id § 91.35(1).
349. Id § 91.13(8)(d).
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of the plan.
350
Lands under permanent farmland preservation agreements located
within an area of the county and subject to either exclusive agricultural zon-
ing or an agricultural preservation plan are eligible for tax credits of seventy
percent of the potential credits, calculated under a "circuit-breaker" formula
in the same manner as initial agreements. 35 1 A seventy percent tax credit is
available on farmland located in an urbanizing area if the farmland is iden-
tified as such in the preservation plan and the owner signs a special transi-
tion area agreement. 352 If a county has both exclusive agricultural zoning
and a preservation plan, land located with an area covered by both is eligi-
ble for 100% of the potential tax credit calculated under the "circuit-
breaker" formula.
353
The same procedures and criteria apply to the relinquishment of farm-
land preservation agreements under both the initial and permanent pro-
grams. 354 A lien is recorded against the property for all tax credits received
during the past ten years the landowner was eligible for such credits if either
the permanent farmland preservation agreement expired or the land was
rezoned out of the exclusive agricultural district. 3 55 Interest is assessed from
the time the agreement expired or the land was removed from the exclusive
agricultural zone.356 When a farmland preservation agreement is relin-
quished before its expiration date with state and county approval or a transi-
tion area agreement expires, a lien is recorded against the land for all tax
credits received during the last ten years that the land was eligible for such




Owners of ten or more acres of land who intend to practice forestry on it
may apply to the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to
have their lands placed under the woodland tax law for a fifteen-year pe-
riod. 358 The DNR examines the land and approves the application if the
woodland is suitable for growing timber and other forest products, the land
is not more useful for other purposes, and the owner agrees to follow the
DNR-approved woodland management plan.
359
350. Id § 71.09(11)(o).
351. Id § 71.09(11)(b)(3)(e) (1977 & Supp. 1981). See also id § 71.09(11)(b)(3)(bm), (cm)
(Supp. 1981).
352. WIS. STAT. § 71.09(11)(b)(3)(c) (1977 & Supp. 1981).
353. WIs. STAT. §§ 71.09(11)(b)(3)(a), (b) (1977 & Supp. 1981).
354. See WIs. STAT. §§ 91.19(1)-(6) (1977).
355. Id. § 91.19(8); see id § 91.77(2).
356. Id. § 91.19(8). No interest accumulates if the owner later signs a new farmland preser-
vation agreement or transition area agreement or if the land has been included in an exclusive
agricultural zone. Id
357. Id § 91.19(7).
358. Id § 77.16(4). Lands that are ineligible for woodland taxation include those consisting
of an entire quarter-quarter section, fractional lots, or government lots as determined by the
federal survey plat; within recorded subdivision plats; within incorporated limits of cities or
villages; and which have improvements on them. Id
359. Id § 77.16(3). Copies of the order approving the application are forwarded to the
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Once the DNR approves the application, the assessor reduces the total
assessed valuation on the land by an amount equal to the assessed value of
the acreage covered by the contract. Landowners pay the town a special
property tax of forty cents per acre per year on all lands entered in the pro-
gram or renewed after December 31, 1976, until 1982.360 In 1982, and at
ten-year intervals thereafter, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue will re-
calculate the rate by multiplying twenty cents per acre by a ratio, using as
the denominator of the ratio the equalized value-of the combined residential,
mercantile, manufacturing, agricultural, swamp or wasteland, productive
forest land, and nonproductive forest land classes within the state in 1972,
and as the numerator, the equalized value for these combined land classes in
1982 and every tenth year thereafter, rounded to the nearest cent. 36 1 Own-
ers must pay the town a penalty based on the average full value per acre of
the productive forest land classes during the previous year in the county
where the land is located as determined by the Department of Revenue once
the DNR or the owner removes the land from the program. The penalty is
equal to one percent of that figure for each acre for each year the land was in
the program. 362 Owners are not liable for any penalty if the contract is not
renewed at the end of its period.
3 63
3. Forest Croplands
Soon after Wisconsin amended its constitution to allow forest lands to
be taxed differently from other lands and timber to be taxed separately from
the land, 3 6 4 the legislature enacted the Forest Crop Law.3 65 The law pro-
vides that the owner of an entire quarter section, fractional lot, or govern-
mental lot as determined by the federal government may petition the DNR
requesting that such lands be approved as forest croplands. 366 The DNR
will grant the request if after a public hearing3 6 7 and investigation it finds
that the facts give "reasonable assurance" that the landowner will develop a
stand of merchantable timber within a reasonable time and that the owner
presently holds the land permanently for growing timber under sound for-
estry practices, rather than for agricultural, mineral, shoreland development
owner of the land, the supervisor of property assessments of the district where the land is lo-
cated, the town clerk and assessor, and the county register of deeds for recording.
360. Id § 77.16(6). The special tax was 20¢ per acre per year for lands entered in the pro-
gram prior to 1977.
361. Id. See id § 77.04(2) for the method of calculation.
362. Id. § 77.16(11).
363. Id § 77.16(12).
364. Wis. J. Res. 62 (1925); Wis. J. Res. 13 (1927) (codified in WiS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1927)).
365. 1927 Wis. Laws ch. 454 (codified in Wis. STAT. §§ 77.01-.14 (1977 & Supp. 1981)).
The purpose of the act was to protect forests from destructive or premature cutting and provide
towns in which forest lands are located with just tax revenue. WIs. STAT. § 77.01 (1977). See
Waite, Land Use Controls and Recreation in Northern Wisconsin, 42 MARQ. L. REV. 271, 272-75
(1959) for a discussion of the Forest Crop Law.
366. WIs. STAT. § 77.02(1) (1977). The petitioner must state that he believes the lands
described in the petition would be more useful for growing timber and other forest crops than
for any other purpose, that he intends to practice forestry on the lands, and that all persons
holding encumbrances on the lands have joined in the petition.
367. See id § 77.02(2) for public hearing requirements.
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of navigable water, recreational, residential, or other purposes. 368 The
DNR's order accepting the petition and designating the lands as "forest
croplands" becomes a contract running with the land between the state and
owner for a period of twenty-five to fifty years.
369
Owners of land designated as forest croplands pay an "acreage share" to
the town each year rather than the ordinary property tax. 3 70 The Depart-
ment of Revenue computes the acreage share every ten years for all lands
designated as forest croplands after December 31, 1971, by multiplying
twenty cents per acre by a specific ratio and rounding it off to the nearest
cent. 37 1 The DNR pays the town twenty cents for each acre in the town
under the forest cropland program. 372 The town, in turn, pays the county
twenty percent of all funds it receives from any source due to the forest
croplands within its boundary. 373 Owners are not liable for any other taxes
on their cropland, except for buildings located on it which are assessed and
taxed as personal property.
374
A severance tax equal to ten percent of the value of the wood products
removed based on stumpage value is paid by the owner for any timber cut
on the forest croplands prior to the expiration of the contract. 375 If the state
and owner do not renew the forest cropland contract by mutual consent
upon its expiration, the owner must pay a ten percent severance tax just as if
the wood had been cut. 376 The DNR will remove the land from forest
cropland status if the tax records show prolonged delinquency or the owner
fails to comply with the program's requirements. 37 7 An owner must pay a
rollback tax plus interest, less any severance tax and acreage share previously
paid, if either the owner withdraws or the DNR removes the land from the
forest cropland program.
378
C. Implementation of Tax Incentives for Conservation Programs
Amendments to Wisconsin's constitutional uniformity clause allowing
for the classification of forest lands, 3 79 merchants' stock-in-trade, manufac-
turers' materials and finished products, livestock, 380 and agricultural
368. Id. § 77.02(3).
369. Id § 77.03. The landowner must designate the duration when filing the petition.
370. See Waite, supra note 365, at 272 for a discussion of the Forest Crop Law's distinction
between land, which is considered capital, and timber, which is the crop or income.
371. WIs. STAT. § 77.04(2) (1977).
372. Id § 77.05(1).
373. Id § 77.04(3).
374. Id. § 77.04(1). Forest cropland owners, however, are liable for special assessments for
specific improvements. 18 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 108, 109 (1929).
375. Wis. STAT. § 77.06(5) (1977). See id §§ 77.06(2) for procedure to determine stumpage
value.
376. M. § 77.03.
377. Id § 77.10(1)(a).
378. Id § 77.10(2)(a).
379. Wis. J. Res. 62 (1925); Wis. J. Res. 13 (1927) (codified in Wts. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1848, amended 1927)).
380. Wis. J. Res. 78 (1959); Wis. J. Res. 13 (1961) (codified in Wis. CONST. art. VIII, § 1,
(1848, amended 1961)).
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lands38 ' for differential taxation permit the legislature to enact a variety of
property tax incentives for implementing soil conservation programs. Such
programs may be implemented in conjunction with differential assessments
permitted for agricultural lands, forest lands, and woodlands or property tax
credits can be provided against state income taxes under a farmland preser-
vation agreement. A possibility exists for adjusting assessed valuation or tax
rates applied to assessed values under the constitutional amendments for im-
plementing soil conservation programs. Also, under certain circumstances,
soil conservation structures may be exempt from taxation in Wisconsin.
1. Differential Taxation of Lands
Legislation has been enacted in Wisconsin permitting differential assess-
ment for agricultural land,38 2 forest land, 38 3 and woodlands. 38 4 In each
case, the landowner must adhere to certain management practices38 5 and
sign an agreement 38 6 to be eligible for differential assessments.
Wisconsin is one state that requires participation in a soil conservation
program as a prerequisite for differential assessment under farmland preser-
vation agreements. A farm conservation plan must be either prepared or in
the process of being prepared before approval of an initial program agree-
ment. 38 7 A farm conservation plan must also be in effect before approval of
a permanent program agreement. 388 Approximately 2,000 farmers through-
out the state have signed farmland preservation agreements since 1977 and
farm conservation plans were prepared for about one-half of the farms. Con-
servation plans were already in existence on the remaining farms. The fail-
ure of SCS to assign additional technicians to prepare conservation plans has
forced the soil and water conservation districts to hire additional personnel
to perform the work.
38 9
Soil and water conservation district supervisors are charged with the
responsibility of preparing and enforcing farm conservation plans. 390 Own-
ers of land under a permanent farmland preservation agreement who fail to
comply with the farm conservation plan are given one year to comply.
391
Compliance can be enforced by an injunction or civil penalty for actual
damages up to double the value of the land at the time the agreement appli-
cation was approved. 392 Also, if owners fail to renew a permanent agree-
ment at its expiration date or relinquish it, with state approval, prior to
381. Wis. J. Res. 39 (1971); Wis. J. Res. 29 (1973) (codified in WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1848, amended 1973)).
382. WIs. STAT. §§ 20.115(6)(a), 71.09(11), 91.01-.79 (1977).
383. Id § 77.01-.14.
384. Id § 77.16.
385. Id §§ 77.02(1), (3), .16(2), (4), (7), 91.13(8)(d), .35(1).
386. Id §§ 77.02(3), .03, .16(4), 91.13(t)-(5), .31.
387. Id § 77.35(1).
388. Id. § 77.13(8)(d).
389. Telephone Interview with James A. Johnson, Director, Farmland Preservation Pro-
gram, Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, Madison, Wis-
consin, January 28, 1981.
390. WIs. STAT. § 77.13(8)(d) (1977).
391. Id § 91.21(3).
392. Id § 91.21(1).
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expiration, deferred or "rollback" taxes for all credits received for up to ten
years are assessed against the owners.393 Officials in the Department of Agri-
culture, Trade and Consumer Protection feel that the farmland preservation
program has been an effective incentive for promoting participation in soil
conservation programs and that the soil and water conservation districts
have successfully enforced compliance with the farm conservation plan
requirement.
394
Wisconsin has two programs giving differential tax treatment to forest
lands, depending primarily upon the size of the land parcels involved and
length of the contract period between the landowner and state. Both pro-
grams have provisions promoting soil conservation. Prior to approving an
application designating a parcel as forest croplands under the Forest Crop
Law, 395 the DNR must be satisfied that the land will be used for growing
timber under sound forestry practices. 396 The DNR may cancel the contract
prior to expiration if the owner uses the land for anything other than forestry
purposes or fails to practice sound forestry on the land. 397 An owner must
pay a rollback tax, plus interest, less any severance tax and acreage share
previously paid, if the DNR removes the land from the forest cropland
program. 398
The DNR will not approve an application placing a parcel of land
under the woodland tax law unless the owner agrees to follow the depart-
ment's approved management plan for the land. 399 If the DNR finds that
the owner no longer uses the land for forestry purposes or follows the ap-
proved management plan, it may remove the land from the woodland tax
law classification. 4° ° Upon declassification, owners must pay a penalty to
the town based on the average full value per acre of productive forest land
during the previous year in the county where the land is located. The
amount is equal to one percent of that figure for each acre for each year the




2. Adjustments in Assessed Valuation or Tax Rates
Adjustments in assessed valuation or tax rates as a method of promoting
soil and water conservation are not very promising in Wisconsin under the
constitutional uniformity clause. Such adjustments would have to operate in
conjunction with already existing statutes permitting differential assessments
for agricultural lands, forest lands, and woodlands. Owners who sign farm-
land preservation agreements are eligible to receive tax credits against their
393. Id §§ 91.19(1), (2), (7), (8).
394. Telephone Interview with James A. Johnson, Director, Farmland Reservation Pro-
gram, Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, Madison, Wis-
consin, January 28, 1981.
395. WIs. STAT. §§ 77.01-.14 (1977).
396. Id. § 77.02(3).
397. Id § 77.10(1)(a).
398. Id § 77.10(2)(a).
399. Id § 77.16(3). The signed management plan becomes part of the contract. Id
§ 77.16(4).
400. Id. § 77.16(7). See id. §§ 77.16(8), (9) for the removal procedures.
401. Id. § 77.16(11).
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state income taxes for "excessive" property taxes as calculated under a "cir-
cuit-breaker" formula. The percentage of the potential tax credit that a
landowner can claim is dependent upon whether the preservation agreement
is an initial, transitional, or permanent one and whether the subject farm-
land is located in an area zoned for exclusive agricultural use or under a
county agricultural preservation plan .4 2 These statutes could be amended
to have the percentage also dependent upon the implementation of certain
soil conservation practices. Owners of woodlands or forest lands given pref-
erential tax treatment pay twenty cents per acre of land times a specific ratio
based on land values every ten years.4° 3 This twenty cents could be adjusted
for the implementation of certain soil conservation practices.
The only other method of providing adjustments in assessed valuation
or tax rates for implementing soil conservation programs would be to amend
the constitution to provide that the taxation of lands upon which conserva-
tion practices have been implemented need not be uniform with the taxation
of each other or with the taxation of other lands. Existing amendments pro-
vide that the taxation of merchants' stock-in-trade, manufacturers' materials
and finished products, and livestock need not be uniform with the taxation
of real property and other personal property.4° 4 Property can be classified
for the purpose of applying different rates. Graduated rates are a reasonable
scheme of classification. 4° 5
3. Exemptions of Improvements from Taxation
Improvements in Wisconsin are valued separately from the land for tax
purposes. 4 0 6 The legislature could exempt improvements, such as soil con-
servation structures, from property taxation under the constitutional uni-
formity clause as it now exempts all property purchased or constructed as
waste treatment facilities utilized for the treatment of industrial wastes or air
contaminants. 407
Certain rules. must be followed in exempting soil and water conserva-
tion structures from taxation. If improvements are to be exempt from taxa-
tion, the exemption must be a full exemption and all improvements within
the same property class must be exempt, 408 otherwise the exemption is un-
constitutional. The Wisconsin Attorney General said a proposed statute ex-
empting improvements to wild lands by settlers from property taxation for
five years following purchase of the land would be unconstitutional because
it would allow non-uniform taxes. Land having the same value would be
402. Se id § 71.09(11) (b) (1977 & Supp. 1981).
403. Wis. STAT. §§ 77.04(2), .16(6) (1977).
404. Wis. J. Res. 78 (1959); Wis. J. Res. 13 (1961) (codified in WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1848, amended 1961)).
405. See State ex rel. Bolens v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N.W. 673 (1912); Nunnemacher v.
State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906).
406. WIs. STAT. § 70.32(2) (1977).
407. Id § 70.11(21).
408. See Ehrlich v. City of Racine, 26 Wis. 2d 352, 354-55, 132 N.W.2d 489, 490-91 (1965);
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. State, 128 Wis. 553, 603, 108 N.W. 557, 567 (1906); Hale v. City of
Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599, 604 (1872); Knowlton v. Board of Supervisors, 9 Wis. 410, 424 (1859).
There can not be a partial exemption.
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taxed differently depending on how long ago the owner purchased the land
and when improvements were made on it. 40 9 A later opinion stresses an-
other problem. Proposed legislation exempting the first $3,750 of assessed
value of real property occupied by the owner as a homestead would be un-
constitutional because a homestead is not an. item of property. Instead, it is
merely part of the taxable value of the entire property. The uniformity
clause would be violated because property occupied by an owner as a home-
stead would be valued lower than if the property were not occupied as a
homestead.
4 10
Recent supreme court decisions also illustrate that limitations are likely
to be placed on exempting conservation structures from taxation. The Ur-
ban Redevelopment Law,4 1' which authorizes cities to freeze the assessment
on property held by redevelopment corporations for up to thirty years re-
gardless of any improvements the owners made during that period, was de-
clared unconstitutional as providing a special tax privilege to some
landowners. 41 2 A later case held that the Improvements Tax Relief stat-
ute 4 13 providing tax credits to certain owners of residential properties for
making improvements violated the uniformity clause because the credits
were available to only two classes of property owners.
4 14
4. Credits of a Specified Amount Against Property Taxes
Wisconsin is unable to provide credits of specified amounts against
property taxes for implementing soil conservation programs without amend-
ing the constitutional uniformity clause to provide that the taxation of lands
upon which conservation programs have been implemented need not be uni-
form with the taxation of each other or with the taxation of other lands. A
similar amendment provides for the nonuniform taxation of forest and min-
eral lands.4i 5 Once the constitution is amended, the legislature can adopt a
statute permitting the deduction of a specified amount from property taxes
for implementing soil conservation programs. Failure to maintain such pro-
grams could be grounds for imposing rollback taxes.
5. Property Tax Credits Against Income Taxes
Since the constitution was amended in 1974 to allow tax treMment of
agricultural and undeveloped lands to differ from the tax treatment of other
real property, credits against income taxes can be used as an incentive for
409. 10 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 261 (1921).
410. 52 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 143, 144-45, 156-57 (1963).
411. 1943 Wis. Laws ch. 333, as amendrd (codified in WIS. STAT. 66.405-.425 (1977)). The
unconstitutional section, Wis. STAT. § 66.409 (1943), was repealed by 1969 Wis. Laws ch. 15,
§3.
412. Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967).
413. WIs. STAT. §§ 79.24, .25 (1977).
414. State ex rel. LaFollette v. Torphy, 85 Wis. 2d 94, 98, 111-12, 270 N.W.2d 187, 188, 194
(1978).
415. Wis. J. Res. 62 (1925); Wis. J. Res. 13 (1927) (codified in WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(1848, amended 1927)).
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implementing soil conservation programs. 4 16 Such tax credits, because they
relate to income taxes, are not dependent upon whether the constitutional
amendment allows for nonuniformity of treatment within the classification
for agricultural land. 41 7 The legislature could enact a statute providing that
a certain portion of the property taxes paid on lands where the owners have
implemented soil conservation practices be deducted from the owners' state
income taxes. As with the Farmland Preservation Act, 4 18 the amount of de-
duction would relate to the amount of household income. Rollback or de-
ferred taxes could also be imposed for failure to maintain the conservation
program.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Property tax incentives available to promote implementation of soil
conservation programs are dependent upon a state's enabling legislation and
exceptions to its constitutional uniformity clause. Uniformity clauses restrict
legislative power to provide property tax incentives for implementing soil
conservation programs. Several possible methods are available to overcome
uniformity clause restrictions and allow property tax incentives. Among the
methods are to amend the constitution to permit classification of property
upon which soil conservation programs have been implemented, for separate
tax treatment; to exempt agricultural, forest, and open space lands from the
uniformity clause limitations; and to permit general classification of property
so different ratios of assessed valuation or tax rates can be applied to the
various classes. Another method is to consider conservation practices as im-
provements and exempt such improvements from taxation.
Constitutions in virtually all states now permit a general classification of
real property for tax purposes or provide exemptions of agricultural, forest,
and open space lands from the uniformity clause limitations. In conformity
wi'th the liberalization of uniformity restrictions, all states except Georgia
and Mississippi have adopted one of three types of statutes providing for
differential assessment of certain lands and such statutes may provide the
foundation for property tax incentives. Under one type of statute, preferen-
tial assessment, agricultural and other open space lands specified by the leg-
islation are assessed for property tax purposes on the basis of their value for
agriculture and open space purposes as long as the lands are used for those
purposes, and not on the basis of the lands' highest and best use. A second
type of statute, preferential assessment with deferred or "rollback" taxation,
adds a feature to differential assessment by imposing a sanction requiring
owners of qualifying lands converting them to nonqualifying uses to repay
part or all the taxes for a specified number of years they were excused from
paying prior to conversion. The third type of statute involves the use of
restrictive agreements whereby landowners voluntarily contract with govern-
mental agencies to keep their lands in a qualifying use for a number of years.
416. Wis. J. Res. 39 (1971); Wis. J. Res. 29 (1973) (codified in WiS. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1
(1848, amended 1973)).
417. Set 66 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 337, 340-42 (1977).
418. WIs. STAT. §§ 20.115(6)(a), 71.09(11), 91.01-.79 (1977).
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Changing land use prior to termination of the agreement is a breach and
leads to the imposition of rollback taxes or a penalty.
Several possible types of property tax incentives may be available for
implementing soil conservation programs. One type of incentive is associ-
ated with differential assessment of agricultural, forest, and open space lands
and requires the implementation of soil conservation programs as a prerequi-
site to taking advantage of use-value assessment. Another possible type of
property tax incentive is to provide an adjustment in the assessed valuation
or tax rates applied to the assessed value on lands where owners have imple-
mented soil conservation programs. Other possible types of property tax in-
centives include considering conservation structures improvements and
exempting such improvements from taxation, providing property tax credits
against state income taxes, and providing credits in a specified amount
against property taxes.
The preferred type of property tax incentive for participation in soil
conservation programs is the one requiring implementation of such pro-
grams as a condition for eligibility for use-value assessments under the vari-
ous differential assessment taxation statutes. All except two states now have
differential assessment statutes and some, such as Wisconsin, already require
participation in a soil conservation program as a prerequisite for eligibility.
Differential assessment statutes in those states not requiring the implementa-
tion of soil conservation programs as a prerequisite for eligibility could be
easily amended to incorporate such a requirement. Statutes also could easily
be amended to provide for deferred or rollback taxation in instances where
landowners fail to maintain conservation programs. States such as Mary-
land and Wisconsin already require the payment of deferred taxes for failure
to maintain eligible lands in uses qualifying for differential assessment. Soil
and water conservation district supervisors, with the help of SCS district
conservationists, could assist with the compliance and enforcement
requirements.
Several advantages exist with the property tax incentive method that
requires implementation of a soil conservation program as a prerequisite for
differential assessment. Differential assessment statutes are already in exist-
ence and have been held constitutional under the uniformity clauses. A sim-
ple amendment to the statutes requiring the implementation of a soil
conservation program as a prerequisite for use-value assessment and the pay-
ment of deferred taxes for failure to maintain such a program would not
create new classes of property and, therefore, would not conflict with the
uniformity clause restrictions. Local governments would not lose as much
potential property tax revenue under this method of promoting participa-
tion in soil conservation programs as with some other methods because extra
tax incentives are not given for participating in conservation programs. SCS
and soil and water conservation district technical assistance and ACP cost-
share funds can be easily used in conjunction with the prerequisite for differ-
ential assessment method. States could even make the implementation of
soil conservation programs dependent upon the availability of technical
assistance and cost-share funds to avoid hardships. Another advantage of
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the differential assessment method is that many states include open space,
forest, planned development, and country club lands in addition to agricul-
tural lands under their use-value assessment program, thereby permitting a
broad coverage of land subject to conservation programs. The concept of
forcing soil conservation programs upon landowners as a prerequisite for dif-
ferential assessment differs little from forcing conservation practices upon
subdividers as a prerequisite for subdivision plat approval.
Adjustments in the assessed valuation of land or in the tax rate applied
to the assessed value may be a possible property tax incentive for implement-
ing soil conservation programs. Statutes permitting tax adjustments for con-
servation purposes could be enacted only in states where the constitutional
uniformity clause allows subclassification of real property. The next issue to
be addressed is whether subclassification of land in order to implement soil
conservation programs is reasonable and bears some reasonable relationship
to a legitimate state interest or policy. Also, a real difference must exist be-
tween the classes of property. Even though states have not subclassified land
on the basis of implementation of soil conservation programs, states have
subclassified land on the basis of other uses made of the land. For example,
Colorado permits a separate classification for property used to produce alco-
hol for motor fuels and Wisconsin permits separate classifications for
merchants' stock-in-trade, manufacturers' materials and finished products,
and livestock. Statutes permitting classification of land for other uses may
be used as models for classification for conservation programs. In some
cases, however, the state constitutions may have to be amended to permit
specifically subclassifications of land for conservation purposes. States could
decrease, the impact of tax revenue loss due to an adjustment in assessed
value or tax rates by providing that the adjusted assessed value or tax rate on
the assessed value applies only to the land's increased value caused by the
new conservation program.
Another possible method of providing property tax incentives is to con-
sider conservation structures as improvements and assess such improvements
at a lower value or tax them at a lower rate than other property or exempt
them altogether from taxation. The issues involved with this method of pro-
viding a tax incentive for conservation programs include the definition of
improvements and the authority to assess them separately from the land,
classify them, and exempt them from taxation. The constitutional uniform-
ity clause and statutes must permit improvements to be assessed separately
from land and improvements to be classified and exempt from taxation. Ex-
emption of improvements may be easier in a state like Maryland whose con-
stitution provides that improvements on the land are to be assessed
separately from the land and that such improvements can be classified and
subclassified. In addition, the Maryland Constitution gives the legislature
power to exempt property fully from taxation without violating the uniform-
ity clause, where such exemption is reasonable and for a public purpose.
Colorado's constitution, on the other hand, is more restrictive in that it spe-
cifically exempts certain types of property and forbids the legislature from
exempting others not listed. Several examples exist as models to provide
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some type of tax exemption for conservation structures. Planting trees, in-
stalling alternative energy devices, and placing property on the historic regis-
ter do not increase the assessed value of the property in Colorado, and
property purchased or constructed as waste treatment facilities in Wisconsin
is exempt from taxation. If this type of property tax incentive is used, states
should at least strive to exempt any increase in value to land because of the
construction of conservation structures.
Still another type of property tax incentive for conservation programs is
to provide that the property taxes paid on soil conservation practices or
structures be credited against state income taxes. Colorado has such a stat-
ute for pollution control property and Wisconsin's differential assessment for
farmland preservation is based on credits against state income taxes. The
advantage of this method is that state income taxes are not subject to the
constitutional uniformity clause restrictions on property taxation. The last
type of property tax incentive is to provide credits of a specified amount
against property taxes for implementing soil conservation programs. A dis-
advantage of this method of property tax incentive is that the constitutional
uniformity clause must provide that the taxation of lands upon which con-
servation programs have been implemented need not be uniform with the
taxation of other lands.

LIBERATING RADIO: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES' RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
INTRODUCTION
Federal regulation regarding the content of radio programming is pre-
mised on the concept that the airwaves are a limited public resource, one
which requires certain controls so that all voices clamoring for attention can
be heard. The rationale for such regulation was initially based on the scarce
number of stations and the pervasive influence of broadcasting on a captive
audience.' With technological advances and the increased number of sta-
tions, the parameters of federal regulation have required refinement. Thus,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) promul-
gated two policy statements advocating the deregulation of both the en-
tertainment and nonentertainment portions of radio.
2
In 1976, after issuing a notice and inquiry, the FCC formulated a policy
statement which announced that it would let the free market dictate the
types of formats radio stations would have for their entertainment program-
ming. In essence, the FCC promoted the deregulation of entertainment for-
mats by choosing not to regulate the broadcasters' program choices.
Through this deregulation, the FCC endorsed the principle that the public
interest in diversity of entertainment formats would be best served by a com-
petitive marketplace and not by governmental regulation. 3
In FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild,4 the Supreme Court decided that the
FCC could, consonant with the public interest, promote the goal of diversity
in radio programming through the free competition policy. This decision set
aside the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' "format" doctrine 5 which
rejected the FCC's authority to totally deregulate radio entertainment pro-
gramming through the marketplace. According to the format doctrine, if
there is significant public grumbling concerning a proposed change in pro-
1. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
2. The FCC's deregulation policy actions are only applicable to the radio industry, not to
television broadcasting.
3. This deregulation action is in accord with the new presidential strategy of deregulating
America's industries. President Reagan has charged that "[g]overnment regulations impose an
enormous burden on large and small business in America, discourage productivity, and contrib-
ute substantially to our current economic woes .... It is my intention to curb the size and
influence of the federal establishment." Bus. WEEK, Mar. 9, 1981, at 62.
Professor Gellhorn does not agree that the current mood of Congress and the nation favor-
ing deregulation is necessarily desirable. Professor Gellhorn suggests instead that the adminis-
trative agency decision-makers should be more responsible. He characterizes deregulation as a
"dangerous political slogan" that encourages reckless overhauling instead of fine tuning. Gell-
horn, Deregulation: Delight or Delusion?, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 469, 482 (1980).
4. 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
5. The format doctrine is a judicially created principle developed by the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals. The doctrine is applicable to "unique" entertainment programming.
For example, a radio station offering classical music would be considered to have presented a
unique program if it were the only station in the community playing classical music. WNCN
Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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gramming, the FCC must consider, usually in an administrative hearing,
whether the public interest is served by the change. 6 Thus, the court of
appeals reasoned, when the marketplace regulation goes awry, the govern-
ment must intervene in the public interest.7 The Supreme Court upheld the
FCC's contention that even in a format controversy, no government inter-
vention is necessary.
8
In WNCN, the Supreme Court accorded substantial judicial deference
to the FCC's rulemaking authority. The rationale of the decisions comports
with the Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary and capricious" 9 stan-
dard for the scope of judicial review of an administrative agency's action.
Recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had advocated a
stricter scrutiny of administrative action by the judiciary.' 0 In rejecting a
stricter scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court reasoned that an agency could
best decide how to carry out the goals of its enabling statute as long as there
was a rational basis for its methods. Because it accords such judicial defer-
ence to an agency, the WNCN decision has vast implications on the scope of
idirial review of administrative agencies' rulemaking authority."
In February 1981, the FCC, continuing its deregulation policy, promul-
gated a final rule deregulating certain nonentertainment portions of radio
broadcasting.' 2 Under the Deregulation Policy Statement, the broadcaster
must now meet only generalized public interest obligations "in light of the
contemporary reality of the radio marketplace."'
3
This note will analyze and critique the underlying rationale of WNCN
and explore the potential reach of the decision as it relates to the Deregula-
tion Policy Statement.
I. DEREGULATION THROUGH THE COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE
A. The PUb/ic Interest Standard of Diversity in Entertainment Programming
The Communications Act of 193414 established the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to regulate the burgeoning radio industry. The powers
given to the FCC were broad: to regulate the allocation of broadcast fre-
quencies, to grant applications for radio licenses, to renew radio licenses, and
to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public inter-
est."' 5 This public interest charge set the tenor for the FCC's administrative
control. For example, before granting an application for a radio license or
renewing a radio license, the FCC must determine that to do so would serve
the "public interest, necessity, and convenience."'
6
6. See notes 26-44 nfzra and accompanying text.
7. 610 F.2d 838, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
8. 450 U.S. at 593-97.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
10. See notes 125-149 infra.
11. See notes 133-154 t'nf:a and accompanying text.
12. 46 Fed. Reg. 13888 (1981) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. Pts. 0, 73).
13. 46 Fed. Reg. at 13888.
14. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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The definition of "public interest" includes the goal of promoting diver-
sity in radio entertainment programming. The term diversity, as used in the
radio entertainment context, means program formats of all types of music,
news, and public affairs.
1 7
Historically, this goal of diversity in radio programming was met by the
broadcasters without intervention from the FCC. In the early days of radio
broadcasting, when large numbers of Americans lived in areas with only one
or two radio stations, the stations promoted the diversity goal by providing a
general variety of entertainment selections.' 8 With the vast increase in the
number of stations over the years, however, broadcasters have specialized
their entertainment formats. 19 Thus, the implementation of the diversity
goal has shifted from the single radio station providing a variety of selections
to a number of stations each offering different formats.
Throughout the history of radio, broadcasters have selected and
changed their entertainment formats without interference from the public.
Although the Communications Act provided that the airwaves were dedi-
cated for the public benefit, the listening public did not have standing to
question the FCC's public interest determinations in granting, renewing, or
transferring radio licenses. 20 The power to raise the public interest issue was
left, then, to the FCC and to the broadcasters. The broadcasters were con-
sidered to be representatives of the public interest, but the scope of their
interests was usually confined to the narrow questions of their financial losses
or electronic interference.
2 1
Not until the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' 1966 decision in
the Ojice of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,22 did the court
recognize the listening public's standing to participate in licensing decisions
involving the public interest issue. In United Church of Christ, the court of
appeals held that responsible associations have standing "not for the protec-
tion of their private interest, but only to vindicate the public interest."
'2 3
The rationale for this decision was, given the multitude of duties of the FCC
and the narrow interest of the broadcasters, it is unfeasible and inappropri-
ate to rely solely on the FCC and broadcasters to raise all public interest
questions that arise in a licensing proceeding. 24 The court concluded that
conferring standing to a public group to contest a public interest point
17. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
18. 46 Fed. Reg. at 13888. "[I]n the early days of radio, it was essential that a few stations
provide a broad general service." Id
19. Id The number of stations has increased from 583 stations in 1934 to almost 9000
stations in 1981. Id
20. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
21. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1940); accord, Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942). In Scripps-Howard, the Supreme Court held that
the Communications Act did not create new private rights. Standing is given then, to those
persons 'aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected' by the FCC's action. "But these
private litigants have standing only as representatives of the public interest." Id at 14. As such,
these parties with standing are authorized private attorney generals. See Associated Indus., Inc.
v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
22. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
23. Id at 1001.
24. Id at 1002.
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would make the radio licensee more "responsive to the needs of the audience
"25
Although the differences in listening choices between the public and the
broadcasters may have always existed, it was not until after the United Church
of Christ decision that these differences became apparent. Thus, once this
right of standing was conferred, public interest groups began attacking the
traditional policy of allowing broadcasters the discretion to choose their own
entertainment programming. The public interest groups challenged broad-
casters who planned to abandon a unique program in favor of a more com-
mon format-for example, from classical music or jazz to top forty music.
These groups merged into a committee to petition the FCC to conduct a
hearing to review the licensee's application for transfer or renewal.
As provided by the Communications Act, the FCC would usually grant
a transfer application or a license renewal without the necessity of an admin-
istrative hearing, except if: 1) there were substantial and material questions
of fact concerning the transfer or 2) the FCC could not determine if the
i,' lotin mpt the nhlire interest, convenience. and necessity standard.
26
Despite the United Church of Christ decision and the Communications
Act's mandate, the FCC proved unresponsive to the public committee's peti-
tions for hearings. By appealing the FCC's decisions to the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals, the committees found a receptive judiciary that
would reverse the agency's decisions. The proper interpretation and imple-
mentation of the public interest diversity goal sparked the controversy be-
tween the FCC and the appellate court, culminating in the Supreme Court's
decision in WNCN. The crux of the disagreement focused on the judicially
espoused format doctrine.
B. The Format Doctrine--Government Intervention for Unique Programming
In the first of the format doctrine cases, Citiens Committee to Preserve the
"Voice of the Arts 'n Atlanta" v. FCC,2 7 controversy emerged when a citizens'
association, in a petition to deny a transfer application, complained that the
abandonment of a unique format by a prospective transferor of a radio li-
cense would have a serious negative impact on the public interest in diversity
of entertainment programming. 28 The proposed transfer in this case in-
volved a change of format from classical music to "easy listening."
'29
25. Id
26. Under the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1976) any party in interest
may petition the FCC to deny the application, and such petition "shall contain specific allega-
tions of fact sufficient to show. . . that a grant of the application would be prima facie inconsis-
tent with [the public interest standard]." Furthermore, subsection (d)(2) provides that if the
FCC finds that there are no "substantial and material questions of fact," then the petition will
be denied. If there are "substantial and material questions of fact," or "if the Commission for
any reason is unable to find that grant of the application would be consistent with [the public
interest standard]," then the FCC shall proceed with a public hearing pursuant to subsection
(e).
27. 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
28. Id at 268-69.
29. Id at 265. A survey of the area residents showed that 16% of the people in Atlanta
favored a classical music format. Id at 269.
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Notwithstanding the citizens' protest, the FCC granted the application with-
out a hearing. In overruling the FCC's decision, 30 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals mandated that the Commission must inquire into whether
the public interest would be harmed when a unique format is to be discon-
tinued. The court held that the question of alternative sources of program-
ming and profitability had met the threshold standard for a hearing under
the "substantial and material question" directive. Although the court's
opinion did not direct the Commission to dictate programming, the court
held that the FCC should discern "what are the community needs and will
they be properly served by the proposed transfer" 3 1 when a unique format
change is in issue.
In Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC,32 the court of appeals
further delineated the format doctrine. In this case, the existing station was
in financial straits. In an unsuccessful attempt to find a lucrative format, the
station had changed formats from country and western to "golden oldies."
The broadcaster then sought to assign his license. After the application for
transfer proceeding had begun, the station began to experiment with broad-
casting progressive rock music. Although this new format was an immediate
success, the prospective licensee planned to broadcast top forty sounds.
33
The Citizens Committee petitioned the FCC for a hearing on the format
question. 34  The FCC denied the request and granted the application.
Again, the court of appeals reversed. The court concluded that when public
grumbling reaches significant proportions, a substantial and material ques-
tion of fact exists which must be resolved by a hearing.35 The court also held
that the FCC must determine the extent of support by the area residents,
and then make a decision on the public interest based on substantial evi-
dence. 36 Additionally, the court addressed the question of the financial posi-
tion of the station transferring the license, and averred that the financial
condition of the station was not a direct factor in deciding if an assignment
should be granted. Rather, the FCC should consider "whether the format is
so economically unfeasible that an assignment encompassing a format
change should be granted.
3 7
30. Under the Communications Act, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has exclu-
sive appellate jurisdiction in broadcast licensing matters. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
31. 436 F.2d at 272 n.7.
32. 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
33. Id at 928.
34. The Citizens Committee was formed solely for the purpose of petitioning the FCC for a
denial of the application of the license transfer. This committee was thus complying with the
Uniltd Church of Christ case mandate of "responsible associations." See text accompanying notes
22-25 supra.
35. 478 F.2d at 934.
36. Id
37. Id. at 931. At the same time Progressive Rock was decided, the court ruled in Lakewood
Broadcasting Serv. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973), that an all-news station was not a
"unique" format within the purview of the format doctrine. Noting that news was provided by
other radio stations and that two stations were "all news" during prime listening hours, the
court held that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate "material and substantial questions of
fact" necessary to invoke a hearing. Id at 924.
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In Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC,38 the court of appeals put
the final gloss on the format doctrine. Here, the FCC had granted the trans-
fer application of Chicago's primary classical music station, WEFM. The
FCC had specifically found that Chicago's two other classical music stations
served WEFM's service area and provided an adequate alternative for the
listening public. 39 Although the FCC's action was initially upheld by a
three-judge panel, 40 an en bane panel vacated this decision and reversed the
Commission's grant of the transfer, finding that the alternative sources of
programming were unacceptable substitutes.4 ' In the majority opinion, the
court of appeals characterized the format doctrine as a balance between the
public interest in diversity of formats and the broadcasters' business discre-
tion in choosing entertainment programming. The court stated that "if the
FCC is to pursue the public interest, it may not be able at the same time to
pursue a policy of free competition."
'42
The court of appeals outlined a procedure for the FCC to follow in
determining if it must intervene in a licensing proceeding and hold a hearing
on the change of entertainment formats. The court opined that when there
is significant public discontent over the abandonment of a unique format,
the FCC must first decide if the format is unique. If there are no alternate
sources of the same type of programming in the community, the format is
considered unique. Second, once the format is determined to be unique, a
hearing is required to consider the factual issue of whether the public interest
would be served by changing the format.43 As a caveat to this consideration,
the court asserted that the financial losses of a station could be considered, as
justification for granting the application transfer causing the loss of a unique
format, only when the financial losses are "attributable to the format itself
"44
C. The 1976 Polic Statement and WNCN-Advocating Deregulation through the
Competitive Marketplace
1. Notice of Inquiry
Faced with the directive of WEFM, the FCC decided to resolve the for-
mat doctrine controversy by administrative rulemaking and, therefore, is-
sued a Notice of Inquiry45 pursuant to its rulemaking authority.46 The
proceedings were to establish a comprehensive policy statement on the ap-
propriateness and feasibility of the agency's regulation of entertainment for-
mats. 47 This policy was to rest upon consideration of two issues: 1) whether
38. 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir.) vacated, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
39. Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223 (1973).
40. 506 F.2d at 252.
41. Id at 264-65.
42. Id at 267-68.
43. Id at 262.
44. Id
45. Notice of Inquiry, Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats
of Broadcast Stations, 57 F.C.C.2d 580 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Notice of Inquiry).
46. The FCC is authorized to undertake rulemaking as the "public convenience, interest,
or necessity requires." Communications Act of 1934, § 303, 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976).
47. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 45, at 584-85.
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the Communications Act of 1934 required, in the public interest, a "close
scrutiny of broadcast entertainment formats to assure an appropriate diver-
sity" and 2) whether the close scrutiny over broadcast program content was
permitted under the first amendment.48 The Commission posited that "any
administrative regulation or policy tending to constrain an applicant from
selecting programming of its choice 'must be justified by the existence and
immediate impendency of dangers to the public interest which clearly and
not dubiously outweigh those involved in the restrictions.' -49 Thus, accord-
ing to the FCC's prediction, a free, competitive marketplace would best ac-
complish the goal of promoting diversity in entertainment programming.
The Notice of Inquiry, however, was colored by the agency's opinion
that the directive of WEFM was unwarranted. The Commission was obvi-
ously disturbed by the role cast for it by the court, and stated: "[wie are
deeply concerned that, by rejecting the programming choices of individual
broadcasters in favor of a system of pervasive governmental regulation, the
Commission would embark on a course which may have serious adverse con-
sequences for the public interest." 50 In sum, the Commission viewed the
determination of the uniqueness of a format as requiring subjective decision-
making.5 ' Furthermore, it contended that the "uniqueness of a format" de-
termination would be unproductive since cumbersome governmental regula-
tion would be inferior, in achieving diversity of formats, to the decisions
made by the marketplace.
52
2. The 1976 Policy Statement
After receiving comments from interested parties and following public
notice and comment, 53 the FCC issued the Policy Statement. 54 The Policy
Statement underscored the Commission's adherence to its competitive mar-
ketplace regulation policy. Although recognizing that there may be in-
stances of marketplace failure, the FCC insisted that diversity could best be
achieved by free competition. The Commission rested its position on empiri-
48. Id. at 582.
49. Id at 585 (quoting United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948)).
50. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 45, at 582.
51. Commissioner Robinson summarized his views on the vexing problem facing the
agency in regulating entertainment program formats, noting the acute problems in adhering to
the mandate of the court of appeals:
The standard for "uniqueness" or "diversity"-the diversity that the public wants
enough so as to cause it to grumble when it is diminished-is obviously idiosyncratic
and subjective. Quite aside from the constitutional objections . . . this subjective ele-
ment presents intractable difficulties in administration. What makes one format
unique makes all formats unique. If subjectivity is to be an important determinant of
what makes a format "unique" (or, in other terms, what makes it a net contributor to
diversity), how are we to avoid the fact that even with respect to formats which objec-
tively seem identical, people-radio listeners-can and do make distinctions . ...
[B]y the subjective standards that the Court seems to embrace, any format is unique;
from which it follows, all must be preserved. At that thought the mind swims and the
heart sinks.
Id. at 594-95.
52. Id. at 582-83.
53. The FCC received more than fifty responses to its Notice of Inquiry.
54. Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Sta-
tions, 60 F.C.C. 2d 858 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Policy Statement).
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cal evidence, administrative difficulties, and constitutional considerations.5 5
The empirical evidence advanced in the Policy Statement showed the
wide variety of programming currently available. Moreover, the FCC noted
that this diversity had been achieved without any government regulation.
56
The FCC concluded that competition had provided a sufficient amount of
diversity in entertainment programming. Additionally, the FCC reasoned
that the market forces provide "a precious element of flexibility which no
system of regulatory supervision could possibly approximate."'5 7 When the
public taste in entertainment changes quickly, the agency contended, the
listening public has a right to expect broadcasters to change or alter their
programming to meet the new trend, without the delay of government
intervention.
Additionally, the Commission insisted that administrative problems
would require constant broadcaster surveillance and involve a cumbersome
hearing process to meet the standards prescribed in WEFM. According to
the Commission, these difficulties involved the determination of" 1. what the
station's existing format is; 2. whether thcse aic ainy rcanab. e ..........
for that format in the station's market; [and] 3. if there are not, whether the
benefits accruing to the public from the format change outweigh the public
detriment which the format abandonment would entail."
58
Finally, the FCC speculated that the governmental intervention involv-
ing the threat of a hearing might have a "chilling effect" on the broadcasters
experimenting with entertainment programming that would injure the pub-
lic interest. The Commission found that an obligation on the part of the
broadcaster to continue an unwanted format would deprive "the public of
the best efforts of the broadcast industry and [would result] in an inhibition
of constitutionally protected forms of communication with no off-setting jus-
tifications, either in terms of specific First Amendment or diversity-related
values or in broader public interest terms."
5 9
In advancing these arguments, the FCC relied on the Supreme Court's
reasoning in FCC . Sanders Brothers Radio Staton.6° In Sanders Brothers the
Court opined that "broadcasters are not common carriers and are not to be
dealt with as such. The [Communications] Act recognized that the field of
broadcasting is one of free competition." 61 Echoing this concept, the FCC
concluded in the Policy Statement that the right of competition among
broadcasters should be recognized. In essence, the FCC posited that the only
means by which broadcasters can compete for a listening audience and ad-
55. Id
56. The Commission relied on its own staff survey and on a study prepared by Professor
Owen of Stanford University. Policy Statement, app. B, at 873.
57. Id. at 864.
58. Id. at 861-62.
59. Id at 865.
60. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
61. Id at 474. The Court further held that "Congress intended to leave competition in the
business of broadcasting where it found it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering electri-
cally with other broadcasters to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his pro-
grams attractive to the public." Id at 475.
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vertising sponsors is by what they air as their entertainment format.6 2
3. WNCN-The District of Columbia Court of Appeals Decision
The dichotomy between the Policy Statement and the format doctrine
prompted a decisive response from the cou'rt of appeals. Citizens' groups
petitioned the court to set aside the FCC's Policy Statement on the ground
that it was an abdication of authority by the agency. The court of appeals,
sitting en banc,63 struck down the Policy Statement in WNCNListeners Guild v.
FCC,64 reasoning that it did not comport with the rule articulated in
WEFM.
The court of appeals vacated the Policy Statement, using the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act's criteria for judicial review. 65 First, the court ruled
that the FCC had overstepped its bounds in construing the statutory com-
mand of "public interest." Second, it held that the Commission's decision
was arbitrary and caprious. 66 Additionally, the court stated that the Com-
mission's failure to release an internal staff study for public comment vio-
lated the public's right to comment on the Notice of Inquiry. Since the court
found the first two reasons compelling, however, it did not set aside the Pol-
icy Statement on the third ground.
6 7
In WNCN, the appellate court restated the basic premise of its format
doctrine "that the Communications Act's 'public interest, convenience, and
necessity' standard includes a concern for diverse entertainment program-
ming." 68 Congress had "set aside the radio spectrum" to benefit " 'all the
people' of our richly pluralistic society," not simply "those in the cultural
mainstream. '69 Accordingly, the court concluded that Congress intended,
in adopting the general "public interest, convenience, and necessity" stan-
dard of the Communications Act, that "all major aspects of contemporary
culture . . . be accommodated by the commonly-owned public resources
whenever that is technically and economically feasible."
' 70
Furthermore, the court of appeals asserted that the Commission had
misread the directive of WEFM. According to the court, WEFM did not
require hearings in all applications involving license transfers or renewals,
only in those applications seeking abandonment of a unique format. 7i It is
not necessary to make a public interest determination if parties challenging
62. Policy Statement, supra note 54, at 864-65.
63. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court sat en
bane because no panel of the court could overrule the en bane holding in WEFM.
64. 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 852 (1981).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (1976).
66. 610 F.2d at 846-51.
67. Id
68. Id at 842.
69. Id (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17, (1943)).
70. 610 F.2d at 842.
71. Id at 850. The court stated that the Commission had analyzed WEFM as "the antith-
esis of the free market," since it mandated a " 'system of pervasive governmental regulation,'
requiring 'comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance.' Having framed its
analysis in Manichaean terms, it is not surprising that the Commission found numerous flaws in




an application fail to meet threshold standards. Those standards include a
lack of public outcry, an adequate radio station format substitution, a mini-
mal number of devotees, and financial infeasibility. 72 Recognizing "that
market forces do generally provide diversification of formats,"7 3 the court
averred that the ,WFM hearing requirement was necessary "only when
there is strong prima facie evidence that the market has in fact broken
down." 74 Although the court also stated the FCC had discretion to set stan-
dards which would minimize the administrative difficulties, it still charged
the agency with the responsibility of adhering to the format doctrine.
75
4. WNCN-The Supreme Court Reverses
The FCC appealed the court of appeals' decision to the Supreme Court,
seeking reversal on all grounds. The Supreme Court faced the questions of
the proper responsibility of the FCC in accomplishing the goal of promoting
diversity in entertainment formats and the concomitant responsibility of the
court of appeals in reviewing the administrative decisions. After tracing the
facts contributing iu ae ,wuiztrver.3y, the Supreme Ccu- reer,td th'? rnhlrt
of appeals' decision and endorsed the FCC's Policy Statement. 76 The
Supreme Court's analysis of the conflict between the agency and the court of
appeals revolved around two basic concepts of the scope of judicial review of
administrative agencies: 1) that "the construction of a statute by those
charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling
indications that it is wrong";7 7 and 2) when Congress has given the agency
broad discretion to determine the best methods of achieving the goals of the
agency's enabling statute, courts should decline to substitute their views for
the views of the agency.
78
In this decision, the Supreme Court accorded substantial judicial defer-
ence to the FCC's decision-making. The Court stated that the Commission
had discretion in deciding the methods to be used in furthering the public
interest goals of the Communications Act; such methods could include
adopting the policy of using free competition to promote diversity in en-
tertainment programming. 79 The Commission had provided a rational basis
for its reliance on the competitive market forces as the best method of pro-
moting the public interest in diversity in entertainment programming, and
had properly weighed "the benefits and the harm likely to flow from govern-
ment review of entertainment programming"80 in reaching its conclusion.
Therefore, the Court maintained that the Commission was properly within
its realm of competence in relying on the market place to satisfy the listening
preferences of the public.8 '
72. Id at 851.
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id at 852-54.
76. 450 U.S. at 596.
77. Id at 598 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)).
78. Set text accompanying notes 134-159 bfzra.
79. 450 U.S. at 593-95.
80. Id at 595.
81. Id at 600.
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Additionally, the Court held that the Commission's Policy Statement
was consonant with the Communications Act's goal of promoting the public
interest through diversity in programming while preserving journalistic dis-
cretion by avoiding unnecessary restrictions on licensee discretion.8 2 Be-
cause the FCC's policy was neither inconsistent with the legislative history of
the Act 83 nor an improper interpretation of the statute,84 the Court ruled
that the court of appeals should not have vacated the Commission's regula-
tions. Accordingly, the Court reprimanded the court of appeals for violating
the judicial deference doctrine in reviewing the FCC's decisions, while initi-
ating the format doctrine in 1970.85 The Supreme Court insinuated that in
formulating the format doctrine, the court of appeals necessarily engaged in
its own policy making and, thus, substituted its views for the views of the
agency.
8 6
II. CRITIQUE OF THE RATIONALE IN WNCN
A. The Public Interest Standard
As indicated by the Supreme Court, a court reviewing an administra-
tive agency's statutory construction of its own enabling act should uphold
the agency's construction unless there are compelling indications that it is
wrong. The FCC, in its Policy Statement, interpreted the public interest
standard as allowing free marketplace competition to provide diversity in
radio entertainment programming. In examining the correctness of this in-
terpretation, construction of the public interest standard involves three basic
inquiries: the statutory definition of "public interest" as provided by the
Communications Act; the legislative history of the statute; and the history of
the agency's interpretation and implementation of the public interest
standard.
1. The Statutory Definition of "Public Interest"
The court of appeals' and Supreme Court's analysis of the statutory
definition of "public interest" is a contrast between judicial interpretative
expansion and judicial literalism. The court of appeals' definition in the
Voice of the Arts in Atlanta case, the first format case, is limited to the state-
ment that "it is surely in the public interest .. . for all major aspects of
contemporary culture to be accommodated by the commonly-owned public
resources whenever that is technically and economically feasible." '8 7 This
82. Id at 596.
83. The Court stated:
As we read the legislative history of the Act, Congress did not unequivocally express its
disfavor of entertainment format review by the Commission, but neither is there sub-
stantial indication that Congress expected the public-interest standard to require for-
mat regulation by the Commission. The legislative history of the Act does not support
the Court of Appeals and provides insufficient basis for invalidating the agency's con-
struction of the Act.
Id at 597-98 (emphasis in the original).
84. d at 596.
85. Id at 597-600.
86. Id
87. 436 F.2d at 269.
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conclusion was based on that portion of the Communications Act8 8 which
states that prior to granting an application for a license, the FCC must con-
sider if the grant would be in the public interest. In the Voice of the Arts in
Atlanta decision, there is no further analysis of "public interest. '"89
In WEFM, the second format case, the appellate court buttressed its
definition of public interest with the Supreme Court's decision in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States,9° in which the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he
avowed aim of the Communications Act of 1934 was to secure the maximum
benefits of radio to all the people." 9' Reasoning that this statement sup-
ported the format doctrine, the court of appeals further reiterated its posi-
tion that some government intervention is necessary in radio entertainment
programming. The court stated "[t]he very fact that Congress has seen fit to
enter into comprehensive regulation . .. contradicts the notion that na-
tional policy unqualifiedly favors competition in communications.
9 2
The general statement taken from the Supreme Court's decision in Na-
tional Broadcasting, however, does not explicitly require the FCC to regulate
entertainment formats and does noi bupoit the, . I... t ha the PFlCr
may never rely entirely on competition to regulate a particular aspect of
radio broadcasting. If the maximum benefits of radio can be secured to all
people through the Commission's reliance on unrestrained competition,
there is nothing in the express "public interest" language prohibiting such
reliance. The statutory language does not limit the means that the FCC
may employ to further the public interest policy. Using the same language
from the statute as did the court of appeals, the FCC found that governmen-
tal regulation was not necessary, even in the format doctrine situation.
9 3
In construing the public interest standard, the Supreme Court in
WNCN agreed with the FCC. The Court recognized that the "public inter-
est" standard is not a defined term in the Communications Act.94 Hence,
since the literal terms of the Act do not require the Commission to regulate
entertainment formats, the Supreme Court, in overruling the court of ap-
peals' decision, averred that the Commission had broad discretion to deter-
mine how best "to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all of the people
of the United States."95 As a result, the Commission's construction of the
Communications Act "should be followed unless there are compelling indi-
cations that it is wrong." The Court opined that the FCC had provided a
rational basis for choosing to avoid governmental interference with the pro-
gramming discretion of radio broadcasters by allowing the competitive mar-
ketplace to promote diversity. This conclusion is especially cogent in view of
88. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976).
89. See note 29 supra.
90. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
91. 506 F.2d at 267 (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. at 217).
92. 506 F.2d at 267 (quoting FCC v. RCA Corn., Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 93 (1953)).
93. 450 U.S. at 604.
94. Id at 593.
95. I at 594 (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. at 217).
96. Id at 598 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 381).
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the fact that the Court was affirming the status quo of entertainment pro-
gramming prior to the format cases.
2. Legislative History
Since the express language of the public interest standard does not limit
the methods that the FCC may use in promoting the larger and more effec-
tive use of radio, the inquiry next turns to whether the legislative history of
the Communications Act provides any insight on the use of free competition
to regulate radio entertainment programming. The legislative history of the
Communications Act establishes that Congress did not intend an allocation
scheme based on program categories.9 7 An allocation scheme would set
aside some radio frequencies for exclusive broadcasting of special entertain-
ment formats.
In formulating the first radio legislation, Congress considered whether a
preference should be given to prospective licensees who would broadcast sa-
cred music instead of jazz. The promoter of this idea believed that "some
provision should be made to afford a better and more wholesome set of pro-
grams than sometimes exist."'9 8 In rejecting this idea as a form of censor-
ship, 99 Congress intended that each licensee be allowed to select the type of
programming to be broadcast.'
00
The more narrow focus of the format doctrine, however, is not ad-
dressed in the legislative history. The format decisions are premised on indi-
vidual public interest determinations in specific renewal or transfer
situations. In this setting, the congressional intent is clear that all radio
licenses should be granted only after it is determined to be in the public
interest. Congress is silent regarding the necessity of individual license pro-
ceedings as a means of regulating entertainment formats in the public inter-
est. Because of this silence, it can be inferred that Congress left to the agency
the means of determining the public interest when conducting an individual
license proceeding.
3. The History of the FCC's Policy of Nonintervention
Finally, it is necessary to examine the history of the FCC's implementa-
tion of the public interest standard. In construing its own enabling statute,
the Commission has consistently adhered to a policy of noninterference with
97. BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES, 22-28 (1968).
98. Radio Communicatton: Hearings on HR. 5589 Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine&
Fihertes, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 5589].
99. The Communications Act of 1934 provides:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any ra-
dio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Com-
mission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
100. See Hearings on HR. 5589, supra note 98, at 39-40. A proposal to allocate 25% of the
radio station broadcast signals to educational, religious, agricultural and similar programming
was defeated since the proposal would establish a preference for some programs over others. 78
CONG. REC. 8843-46 (1934).
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the discretion of broadcasters in selecting and modifying entertainment for-
mats. In En Banc Programming Inquiv,y0 1 in 1960, the Commission reiterated
its position that the "responsibility for the selection and presentation of
broadcast material ultimately devolves upon the individual station licensee,
and that the fulfillment of the public interest requires the free exercise of his
independent judgment."' 1 2 As a result, the Commission's role could not "be
one of program dictation or program supervision."
' 10 3
It was not until after the first format doctrine case that the Commission
departed from this interpretation. Although still giving considerable lati-
tude in the matter of programming, the Commission in its 1971 Primer on
Ascertainment of Community Problems t04 stated that "any application involving
a substantial change in program format . . . will be scrutinized in light of [the
Voice of the Arts in Atlanta] decision. . . ."15 The FCC charged the appli-
cants with the burden of demonstrating that the public interest favored their
proposal to change formats. Additionally, the FCC stated that it would
"take an extra hard look at the reasonableness of any proposal which would
depri a community of its only source of a particular type of program-
ming." 10 6 After the tension between the FCC and the court of appeals over
the reach of the format doctrine, however, the Commission, in the 1976 Pol-
icy Statement, retreated to its original conviction that this approach "was
neither administratively tenable nor necessary in the public interest.""0
7
B. The Commisston's Findings-Providing a Rational Basis for the Use of Free
Competition in Regulating Radio Programming
In the 1976 Policy Statement the FCC rejected the format doctrine on
four grounds: 1) classification of formats; 2) ascertainment of listener inter-
ests; 3) financial viability of the broadcasting station; and 4) first amend-
ment considerations.
1. Classification of Formats
The FCC maintained that classifying musical formats would be highly
subjective because it would involve a unique combination of many elements:
music selection, disc jockey personality, commercials, and news.i08 Al-
though the FCC complained that "radio format idiosyncracies . . . are too
fleeting to be caught in the clumsy nets of legal formulations,"' 0 9 the staff
study did categorize the radio station formats of several cities. The Commis-
sion's argument is specious in light of the framework which the format doc-
trine created. Necessarily, when there is a public outcry, it will be because a
101. 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960).
102. Id at 2308-09.
103. Id
104. 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).
105. Id at 680.
106. Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223, 231 (1973) (additional views of Chairman
Burch).
107. Policy Statement, supra note 54, at 866 n.8.





format is unique. The ability to classify formats is not an impossible task, as
evidenced by the staff study which placed radio station formats in nineteen
categories.' 1O But as the Commission noted, the final administrative deci-
sion would, by necessity, be subjective. Rather than employ a subjective test
of "[I] know it when [I] hear it,"' I  the Commission reasonably decided to
use the competitive market place to regulate radio station formats.
2. Ascertaining Listener Interests
The Commission established that no feasible method of measuring the
intensity of listener preferences for particular types of programming existed.
With the radio industry changing formats to accommodate perceived
changes in listener demand, the FCC asserted it would face difficulty in
quantifying the different sizes and compositions of markets.' 12 Moreover,
the Commission noted that when a unique format is replaced by another
format, there may be a loss in diversity; however, there may also be an over-
all increase in listener satisfaction since the intensity of public demand for
the replacement format may be greater than the intensity of demand for the
abandoned format. 1 3 Because radio listeners "cannot register their inten-
sity of preference through a price system,"' 14 the FCC was correct in its
position that it is "extremely difficult to compare the intensity of preference
of different persons."' 15
3. Financial Viability
Another reason given by the Commission for rejecting the WEFM test
was the speculation involved in determining a station's financial status.
Under the format doctrine, a format could not be abandoned simply because
it was more profitable to chose another format. Only if the financial losses
were attributable to the unique format could the licensee change the pro-
gramming. The Commission charged this administrative regulation with
creating a purely speculative task based on an inquiry into what the
financial position of the station might be if the format were different.' 16
The court of appeals did not view the format doctrine as administra-
tively impractical, reasoning that administrative agencies have, in the past,
110. Id., app. B at 872-81. The staff report did contain a caveat about the methodology of
ascertaining where each radio format should fit into the designated type of musical or other
entertainment program; it was claimed to be a subjective judgment.
111. Commissioner Robinson applied Justice Stewart's test for determining obscenity to
characterizing the subjectiveness of determining a type of radio format. Id at 594.
112. Policy Statement, supra note 54, at 864.
113. Id at 863.
114. 610 F.2d at 863 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
115. Id
116. In the Policy Statement, supra note 54, the Commission asserted:
In WEFM the Court was careful to note that the relevant financial inquiry was not
whether the station had been financially profitable during the tenure of a particular
format, because financial losses could proceed from a variety of causes [argued the
Court] completely unrelated to the station's program menu. Rather, the relevant in-
quiry is whether the format might hauc been viable. This is, we observe, an almost fan-
tastically speculative point for inquiry, and one not subject to very satisfactory-and
certainly not to incontestable--proof.
Id. at 863 n.6 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original).
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grappled with difficult factual questions. The appellate court was probably
correct in asserting that the FCC could devise procedures to accommodate a
format change hearing. But the issue was whether the FCC decision-making
process, embodied in the Policy Statement, was arbitrary and capricious.
The Supreme Court correctly ruled that the Commission had provided a
reasonable basis for promoting diversity in entertainment programming
through the competitive marketplace.'
17
4. First Amendment Considerations
Finally, first amendment considerations provide a reasonable basis for
the FCC to shy away from imposing restrictions resembling censorship on
broadcasters. The first amendment right of free speech is applicable to the
broadcast media. Because of the peculiar characteristics of the media,' 11
however, "[iut is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount."'" 9 Broadcasters are, however, still enti-
tled to "the widest journalistic freedom consistent with [their] public obliga-
t;n "120 TUnArt tho- fnrmn-t dnrtrinP, the. hrnadaqtrrq' right tn chnnre. nr
modify their existing programs would be conditional. The risk of losing a
license or having a prescribed format imposed on them would necessarily
"chill" the broadcasters' free speech right.
In CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 12 the Supreme Court held that
the Commission could reasonably balance the gains made by governmental
regulation toward meeting public interest goals against the interference with
the freedom of broadcasters. The Court also permitted the FCC to deter-
mine from the balancing that the price of governmental regulation was too
high. In this case, the Commission made such a determination and decided
that the gains in diversity were outweighed by the disadvantages of govern-
ment intervention in programming decisions.
The Supreme Court in WNCN sided with the Commission and held the
FCC's policy would best preserve the broadcasters' first amendment rights
and still promote the goal of diversity for the listening audience. The Court
noted that while listeners do have certain first amendment rights, the first
amendment does not grant to "individual listeners the right to have the
117. The Court, however, did not stop here. Instead the Court deferred to the Commis-
sion's expertise in any determinations the Commission might make injuturo and concluded that
"[i]f time and changing circumstances reveal that the 'public interest' is not served by applica-
tion of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the Commission will act in accordance with its
statutory obligations." 450 U.S. at 603 (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. at 225). Because this language seems to sanction unknown future actions of the Com-
mission, essentially giving it a carte blanche in questions regarding the public interest, it may be
regarded as mere dictum.
118. See generally Chamberlin, The FCC and the Fist Prnzciple of the Fairness Doctrine.- A Hitor'
of Neglect and Distortion, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 361 (1979); Goldberg & Couzens, "Pecuhiar Characteris-
tics" An Analysis of the First Amendment Implications of Broadcast Regulation, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 1
(1978); Note, FCC Regulation of Broadcast News: First Amendment Peril of Confcting StAndards of
Review, 48 FORDHAm L. REv. 1226 (1980); Note, The Equal Opportunity Doctrine in Political Broad-
casting: Proposed Modiftatitns of the Communications Act of 1934, 12 IND. L. REv. 745 (1979).
119. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
120. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110
(1973).
121. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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Commission review the abandonment of their favorite entertainment
programs."1
22
In the appellate decision in WNCN, Judge Bazelon stated in a concur-
ring opinion: "[the] regulation of entertainment formats is not content neu-
tral. The regulator is inevitably led to favor some forms of expression over
others." 123 By regulating through the marketplace, the Commission reason-
ably avoided a first amendment confrontation.
III. THE AGENCY-JUDICIARY RELATIONSHIP
In recent years, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has become a
vocal advocate for a stricter scrutiny by the judiciary of administrative ac-
tion. In promoting this principle, the appellate court has strayed from the
historical standard of substantial judicial deference to agency decisions. In
WNCN, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this earlier standard of court review.
Although the express holding of WNCN applies to the FCC's free market-
place policy, the reasoning of the opinion has vast implications for the scope
of judicial review of administrative agency rulemaking authority.
A. Informal Rulemaking
The Communications Act of 1934 provides that "the Commission from
time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires shall . . .
[s]tudy new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies, and
generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
interest."
124
Under this directive, the FCC has the authority to devise and imple-
ment these public interest goals. Pursuant to this authority, the Commission
issued the Policy Statement on the deregulation of entertainment formats
through the dictates of the competitive marketplace. In promulgating the
Policy Statement, the FCC followed the informal rulemaking procedure as
set out in section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 125 The
APA informal rulemaking procedure provides for a simple quasi-legislative
process. The agency initially develops a proposed policy (or rule) 126 which is
then published as a notice in the Federal Register, inviting comments from
all interested persons. The agency may also have hearings and other proce-
dures to further develop the policy. The agency must provide reasonable
time deadlines for comments and institute public hearings if it is necessary to
ensure that interested parties have an "opportunity to be heard and to par-
122. 450 U.S. at 604.
123. Judge Bazelon noted "that there is [not] a simple resolution to the conflict between
fostering diversity, on the one hand, and protecting the media from chilling government inter-
ference on the other." Id.
124. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). For a thorough discussion on informal
rulemaking, see DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and tac Integration of Law and Poblt, 65 VA. L. REV.
257 (1979).
126. The APA defines a rule as "an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement . . . law or policy .... " 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976).
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ticipate in a meaningful way."'1 27 In addition, the agency can evaluate any
sources of information that are pertinent to a reasoned decision.' 2 8 Finally,
the agency will fashion the final policy and publish it in the Federal Regis-
ter. A concise statement of the reason and basis for the agency's action must
be published with the policy. 129 The agency may, however, by relying on its
expert knowledge and experience, ground its final decision on future predic-
tions of how the policy goals will be accomplished.
130
B. Scope ofJudaial Review
An administrative policy statement is reviewable by the court of appeals
pursuant to the APA. Section 706 of the APA sets out the criteria a court
should employ when reviewing an administrative decision issued under the
informal rulemaking process. This section requires the court to "decide all
relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provi-
sions . . ,,31 The court will uphold the agency rule unless it finds that
the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or in excess of its statutory authority or
WILIIUUL UlYVL: U_ vKuuRc Ac4u1Ku U_ law., -
As a result of this broad language, the proper scope of judicial review
has been given different interpretations.1 33 One viewpoint is that agency
action is to be accorded vast judicial deference whenever the agency has
advanced a reason for its decision. The basis for this judicial deference is
that Congress has delegated to the agency the responsibility of implementing
the goals of its enabling statute. Since the agency has the expertise and ex-
perience to make a rational decision, a reviewing court should not disturb
administrative action as long as the agency's decision is not arbitrary or ca-
pricious. Another viewpoint holds that a court reviewing an agency's deci-
sion based on statutory construction or proper procedure may style its own
independent judgment. This departure from the judicial deference tenet is
rationalized by the concept that "the courts are the final authorities on issues
of statutory construction."' 3 4 Advocacy of this more rigorous standard of
127. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 541 (1978).
128. The court of appeals' decision in WNCN upbraided the FCC for not publishing for pre-
decisional comment a staff paper compiling certain publicly available data. However, neither
the due process clause nor the APA require pre-decision disclosure in rulemaking proceeding of
staff memoranda. &.e Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 547 (1978); sergeneral~ly Wilson v. Zuckerman, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
RULEMAKING PROCEDURE, 1979 Ann. Survy of Am. L. 393.
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
130. Id.
131. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
132. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1976). The courts employ the substantial evidence standard
when reviewing administrative decisions based on adjudicatory proceedings.
133. Gifford, Adminirtrai'oe Rulemaking andluditcial Reviiw: Some Conceptual Model, 65 MINN.
L. REV. 63 (1980); Hubbard, Patterns of judt'al Review ofAdminirtratie Deciutns, 12 U. TOL. L.
REV. 37 (1980).
134. These two positions are exemplified in the concurring opinions in WNCN. Judge
Leventhal advocates a hard look at agency's decisions. His view of the relationship between the
administrative and judicial functions is one of a partnership-type status. Thus, "[tjhe court is in
a real sense part of the administrative process .. " and by implication, affords administrative
actions less judicial deference. 610 F.2d at 859 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
Judge Bazelon, however, reasons that judicial review should correct only the most egre-
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review was the crux of the controversy in WNCN.' 35
The court of appeals in deciding the format cases and in vacating the
Policy Statement employed a more rigorous judicial scrutiny of the FCC's
administrative decision-making. Judge McGowan, who authored both
WEFM and WNCN, set out the method of judicial review that the appellate
courts use in scrutinizing administrative decisions.' 36 He characterized the
scope of review as possessing three levels of judicial scrutiny, with the inten-
sity of the scrutiny dependent upon the basis for the administrative decision.
Judge McGowan stated that the reviewing court will use the least in-
tense level of review when the administrative decision involves an interpreta-
tion of purely technical or scientific facts before the agency. In this situation,
with "the 'obvious limitations upon the capacity of courts to deal meaning-
fully' with such areas of knowledge," the "court should consider itself under
the greatest measure of restraint in disturbing agency action."'
137
A middle level of judicial scrutiny, Judge McGowan maintained, is ap-
propriate when the court is examining an alleged error in statutory interpre-
tation. Although courts will take into account the construction of the statute
by the agency, "[t]hat deference . . . is strictly limited."' 38 Judge Mc-
Gowan insisted that "[tihe reach and meaning of an act of Congress is for
the courts to decide in the last analysis, and it is a judicial responsibility not
to be abdicated."'
39
Judge McGowan asserted that an examination of procedural fairness in
the agency's actions prompts a court to use the most intense level of scrutiny.
Due to the courts' expertise with due process clauses, Judge McGowan
opined that the courts have judicial discretion to decide what is "procedural
fair play and effective truth ascertainment." 4"
The court of appeals specifically found in WNCN that the Commission's
action in issuing the Policy Statement was arbitrary and capricious 14 1 and
that it exceeded the Commission's statutory authority.' 42 The appellate
court stated that since these two grounds were so compelling, it need not rule
on the procedural fairness of the Commission's failure to release a staff
study.143 The Supreme Court, however, in overruling the court of appeals,
upheld the Policy Statement since there was a rational basis for it. ' 4 4 The
differences between these two divergent opinions revolve around the right of
the agency to formulate substantive policies and on the proper scope ofjudi-
gious abuses. He noted that "[i]mplementing the public interest standard calls for a strong dose
of policy judgment, a responsibility entrusted by Congress to the FCC." Id. at 858 (Bazelon, J.,
concurring). Judge Bazelon stated that the majority in WNCN had reduced the FCC's job to a
"spectator's role." He concluded that the Commission should be permitted "to cast its lot with
the marketplace." Id. at 858-59 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
135. See note 134 supra.
136. McGowan, Reftections on Rulemaking Review, 53 TUL. L. REV. 681 (1979).1




141. 610 F.2d at 850-52.
142. Id at 854-55.
143. Id at 847 n.24.
144. 450 U.S. at 595-96.
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cial review of agency action. The issue in controversy was, who is entitled to
decide the direction of administrative policies?
14 5
The Supreme Court's decision in WNCN, affirming the judicial defer-
ence principle, is consistent with another recent Supreme Court case. In FCC
v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,146 the Supreme Court over-
turned a District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision and affirmed the
FCC's authority to provide a "grandfather" exception to the broadcaster-
newspaper owner policy. This policy limited the amount of co-ownership in
broadcasting stations and newspapers that any individual, partnership, or
corporation could have. In permitting the Commission to pursue its policy
of prospective divestiture of commonly owned broadcasting stations and
newspapers, the Court characterized the Commission's action as a proper
judgment determination: "In such circumstances, complete factual support
in the record for the Commission's judgment or prediction is not possible or
required; 'a forecast of the direction in which the public interest lies neces-
sarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency.' "147
.n8 f-AAhinin V S.. tatcmft, . FCC',. .. iade sn IIsuas Juuguscilt
predictions. The court of appeals in the format doctrine decisions usurped
the Commission's discretion to decide administrative policy and substituted
its own views for what the proper policy should be. Previously, the court of
appeals had disapproved of courts legislating administrative policy. In
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,14 8 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals profiled the agency-judiciary relationship, noting that the courts
should not overstep their boundaries in administrative review. The appel-
late court acknowledged that an agency "has latitude not merely to find
facts and make judgments, but also to select the policies deemed in the pub-
lic interest. The function of the court is to assure that the agency has given
reasoned consideration to all the material facts and issues." 1 49 Once the
court ascertains that the administrative decision is proper, "the court exer-
cises restraint and affirms the agency's action even though the court would
on its own account have made different findings or adopted different
standards."1
50
In WNCN, the Supreme Court employed the same judicial restraint as
did the court in Greater Boston. In contrast to Judge McGowan's analysis, the
Supreme Court in WNCN rejected the use of a more rigorous standard of
145. One commentator has viewed the court of appeals' format decisions as that court's own
interpretation of the Communications Act statute:
The cases are extraordinary illustrations of a court willing to expand its own function
at the expense of the agency's discretion, to make remote inferences of the policy from
amorphous and general statutory language, and to go beyond mere oversight of the
agency's work product to an extended collaborative dialogue with the Commission
over what its substantive policies ought to be.
Polsby, FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting and the Judicious Uses of Ad-
ministrative Discretion, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 17.
146. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
147. Id at 814 (quoting FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29
(1961)).
148. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).




judicial review of an agency's action when that action is based on statutory
interpretation or a procedural fairness question. Instead, the Court used a
rational basis test, the statutory "arbitrary and capricious" standard, in af-
firming the administrative action of formulating the Policy Statement. 15 1
The APA, in providing for judicial review, 152 does not offer more than a
broad statement of criteria for the courts to employ in reviewing administra-
tive action. Manifestly, the gloss that the Supreme Court places on the con-
struction of the APA statutory standards is important for future court
decisions.
IV. DEREGULATION OF NONENTERTAINMENT PROGRAMMING
A. The 1981 Deregulation of Radio Rule
The FCC's deregulation of radio content did not stop, however, with
the entertainment portions. On February 24, 1981, the Commission promul-
gated a final rule in which certain nonentertainment portions of radio
broadcasting were also deregulated. The areas of programming affected
were: (1) the nonentertainment programming guideline; (2) the ascertain-
ment primer; (3) the commercial guideline; and (4) the program logs. Essen-
tially, under the Deregulation Policy Statement, 15 3 the radio licensee is no
longer required to comply with strict government formalities in those four
areas, only generalized public interest obligations "in light of the contempo-
rary reality of the radio marketplace."'
54
1. Nonentertainment Guideline
Nonentertainment programming consists of news, public affairs, and
other general items of a public interest nature. The original guideline had
been instituted to ensure that the listening public would be well informed on
current, significant issues affecting the community. Before the 1981 Deregu-
lation Rule, 155 the guideline' 56 specified that AM stations should devote
eight percent, and FM stations six percent, of their air time to nonentertain-
ment programming. If the licensees complied with this guideline, their re-
newal applications were routinely processed and their licenses re-issued.'
5 7
The new rule that replaced the guideline still obligates the broadcasters
to offer issues of concern to the community, but it is designed to "assure that
broadcasters will have the maximum flexibility to be responsive to issues im-
151. The Court cited the APA "arbitrary and capricious" standard, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)
(1976), and then observed "that a reviewing court applying this standard 'is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.' " 450 U.S. at 594 n.30 (quoting Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
152. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
153. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888 (1981).
154. Id. at 13,888.
155. The Commission received over 20,000 comments following notice of the proposed de-
regulation rule. Classifying the "formal" comments, the Commission found about half of the
comments to be in favor of the deregulation and about half of them opposed to it. 46 Fed. Reg.
13,888, 13,889 (1981) (to be codified in 47 CFR pts. 0 & 73).
156. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888, 13,890 (1981).
157. Id. at 13,890.
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portant to their listeners, with the minimum amount of governmental inter-
ference."' 58 Thus, broadcasters, in determining what community needs to
address, can also consider the preferences of their listening audience and
"the services provided by other radio stations in the community to groups
other than its own listenership."' 159 No specified amount of time now needs
to be devoted to nonentertainment programming in order to meet the public
interest standard. Instead, the Commission, in determining if the broad-
caster has complied with the standard, will examine "whether the chal-
lenged licensee acted reasonably in choosing which issues to address.'
'1 60
2. Ascertainment
Ascertainment is the formal procedure which broadcasters use to dis-
cover the community issues so that programs can be broadcast to examine
these issues. The Commission stated that the procedure "was never intended
to be an end in and of itself. Rather, it is merely a tool to be used as an aid
in the provision of programming responsive to the needs and problems of the
community. ; Thus, iicensees are nu ,uilsuc ici.t,,i ,,l t , ...... ' .....-
ment's detailed ascertainment procedure. Broadcasters can now "determine
the issues in their community that warrant consideration and may do so by
any reasonable means."' 62 The rationale given for the deregulation of the
ascertainment procedure was the number of radio stations providing well-
balanced programming directed to community issues. The market forces,
the Commission maintained, would ensure that this programming continues.
The general criterion that the FCC will use in determining if licensees have
met their public interest obligation is the licensees' "good faith discretion" to




Before the deregulation action, broadcasters could air a maximum of
eighteen minutes of commercials per hour. 164 'Expressing its concern that
"advertising not become the superseding force in broadcast service and pro-
gramming,"' 65 the FCC nonetheless eliminated all of the policies concerning
the amount of commercial time. The Commission again relied on the "mar-
ketplace forces to regulate levels of commercialization."' 66 In addition, the
FCC noted that most broadcasters, even before the deregulation, generally
158. Id at 13,891.
159. Id. at 13,892. The Commission also stated that stations serving smaller communities
may have to provide a more general type of public interest program than stations in larger
areas. The Commission not only found that this was a part of the licensees' general obligation
to serve the public interest, but that it also made good business sense. Id.
160. Id. at 13,897.
161. IM
162. Id
163. Id at 13,899.





aired less than the maximum limit.'
6 7
The FCC predicted that reliance on the marketplace would work for
two reasons. First, the Commission postulated that "stations with commer-
cial excesses are attractive neither to listeners nor to advertisers."' 68 The
listening public will not listen to a station that is overloaded with commer-
cials and the advertisers will seek a station where their commercials do not
get lost in the "clutter" of other ads.' 69 Second, the Commission proposed
that with the elimination of the commercial time limit, broadcasters might




A programming log is a comprehensive record detailing "the level and
timing of programming for every specified program type.' 7 ' Each licensee
was previously required to keep a program log and make it available for
public inspection. The deregulation action adopted for programming logs
eliminates the requirement of formalized government forms and record
keeping. Broadcasters are still required to maintain all other public files
containing relevant programming information. These public records are
still required to be available for public perusal and inspection. The Com-
mission supported this deregulation because of data indicating that the for-
mal record logs were a costly burden to the broadcaster. 172 Furthermore,
the Commission noted the dissatisfaction of many commentators because
these logs did not contain "useful information considering their pervasive
and complex nature."' 73 Hence, the FCC discerned that the informal pub-
lic records provided a better method of informing the public of a station's
nonentertainment programming.
B. The Future Efect of the 1981 Deregulation Rule on Judicial Review
The Commission asserted that this deregulation rule will "reduce the
paperwork and other burdens on commercial radio stations without having a
substantial adverse impact upon the public interest." ' 74 The Commission
also contended that broadcasters must still be responsive to the needs of their
167. Id at 13,901.
168. Id at 13,902.
169. Id The Commission predicted that "[s]tations with excessive commercials will often
find themselves with smaller audiences and fewer advertisers."
170. Id at 13,903.
171. Id.
172. Supporting its rationale that the programming logs were excessively burdensome, the
Commission cited a General Accounting Office report that found that "the logging rules for
AM and FM stations require a total of 18,233,940 hours per year by the industry." Id. at
13,904. The data was contained in Federal Papetrwork Its Impact on Small Business, General Ac-
counting Office, November 17, 1978, at 43 n.87.
173. 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,903.
174. Id at 13,888. One commentator has charged that the deregulation action violated the
FCC's statutory authority. See Note, The FCC's Proposal to Deregulate Radio: Is it Permissible Under
the Communcations Act of 1931?, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 233 (1980). See generally Note, The Proposed




listening public, but that the deregulation will give the broadcasters more
flexibility in meeting those needs. The problem with the deregulation rule is
that there is now a degree of uncertainty concerning the requisite quantum
of good faith effort the FCC will expect from the broadcasters. 175 Assuming,
however, that the broadcasters do make a good faith effort, this deregulation
rule creates an almost irrebuttable presumption that the nonentertainment
programming the broadcasters air will meet the public interest standard.
Moreover, this reliance on the market forces and-on the reasonableness of the
broadcatsers places a very high burden on citizens' groups to prove that a
licensee is not broadcasting in the public interest.
These problems with the nonentertainment deregulation rule, however,
probably do not constitute sufficient cause to set it aside. The Supreme
Court's decision in WNCN is instructive of how the Court will review the
Commission's 1981 deregulation decision. The FCC's substitution of compe-
tition for regulation in the public interest does not violate the Communica-
tions Act under the rationale espoused in WNCN. The Commission's recent
implementation of the nonentertainment deregulation standard, if based on
sufficient reasoning, will be upheld by the courts. After the Supreme Court's
admonishment in WNCN, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals will
probably refrain from either vacating the new rule or imposing additional
procedures for the broadcasters to follow.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in WNCN reduced the broad judicial role in the
administrative process. The Court's discussion of the proper relationship be-
tween the judicial and administrative authorities led to the conclusion that
the judiciary's role was one of a benign overseer. The redefining of the judi-
ciary's role in reviewing administrative decisions can be traced to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council Inc. 176 In Vermont Yankee, the Court stated that the
court of appeals "fundamentally misconceives the nature of the standard of
review for an agency rule" and had engaged in "Monday morning
quarterbacking."177 In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,178
the Court further elaborated on the relationship between the FCC and the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and held that "the weighing of poli-
cies under the 'public interest' standard is a task that Congress has delegated
to the Commission in the first instance."' 79 The agency's decision was,
therefore, entitled to judicial deference. Finally, in WNCN, the Supreme
Court declared that the Commission's reliance on a competitive marketplace
to further the public interest in diverse programming had a rational basis
and was entitled to judicial deference.
175. "What do we mean by 'a generalized obligation'? That is not at all clear from our
document." 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,950.
176. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
177. Id at 547.
178. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
179. Id. at 810.
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More importantly, the Supreme Court adhered to the APA's standard
of judicial review, the "arbitrary and capricious" test, in deciding that the
agency's decision was reasonable. The Court did not differentiate or impose
a different level of scrutiny for reviewing agency decisions which are based
on facts or on statutory construction. The potential reach of WNCN on the
agency-judicial relationships will necessarily be gauged by the appellate
court's acquiescence with the Supreme Court's advocacy of judicial defer-
ence. Moreover, the WNCN decision has essentially provided administrative
agencies with greater authority in guiding future policy. Although that au-
thority may have always existed, the reviewing court has often kept the
agency from fully exercising it.
Based on this analysis, the promulation of the FCC's 1981 Deregulation
Rule undoubtedly will be considered to be a proper exercise of administra-
tive authority. The deregulation of both the entertainment and
nonentertainment portions of radio programming has relieved broadcasters
of many burdensome government requirements. Radio broadcasters have
not been totally freed from governmental regulation, nor should they be.
The Communications Act still mandates that the broadcasters provide for
the public interest as a condition to obtaining a license grant. But the
Supreme Court's decision in WNCN, upholding the FCC's new policy of de-
regulation by reliance on the competitive marketplace, has to a certain de-




MONTANA STRIKES IT RICH: COMMONWEALTH
EDISON Co. v MONTANA
INTRODUCTION4
If the Montana legislature met in Helena this month and passed a
measure that would impose a tax on coal consumed in Arkansas, there is
little doubt that the tax would be invalid. Yet a tax on coal mined in Mon-
tana and ultimately consumed in Arkansas is just as clearly a valid exercise
of state power. As a result, while the taxes may have identical economic
impact, they receive different judicial treatment. This dichotomy lies at the
center of the controversy surrounding Montana's coal severance tax, specifi-
cally: May Montana do indirectly what the Constitution forbids when done
directly? This comment will explore the state of the law concerning state
resource severance taxation after the United States Supreme Court's opinion
in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana.'
A severance tax may be defined generally as, "a levy assessed at a flat or
graduated rate by a government on the privilege, process, or act of commer-
cially severing or extracting natural resources from the soil or water, and
measured by the physical amount or the gross or net value of the natural
resource produced or severed."'2 The first such tax was imposed by Michi-
gan in 1846; 3 by 1979, thirty-three states had adopted some type of mineral
severance tax.
4
The sharp increase in energy prices since 1973 and an expanded aware-
ness of the environmental effects of mineral production encouraged some
state legislatures to increase their severance taxes. While the added revenues
generated by these taxes undoubtedly are and were welcomed by the coal-
producing states, these higher taxes are being decried by many as an attempt
on the part of the coal-rich western states to line their coffers at the expense
of the rest of the nation. Before condemning our sister states as "blue-eyed
Arabs," 5 we should examine the purposes and motivation behind such tax-
ing measures.
Severance taxes tend to reduce the speed of extraction and to decrease
the total amount of mineral to be extracted.6 States enact such taxes for the
dual purposes of raising revenues and preserving their mineral resources for
future generations. Some states that impose these taxes dedicate a substan-
tial portion of the revenues to some type of trust fund, the principal of which
1. 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
2. See Lockner, The Economic Effect of the Severance Tax on Decirzons of the Mining Firm, 4 NAT.
REs. J. 468, 469 (1965).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, STATE TAXATION OF MINERAL DEPOSITS AND PRO-
DUCTION (1978).
4. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATE GOV'T TAX COLLECTIONS IN 1979, table 3 (1980).
5. See Washington Post, May 27, 1977, at 1, col. 1, (quoting then-Governor of Montana
Tom Judge).
6. See Lockner, rupra note 2, at 485.
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is typically held for the benefit of future generations.
7
The effect of a severance tax will, of course, depend upon the demand
for the taxed resource. As the tax increases the price of the resource, in a
flexible market where there are good substitutes produced in other states,
consumers will opt for the less expensive minerals produced in those other
states. This preserves mineral reserves in the taxing state.
On the other hand, where no good substitute is available in other states
and an inflexible demand exists, the coal will be produced and the taxing
state will reap the monetary benefits in return. The political advantage of
these taxes becomes evident where, as is the case with Montana and other
western coal states, no substantial market exists within the state. The major
burden of the tax, therefore, falls on residents of other states. 8
A third motive behind escalating severance tax rates is to mitigate the
detrimental effects that increased coal production by surface mining has on
the environment of producing states. Problems inherent to surface mining
include handling of spoil, revegetation, sediment control, and acid mine
drainage.9 Finally, the impacts coal boomtowns will have on state highway,




Montana levies a severance tax on coal mined within the state.II The
rate of taxation differs, depending upon the value of the coal, its energy con-
tent measured in BTUs, and method of resource extraction. 12 The tax may
equal, at a maximum, thirty percent of the contract sales price, which is
defined as the price of coal extracted and prepared for shipment f.o.b. mine,
excluding the amount charged by the seller to cover taxes paid on produc-
tion.13 At thirty percent, Montana's tax is the highest of all coal-producing
states.' 4 Montana amended its constitution in 1976 to require at least fifty
percent of the revenues generated by the tax to be paid into a trust fund, the
principal of which may be appropriated only by a three-fourths vote of each
7. See Appendix for comparison among states of the disposition of revenues from sever-
ance taxes on coal.
8. Note, The Increasing Con flict Between State Coal Severance Taxation and Federal Energy Policy,
57 TEx. L.REv. 675 (1979). See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW, 279-83 (2d
ed. 1977).
9. Note, Energy v. Environment. Who Wins in the Race For Coal tn Kentucky, 64 KY. L.J. 641
(1976).
10. The idea that coal consumers should finance increased coal production led some writ-
ers to describe severance taxes as "analagous to the fabled tax on bachelors, where collections
were earmarked for children born out of wedlock; the underlying tax policy was that the parties
[allegedly] causing the problem should compensate society for some of the damage." See White-
side & Gillig, Coal and Conservation- Tax Policy, 64 KY. L.J. 573, 598 (1976).
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house of the state legislature.'
5
A Montana legislative subcommittee explained the state's reasoning be-
hind enacting the tax:
Severance taxes are levied upon a State's natural resources for
several reasons. One obviously, is the need for revenues. Another
is that a State's natural resources, particularly its mineral resources
are nonrenewable. When the resources are mined, the State loses a
valuable asset forever. The levying of a severance tax is one man-
ner by which the State can share in the profits associated with the
extraction of a mineral asset. A severance tax, moreover, can help
discourage waste; a basic assumption of severance taxation is that
future generations will need mineral resources similar to those used
today. 16
B. The Facts
On June, 1978, a group of four coal and eleven utility companies filed
suits seeking to have Montana's thirty percent coal severance tax declared
unconstitutional.' 7 They argued that the tax was a burden on interstate
commerce, an impermissible intrusion into an area preempted by federal
legislation, and a violation of the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution because it frustrated national policies embodied in the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920.18
The trial court upheld the tax without hearing any evidence, and dis-
missed the complaints. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed.' 9 The
United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction 20 and on July 2,
15. MONT. CONST. art. 9, § 5. The table below indicates how Montana's severance tax




Trust fund for future generations ................... $10,700 $23,600 40,300
Alternative energy grants for research, and demonstra-
tion programs in solar, wind, biomass and other areas
800 1,500 2,000
Local impact account to mitigate social, environmental
problems (Coal Board) .......................... 5,400 9,000 7,100
Educational trust ................................. 3,100 8,900 8,000
State equalization aid State School Foundation ....... 3,200 5,200 4,000
County land planning ............................. 300 500.045 400
Renewable resources, water projects, dams and irriga-
tion projects ................................... 800 1,300 1,000
Parks and cultural projects ......................... 800 2,200 2,000
State libraries .............................................. 400 400
General Funds ................................... 12,800 20,100 15,300
16. MONTANA LEGISLATIVE SUBcOMMITTEE ON FOSSIL FUEL TAXATION, INTERIM
STUDY 3 (1974).
17. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No. 42657 (D. Mont., June 20, 1978). The
suits were consolidated by the district court.
18. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1976). For a list of the statutes that petitioners asserted indicated a
clear federal policy encouraging the production and use of coal, see Petitioners' Jurisdictional
Statement at 1-2, 101 S. Ct. at 2962-63.
19. 615 P.2d 847 (Mont. 1980).
20. 449 U.S. 1033 (1980).
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1981, affirmed in a six-to-three opinion delivered by Justice Marshall. 2 1
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution includes, among
the powers of Congress, the authority "to regulate Commerce . . . among
the several States. . . ." The history of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the commerce clause reflects the very nature of the Constitution itself. To
endure, it must be flexible, able to adapt itself to changing social and eco-
nomic realities.
Decisions respecting the right of a state to impose taxes that affect inter-
state commerce have evolved from the notion that interstate commerce en-
joyed a privileged position (and was immune from any taxes), to the
contemporary view that "interstate business must pay its own way."
22
Until recently, state taxes burdening interstate commerce were subject
to a somewhat formalistic analysis by the Supreme Court. Any state tax
imposed on a multi-state business for "the privilege of doing business" was
held per se unconstitutional. 23 This process resulted in a simplistic labeling
of the statute rather than an examination of the effects of the tax on inter-
state commerce. States were permitted to tax only the purely "local" inci-
dents of an otherwise interstate business.
24
The Supreme Court's first and last consideration of the constitutionality
of state severance taxes occurred more than fifty years ago. In Heisler v.
Thomas Co/liery Co. ,25 the Court considered a challenge to a Pennsylvania tax
on every ton of anthracite coal mined, washed, screened or otherwise pre-
pared for market in the state. Plaintiffs, owners z-id operators of anthracite
coal mines, alleged that to tax anthracite, but not bituminous, coal was an
arbitrary and unreasonable classification in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Second, they contended that because
most of the coal was shipped out of state, the tax imposed a burden on inter-
state commerce under a theory of "tax exporting."
'26
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. In rejecting the equal
protection claim, the Court held that the state may properly differentiate
between the two types of coal, the differing physical properties of each pro-
viding a rational basis for according differential tax treatment.2 7 The Court
dismissed the commerce clause claim because the coal had not yet entered
21. 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
22. Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938). Seegeneral Brown,
The Open Economy. justice Frankfurter and the Position oftheJua'uiaby, 67 YALE L.J. 219 (1957).
23. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946) ("[s]tate taxation falling on interstate commerce . . . can only
be justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local govern-
ment whose protection it enjoys. . . ."); McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); Alpha
Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier,
266 U.S. 555 (1925).
24. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
25. 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
26. Id. at 260.
27. Id. at 257.
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the stream of commerce when taxed.28
Heisler, and its progeny, Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord,29 and Hope Natural
Gas Co. v. Hall,30 which upheld, respectively, Minnesota 3' and West Vir-
ginia 32 occupational taxes on the business of mining, have for over half a
century stood for the proposition that states have wide latitude in classifying
energy resources for tax purposes. These cases reflected the Court's view that
imposition of facially neutral, non-discriminatory, state taxes on energy re-
sources prior to entry into the stream of commerce falls outside the pale of
commerce clause protection. Under the logic of previous cases, the Court
focused, not on the coal's out-of-state destination or the impact on interstate
commerce, but on the status of the coal at the time the tax was imposed.
States continue to employ this reasoning in imposing coal severance taxes
33
even though this mode of analysis conflicts with the Court's present ap-





In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,35 the Supreme Court has finally
laid to rest the claim that by levying a tax on goods prior to their entry into
the stream of interstate commerce, a state can avoid the limitations of the
commerce clause. The Court held that the proper inquiry should focus on
the "practical effect" of the challenged tax. This four-part "practical analy-
sis" test is set out in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady',3 6 which held that a
state tax does not offend the commerce clause if applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce and is fairly related to services pro-
vided by the state.
3 7
At the outset, the Court in Commonwealth Edison noted that the Montana
tax easily satisfied the first two prongs of the Complete Auto Transit test. The
Court quoted the Montana Supreme Court as observing: "there can be no
argument here that a substantial, in fact, the only nexus of the severance of
28. Id. at 259.
29. 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
30. 274 U.S. 284 (1927).
31. 262 U.S. at 174, n. 1.
32. 274 U.S. at 285-86.
33. See, e.g., Industrial Uranium Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 95 Ariz. 130, 387 P.2d 1013
(1963) (upholding Arizona transaction privilege tax on mining companies); California Co. v.
Colorado, 141 Colo. 288, 348 P.2d 382 (1959) (upholding Colorado's graduated tax on oil and
gas drilling and production); Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. Haden, 157 W. Va. 298, 200
S.E.2d 848 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974) (upholding West Virginia's tax on the com-
mercial act of manufacturing electric power).
34. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
35. 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
36. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
37. Id. at 279.
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coal is established in Montana."'38 Likewise, there was no question of appor-
tionment or potential multiple taxation because "the severance can occur in
no other state." 39 The Court then observed that because the tax is imposed
on all coal shipments, regardless of destination, no discrimination against
out-of-state coal consumers exists.40 Having thus satisfied the first three
prongs of the Complete Auto Transit test, the Court scrutinized the fourth
prong of the test-the claim that the amount collected under the Montana
scheme is not "fairly related to the services provided by the State" to the coal
producers. 4i This requirement that the tax be "fairly related" to services
provided by the taxing state was the most troublesome one for the Court.
The majority refused to equate the severance tax with a privilege or "user"
tax, and held the severance tax to be a general revenue tax.42 A general
revenue tax, as opposed to a "user" fee, or tax designed as a specific charge
for the use of state-owned facilities, is the means by which a state distributes
the costs of government. Stated the Court:
[T]he only benefit to which the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled
is that derived from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an
organized society, established and safeguarded by the devotion of
taxes to public purposes. Any other view would preclude the levy-
ing of taxes, except as they are used to compensate for the burden
on those who pay them, and would involve abandonment of the
most fundamental principal of government-that it exists prima-
rily to provide for the common good.
43
The Court rejected appellants' suggestion that the relevant inquiry un-
der Complete Auto Transit is the amount of the tax or the value of the benefits
received, as measured by some type of cost-benefit analysis. Rather, the
proper inquiry is whether there is a substantial nexus with the taxing state,
and if so, the measure of the tax must be reasonably related to the extent of
that contact. Applying these criteria to the Montana tax, the Court noted
that since the contact with the taxing state was the severance of the coal
itself, and since the tax was measured as a percentage of the value of the coal
taken, the tax passed the Complete Auto Transit test.44
As to the rate of the tax, the Court deferred to the legislature: "apart
from the difficulty of the judicial undertaking, the nature of the factfinding
and judgment that would be required of the courts merely reinforces the
conclusion that questions about the appropriate level of state taxes must be
resolved through the political process."
'45
The Court also concluded that the tax did not frustrate the purposes of
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 because section 32 of the Act expressly au-
thorizes states to impose severance taxes.4 6 Appellants claimed the Act,
38. 101 S. Ct. at 2954 (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d at 855).
39. 101 S. Ct. at 2954.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2955 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279).
42. 101 S. Ct. at 2956.
43. Id. (citing Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-22 (1937)).
44. 101 S. Ct. at 2960.
45. Id. at 2959.
46. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1976).
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which provides that royalty payments from federal lessees be divided be-
tween the leasing state and the federal government, was frustrated by the tax
that appropriated directly to Montana a major portion of the "economic
rents" from the leased federal land. 47 Section 32 of the Act was interpreted
in Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker48 as holding that if a state tax is otherwise
lawful, the state may impose the tax "as though the government were not
concerned. "'
4 9
Finally, the Court addressed the argument that Montana's severance
tax was an impermissible intrusion into an area preempted by federal legisla-
tion. Even in the absence of express congressional intent to dominate a field,
if state regulation may produce a result in conflict or inconsistent with fed-
eral legislation, such intent will be inferred. 50 The utility and coal compa-
nies in Commonwealth Edison argued that an examination of several federal
statutes revealed a clear national policy encouraging the production and use
of coal. 51 The general statements included within these statutes-"to en-
courage and foster the greater use [of] coal, and other alternative fuels
• . ."---indicated, appellants reasoned, a congressional intent to preempt all
state legislation having an adverse impact on coal production.
52
The Court pointed out that it had recently rejected a similar argument
in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,53 and stated that "[p]re-emption of
state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored 'in the absence of
persuasive reasons--either that the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakeably so or-
dained'."' 54 The statutes cited by appellants, while containing policy state-
ments encouraging the use of coal, did not contain language indicating a
congressional intent to pre-empt state severance taxes.
B. The Concurrence
In his concurring opinion,55 Justice White conceded the persuasiveness
of the argument that Montana has over-compensated itself by collecting a
tax on coal mined from federally leased lands, while at the same time shar-
ing equally with the federal government all of the royalties paid under these
leases. The fact that an additional forty percent of the federal revenues from
these lease lands are also returned to the state through a reclamation fund,
further supplemented by federal grants to areas impacted by coal produc-
tion, led Justice White to express his doubts as to the compensatory nature of
the tax.56 Although he agreed with the majority that Congress should man-
47. 101 S. Ct. at 2962-63.
48. 268 U.S. 45 (1925).
49. Id. at 48-50.
50. See Comment, Areemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context: 4 Unied Method of Analosis,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1978).
51. 101 S. Ct. at 2962.
52. Id.
53. 437 U.S. 117 (1978), where the Court rejected arguments that basic federal policy
favoring competition pre-empted a state law regulating retail distribution of gasoline.
54. See Petitioners' Jurisdictional Statement at 22-24.




date what is or is not a tolerable rate for state severance taxes, the tone of
Justice White's brief concurrence indicates his lack of commitment to the
majority view:
I join the Court's opinion with considerable doubt and with the
realization that Montana's levy on consumers in other States may
in the long run prove to be an intolerable and unacceptable bur-
den on commerce. Indeed, there is particular force in the argu-
•ment that the tax is here and now unconstitutional.
57
C. The Dzssent
The dissenting members of the Court agreed with the majority that the
Montana tax must be evaluated under the four-prong test of Complete Auto
Transit.58 They further agreed that the tax is facially neutral, fairly appor-
tioned and substantially related to the taxed activity and the taxing state.
59
The gravamen of Justice Blackmun's dissent is the fact that the majority
opinion did not remand the case for a trial on the issue of whether the tax
was reasonably related to services provided by the taxing state.60 The ma-
jority found the reasonable relationship, as required by the fourth prong of
the Complete Auto Transit test, by equating the tax to a general revenue tax.
Such a general revenue tax is measured by a formula relating tax liability to
the value of the taxpayer's activities within the state. The dissent, however,
would require a trial to determine the nature of the tax:
[i]f the tax is in fact a legitimate general revenue measure identical
or roughly comparable to taxes imposed upon similar industries, a
court's inquiry is at an end; on the other hand, if the tax singles out
this particular interstate activity and charges it with a grossly dis-
proportionate share of the general costs of government, the court
must determine whether there is some reasonable basis for the legis-
lative judgment that the tax is necessary to compensate the State
for the particular costs imposed by the activity.
6 1
IV. THE IMPACT OF COMMONWEALTH EDISON v MONTANA
By adopting the constitutional test of Complete Auto Transit, the Court
has brought its decisions concerning state severance taxes into line with mod-
ern commerce clause analysis, at least to the extent that it overrules the
mechanical approach of Heisler. Under the majority view, so long as the
state has devised a tax measured at a proportional rather than at a flat rate,
it is unlikely that the issue of whether the tax is fairly related to services
provided by the state will ever be determined at trial. However, as the dis-
sent pointed out, the interpretation the majority placed upon this fourth
prong of the Complete Auto Transit test is rather formalistic. 62 For the major-
ity, the label of "general revenue tax" emasculates the very standard it is
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2964 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Powell, J. and Steven J.).
59. Id. at 2968.
60. Id. at 2971-72.
61. Id.
62. Id: at 2968 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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purporting to apply, as "[t]here is no requirement under the due process
clause that the amount of general revenue taxes collected from a particular
activity must be reasonably related to the value of the services provided to
the activity."
6 3
In considering the impact of state taxes upon interstate commerce, the
Court has attempted to accommodate legitimate local needs, while at the
same time, assuring free trade between the states, which is the underlying
policy of the commerce clause. The Court previously has voiced its frustra-
tion with attempts to judicially control the nation's commerce. In his dissent
to an opinion upholding a Minnesota income tax imposed on an Iowa corpo-
ration engaged in the manufacture and sale of cement from its Iowa plant to
dealers in Minnesota, Justice Frankfurter mused that:
[Rlelying on the courts to solve these problems only aggra-
vates the difficulties and retards proper legislative solution.
At best, this Court can only act negatively; it can determine
whether a specific state tax is imposed in violation of the Com-
merce Clause. Such decisions must necessarily depend on the ap-
plication of rough and ready legal concepts. We cannot make a
detailed inquiry into the incidence of diverse economic burdens in
order to determine the extent to which such burdens conflict with
the necessities of national economic life. Neither can we devise ap-
propriate standards for dividing up national revenue on the basis
of more or less abstract principles of constitutional law, which can-
not be responsive to the subtleties of the interrelated economies of
Nation and State.
The problem calls for solution by devising a congressional pol-
icy. Congress alone can provide for a full and thorough canvassing
of the multitudinous and intricate factors which compose the prob-
lem of the taxing freedom of the States and the needed limits on
such state taxing power.
6 4
The Court's refusal to examine the rate of Montana's challenged tax is
consistent with its historic approach in reviewing state taxes under the com-
merce clause. While the Court will not hesitate to invalidate a tax it deter-
mines is a burden upon interstate commerce, its determination has never
rested on the rate of the taxing measure.
65
Pending federal legislation limiting severance taxes, other coal produc-
ing states may safely follow Montana's lead and increase their severance tax
rate structures. As long as their taxes are measured as a percentage of the
value of the coal removed and are not discriminatorily assessed based on the
destination of the resource, they should withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The Court's refusal in Commonwealth Edson to define an equitable rate
for state coal severance taxes should pressure Congress to impose a ceiling on
these taxes. Although such legislation failed to pass the 1980 legislative ses-
63. Id. at 2956.
64. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
65. 101 S. Ct. at 2955. See also Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434
(1979); Washington Revenue Dept. v. Stevedoring Ass'n, 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
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sion, similar legislation has been reintroduced into both houses of Con-
gress.66 While last year's proposals won committee approval in the House,
this year's attempt to amend the Fuel Use Act of 197867 to impose a limit of
12.5% on state coal severance taxes faces an uphill battle in light of a tight
legislative schedule and renewed opposition from western legislators.
The arguments by the proponents of the proposed 12.5% rate ceiling
parallel those of the unsuccessful plaintiff utilities in Commonwealth Edison:
that the present tax rate structure of the coal producing states reduces coal
production, thereby frustrating national energy policies.
68
In its report to Congress recommending passage of last year's proposal,
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated that the pro-
posed 12.5% ceiling would promote the interstate use of a domestic resource,
would result in decreased use of imported oil, and therefore, would reduce
the export of dollars and improve the nation's balance of trade deficit. 69
The Committee criticized state tax rates in excess of 12.5% as not being in
proportion to the direct and indirect impact costs attributable to the produc-
tion of coal. Committee members also expressed fears that placing the tax
burden on out-of-state consumers, who are denied a voting voice in deter-
mining such tax, would polarize the nation and promote regional
divisiveness. 7o
Opponents to a federally mandated rate ceiling denounced last year's
bill as "an attempt by the federal government to run roughshod over the
rights of the states." 7' These representatives claimed that the state's right to
tax the severance of minerals within its borders is a fundamental right re-
served to the states under the Constitution (presumably under the tenth
amendment) .72
There can be little doubt that Congress has plenary power under article
I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution to limit legislatively
the power of the states to impose severance taxes. In Arizona ubih'c Servce Co.
v. Snead,73 the Supreme Court, in upholding a 1976 federal statute placing
limitations on state taxation of the interstate transmission of electricity, re-
stated the broad powers of Congress under the commerce clause. The Court
held that where Congress has a rational basis for finding that a state taxing
measure interferes with interstate commerce, legislation limiting such taxa-
66. See S. 178, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), sponsored by Sen. D. Durenberger (R-Minn.),
which would impose a 12.5% ceiling on state coal severance taxes. A companion bill, H.R.
1313, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), has been introduced and as of this writing is in the House
Energy and Commerce Committee.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 8301(b)(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
68. See note 66supra. See also H.R. REP. No. 96-1527, Pt. I, pp. 2-6, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1981).
69. Other sources estimate that the 12.5% tax ceiling, over the next 30 years, would save as
much as $11 billion. See Washington and ie Ui/jizes, 105 PuB. UTIL. FORT. No. 8, at 30, 32
(April 10, 1980).
70. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1527, Pt. I, at 19, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
71. Id.
72. See remarks of Rep. Timothy Wirth (D-Colo.), H.R. REP. No. 96-1527, Pt. I, at 20-21,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). For a discussion on the economics of "tax exporting," see McLure,
Economic Constramis on Saie and Local Taxation of Energy Resources, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 257 (1978).
73. 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
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tion is a reasonable means of eliminating that interference and thus is within
the constitutional power of Congress.
74
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has, for the moment, eschewed the difficult task of
mandating an equitable rate for state severance taxes while at the same time
recognizing the right of states to impose such taxes and the proper role of
Congress to place limits on the rate of such taxes. Justice White, even as he
joined in the opinion of the Court, expressed his doubts as to the constitu-
tionality of the Montana tax. His brief concurrence appears to recognize the
persuasiveness of both the pre-emption argument and the concept of dis-
criminatory tax-exporting. If Montana's sister coal-producing states should,
in the absence of a congressionally imposed ceiling, choose to raise their sev-
erance tax rates,7 5 it is likely that Justice White could be persuaded to
change his vote on this issue which, when added to the three votes of the
dissent, would be enough to carry a vote on a grant of certiorari and ensure
that this issue would again be examined by the Supreme Court.
While critics of Montana's coal severance tax express fears that this case
signals a trend in state taxation of energy resources which will lead to the
"Balkanization" of this country, 76 it is unlikely that Congress will allow the
states to continue increasing their mineral severance taxes. Given the dispar-
ity of political clout between the coal-producing states of the West and the
coal-consuming states of the East, it is not likely any coal cartel can with-
stand the political storm that is brewing.
Larry M Cowger
74. Id. at 150.
75. Action has already been taken by other states to increase severance taxation. A Colo-
rado citizen's committee has been formed in an attempt to place an initiative on that state's
ballot to adopt a constitutional amendment which would increase the rate of Colorado's min-
eral severance taxes. The group, Initiative on Mineral Policy Assisting Colorado Taxpayers
(IMPACT), also seeks to change the measure of the present severance tax structure from the
present flat rate to rates based on a percentage of the value of the mineral. IMPACT, Constitu-
tional Amendment, Draft of 10/6/81, Denver, Colorado. Colorado Governor Richard Lamm
also favors this measure of taxation and a higher rate for his state, but looks to the state legisla-
ture to enact such changes. See Squanng OffOn S&verance Taxes, COLO. Bus. 83 (April 1981).
76. Former Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who represented appellant utility com-
panies in Commonwealth Edison, recently warned, in a hearing before the Senate Intergovernmen-
tal Relations Subcommittee, that within two weeks of the Court's decision, proposals had
already been made to increase state taxes on energy resources. THE WEEK IN CONGRESS,
(CCH), July 17, 1981, at 1, col.2.
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APPENDIX
The following chart provides comparative information on the states





33.5c per ton, 20¢ per ton of coal or
lignite severed, ALA. CODE § 40-13-
31 (Supp. 1981), plus 13.5C per ton
of coal severed, ALA. CODE § 40-13-2
(1975).
A mining license tax upon the net in-
come of the taxpayer from the prop-
erty in the state computed with al-
lowable depletion: over $40,000, not
over $50,000, 3%; over $50,000, not
over $100,000, $1,500 plus 5% of the
excess over $50,000; over $100,000,
$4,000 plus 7% of the excess over
$100,000. ALASKA STAT. § 43.65.010
(Supp. 1981).
Arkansas 2C per ton of coal severed. ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 84-2102(b) (1980).
Colorado 60¢ per ton, subject to increase or de-
crease of 1% per each 3 points
change in index of wholesale prices
of U.S. Dept. of Labor. (78.64t eff.
7/10/81) CoLo. REV. STAT. § 39-29-
106 (Supp. 1981).
Florida All solid minerals, including coal, 5%
of value at point of severance. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 211.31 (West Supp.
1982).
Idaho License tax equal to 2% of net value
of ore mined or extracted. IDAHO
CODE § 47-1201 (Supp. 1981).
Kentucky 4 /% of gross value. of coal severed.
(50C per ton minimum). KY. REV.
STAT. § 143.020 (1982).
Louisiana 10¢ per ton of coal severed. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 631,633(12)
(West 1970 & Supp. 1981).
Revenue Disposition
50% goes to the municipality from
which the coal was taken; 50% goes
to each county from which the coal
was severed. ALA. CODE § 40-13-32
(Supp. 1981).
Statutes silent on disposition.
75% of revenues are deposited as gen-
eral revenue, 25% are deposited as
special revenue into the county aid
fund. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2112
(1980).
50% of revenues credited to a local
government severance tax fund for
impact aid. 50% of revenues credited
to state severance tax fund, which is
perpetual, and held in trust as a re-
placement for depleted resources and
water conservation and develop-
ment. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-29-
110 (Supp. 1981).
50% to Conservation & Recreation
Lands Trust Fund and 50% to Land
Reclamation Trust Fund. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 211.31 (West Supp.
1982).
Revenues go to state's general fund.
IDAHO CODE § 47-1206 (Supp.
1981).
Revenues are divided between the
Kentucky Department of Transpor-
tation and Department of Energy.
KY. REV. STAT. § 143.090 (1982).
Local taxes are prohibited. Ky.
REV. STAT. § 143.100 (1982).
Credited to state treasury unless
otherwise allocated by state constitu-
tion of 1974. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 645 (West Supp. 1981).
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Montana Tax due is higher of tax in dollars or
percentage in value (rates differ for
surface vs. underground mines).
Under 7,000 BTU per lb., 12€ or
20%; 7,000-8,000 BTU, 22¢ or 30%;
8,000-9,000 BTU, 34C or 30%; over
9,000 BTU, 40¢ or 30%. MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 15-35-101
(1981).
New Mexico 57C per ton (plus a surtax tied to the
index of wholesale prices, U.S. Dept.
of Labor) N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-26-6
(1980).
North Dakota 85¢ per ton, subject to increase only
at one cent per ton for every four
point increase in the index of whole-
sale prices, U.S. Dept. of Labor, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 57-61-01 (Supp.
1981).
Ohio 4¢ per ton of coal severed. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5749.02 (Page
1980).
South Dakota 4.5% of taxable value (posted field
price, market value) of any energy
minerals severed. S.D. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 10-39A-1 (Supp. 1981).
Tennessee 20¢ per ton of coal severed. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 67-5902 (Supp. 1981).
West Virginia 3.5% of value of coal produced,
processed and prepared, plus gross
proceeds derived from sale, multi-
plied by .35. W. VA. CODE § 11-13-
2(L)(a) (Supp. 1981).
Wyoming State severance and local ad va/ortm
taxes equal a combined total of ap-
proximately 171/% of value. WYO.
STAT. §§ 39-2-202, 39-2-402, 39-6-
302(a)-(f), and 39-6-303(a) (1977 &
Supp. 1981).
50% of revenues generated by the tax
are allocated to trust fund, the prin-
cipal of which requires a three-
fourths vote of each house to appro-
priate. For disposition of the remain-
ing 50%, see text, at 564-65.
Proceeds from the tax are credited to
the severance tax bonding fund.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-27-1 (1980).
The revenues are paid into the coal
development fund. 35% goes by
grant to impacted cities and coun-
ties, 15% to a fund to provide loans
to impacted local governments, 20%
is allocated directly to the coal-pro-
ducing counties and 30% goes to the
general fund. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 57-62-02 (Supp. 1981).
75% of revenues credited to the un-
reclaimed lands special account.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1513.30
(Page 1980). 25% of revenues
credited to the oil and gas well-plug-
ging account. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1513.071 (Page 1980).
Revenues are divided, 50% to county
where severed; 20% to energy devel-
opment impact fund; and 30% to
general fund. S.D. COMP. LAwS
ANN. § 10-39A-8 (Supp. 1981).
All revenues collected from tax are
allocated to the county from which
such coal products were severed.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5905 (Supp.
1981).
75% of revenue goes to coal-produc-
ing counties; 25% to all counties re-
gardless of coal production therein.
W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2(L)(b) (Supp.
1981).
All revenue collected from the levy of
state taxes is transferred to the state
treasurer who, in turn, transfers the
funds to various earmarked revenue
funds, the general fund and the per-
manent mineral trust fund, depend-
ing upon under which statutory sec-
tion the revenues were collected. See
WYo. STAT. §§ 39-6-303(a)-(j), 39-6-
306(a)-(e) (1977 & Supp. 1981).
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UNLEASHING THE WILDCATS: THE SUPREME COURT
IMMUNIZES WILDCAT STRIKES FROM INDIVIDUAL
DAMAGE LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYER LOSSES
RESULTING FROM THE WILDCAT STRIKE,
IN COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT, INC. V REIS
INTRODUCTION
Some seventy years ago, in the celebrated Danbury Hatters cases,' the
Supreme Court of the United States held individual union members person-
ally liable for a damage judgment rendered against their parent union. In
the ensuing efforts to satisfy that judgment, many unionists lost their homes
through garnishment actions. To prevent a recurrence of this spectacle,
Congress enacted legislation immunizing individual union members from
fiscal responsibility for damage judgments against their unions. Under sec-
tion 301(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act,2 damage judgments
can be satisfied only from the union as an entity, not from individual union
members.
The Court, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 3 now has extended indi-
vidual immunity from damage suits arising from union-authorized activities
to cover unauthorized individual work stoppages, or wildcat strikes, as well.
The Court relied largely upon congressional intent, which was construed as
preventing garnishment and attachment proceedings against individual
union members' homes to satisfy judgments against a union. The result,
however, leaves the employer without means to recoup his losses incurred
from a wildcat strike.
The Court's ruling completes a 180-degree change in position in the last
seventy-five years. Individual union members, once held solely liable for
damages arising from union-directed strikes, are now immune from damages
arising from both union-authorized and wildcat strikes.
The pendulum has completed its arc since the Danbur Hatters cases;
whether it will swing back depends on whether Congress recognizes that the
inequitable financial burdens shouldered by the employer as a result of Com-
plete Auto Transit are, ironically, those once shouldered by individual employ-
1. Loewe v. Savings Bank of Danbury, 236 F. 444 (2d Cir. 1916), aj'd, 242 U.S. 357
(1917); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915); Lawlor v. Loewe, 209 F. 721 (2d Cir. 1913);
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). Here, Danbury, Connecticut, hatmakers sued 175 mem-
bers of the United Hatters of North America for damages resulting from a nationwide recogni-
tional boycott on grounds of antitrust violations. In Loewe ,. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), the
Supreme Court sustained the hatmakers' right to sue union members under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), including the availability of treble damages under that act. The
Court later affirmed a $252,130 judgment in Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915), and in
Loewe v. Savings Bank of Danbury, 236 F. 444 (2d Cir. 1916), af'd 242 U.S. 357 (1917), a writ
of attachment for $240,000 was issued. The strike began on July 25, 1902, idling the plant for
some seven months. Lawlor v. Loewe, 209 F. 721 (2d Cir. 1913).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976).
3. 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
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ees. This recognition should provoke Congress to provide a legislative
remedy to deter unauthorized work stoppages and to give the employer some
financial relief; in doing so, Congress could snap the leash on striking wild-
catters whose activities threaten to subvert the collective-bargaining process.
I. EVOLUTION OF DAMAGE SUITS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL UNION
MEMBERS
At common law, damage suits could not be brought against labor un-
ions or other unincorporated associations in their common names,4 but had
to be brought against union members as individuals. 5 The Supreme Court
abolished this rule in United Mine Workers . Coronado Coal Co. 6 by holding that
unions were suable entities distinct from their individual members. 7 Both
individual unionists and their unions were liable for money damage judg-
ments for breach of their collective bargaining agreement until 1947, when
Congress enacted section 301 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947,8 principally to avoid another Danbuy Hatters.9 Section 301 (b) provides
that money judgments obtained against a union can be enforced only
against union assets, not against individual members.' 0 The statute was si-
lent about whether individual union members could be sued in lieu of the
union. A quarter of a century later, the Supreme Court in Atkinson v. Sinclair
Refining Co." held that individual union members could not be held liable
when their union violated a no-strike clause in its collective bargaining
agreement. The Atkinson Court did not reach the question of whether union
members would be liable individually for wildcat strikes in breach of a no-
strike clause. ' 2 That question was answered in the negative in Sinclair Oil
4. See Cox, Some Aspects ofthe Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 274,
304 (1947). See also 4 J. JENKINS, TREATISE IN LABOR LAW, § 23.2 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). Damage suits against individual work-
ers date from feudal times, when the infamous Statute of Laborers, 2 Stat. 31, 25 Edw. III
(1350) was enacted after the emergency Ordinance of Laborers, 2 Stat. 26, 23 Edw. III (1349),
to prevent the villein's flight from the manor into the towns for higher wages. Workers at that
time were at a premium because the Black Plague had decimated the population of Europe. To
stop escalating wages, the Statute of Laborers was enacted, fixing wages for various classes of
workers and providing for imprisonment of violators. Other laws, the Elizabethan Statute of
Artificers, 5 Eliz. ch. 4 (1562), and the Poor Laws, 39 & 40 Eliz. ch. 3; 43 Eliz. ch. 2 (1601),
further inserted government into labor relations by fixing ordinary wages, with punishments
ranging from whippings to imprisonment. See M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW,
§§ 17-19, 23, 24 (1953). See also 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 184 (A. Renton
ed. 1898).
6. 259 U.S. 344 (1922). The common law rule that suits had to be brought against indi-
vidual union members kept damage suits to a minimum because judgments could not be col-
lected from union coffers. Consequently, such judgments were uncollectable because the
individual workers could not pay them. See J. JENKINS, supra note 4, at § 23.2.
7. This rule has been codified as FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
8. Ch. 120, § 301(b), 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976)).
9. See note I supra. See also Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 248 (1962);
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); 93 CONG. REc. 6283 (1947) (remarks
of Sen. Case); 93 CONG. REc. 5014 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Ball); 92 CONG. REc. 5705 (1946)
(remarks of Sen. Taft).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976).
11. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
12. d. at 249 n.7.
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Corp. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, 13 where the court
expressly immunized individual union members from fiscal responsibility for
breaches of a no-strike provision even where the union was absolved of liabil-
ity for such a strike. 14 The court noted that although section 301 language
"does not expressly prohibit employer damage suits against employee union
members who engage in a wildcat strike,"' 5 neither does the language au-
thorize such suits. Basing its decision primarily on the legislative history of
section 301, the court insulated individual union members from damage lia-
bility for their own wildcat activities.
The Sinclair Oil holding, however, was not binding on other circuits.16
During the decade between Sinclair Oil and Complete Auto Transit, federal dis-
trict courts divided on whether to assess individual union member liability
for wildcat strike activities. 17 Of the cases insulating individual union mem-
bers from personal liability for wildcat activities, all cited the Sinclair Oil
holding as controlling in their decisions. ' Sinclair Oil was either disregarded
as not controlling 19 or distinguished factually 20 in those decisions imposing
individual liability for breaches of the no-strike provisions. Of the other
cases imposing indiviual liability, Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers
2'
found liability by interpreting Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight22 and Smith v.
13. 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
14. The Sinclair court held, after analyzing the legislative history of section 301, that the
employer's primary remedy is either discharge or discipline. Id. at 54.
15. Id. at 52. See recent decisions, 6 GA. L. REv. 797 (1972), for an analysis of Sinclair Oil.
16. Besides the Seventh Circuit, only the Sixth Circuit has faced the issue of whether to
impose individual liability on wildcat strikers who breach a no-strike clause. See Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F.2d 1110 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
17. 'Decisions finding no individual liability include Lakeshore Motor Freight v. Steel
Ha'ulers Local 800, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 483 F. Supp. 1150 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers, 470 F. Supp. 1298
(W.D. Pa. 1979); Benada Aluminum Prod. Co. v. United Steel Workers, 83 Lab. Cas. 1 10,609
(N.D. Ohio 1978); and United States Steel Corp. v. UMW Local 8003, 83 Lab. Cas. 10,612
(D.C. Utah 1978). Cases imposing individual liability include: Certain-Teed Corp. v. United
Steelworkers Local 37A, 484 F. Supp. 726 (M.D. Pa. 1980); New York State United Teachers v.
Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 429
F. Supp. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1977); DuQuoin Packing Co. v. Local P-156, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Ill. 1971).
18. Lakeshore Motor Freight v. Steel Haulers Local 800, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 483 F.
Supp. 1150, 1154 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. International Union of Electri-
cal, Radio & Mach. Workers, 470 F. Supp. 1298, 1299 (W.D. Pa. 1979); United States Steel
Corp. v. UMW Local 8003, 83 Lab. Cas. 10,612, 10,613 (D.C. Utah 1978).
19. See New York State United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677, 683 (N.D.N.Y.
1978), where Sinclair Oil was rejected because the usual employer remedies of discharge or disci-
pline did not exist; Certain-Teed Corp. v. United Steelworkers, Local 37A, 484 F. Supp. 726
(M.D. Pa. 1980), which cited the Thompson analysis as controlling over Sinclair Oil.
20. See DuQuoin Packing Co. v. Local P-156, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen, 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. 11. 1971), where the court found individual liability based
on Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). The 1DuQuoin court distinguished Sinclair
Oil, noting that in Sinclair Oil, the individual union members were charged with acting as
agents and on behalf of their union, not individually as wildcatters.
21. 429 F. Supp. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
22. 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976). In Hines, the Court held that individual employees could,
under § 301, bring an action against their employer independent of the union. Section 301, the
Court observed, encompasses those suits seeking to vindicate "uniquely personal rights of em-
ployees." Id. at 562. iHines involved a suit by individuals employees against their employer for
unlawful discharge for alleged dishonesty and against their union for failing in its duty of fair
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Evening News Associaton23 as authorizing damage suits against individuals for
breach of a no-strike clause.
24
The final case rejecting Sinclair Oil, DuQuoin Packing Co. v. Local P-156,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen 25 did so by examining the legis-
lative history of section 301, as did the Sinclair Oil court, but arrived at an
opposite conclusion by distinguishing both the Danbury Hatters cases and At-
kinson. The court noted that in both Atkinson and the Danbury Hatters cases,
the individual union members were charged with acting as agents of their
parent union in furtherance of a union objective.26 The DuQuon court, find-
ing this agency relationship missing, imposed individual liability; if the
union had authorized individual wildcat activity, no liability would have
been imposed. Because the individuals did not act pursuant to a union plan,
but solely as individuals,2 7 liability was found.
During the decade from Sinclair Oil to Complete Auto Transit, the
Supreme Court embraced the agency theory of liability pronounced by Du-
Quoin, but applied the theory to a different wildcat question: Should the
parent international union be liable for wildcat strikes by a.local affiliate? In
Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 28 the Court held that international
unions are liable for damages caused by wildcat strikes of local union affili-
ates only where the parent union authorizes or participates in the strike.
Thus, with the district courts divided on whether to impose individual union
member liability for wildcat strikes, and the Supreme Court finding parent
union liability only where the parent union authorized or sanctioned the
local wildcat strike, the stage was set for Complete Auto Transit.
II. FACTS OF COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT IN. V REIS
On June 8, 1976, drivers and other employees of Complete Auto
Transit, Inc., a Flint, Michigan transporter of newly manufactured vehicles,
engaged in an unauthorized work stoppage (wildcat strike) because of dissat-
isfaction with how their bargaining agent union, Teamsters Local 332, was
representing them in current collective bargaining negotiations.29 The wild-
cat strike violated a no-strike provision in the existing labor contract between
the union and Complete Auto Transit, Inc., signatories along with other
representation to investigate the dishonesty charges and to exonerate the employees. The em-
ployees, after hiring an attorney, later were absolved of the dishonesty charges.
23. 371 U.S. 195 (1962). In Smith, the Court held that individuals are not barred by § 301
from suing their employers to vindicate their individual rights under the labor contract. In the
case at bar, the employers argued unsuccessfully that a damage remedy would eliminate a
double standard under which employees may sue individually and recover damages individu-
ally, but may not be held liable under the contract individually. See Petitioner's Brief for Certi-
orari at 8, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981). The lower court
distinguished Smith, finding merely a dispute over jurisdiction, not over whether § 301 created a
separate cause of action. 614 F.2d at 1116.
24. 429 F. Supp. at 451.
25. 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. I11. 1971).
26. Id. at 1232-33.
27. Id. at 1233. The same reasoning was advanced, albeit futilely, by the employers in
Complete Auto Transit See Petitioner's Brief at 9.
28. 444 U.S. 212, 216 (1979).
29. Id. at 1838. See also Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 5.
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trucking companies to a collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters
Union. 30 After employees of two similar vehicle haulers also engaged in the
wildcat strike, the employers filed suit under section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947,31 seeking an injunction and damages
against the wildcatters individually for all losses arising from the strike.
3 2
The employers sought no damages from the union itself, alleging that the
strike was neither union authorized nor union sanctioned. 33 The district
court refused to issue the injunction on the ground that the wildcat strike
was caused by a non-arbitrable issue-the intra-union dispute over ade-
quacy of union negotiation representation. 34 After the employers renewed
their plea for the injunction, the court held further hearings and issued a
preliminary injunction stopping the strike after finding that the intra-union
dispute had been settled; the only remaining issue was whether the employ-
ers would grant amnesty to the wildcatters, an arbitrable issue.35 Nine
months later the employees moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction
and to dismiss the complaint for damages. 36 The district court, relying on
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 37 dissolved the injunction on the
ground that the strike was not caused by an arbitrable issue. The court
thereby reapplied its original logic, and dismissed the damage suit on the
ground that employers may not sue employees for money damages for
breach of a labor contract. 38 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal of the damage suit, but ruled that an injunction may be granted even
where the issue precipitating the strike was itself non-arbitrable but led to an
arbitrable issue of whether the wildcatters would receive amnesty.39 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the damage claim
by relying principally on the legislative history of section 301. The court
concluded Congress did not intend to create a money damage remedy
against individual union members for breach of a no-strike provision,40 be-
cause Congress wanted to prevent a recurrence of the Danbury Hatters situa-
tion.4 1 The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit, relying almost
exclusively on the legislative history of section 301 and its predecessor, sec-
30. 101 S. Ct. at 1838. See also Respondent's Brief at 4.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Section 301(a) authorizes employers and labor unions to
bring suits for breach of the labor contract in federal court.
32. 101 S. Ct. at 1838.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1838-39. The judge denied the back-to-work order based on Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), which permits a narrow exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), prohibition on federal courts
enjoining strikes. A Boys Markets injunction will issue when the labor contract contains a
mandatory grievance or arbitration procedure and when the underlying issue causing the strike
is arbitrable. Id. at 1838 n.2.
35. 101 S. Ct. at 1838.
36. 614 F.2d at 1112.
37. 428 U.S. 397 (1976). The Court prohibited the lower court from enjoining a sympathy
strike because the strike was not over any union-employer dispute subject to arbitration
provisions.
38. 101 S. Ct. at 1839.
39. 614 F.2d at 1114.
40. Id. at 1115.
41. See note I supra.
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tion 10 of the Case Bill,42 which was vetoed in 1946 by President Truman.
43
The Court concluded that Congress intended to immunize individual union
employees from damage liability both for union-authorized and non-union-
authorized (wildcat) strikes, even if the result would leave the employer
without means to recoup his losses from the wildcat strikes.
44 The Court's
finding completes a 180-degree turn in the last seventy years from holding
employees solely liable for damages for their collective bargaining activi-
ties4 5 to finding union employees immune to damage suits for their partici-
pation either in, or out, of union strike activities.
III. COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT. INC. V. REiS
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis ,46 the Supreme Court was confronted
with whether to exercise its judicial inventiveness to fashion a federal com-
mon law of labor as prescribed by Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mdis, 47 or
to narrowly construe perceived congressional intent. With this admonition
in mind, the Court acknowledged the Lincoln Mills prescription, but noted
that Lincoln Mills did not call for judicial second-guessing of legislative com-
mands; rather, "in fashioning federal law under § 301(a) substantial defer-
ence should be paid to revealed congressional intention.
'48 The Court
deferred, in its affirmance of the Sixth Circuit, both to perceived congres-
sional intent and to the Atkinson and Sinclair Oil decisions.
49
A. The Employers' Position
The employers mounted a three-pronged attack on the Sixth Circuit's
dismissal of their damage claims against the individual wildcatters.
50
Branding the Sixth Circuit's analysis "at best superficial,'
'
15 the employers
argued primarily that the court failed to distinguish the factual differences
42. See H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
43. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 (1962).
44. 101 S. Ct. at 1840.
45. See note I supra.
46. 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
47. 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). In Lincoln Mills, a dispute over whether federal district
courts had jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration provision in a collective-bargaining agreement,
the Court held that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 confers both proce-
dural and subject matter jurisdiction on federal district courts regarding labor management
controversies. The Court held that "in the penumbra of express statutory mandates," the lower
courts should exercise their "judicial inventiveness" in fashioning federal labor common law.
Id. at 457.
48. 101 S. Ct. at 1840. The opinion first discussed procedural requirements for obtaining a
Boys Markets injunction. See note 34 supra. Issuance of the injunction and analysis behind its
issuance are not pertinent to case analysis of the applicability of a damage remedy against
wildcat strikers individually. This, however, does not suggest that Boys Markets injunctions may
not issue individually against the wildcatters; the Court specifically reserved opinion on that
particular issue. See note 83 infa. Some state courts, however, have issued injunctions against
wildcatters individually. See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Perkins, 411 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. App.
1967).
49. 101 S. Ct. at 1840.
50. Petitioner's Brief at 9.
51. Id. Petitioners insisted the Sixth Circuit did not address the fact that the strikers' ac-
tions were neither ratified nor authorized by the unions; the employees only were sued, individ-
ually, for individual breaches of the labor contract. Id. at 14.
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between the Danbug Hatters cases and those of the instant case. For example,
in Danbuy Hatters, the employees acted pursuant to their union's directive,
while in this case, they did not. The employers also argued, alternatively,
that a failure to allow a damage claim would leave them without a remedy
and with no means to enforce the "integrity" of the labor contract. 52 A
damage remedy, they urged, would insure that employees would recognize
their contractual responsibilities, would deter future wildcat strikes, and
would promote industrial peace.53 To allow employees to disregard the no-
strike obligation in the agreement without penalty would render the obliga-
tion meaningless, and reduce it to a "hollow promise."
'54
B. The Wildcatlers' Position
Predictably, the employees countered that the Sixth Circuit correctly
interpreted the legislative history of section 301, and specifically argued that
employers do not suffer a lesser degree of protection than that afforded em-
ployees under section 301.55 Moreover, they argued, the Sixth Circuit deci-
sion leaves no gap in section 301 remedies because employers still can
discharge or discipline the wildcatting strikers for breaches of the labor con-
tract.56 They added that no such option exists for employees for an em-
ployer's breach.
57
Attacking the third prong of the employers' onslaught, the employees
asserted that industrial peace would not be enhanced "one iota" by ex-
tending a damage remedy, but instead would be aggravated because collect-
ing such a judgment could result in the same garnishment and attachment
actions workers suffered in the Danbur Hatters debacle. 58 The employees ad-
ded that congressional silence after the Sinclair Oil decision should be consid-
ered tacit approval of the practice of immunizing individuals from damage
liability for breach of a labor contract; 59 any gaps in section 301 should be
filled by Congress, not by the courts.60
C. The Court's Holding
Relying primarily on the legislative history of both section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act and its predecessor, section 10 of the Case Bill, 6 1 the
52. Id. at 23.
The companies are left in a position where they were victimized by a dispute over
which they had no control; were unable to engage in normal operations; were coerced,
albeit unsuccessfully, by the employees to give up additional rights under the agree-
ment; and were left by the courts without any monetary remedy. This result is hardly
what Congress had anticipated when it enacted § 301.
Ad. at 24.
53. Id. at 25-26.
54. Id. at 25.
55. Respondent's Brief at 7.
56. Id. at 8. See also NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
57. Respondent's Brief at 7.
58. See note I supra.
59. Respondent's Brief at 32.
60. Id. at 33.
61. H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
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Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended to shield individual
unionists from damage liability for breach of a no-strike clause in a labor
contract. This immunization was intended, according to Justice Brennan's
majority opinion, "even though it might leave the employer unable to re-
cover for his losses." 62 Dismissing employer contentions that a damage rem-
edy is indispensable to preserve the integrity of the labor contract and to
advance the national labor policy of promoting industrial peace, the Court
concluded that employers command "an array of potential remedies . . .
apart from a damage remedy against individuals. ' 63 The remedies cited in-
clude discipline and discharge of wildcat strikers, damages against the union
where the union is responsible for the contract breach, or an injunction
against a union for breach of a no-strike clause where the underlying dispute
is subject to binding arbitration. 64 Of the remedies cited, only two, disci-
pline and discharge, refer to actions that may be taken against union mem-
bers as individuals, not as members of the union as an entity.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDING
Despite its conclusory language that legislative history reveals a congres-
sional intent to shield individual employees from damage liability for breach
of no-strike clauses, 65 the Court could have decided the issue against the
wildcatters and still have been consistent with both congressional intent and
previous case law, a position advanced by Chief Justice Burger's dissent.
While nothing in section 301 expressly permits damage suits against individ-
uals, nothing expressly prohibits such actions.66 The Atkinson Court noted
that no-strike clauses are binding on indi'idual bargaining unit members, but
held that Congress intended to insulate such individuals from fiscal responsi-
bility for unon liability for breach of a no-strike clause.6 7 Later case law
suggests the Court was leaning toward authorizing actions, including dam-
age suits, against individuals under section 301. 68 The only easily discerni-
ble congressional intent was to prevent a recurrence of the Danbuq Hatters
incident. Imposing liability in that instance would be as unfair as imposing
liability upon a stockholder for debts of the corporation. 69 No such unfair-
ness issue appeared in Complete Auto Transit. Thus, sufficient factual differ-
ences existed for the Court to have imposed fiscal responsibility on the
wildcatters while remaining consistent with congressional intent and previ-
ous decisions7 ° interpreting section 301.
62. 101 S. Ct. at 1840.
63. Id. at 1845 n.18.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1840.
66. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 452 F.2d 49, 52
(7th Cir. 1971).
67. 370 U.S. 238, 246 (1962).
68. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957).
69. See Cox, supra note 4.
70. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
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The better-reasoned analysis emanated from Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion,7 1 which questioned whether management does indeed enjoy
the plethora of remedies against wildcatters, as suggested by the majority,
72
and charged that the Court was being "unrealistic" when it suggested em-
ployers "have at their disposal a battery of alternate remedies for illegal
strikes." 73 Justice Powell noted first that unions agree to such no-strike pro-
visions in exchange for the employer's promise to arbitrate labor contract
disputes that arise during the life of the contract, each promise being the
consideration for the other, "because the employer yields traditional mana-
gerial autonomy in exchange for industrial peace."'74 Despite these mutual
assurances, he noted, wildcat strikes still occur "with disturbing fre-
quency." 75 Yet, he observed, the cited remedies do not solve the problem of
deterring strikes that "squander human work capacity, the full use of which
is essential to the enjoyment of the Nation's productive potential. ' 76 In ar-
guing that each of the cited remedies, injunction, discharge, internal union
discipline, or a damage suit against the union entity, 77 is illusory, Justice
Powell dissected each remedy and concluded that "[t]he result of the absence
of remedies is a lawless vacuum." 78 Injunctions, while generally prohibited
in labor disputes by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 79 are permitted by Boys Mar-
ket pending arbitration if the grievance underlying the strike is arbitrable.
80
Justice Powell noted that some work stoppages cannot be enjoined, such as
sympathy strikes, 8 1 and that strikers often disobey injunctions. 82 Justice
Powell ignored the fact that such injunctions would be sought against the
strikers individually, not as members of the union. The Court specifically
dodged that particular issue.83 Such an injunction would assume the union
as an entity could be enjoined. But based on the Carbon Fuel holding that a
parent union will be liable in damages for a local affiliate's wildcat strike
only if the parent union authorized or participated in the strike,8 4 no injunc-
71. 101 S. Ct. at 1845 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
72. Id. at 1845. Justice Powell suggests that the remedies available "are largely chimeri-
cal." Id.
73. Id. at 1848.
74. Id. at 1845-46.
75. Id. at 1846. In 1979, 1.5 million workers were idled by strikes. No figures were avail-
able to determine how many of those workers were wildcat strikers. See News and Background
Information, 103 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 99 (1980).
76. 101 S. Ct. at 1846 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
77. Id. at 1847.
78. Id. at 1848.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
80. 101 S. Ct. at 1847 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
81. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
82. 101 S. Ct. at 1847 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Justice Powell mused that "courts
may be reluctant to impose contempt penalties on individual workers; if ordered, such penalties
are difficult to enforce." Id.
83. Id. at 1845 n. 18: "Whether a Boys Market-Buffalo Forge injunction could have been is-
sued against individual union members engaged in the wildcat strike at issue is not before us."
Such a remedy was urged by one commentator. See Note, Labor Lau--Sction 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act-Individual Liabilty of Employees for an Unauthorized Work Stoppage In
Breath of the No-Stinke Clause of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1657, 1671
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Labor Law].
84. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
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tion could issue against a union disavowing the wildcat strike.85
Justice Powell argued that discharge, although feasible and lawful,
86
proves unrealistic for three reasons. First, the employer cannot fire all wild-
catters in a large wildcat strike or he will cripple production. Second, selec-
tive discharge may be illegal where exercised discriminately and such
discharges may exacerbate, not alleviate, worker unrest. Third, discharges
sometimes are denied by arbitrators.8 7 Justice Powell then observed that
internal union discipline has been proven ineffective because wildcat strikes
often are "directed at the incumbent union leadership as much as at com-
pany management. ' 88 He concluded by suggesting Congress supply the nec-
essary remedial legislation to combat wildcat strikes that are "at war" with
labor rights and orderly labor relations.8 9
Justice Burger's dissent, joined by Justice Rehnquist, 90 confused labor
contracts with individual commercial contracts. Nearly forty years ago, Jus-
tice Jackson eloquently distinguished the two types of agreements inj.I Case
Co. o. NLRB, 91 where the Court held that union-negotiated collective bar-
gaining agreements supersede any private employment contracts arranged
by the employer and any employees within the bargaining unit. The!.
Case Court equated collective bargaining agreements with tariffs:
[Tariffs] do not of themselves establish any relationships, but .. .
do govern the terms of the shipper or insurer or customer relations
whenever and with whomever it may be established . . . . The
employer .. .is free to select those he will employ or discharge.
But the terms of the employment already have been traded out.
There is little left to individual agreement except the act of
hiring.
92
TheJ Case Court said further that:
[an] individual hiring contract is subsidiary to the terms of the
trade agreement and may not waive any of its benefits ....
Wherever private contracts conflict with [the trade agreement],
they obviously must yield. . . . The very purpose of providing by
statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of sep-
arate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the
85. One commentator argues for such injunctive relief against individual wildcatters.
"Unless there is a remedy against individual violators of a labor contract (and preferably imme-
diate injunctive relief), as a practical matter, the employer has no remedy at all in most cases."
See Spelfogel, Wildcat Strikes and Minory Concerted Activit--Discptline, Damage Suits and Injunctions,
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION: LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1973, 157, 195 (1973).
86. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
87. 101 S. Ct. at 1847, 1848 (Powell, J., concurring in part). See Spelfogel, supra note 85, at
184; Note, Reaction to the Wildcat Strike-The Employer's Dilemma, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 423,
429-436 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Employer's Dilemma]; Note, Employer Remedies for Breach of No-
Strike Clauses, 39 IND. L.J. 387, 403 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Employer Remedtis].
88. 101 S. Ct. at 1848 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
89. Id. at 1849.
90. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91. 321 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1944).
92. Id. at 336-39. Compare this with Cox's observation that a "collective agreement is
most workable when it is treated as a constitutional instrument or basic statute charging an




strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group
. . . . The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks
with suspicion on such individual advantages.
93
Despite the faulty equation of labor contracts with ordinary commercial
contracts, the Complete Auto Transit dissent correctly distinguished the factual
situation of the Danbug Hatters cases from that of the instant case and con-
cluded that congressional intent would have been served by imposing indi-
vidual liability and accountability through a damage remedy.94 The
dissent, framing the issue as imposing individual liability for individual con-
duct taken without union investment, sharply chastised the majority for pe-
nalizing the employer and rewarding the wildcatters:
It seems to me that, by now, the American labor movement has
matured sufficiently so that neither unions nor their members need
this kind of artificial, excessively paternalistic protection for admit-
tedly illegal acts-a protection contrary to fundamental, centuries-
old concepts of individual accountability. The stability of unions
and the harmony of industrial relations will be enhanced, not im-
paired, by applying to union members the same standards of ac-
countability that govern all other individuals in society.
95
The Chief Justice concluded that a damage remedy would deter future wild-
cat strikes and thereby promote industrial peace. But Chief Justice Burger,
along with the majority, failed to address the adequacy of the damage rem-
edy itself as either a deterrent to, or as adequate compensation for, losses
from wildcat strikes. The wisdom of extracting damages from individuals
has been questioned 96 on the ground that such a judgment would barely
compensate an employer for strike-related losses, and would simply serve as a
device for an employer to punish strikers. 9 7 To collect such a judgment
would also hark back to Danbury Hatters, the very spectre Congress wanted to
avoid.
The deterrent effect of damages has been conceded. Damages arguably
would antagonize the workers no more than would summary discharge;98
thus, a damage remedy alone would not inevitably aggravate already
strained industrial relations. 99 The problem not pointed out, however, is
reconciling the nature of the damage remedy itself, which is punitive, with
the nature of the Taft-Hartley Act, which is remedial in nature and pur-
pose.' ° Because few individual workers would be financially able to pro-
93. 321 U.S. at 336-38.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 1850-51 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1851.
96. See Employer's Dilemma, supra note 87, at 436-37. See also Gould, The Status of Unauthor-
ized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672 (1967);
Recent Decisions, 6 GA. L. REV. 797, 801 (1972).
97. See, e.g., Givens, Responsibthity of Indizidual Employees for Breaches of No-Strike Clauses, 14
INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 595, 596 (1961). Givens charged that a damages remedy against wild-
catters would be "cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 600.
98. See Labor Law, supra note 83, at 1669-70.
99. See Employer Remedies, supra note 87, at 402.
100. Brown, Exploring the World of Remedies, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION: LABOR
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1968, 69, 83 (1968). Brown at that time was a member of the National
Labor Relations Board. See also the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), which gives
the National Relations Board its remedial powers.
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vide adequate compensation to the employer for wildcat strike-caused losses,
the damage remedy would serve more to punish the wildcatter than it would
to compensate the aggrieved employer. Moreover, a damage remedy, even if
collectable, would be a "hollow reward" to the business ruined because of
lost customers resulting from the wildcat strike.10 ' A punitive damage rem-
edy, notwithstanding its conceded deterrent effect, would be inconsistent
with the remedial nature of national labor policy as currently enacted.
Solutions to this inequitable situation range from imposing strict liabil-
ity on the parent union for actions of its local affiliates who breach no-strike
clauses 10 2 to subcontracting the strikers' jobs. 10 3 Other remedies could in-
clude requiring the union to post a bond or procure insurance policies to
cover possible wildcat strike losses, or possibly inserting provisions in the la-
bor contract requiring the union either to replace the strikers immediately so
production can resume or pay all resulting damages.' 0 4 When a certain
number or percentage of the union work force engages in an unauthorized
work stoppage, the courts could presume the strike to have been union-au-
thorized, with the union then liable under Carbon Fuel. Management could
insist either that it be allowed to impose disciplinary penalties on wildcatters
without going through the grievance procedure, or that the union be re-
quired to discipline the wildcatters with set fines, loss of seniority rights or
loss of vacation leave. When compounded with existing employer remedies
of discharge and discipline, these suggested remedies could serve to deter
wildcat strikes or in the alternative provide the employer with some avenue
of relief. At present, no such avenue exists.
None of these suggested measures, however, would command the force
of law required to effectively deter wildcat strikes. Regardless of whether
"Congress meant to exclude individual strikers from damages liability,"'
0 5
Congress now sits in the catbird seat in determining whether union employ-
ees will continue to exploit their immunity for unauthorized work stoppages
as leverage to extract benefits beyond their labor contracts at the expense of
employers, or whether employers will continue to be punished financially by
wildcat strikes.
101. See Employer's Dilemma, supra note 87, at 437.
102. Allison, Wildcat Strikes-The Need for an Enforceable Damages Remedy, 3 UTAH L. REV.
493, 501 (1980).
103. See Employer Remedes, supra note 87, at 405. However, the author admits that this form
of self-help may be "more illusory than real." Id. at 409.
104. See, e.g., Motor Haulage Co., 6 LAB. ARB. 720, 726 (1946) (Sheridan, Arb.), wherein the
union was found liable for damages caused by a wildcat strike by some of its members, partly
because the union made no attempt to reprimand the strikers or resupply the employer with
other union workers. The case was not decided under an agency theory, but simply on the
equitable ground that the employer would suffer unfairly because of the unauthorized work
stoppage. The arbitrator said he wanted to avoid giving credence to the then-popular refrain
that one who deals with a union does so at his own peril. See also Great Scott! Super Markets,
Inc. v. Goodman, 50 Mich. App. 635, 213 N.W.2d 762 (1974), in which the court held that the
employer bargained away his opportunity and contract right to recover damages against the
union for wildcat strike damages. By extension, the court thus suggested that had the employer
so bargained, he could have recovered for such strike-related damages. Such terms, however,
must be bargained for, and will be subject to "the political realities of the shop." See also Em-
ployer's Dilemma, supra note 87, at 437.




By holding that individual union members are insulated from damages
arising from their breach of their labor contract's no-strike clause, the Court
has swung full circle from Danbury Hatters. That individual unionists acted
outside union directives in Complete Auto Transit, but acted pursuant to union
orders in Danbury Hatters, proved inconsequential to the Court's rationale.
The significance of Complete Auto Transit becomes apparent when analyzed
with the Carbon Fuel finding of union liability for actions of their local affili-
ates only under traditional agency principles. 10 6 The two cases combine to
eliminate any damage compensation to employers from either unions or
their individual members for wildcat strike-caused losses. The net effect of
these two cases, when combined with section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, is to judicially and congressionally create a union veil to
shield both individual unionists and union officials from damage liability for
wildcat strikes. Thus, unions, as unincorporated associations, and their
members now share the same limited liability as corporate officers and direc-
tors.' 0 7 Just as corporations are considered entities distinct from their share-
holders,10 8 unions similarly are held to be distinct from their members or
local affiliates. 109
This fiction of corporate limited liability, however, "may be and should
be disregarded in the interests of and to promote justice in such cases as
fraud, violations of law or contract, public wrong or to work out the equities
among members of the corporation internally .. ."110 This disregard of
the corporate entity, or a piercing of the corporate veil, is generally em-
ployed in fastening liability upon individual corporate officials when: 1) the
unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and individual
merge, so no distinction between them exists; and 2) an inequitable result
will follow by treating the corporation's acts as solely those of the corporate
entity."' The basic rule holds that a corporation will be considered a
fictional legal entity with limited liability until it is "used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime ... ,12
The same analysis could be applied to justify a judicial piercing of the
union veil, should the underlying nature of federal labor policy evolve from
being remedial to being punitive. Given the current remedial purpose of
federal labor policy, piercing the union veil to assess individual damage lia-
106. 444 U.S. at 216.
107. See also 92 CONG. REC. 5705 (1946) (remarks of Sen. Taft equating suability and liabil-
ity of unions with that of corporations.)
108. Se I W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 25 (rev.
perm. ed. 1974).
109. See Dean v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 17 F. Supp. 748, 750 (W.D. La. 1936)
(citing UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 345 (1922)).
110. W. FLETCHER, supra note 108, at § 25 (emphasis added). See generaly Krendl &
Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil" Focusing the Inqui7y, 55 DEN. L.J. 1 (1978).
111. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. L. Bloom Sons, 206 Cal. App. 2d 848, 24 Cal. Rptr. 311, 313
(1962).
112. See W. FLETCHER, supra note 108, at § 41. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Lavach, 165
Colo. 433, 439 P.2d 359, 361 (1968); Contractors Heating & Supp. Co. v. Scherb, 163 Colo. 584,




bility would be an inconsistent punitive result. For now, the focus shifts to
Congress to consider whether to remedy, or to perpetuate, an apparent ineq-
uitable dilemma.' 13
Richard Michael Kaud
113. Cf. Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982) where the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the National Labor Relations Board and held
that an employer lawfully could punish a union official who participated in a wildcat strike
more severely than rank-and-file wildcatters. The court reasoned that such selective discipline is
permitted if the collective bargaining process has imposed higher duties on union officials than
on rank-and-file employees.
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LASSITER V DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES: DUE PROCESS
TAKES AN AD HOC TURN-WHAT'S A
PARENT TO Do?
INTRODUCTION
In the recent Supreme Court decision, Lasslter v. Department of Social Serv-
ices,' the majority, by a vote of five to four, held that there is noperse consti-
tutional requirement that counsel be appointed for indigents in parental
status termination proceedings. 2 The Court left the question whether due
process requires the appointment of counsel to the determination of the trial
court, subject to appellate review.
3
This comment will examine the evolution of the procedural due process
right of indigent litigants to appointed counsel, and will briefly discuss the
Court's holding in Lassier. The majority's rationale will be analyzed in
depth with an exploration of the potential ramifications of the decision. Fi-
nally, there will be consideration of equal protection, which the Lassiter
Court failed to address, as an alternate source of the right to counsel.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
On May 23, 1975, a state court in North Carolina determined that Ms.
Abby Lassiter's son, William, was a neglected child, based on evidence that
she had not provided him with adequate medical care. 4 At that time, the
Durham County Department of Social Services (Department) gained cus-
tody of William. A year later, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second-degree
murder with a twenty-five-to-forty-year sentence.5
In the spring of 1978, the Department filed a petition to terminate Ms.
Lassiter's parental rights with respect to William.6 Subsequently, Ms.
Lassiter was served with the petition in prison, and received notice and a
summons, which she failed to answer.
7
The attorney representing the Department requested that Ms. Lassiter
be brought to the hearing on August 31, 1978. Before taking testimony at
the hearing, the court discussed Ms. Lassiter's lack of legal representation.8
It was disclosed that although she had apparently informed several prison
officials of her pending termination hearing, she had received no advice of
her right to counsel, nor was any action taken to help her secure representa-
1. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
2. Id at 31.
3. d at 31-32.
4. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, In re Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (Juvenile Peti-
tion) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix].
5. Id at 5 (Order Terminating Parental Rights).
6. Id. at 2-4 (Juvenile Petition).
7. Id at 16 (Exception to Record on Appeal, Narrative of Testimony).
8. Petitioner's Answer Brief for Certiorari, IV at 3-9, In re Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 (1981)
(Transcript of Evidence) [hereinafter cited as Appendix IV].
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tion.9 While in prison, Abby Lassiter's mother retained counsel for an ap-
peal of her daughter's murder conviction. However, Abby did not discuss
the proceeding to terminate her parental rights with that attorney.10
The court concluded that Ms. Lassiter had had sufficient opportunity to
obtain counsel prior to the hearing and nonetheless had failed to do so.II
Therefore, the hearing proceeded without appointment of counsel. She was
allowed to cross-examine and testify on her own behalf.' 2 The court termi-
nated Ms. Lassiter's status as William's parent based on a finding of her
infrequent contact with, and lack of demonstrated concern for, her son.
13
On appeal, Ms. Lassiter claimed that due to her indigency, the trial court
erred in not appointing counsel for her in violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.' 4 On No-
vember 6, 1979, the North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed
the judgment of the district court. Individual privacy was held to be a fun-
damental right; however, termination of parental status was found not to
interfere with individual privacy sufficiently to require the appointment of
counsel.15 On January 17, 1980, the Supreme Court of North Carolina sum-
marily denied Ms. Lassiter's application for discretionary review. '
6
After granting certiorari, 17 the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the North Carolina decisions, holding that the Constitution does not man-
date the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status
termination proceeding.' 8 Nevertheless, the trial court, subject to appellate
review, may decide on a case-by-case basis whether due process requires the
appointment of counsel.19
9. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 16 (Exception to Record on Appeal, Narrative of
Testimony).
10. Id at II (Affidavit of T. F. Loflin). The attorney representing Ms. Lassiter for the
appeal of her murder conviction, Mr. Loflin, indicated that had Ms. Lassiter asked him to
represent her in the parental rights termination proceeding, he would have been unwilling to do
so because of her indigent status.
11. Id at 16 (Exception to Record on Appeal, Narrative of Testimony).
12. Appendix IV, supra note 8, at 19-42 (Transcript of Evidence).
13. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 5 (Order Terminating Parental Rights at 1). The
termination order quoted from the N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32 (1981) which states the
grounds for terminating parental rights as of August 31, 1978--the date of Ms. Lassiter's hear-
ing. The instant termination order was based on the following two grounds as stated in § 7A-
289.32(1) and (3) (1977):
(1) The parent has without cause failed to establish or maintain concern or responsi-
bility as to the child's welfare. (repealed 1979).
(3) The parent has willfully left the child in foster care for more than two consecu-
tive years without showing to the satisfaction of the court that substantial progress has
been made within two years in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of
the child for neglect, or without showing positive response within two years to the
diligent efforts of a county department of social services . . . to encourage the parent
to strengthen the parental relationship to the child or to make and follow through
with constructive planning for the future of the child.
14. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 15 (Assignment of Error).
15. In re Lassiter, 43 N.C. App. 525, 259 S.E.2d 336 (1979).
16. In re Lassiter, 299 N.C. 120, 262 S.E.2d 6 (1980).
17. 449 U.S. 819 (1980).
18. 452 U.S. at 31.
19. Id at 31-32.
[Vol. 59:3
1982] LASSITER V DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 593
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The due process safeguards embodied in the fifth 20 and fourteenth 2'
amendments arose from an historical recognition of the need for institutional
checks to protect individual freedom from arbitrary government action.
22
The value society places on different rights and freedoms has evolved, as
have the governmental challenges to those rights. Therefore, the courts have
been faced with the task of delineating the contours of due process in a way
that provides both flexibility and guidance.
A. The Right to Counsel in the Cnminal Context
One facet of procedural due process, an accused's right to counsel in a
federal court, is explicitly guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 23 In 1932,
Powell v. Alabama24 required the appointment of counsel in all capital cases.
However, for many years after the Powell decision, there was no per se right
to appointed counsel in non-capital cases. If, in a particular case, the court
determined that lack of counsel produced unfairness, then an attorney was
appointed. This process became known as the "special circumstances" rule
of Bets v. Brady.25 The Betts rule was based on the view that the right to
counsel conferred by the sixth amendment was not a fundamental right and
therefore was not binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment.
During the next few decades this flexible, case-by-case approach to due pro-
cess caused some confusion and resulted in the reversal of many state convic-
tions. 26  Finally, Betts was overruled in Gideon v. Wainwnght,27 which
established an absolute right to counsel in all felony cases. Justice Black,
writing for the majority, emphasized that due to the fundamental character
of the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, a state would not have the
prerogative to decide on an ad hoc basis whether to insure this right.
28
Argersinger v. Ham'ln 29 further extended this principle, holding that no one
can be imprisoned for any petty, misdemeanor, or felony offense without
representation by counsel, unless there is a knowing and intelligent waiver of
the right. 30 This right was limited later in Scott v. Illinois,3' which held the
right to counsel to be constitutionally mandated only when imprisonment is
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 specifies that: "No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law .... "
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
22. See generaly Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjidiation-A Survey and Cnti-
cijm, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 340 (1957).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 1 states in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
24. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
25. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
26. Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 264 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
27. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
28. Id at 344.
29. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
30. Id at 37.




B. The Right to Counsel in Cld Cases
Although the Supreme Court has often expressed the view that the
"right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel,"'33 no single rule has developed
concerning the right to counsel in civil proceedings. Instead, the Court has
focused on the flexibility of due process and the necessity of considering the
particularities in a given context. 34 Although the Court is not always ex-
plicit or consistent in its analytic approach to procedural due process issues,
a two-tiered analysis is useful in understanding these cases. The first tier
involves the question of whether some fundamental "life", "liberty", or
"property" interest has been infringed by government action. If so, the sec-
ond level of analysis determines what process is due.
35
When the infringed fundamental right is considered to be one of sub-
stantial importance, such as personal freedom, the Court has questioned the
usefulness of the civil/criminal distinction. In Specht v. Patterson,36 the Court
held that individuals facing commitment as sex offenders are entitled to
counsel despite the fact that the proceedings are technically civil. 37 The
Supreme Court likewise held in the case of In re Gault38 that children must be
provided with counsel in civil proceedings to determine delinquency. Such
juvenile litigants need "the guiding hand of counsel" 39 to deal with
problems of law, prepare and submit an effective defense, inquire into the
facts, and insist upon adherence to procedural and evidentiary rules.
40
Once a fundamental right is threatened, the second tier of analysis usu-
ally involves the Court's recognition that the procedural safeguards required
in a given context depend on the interests at stake and the nature of the
governmental proceedings. Gagnon v. Scarpeli"4 involved a due process anal-
ysis of probation revocation hearings which were found to be analogous to
the parole revocation hearings in Morr'sse v. Brewer.4 2 The private interest
at stake in both cases was held to be a conditional liberty interest because it
depended on the observance of certain restrictions. 43 In assessing the process
due in Gagnon, the Court focused primarily on the rehabilitative, 44 infor-
32. Id at 373.
33. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
68-69 (1932)).
34. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
35. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 477 (1978).
36. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
37. Id at 608.
38. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
39. Id. at 36 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
40. Id at *36.
41. 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
42. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
43. 411 U.S. at 781.
44. F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, M. MELLI & H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, MATERIALS AND CASES 910-11 (1969).
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ma145 and discretionary, 46 nature of the proceedings.47  The Court con-
cluded that the state is not under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for
indigents in probation (parole) revocation hearings.
48
A decision as to the need for counsel may be made on a case-by-case
basis in which there is special consideration'given to the probationer's (pa-
rolee's) ability to speak effectively for himself.49 In Wooffv. McDonnell,5 0 the
Court held that inmates do not have a constitutional right to appointed
counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings. However, the Court stressed that
inmates should have the right to seek free aid when they are illiterate or the
issues are complex.
5 1
Outside the area of prisoners' rights, the Court also declined to find a
constitutional mandate to appoint counsel in Goss v. Lopez, 52 which involved
school disciplinary proceedings. The Court considered the brief, informal
and educational nature of the proceedings to be significant. 53 In the more
recent decision of Parham v. J.R. ,54 the Court balanced individual, family,
and social interests in concluding there is no right to a formal adversary
hearing or counsel when parents seek to commit their children to state
mental institutions.5 5 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated
that parents have a substantial role in deciding their child's treatment, but
that such parental authority is not absolute. Furthermore, he emphasized
that the issues were essentially medical and informal in nature.
56
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 5 7 the Court developed a general balancing
formula which has become the standard mode of analysis for resolving the
second tier issue of which procedures are appropriate in a particular context.
The formula requires a weighing of the private interest infringed, the risk
that the government's decisionmaking procedure will yield erroneous results,
and the countervailing state interest in the challenged procedure. 58 Unlike
45. 411 U.S. at 786-87 stating, in part, that members of the neutral and detached hearing
body need not be judicial officers or lawyers and that the technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not used at such proceedings.
46. Id. at 784 n.8: "[I]n the sample studied, probation or parole was revoked in only 34.5%
of the cases in which the probationer or parolee violated the terms of his release." (citing S.
HUNT, THE REVOCATION DECISION: A STUDY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE AGENTS' DISCRE-
TION 10 (unpublished thesis in University of Wisconsin library) (1964) (cited in Brief for Peti-
tioner, Addendum 106).
47. 411 U.S. at 783-88.
48. Id. at 790.
49. Id at 791.
50. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
51. Id at 570.
52. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
53. Id at 583.
54. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
55. Id. at 604-09.
56. Id at 591.
57. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
58. Id at 335. The three elements of the balancing test are:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
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the landmark case of Goldberg v. Ke/y, 5 9 in which the Court held that the
state could not terminate public assistance benefits to a recipient without
affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termina-
tion,60 the Eldridge Court held that pretermination evidentiary hearings were
not required in the context of disability benefits.6 1 The Court distinguished
Goldberg, stating that it involved an income maintenance scheme for those in
financial need, whereas the Social Security disability system in Eldridge made
payments to the disabled irrespective of financial need.
62
One of the Court's most recent decisions involving the right to counsel
in civil proceedings was Vtek v.Jones.6 3 The Court held that the involuntary
transfer of a state prisoner to a mental hospital implicates a liberty interest
that is protected by the due process clause. 64 The case is noteworthy in that
the infringed liberty interest was not strictly a loss of personal freedom, since
the prisoner was involuntarily confined in both the prison and the mental
hospital. Nevertheless, confinement to a mental hospital was found to re-
quire additional procedural protections for the prisoner because of the com-
pelled therapeutic treatment 65 and stigma associated with such a transfer. 66
After applying the Eldr'dge balancing formula, four of the five Justices who
reached the merits considered the deprivation of liberty and the limited
mental capacity of the prisoner as justifying the right to counsel. 67 The fifth
Justice stated that due process would be satisfied if the prisoner were pro-
vided with qualified and independent assistance-not necessarily by a li-
censed attorney.
68
C. The Liberty Interest in Family Integrity'
The first Supreme Court case to acknowledge the right to the integrity
of the family was Meyer o. Nebraska.69 Justice McReynolds, writing for the
majority, stated that "liberty" as used in the due process clause "denotes, not
merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right. . . to marry, estab-
lish a home and bring up children."' 70 Utilizing this broad definition of "lib-
erty", the Court proceeded to invalidate a state law which prohibited the
teaching of foreign languages to young children.
7 1
Two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,72 Justice McReynolds devel-
oped the theme previously introduced in Meyer. Pierce sustained a challenge
by private schools to the state law which required children to attend public
59. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
60. Id at 266.
61. 424 U.S. at 340.
62. Id at 340-41.
63. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
64. Id at 488.
65. Id
66. Id at 492.
67. Id at 496-97.
68. Id at 497-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
69. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
70. Id at 399.
71. Id at 402.
72. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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schools. 73 The Court reasoned that the statute "unreasonably interferes with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing . . . of [their]
children." 74 Later the Court, in Prince v. Massachu.retts,75 reiterated the fun-
damental role and freedom that parents have in the care of their children.
This freedom creates a private sphere into which the state cannot intrude.
76
In May v. Anderson, 77 the Court referred to a mother's custody right in her
child as "rights far more precious to appellant than property rights . . . . 7
The 1972 Supreme Court case of Stanley v. Illinot's79 utilized both a due
process and equal protection analysis in holding unconstitutional an irrebut-
table statutory presumption that all unwed fathers are unfit to have custody
of their children.80 The Court stressed that the rights to conceive and raise
one's children are "essential" 81 and "basic civil rights of man,"'8 2 which are
recognized by the law regardless of whether the parents are married. Such
rights are deemed to be fundamental and therefore invoke the strict scrutiny
test associated with the equal protection clause.8 3 The Stanley majority
noted that the fundamental right to family integrity is derived from the due
process8 4 and equal protection clauses
8 5 of the fourteenth amendment.8 6
III. LASSITER V DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, discussed prior cases dealing
with the due process right to counsel,8 7 and then examined parental status
termination proceedings in light of the Eldridge balancing formula.8 8 In
terms of precedent, the Court cited the early criminal cases which helped
establish an accused's right to counsel when actual imprisonment is
threatened.8 9 Next, there was an examination of civil cases, 9° in which the
73. Id at 517.
74. Id at 513.
75. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
76. Id at 166. The Court stated:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder . . . [a]nd it is in recognition of this that [Meyer
and Pierce] have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
M.
77. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
78. Id at 533.
79. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
80. Id at 649.
81. Id at 651 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
82. Id at 651 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
83. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Skinner decision was one of the
first Supreme Court cases to exercise strict scrutiny in favor of a 'basic liberty' not explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that
"[mlarriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id
The majority elaborated upon this equal protection argument by emphasizing that infringe-
ment of fundamental rights triggers the Court's strict scrutiny of state classifications.
84. 405 U.S. at 651 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
85. 405 U.S. at 651 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
86. 405 U.S. at 651 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965)).
87. 452 U.S. at 25-27.
88. Id. at 27-32.
89. Id at 25 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)). Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)).
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majority argued that the primary determinant of the right to counsel is the
potential loss of personal freedom. 9 ' The Court concluded the "precedents
speak with one voice" that there is a "presumption" due process does not
require that an indigent have a right to appointed counsel unless he may be
deprived of his physical liberty. The results of the Eldridge balancing
formula must be weighed against this presumption.
92
In applying the three-pronged Eldridge analysis, the majority found the
following interests. First, a parent's interest in a just and accurate parental
status decision is a "commanding one," especially if there is potential crimi-
nal liability. Second, the state shares with the parent an interest in correct
decisions and has an interst in informal procedures, in some cases. However,
the state's economic interest is relatively weak. Third, the Court held there
may be an "insupportably high" risk of an erroneous deprivation of parental
rights where the uncounseled parent is incapable of handling complex
proceedings.
93
The majority acknowledged that the "courts have generally held that
the state must appoint counsel for indigent parents at termination proceed-
ings." 94 The Court also stated that the Department of Social Services had
no precedent for its policy denying appointed counsel to indigent parents,
except the North Carolina opinion in the instant case.
95
Justice Stewart stated that the presumption could be overcome only if
the Eldridge factors were balanced such that the parent's interest and the risk
of an erroneous decision were at their highest level and the state's interest
was at its lowest level. 96 Reasoning that such a balance would not always
occur, the Court concluded there was no constitutional mandate for the ap-
pointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding. The issue
whether due process requires the appointment of counsel in a given case
could then be decided by the trial court, subject to appellate review.9 7 The
majority pointed out in closing that, although the Constitution does not
mandate the appointment of counsel in all termination proceedings, enlight-
ened public policy may and often has required higher standards.98
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY'S RATIONALE
Significant portions of the majority's rationale involve a balanced ex-
amination of the competing views. However, at several crucial junctures,
the majority made questionable assertions upon which it based its subse-
quent argument. The following analysis will focus on these assertions.
90. 452 U.S. at 25-26 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367 (1979); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
91. 452 U.S. at 25-27.
92. Id at 27.
93. Id at 31.
94. d at 30.
95. Id at 30-31.
96. d at 31.
97. d at 31-32.
98. Id at 33.
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A. The Presumption that the "Precedents Speak With One Voice"
Justice Blackmun's comprehensive dissent in Lassiter rejected the major-
ity's notion that legal precedent supports a "presumption" that the Constitu-
tion requires the appointment of counsel only when physical liberty is
infringed. 99 He further stated that "incarceration has been found to be
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for requiring counsel on behalf
of an indigent defendant."' °
The majority's presumption is an accurate reflection of the right to
counsel in criminal cases. In elucidating the sixth amendment's mandate
that an accused should be afforded the right to counsel, the Court has found
it necessary to define this constitutional right by drawing the line at actual
imprisonment. 101
However, strict extrapolation of this premise to civil cases is not justi-
fied. The fifth and fourteenth amendments state that fundamental rights
may not be abridged without due process, but do not specify the requisites of
that process.' 0 2 Thus, ascertainment of due process requires an analytic ap-
proach sensitive to the variables in the civil arena.'
0 3
A closer examination of several of the civil cases cited by Justice Stewart
reveals important distinctions which he failed to address. He relied heavily
on Gagnon v. Scarpe/i'° 4 as precedent for the case-by-case approach to assess-
ing due process rights in Lassiter,'05 without adequately distinguishing the
two cases. The probation revocation hearings in Gagnon were before a deci-
sionmaker who was neither a judge nor an attorney. The hearing took place
without the technical rules of procedure and evidence. The primary purpose
of the Gagnon proceeding was rehabilitative, the state was not represented by
counsel, and the ultimate decision was discretionary.t°06 The presence of an
attorney at such a hearing is unnecessary and arguably counterproductive to
the extent that counsel introduces an undesirable adversarial edge.
0 7
In Lassiter, the parental termination proceedings were heard before a
judge, with the full panoply of procedural and evidentiary rules. The state
was represented by counsel. The result, though perhaps not the intent, was
punitive, and the court was required to make formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law.10 8 In such a formal, adversarial proceeding the parent's
ability to understand, let alone effectively utilize, the available legal mecha-
99. Id at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. Id
101. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), where the Court stated: "[W]e believe that the
central premise of Argersinger-that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines
or the mere threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual im-
prisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel." Id at 373.
102. See notes 20, 21 supra.
103. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). "The
very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation." Id at 895.
104. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
105. 452 U.S. at 31-32.
106. 411 U.S. at 784-86.
107. Id at 787-88.
108. 452 U.S. at 42-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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nisms is substantially impaired by the lack of representation. 10 9
The majority also cited Vitek v. Jones11 in support of its presumption.1 1
However, loss of physical liberty was not the determinative factor in Viek,
which involved a transfer from a prison to a mental hospital. 1' 2 Four of the
five Justices who reached the merits held there is aper se constitutional right
to appointed counsel because of the diminished capacity of the prisoner to
present his case, the stigmatizing effect of the transfer, and the compulsory
therapy. 113
If the "precedents speak with one voice," the message is mumbled. The
majority's presumption does not adequately explain why there was no right
to counsel in Gagnon 114 when there was the prospect of deprivation of per-
sonal liberty through revocation of probation, whereas four of the Justices in
Mtek11 5 held there was a right to counsel when personal freedom was not the
major issue.
Lassiter also establishes a potentially dangerous precedent through its
implicit value judgment that incarceration, even for a brief period of time, is
a more grievous loss than the complete and irrevocable termination of a par-
ent's right to her child.1 16 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun argued that the
majority's presumption "grafts an unnecessary and burdensome new layer of
analysis onto its traditional three-factor balancing test."' ' 7 Lassiter does not
rest squarely on precedent and lacks predictive value.
B. On'gins and Eects of the Case-by-Case Approach
Justices Stewart's and Blackmun's application of the Mathews v. Eldridge
balancing test is surprisingly similar, despite their contrary conclusions.
Both Justices acknowledged the fundamental importance of a parent's inter-
est in the care and custody of his or her child," 8 and the "unique kind of
deprivation""' 9 that results from the irrevocable termination of parental sta-
tus. The majority and Justice Blackmun agreed that parents and the state
109. The inadequacy ofpro se representation is further augmented by the fact that, like Ms.
Lassiter, most parents in termination proceedings are poor and uneducated. See Schetky, An-
gell, Morrison & Sack, Parents Who Fail: A Study of.51 Cases of Temination of Parental Rights, 18 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. 366, 381 (1979) (describing the typical parent involved in a termina-
tion proceeding as being at an educational, economic, social, and emotional disadvantage). A
recent North Carolina study of parents of foster children, who are the same group of parents
involved in termination proceedings, shows that such parents have an average educational level
of the eighth grade, an average income of $6,000 for a family of four, and are generally unem-
ployed or working as unskilled labor. GOVERNOR'S ADVOCACY COUNCIL ON CHILDREN AND
YOUTH, WHY CAN'T I HAVE A HOME?: A REPORT ON FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION IN
NORTH CAROLINA 16-17 (Dec. 1978).
110. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
111. 452 U.S. at 25.
112. 445 U.S. at 494.
113. Id at 496-97.
114. 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973).
115. 445 U.S. at 496-97.
116. Brief for Amicus Curiae National Legal Aid and Defender Association, No. 79-6423 at
20, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
117. 452 U.S. at 41 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. Id at 27, 35-42.
119. Id at 27, 40.
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share an interest in accurate and just adjudication, 120 that the state has a
legitimate role in protecting the child's welfare,' 2 1 and that the government
has minimal pecuniary interests.' 22 Although Justice Blackmun's discussion
of the risk of an erroneous decision is more thorough and emphatic, 123 both
he and Justice Stewart note the potential for complicated issues and the
probable difficulty the uncounseled parent will have in effectively participat-
ing in a termination proceeding.
124
On balance, the two opinions are similar in their Eldridge analysis and
appear to weigh decisively in favor of the indigent parent's right to ap-
pointed counsel. However, the majority then stated that since the three fac-
tors "will not always be so distributed," the Constitution should not be read
to require "the appointment of counsel in every parental termination pro-
ceeding."' 125 This statement represents the illogical bridge between the El-
dridge balancing analysis and the majority's final rejection of a per se
constitutional right to counsel. The strength of the holding in Lassiter de-
pends to a great extent on the structural soundness of this bridge.
The "bridge" is flawed in several respects. First, the majority departs
from due process precedent by focusing on the individual litigant rather
than establishing a general rule within a given context. This contradicts the
principle espoused in Eldridge that "procedural due process rules are shaped
by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the
generality of cases, not the rare exceptions." 126 In the Eldridge case, for ex-
ample, the Court extracted the generic components of the balancing test
from the particular context of Social Security disability benefits. As a result
of that analysis, the Court then expressed the general rule that an eviden-
tiary hearing is not required prior to termination of disability benefits.
127
A second and related flaw in Lassiter stemming from the majority's fail-
ure to enunciate a general rule is the resulting inconsistency in due process
doctrine and its application. 128 The Lassiter amalgamation of the Eldridge
balancing test with the rebuttable presumption detracts from the judicial
ideal of predictability.
Third, the Lassiter approach is simply impractical. An ad hoc method of
determining the right to appointed counsel is riddled with problems, as illus-
trated by the consequences of the Betlts v. Brady '2 9 decision. For two decades
following Betts, there was confusion and a multitude of post-verdict chal-
lenges. 130 Finally, Belts proved so unworkable that it was overruled by
120. Id at 27, 31, 47-48.
121. Id at 27, 47-49.
122. Id. at 28, 31, 48.
123. Id. at 41-47.
124. Id at 30-32, 41-47.
125. Id. at 31.
126. 424 U.S. at 344.
127. Id at 340.
128. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calcuus for Administrative Adjiudication in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search ofa Theog; of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 28, 28-29 (1976)
(expressing need for general criteria to provide consistency and to minimize need for judicial
testing of each procedure).
129. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
130. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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Gideon v. Wainwright. 13 1 In his concurring opinion in Gideon, Justice Harlan
commented that in application, the Betts ad hoc approach was no longer a
reality because the Supreme Court had found "special circumstances" justi-
fying reversal for lack of counsel in most of the challenged cases. 13 2
The increased federal court interference with lower court decisions re-
sults in a concomitant augmentation of the burden placed on the trial
court.1 33 The majority opinion in Lassiter requires the trial judge to assess
whether an attorney will make a determinative difference-before the hear-
ing takes place.'
34
The inherent risks in such an approach are vividly highlighted in Ms.
Lassiter's hearing. The trial judge considered and rejected Ms. Lassiter's
need for counsel before taking testimony.1 35 Much of the evidence, which
was subsequently admitted against Ms. Lassiter, was hearsay based upon
social welfare records that were never authenticated or qualified as business
record exceptions to the hearsay rule. 136 Without the aid of counsel, Ms.
Lassiter's "cross-examination" was an empty ritual. 137 Her testimony was
primarily delivered in response to leading questions from the court, and on
several occasions the judge displayed impatience1 38 and disbelief1 39 at Ms.
Lassiter's answers.
The Supreme Court, after announcing the ad hoc approach to the ap-
pointment of counsel, proceeded to evaluate Ms. Lassiter's case. 140 The ma-
jority held that the trial court's failure to appoint counsel was not a violation
of due process largely because there were no criminal charges, expert wit-
nesses, or complicated issues of law.' 4 ' Justice Stewart reasoned that given
the weight of authority, an attorney would not have made a determinative
difference even though the state was represented by counsel, hearsay evi-
dence was admitted, and Ms. Lassiter did not develop several potential de-
fenses. 14 2 In addition, the majority would allow the trial court to consider a
131. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
132. Id at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
133. 452 U.S. at 51 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. d at 31-32.
135. Appendix IV, supra note 8, at 3-9 (Transcript of Evidence).
136. Id at 10-18.
137. Id at 19-24 (Ms. Lassiter made 27 statements during her "cross-examination" of which
only two were questions. The remaining statements were dismissed by the judge as being im-
properly declarative).
138. Id at 52, where the judge said in response to Ms. Lassiter's mother's answers to his
questions, "I tell you what, let's just stop all this. You [attorney for the Department of Social
Services] question her, please. Just answer his questions. We'll be here all day at this rate. I
mean, we are just wasting time, we're skipping from one subject to another."
139. Id at 30, where the judge asked Ms. Lassiter if she knew her mother had filed a com-
plaint. When Ms. Lassiter responded in the negative, the judge said, "That was some ghost who
came up here and filed it I suppose."
140. 452 U.S. at 32-33.
141. Id at 32.
142. Id at 32-33. See also note 13 supra (which quotes the applicable charges against Ms.
Lassiter). There were possible defenses that Ms. Lassiter failed to develop. She could have
argued that the Department had not made "diligent efforts" to help her reestablish an interest
in her son, especially considering her lack of access to William because of her incarceration. Ms.
Lassiter could have claimed that she had a "constructive plan" for William's future as demon-
strated by her arrangement with William's grandmother to care for him. Furthermore, the
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litigant's lack of interest in attending a prior hearing as one factor in evaluat-
ing due process.
143
This analysis sets a dangerous precedent. Ms. Lassiter's status as a par-
ent might have been terminated even if she had been represented by counsel.
Nevertheless, due process should not pivot on a judicial guess as to the out-
come of a case. In addition, by considering a litigant's lack of interest in
attending a hearing, there is a risk of allowing character judgments to influ-
ence the determination of whether a litigant has a constitutional right to
appointed counsel. Instead, the essential question of due process should be
founded on an inquiry into whether there has been fundamental "fair-
ness"' 44 and a "meaningful opportunity to be heard."'
145
C. Do Liberty Interests Fit on the Eldridge Scales?
The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing formula originated in the context of
administrative and exparte quasi-judicial proceedings to determine due pro-
cess requirements when property interests were in dispute.' 46 The tripartite
Eldridge test is suited for the comparison of such "quantifiable" factors as the
fiscal and administrative burdens on government and the value of statutory
property entitlements. The formula provides a "neutral" balancing mecha-
nism designed to insure the accurate implementation of laws.'
47
All of the Justices in Lassiter, except Justice Stevens, made the dubious
assumption that the Eldridge test is an appropriate method for balancing the
fundamental liberty interest in family integrity. 148 There are multiple risks
inherent in such an assumption.
First, liberty interests are not readily quantifiable and as such tend to be
undervalued in a balancing test. One commentator has suggested that, "[a]s
applied by the Eldridge Court the utilitarian calculus tends, as cost-benefit
analyses typically do, to 'dwarf soft variables' and to ignore complexities and
ambiguities."' 49 Justice Stevens wove this critical theme into his dissent by
noting that the majority appeared to treat Ms. Lassiter's deprivation as a
property interest, less deserving of protection than a liberty interest. '
50
Second, there are certain explicit and implicit constitutional rights that
are so fundamental to our concept of ordered liberty that care must be exer-
cised to avoid balancing them away in a "neutral" test. In the case of Stanley
charge that Ms. Lassiter "willfully" and "without cause" left her son in foster care could have
been defended on the ground that during the majority of the two years in which William was in
foster care, Ms. Lassiter was in prison.
143. Id at 33.
144. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
145. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie the Court emphasized that,
"persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Id at 377.
146. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 668-69 (10th ed. 1980).
147. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-14 (1978).
148. 452 U.S. at 27. The majority avoided the property/liberty distinction by describing a
parent's interest in a termination proceeding as a "commanding one".
149. Mashaw, supra note 128, at 48.
150. 452 U.S. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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v. Illhnois,15 1 the Court characterized the due process clause as "designed to
protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing con-
cern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy govern-
ment officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones."
152
Third, the cost-benefit trappings of the Eld'dge balancing formula cre-
ate the seductive illusion that the analysis is objective. However, the values
placed on facts within the balancing framework are necessarily subjective.
Furthermore, as was demonstrated in Lassiter, different Justices may apply
similar values to the individual factors within the formula and yet reach
astonishingly disparate conclusions.
1 53
Fourth, the Eldr'dge balancing test creates a presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of government procedures. The judicial balancing outlined
in Eldridge duplicates, to a large extent, the process utilized by the legislature
or agency in formulating procedures. This presumption was explicitly stated
by Justice Powell in the majority opinion in Eldridge, which urged that "sub-
stantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals
charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that
the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitle-
ment claims of individuals."'
5 4
This criticism is not intended as a total indictment of the Eldridge bal-
ancing test. Balancing is an indispensable legal tool with which to consider
multiple, competing interests. With growing budgetary constraints, cost-
benefit analysis will become increasingly alluring. Just application of the
Eldridge balancing test will necessitate a continual awareness of, and com-
pensation for, the propensity to dwarf liberty interests.
D. Has the Equal Protection Door Been Left Ajar?
Ms. Lassiter never raised the issue that the court's refusal to appoint
counsel at her termination proceeding was a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment,' 55 thus precluding the Supreme Court
from considering that argument. 156 Use of the equal protection clause
would have fortified Ms. Lassiter's case and might have produced a different
result.
In the area of economic barriers to the judicial process, the Supreme
Court has been divided over whether to apply due process or equal protec-
tion analysis. The majority of justices have favored an equal protection ap-
proach. 157 The seminal case is Grjfi v. Iltnos, 15 8 in which it was held that
both due process and equal protection require that an indigent defendant
convicted of a felony be provided with a transcript or its equivalent on ap-
151. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
152. Id at 656.
153. See text accompanying notes 118-124 szpra.
154. 424 U.S. at 349.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I states in part that, "No State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
156. 405 U.S. 658 n.10.
157. Se GUNTHER, supra note 146, at 938.
158. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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peal.1 59 There is no constitutional mandate that the states provide a right to
appellate review. 160 However once such a system of review has been created,
a state cannot discriminate against destitute defendants by limiting their op-
portunity for an adequate appellate review.1 6 1 There can be no equal justice
where "the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has."
162
The equal protection principles articulated in Grff were expanded in
Douglas v. Calfornia 163 which held that an indigent criminal defendant must
be given the assistance of counsel in a first appeal of right.' 64 Prior to the
decision in Douglas, California state appellate courts, upon request of an in-
digent for counsel, would review the transcript and determine whether ap-
pointed counsel would benefit either the defendant or the court. 6 5 This ad
hoc approach to determine the right to counsel was rejected in Douglas as
creating an invidious distinction based on wealth. 166 The opinion, which in
many respects foreshadowed Blackmun's dissent in Lassiter, criticized Cali-
fornia's procedure as forcing a court to prejudge the merits before determin-
ing whether to appoint counsel. 167 Justice Douglas went on to say that
"[t]he indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only
the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful
appeal." 168
Both Griffin and Douglas applied equal protection analyses to defendants
convicted of felonies. However, in the subsequent case of Mayer v. City of
Chicago,169 the Supreme Court utilized the equal protection clause in-hold-
ing that an indigent criminal defendant convicted of a misdemeanor was
entitled to a free transcript on appeal, despite the fact that no jail sentence
was imposed. 170 In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the im-
portance of considering the impact of the state's action on the defendant, not
just the label attached to the action.1 7 1 "The size of the defendant's pocket-
book bears no more relationship to his guilt or innocence in a nonfelony than
in a felony case."' 1 72 The majority in Mayer rejected the interpretation that
Gnffi balanced the interests of society with the needs of the accused,' 73 and
held that Griffin's principle "is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent de-
fendants out of as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to
159. Id at 19-20.
160. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). One author has questioned the current via-
bility of McKane," see Note, The Suprent Court 1962 Terrm, 77 HARv. L. REv. 79, 108 (1963).
161. 351 U.S. at 18.
162. Id at 19.
163. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
164. Id. at 357. But cf. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (which refused to extend an
indigent's right to appointed counsel in discretionary appeals).
165. Id at 355.
166. Id
167. Id. at 356.
168. Id. at 358.
169. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
170. Id. at 196-97.
171. Id. at 197.
172. Id at 196.
173. Id
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pay their own way."' 1 74
Gnffin and its progeny dealt with the rights of an accused on appeal.
Therefore, the issue of the requisite procedural rights arose after adjudica-
tion on the merits. In most of these cases, the defendants had the crucial
safeguards of representation by counsel and the presence of a jury during the
orginal trial. Indigent parents, by comparison, are denied theper se right to
appointed counsel from the beginning of their legal effort to maintain cus-
tody of their children. The relative importance -of a criminal appeal and a
civil trial can be deduced from the fact that there is no constitutional man-
date for an appellate system.' 75 To suppose that the entire system of civil
trial courts is equally dispensable is incomprehensible.1
76
The equal protection analyses set forth in Gritji and its subsequent line
of cases are an appropriate legal framework within which to assess the rights
of parents in termination proceedings. First, parental termination proceed-
ings bear many of the indicia of a criminal trial. 177 For example, in Ms.
Lassiter's case, the state initiated the proceeding and was represented by
counsel. Unlike an administrative hearing, Ms. Lassiter's case involved a
formal proceeding utilizing the technical rules of procedure and evidence
and was heard before a trialjudge. Furthermore, the judicial decision essen-
tially branded Ms. Lassiter with the stigma of being an inadequate parent.
Second, the potential impact of the state's action is the devastating and
irrevocable severing of a parent's fundamental right to family integrity.' 78
The impairment of fundamental rights by the government invokes the
Court's strictest scrutiny.' 79 Unless there is a compelling state justification
for a wealth-based classification of parents in termination proceedings, the
government action is deemed unconstitutional. In Lassiter, the government's
minimal pecuniary interest in not providing court-appointed counsel is far
from compelling. '80
Third, the North Carolina statute, 18 1 which does not require the ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings, cre-
ates an invidious discrimination. The fourteenth amendment does not
require absolute equality.I8 2 However, when an indigent is denied the right
to appointed counsel, and this denial either is based on an "unreasoned dis-
tinction"'' 83 or results in fundamental unfairness,' 84 there is a violation of
the equal protection clause. The financial status of a parent is not rationally
related to the legal adequacy of that parent. Furthermore, there is data to
174. Id at 196-97.
175. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
176. See Note, The Indi ent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 550 (1967).
177. See Catz & Kuelbs, The Requirement of Appointment of Counselfor Indient Parents in Neglect or
Termination Proceedings." A Developing Area, 13 J. FAM. L. 223, 231 (1973).
178. See notes 69-86 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
180. 452 U.S. at 31. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.23 (1981). The only two instances in which indigent par-
ents are entitled to court-appointed counsel are: parents under the age of 14 (effective Aug. 23,
1979) and parents with certain mental defects. Id
182. See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
183. 404 U.S. at 193 (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966)).
184. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 162.
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suggest that unrepresented parents are more likely than parents who are rep-
resented by counsel to lose custody of their children in neglect proceed-
ings.18 5 "Since there is no evidence indicating that the average respondent
who can retain counsel is better or less neglectful than one who cannot, the
conclusion seems inescapable that a significant number of cases against un-




The Supreme Court's five to four decision in Lassi'ter that indigent par-
ents do not have aperse constitutional right to appointed counsel in termina-
tion proceedings is based on a novel amalgamation of tests. The results of
the Eldridge balancing formula were weighed against a presumption that liti-
gants do not have a right to appointed counsel unless they are in danger of
losing their physical freedom as a result of the litigation. This presumption
does not follow from prior Supreme Court cases, and the combination of
tests sets a dangerous precedent. Lassiter places the Court in the position of
stating that imprisonment, even for several days, is a more grievous loss than
the irrevocable severance of a parent from his or her child.
Eight of the nine Justices applied the Eldridge balancing test in weighing
Ms. Lassiter's fundamental right to the care and custody of her son. This
cost-benefit analysis has the seductive appearance of objectivity. The most
critical distortion associated with the Eldridge balancing test is that it under-
values core liberty interests which are not easily quantifiable. In this period
of growing budgetary constraints, the Court will be faced with increasing
pressure to determine the level of protection for fundamental rights accord-
ing to cost-benefit analysis. If these vulnerable "core" liberties are to survive,
the Court must recognize and compensate for the distortions inherent in the
Eldrtdge balancing test.
While holding that Ms. Lassiter's lack of appointed counsel was not a
violation of due process, the Supreme Court stated that in the future such
issues should be resolved by the trial courts on an ad hoc basis, subject to
appellate review. Such a case-by-case approach will undoubtedly increase
the flexibility in determining the requisites of due process, but will also in-
crease the burdens on the trial court. Judges will be forced to evaluate
whether the appointment of counsel would make a determinative difference
before assessing the merits of the case. In the past, an adhoc approach to the
appointment of counsel under the Bells rule created confusion, increased liti-
gation, and was subsequently overruled. 187
Although the Supreme Court has decided there is no per se due process
185. Note, Representation n Child-Neglect Cases: Are Parents Neglected?, 4 COLUM. J. OF LAW &
SoC. PROB. 230, 241-43 (1968). This study indicated that in state initiated proceedings, 79.5%
of the unrepresented parents were adjudicated neglectful and 16.6% of the petitions were either
withdrawn or dismissed; whereas, only 62.5% of the proceedings resulted in findings of neglect
when parents had retained counsel and of this group, 37.5% of the petitions were withdrawn or
dismissed.
186. Note, Child Neglect: Due Process For the Parent, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 465, 476 (1970).
187. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overuled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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right to appointed counsel in parental termination proceedings, the corre-
sponding equal protection argument has not been adjudicated. It is likely
the strict scrutiny test would be invoked since termination proceedings affect
a parent's fundamental liberty interest in the integrity of the family. The de
facto, wealth-based classification of parents in termination proceedings
would be deemed unconstitutional unless there was a compelling state justifi-
cation. Such a justification was not demonstrated in the Lassiter case. De-
spite the strength of this argument, it should be noted that equal protection
arguments, in general, have not been overwhelmingly successful since
1972.188 However, given the United States Supreme Court's past changes in
emphasis, particularly with respect to fundamental rights, it would be a mis-
take to ignore or underestimate the potential leverage available to impover-
ished litigants through the equal protection argument. Nevertheless, for the
present, indigent parents may obtain counsel in termination proceedings
only on a case-by-case basis under the due process analysis of Lassiter.
EPILOGUE
In trying to discern the future ramifications of Lassiter, the subsequent
case of Santosky v. Kramert89 should be noted. Because the two cases dealt
with different issues, the Santosky Court could not explicitly affirm or over-
rule Lassiter. Nevertheless, the analysis in Santosky is instructive to the extent
it reflects the United States Supreme Court's attitude towards parental sta-
tus termination proceedings almost one year after deciding Lassiter.
The Santosky decision makes it more difficult to terminate parental sta-
tus since it compels the state to meet a more stringent standard of proof. A
New York statute requiring a fair preponderance of the evidence was invali-
dated; 19° instead, the Court held that, at a minimum, due process necessi-
tates that the state establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent-child tie should be permanently severed.191
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Santosky, reiterated many
of the themes he had previously articulated in his dissenting opinion in
Lassiter. The Santosky Court, quoting Mathews v. Eldrdge, stated that "proce-
dural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-
finding process as applied to the generahty of cases, not the rare exception." 192
In light of this consideration, the Santosky Court refused to accept the Lassiter
case-by-case approach to determining the requisite due process. 93 Utilizing
the Eldridge balancing formula, Justice Blackmun rejected the Lassiter pre-
sumption disfavoring the appointment of counsel unless the litigant was
threatened with loss of physical liberty as irrelevant to the issue of the stan-
dard of proof.194
188. Ste GUNTHER, supra note 146, at 946.
189. 50 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1982).
190. Id. at 4339.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 4336 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)) (emphasis added
in Santosky). Ste notes 126 & 127 supra and accompanying text.
193. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4336.
194. Id. at 4335.
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Unlike the majority in Lassiter, the Santosky Court expressly described
natural parents' custody, care, and manAgement of their children as a funda-
mental liberty interest.' 9 5 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun, in Santosky, es-
poused the need to go beyond civil labels in assessing due process,
196
particularly with respect to parental status termination proceedings which
possess many of the characteristics of a criminal trial.' 9 7 He concluded that
greater due process must be accorded in government-initiated proceedings
where an individual is threatened With a sig'nificant deprivation of liberty or
the imposition of a stigma.' 9 8
Lassiter's holding that indigents have no per se right to appointed coun-
sel in parental status termination proceedings has not been overruled by
Santosky. Nevertheless, to the degree the majority in Santosky echoed the
themes previously enunciated by the dissent in Lassiter- albeit in a different
context, the Court appears more receptive to the due process rights of im-
poverished parents. The Santosky Court's explicit affirmation of parents' fun-
damental liberty interest in the custody, care, and management of their
children'9 can only strengthen the as yet untried equal protection argument




196. Id. at 4336.
197. Id. at 4337.
198. Id at 4336.
199. Id. at 4335.

DEMOCRATIC PARTY V WISCONSIT EX REL. LAFOLLET-FE: MAY
STATES IMPOSE OPEN PRIMARY RESULTS UPON
NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS?
INTRODUCTION
For the Democratic Party, 1980 was not a good year. At the polls,
incumbent President Jimmy Carter lost to Republican Ronald Reagan;
Democrats lost control of the United States Senate for the first time in many
years, and saw their margin of control in the House of Representatives sliced
dramatically. The Democratic Party also suffered a judicial setback when
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the validity of Wisconsin's open presi-
dential primary statute. This statute directly conflicted with Democratic
National Party (DNP) rules limiting participation in the National Conven-
tion delegate selection process to publicly affiliated Democrats.1
From a judicial perspective, 1981 was decidedly brighter for the Demo-
crats. On February 25, 1981, the United States Supreme Court in Democratic
Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette2 reversed the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision, holding that Wisconsin may not bind the DNP by
the results of an open presidential primary if the open primary violates Party
rules. While this holding represents a major victory for the DNP, its broader
implications are far from obvious.
I. FACTUAL SETTING
Wisconsin adopted its open primary law in 1905, becoming the first
state to require political parties to select their national convention delegates
through a primary. 3 Although the statute has been modified a number of
times since 1905, the primary election has always been "open." Without
declaring party affiliation, a voter receives a ballot for each party participat-
ing in the election, and in the privacy of the voting booth decides which
ballot to mark. It is this private declaration of party affiliation, as opposed
to a publicly recorded declaration, that characterizes the Wisconsin presi-
dential primary as open.4 Under this system, a voter may cast a ballot for
the candidates of one party only. However, it is possible for an individual to
vote in any party's primary regardless of current political affiliation.
Under the Wisconsin statute, voters do not select actual delegates to the
National Convention; rather, they vote for presidential candidates. 5 Dele-
1. State ex rel. LaFollette v. Democratic Party of the United States, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 287
N.W.2d 519 (1980), revd, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
2. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
3. 1905 Wis. Laws, ch. 369. Part II of the state court opinion contains a history of the
Wisconsin open primary. 93 Wis. 2d at 493, 287 N.W.2d at 526. See CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, NOMINATION AND ELECrION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES 134 (1980).
4. 93 Wis. 2d at 485, 287 N.W.2d at 523. Wisconsin election laws are contained in WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5-12 (West 1967 & Supp. 1981).
5. Wis. STAT. ANN, § 5.37 (West 1967 & Supp. 1981).
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gates to the Convention are selected in a separate process determined by
state Party rules.6 The Wisconsin Democratic Party permits only publicly
affiliated Democrats to participate in this process. 7 These delegates, how-
ever, are bound to vote at the National Convention in accordance with the
results of the open primary."
In contrast to the relative antiquity of the Wisconsin open primary law,
the DNP rules which led to the present conflict have their genesis in efforts to
reform and strengthen the Party in the wake of the tumultuous 1968 Na-
tional Convention. 9 During the course of the 1970's these efforts moved in
two directions: one, to open the presidential section process to rank and file
members; and two, to restrict participation to Party members only. Rule
2A, as enacted for the 1980 National Convention, required that participa-
tion in the delegate selection process be restricted to Democratic voters who
had publicly declared and recorded their party preference.' 0
In May 1979, the DNP informed the Wisconsin State Democratic Party
that no Wisconsin delegates to the Convention would be seated who were
bound to vote according to results reached in an open primary. The Wis-
consin Attorney General responded by bringing an original action on behalf
of the State in the Wisconsin Supreme Court against both the State and
National Parties. The Attorney General sought a declaration that the Wis-
consin statute was constitutional and that the DNP could not refuse to seat
the Wisconsin delegation.II The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the stat-
ute constitutional and declared that Wisconsin delegates could not be dis-
qualified solely because apportioned by the results of an open primary. 12
The DNP appealed to the United States Supreme Court.1
3
6. WIS. STAr. ANN. § 8.12(3)(b) (West 1967 & Supp. 1981).
7. 93 Wis. 2d at 485-86, 287 N.W.2d at 524. Wisconsin Democrats select delegates
through a series of caucuses.
8. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.12(3)(b), (c) (West 1967 & Supp. 1980). Each delegate must vote
for the candidate to whom he or she is pledged on the first ballot, and every ballot thereafter
until the candidate releases the delegate or receives less than one-third of the votes authorized to
be cast.
The DNP pointed out that positions on the Platform, Credentials, and Rules Committees
of the Convention are allocated on the basis of preconvention candidate strength. Thus pri-
mary results can affect Party policy beyond simply the presidential nomination itself. Appel-
lant's Reply Brief at 6, 7, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
9. 450 U.S. at 115. Three different commissions studied and reported to the National
Party various avenues of reforming the delegate selection process: COMMISSION ON DELEGATE
SELECTION AND PARTY STRUCTURE, DEMOCRATS ALL (1973) (The Mikulski Commission);
COMMISSION ON PARTY STRUCTURE AND DELEGATE SELECTION, MANDATE FOR REFORM
(1970) (the McGovern/Fraser Commission); COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION AND
PARTY STRUCTURE, OPENNESS, PARTICIPATION AND PARTY BUILDING (1978) (the Winograd
Commission). The Appendix to the National Party's Jurisdictional Statement, 450 U.S. 107
(1981), contains excerpts from OPENNESS, PARTICIPATION AND PARTY BUILDING, and a fuller
history of the Party's reform efforts. See also Adamany, Cross-Ooer Voting and the Democratic Party's
Reform Rules, 70 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 536 (1976); Segal, Delegate Selection Standards:. The Democratic
Party's Expern'er, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873 (1970).
10. 450 U.S. at 109.
11. Id. at 113. The State Party agreed with the state's position and cross-claimed against
the National Party, seeking an order compelling the National Party to recognize the Wisconsin
delegates selected according to Wisconsin law. Id.
12. 93 Wis. 2d at 525-26, 287 N.W.2d at 543.
13. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on July 2, 1980. 448 U.S. 909 (1980).
On the same day, the Court stayed the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Wis-
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Government establishment and regulation of the electoral process are
necessary if the results are to be legitimate expressions of the will of the citi-
zenry. Yet there is an innate tension created by state regulation of elections.
In an open, democratic society elections are mechanisms designed to transfer
power. Despite the necessity of governmental regulation, the state must not
unduly restrict opportunities for those out of power to coalesce, form new
majorities, and "throw the rascals out." Legitimate interests of the state in
bringing order to the electoral process have been recognized, but this power
must be exercised within constitutional limits. 1 4 The difficult questions are
which regulations "pass constitutional muster."
'1 5
In the early part of our nation's history there were no primary elections;
Political parties selected candidates for the general elections through
caucuses or conventions.1 6 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, states began to require that major political parties select their candi-
dates through state-run primaries. The primary, which takes the place of
party-run selection methods, has become an integral part of the overall elec-
tion process.
While possessing extensive power over primary and general elections in
determining voter qualifications and the manner of elections, the govern-
ment must not infringe upon constitutionally protected rights.1 7 Attacks
upon primary statutes typically come from individuals who assert they have
been denied proper access to the primary system. However, political parties
have also launched attacks, claiming infringement upon associational rights.
An explicit right to vote is not mentioned in the Constitution. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has held that once primary or general elections
are established, there is a fundamental right to vote; substantial infringe-
ments upon this right are constitutionally suspect under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 The Court has also invalidated cer-
consin delegates were seated at the Convention despite the stay and despite their selection in a
manner violative of Rule 2A, since, according to the National Party, there was no time at that
late date to provide an alternate selection procedure. 450 U.S. at 114-15.
14. Devlopments in the Law--Eletions, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1121 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Developments].
15. 93 Wis. 2d at 495, 287 N.W.2d at 528.
16. Id. at 491, 287 N.W.2d at 526; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 3, at
134.
17. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 141, 145 (1972). See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Administration of the electoral process is largely en-
trusted to the states. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4; art. II, § 1. With respect to elections for
federal office, Congress can pre-empt state regulations. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970).
18. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requirement);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (requirement that residents
must own taxable real property or be parents of children enrolled in public schools in order to
vote in school district elections); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (state requirement that
200 voters from each of at least 50 counties sign petition nominating independent candidate for
President; the 49 most populous of the state's 102 counties contained 93.4% of state's voters);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (payment of poll tax as precondition
for voting in state elections); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (state-mandated county-unit
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tain requirements for potential candidates wishing to obtain a place on the
primary or general ballot. Such requirements were viewed as limiting the
right to vote by restricting the voters' range of choice.' 9
A different but overlapping right which may be infringed by election
statutes is the first amendment right of association. 20 In this context, pri-
mary statutes that demand that a voter be affiliated with a party for a cer-
tain time before the primary election in order to vote for that party's
candidates have been attacked by voters as a denial of associational rights.
Thus, in Kusper v. Pontikes,2 ' an Illinois statute which prohibited a person
from voting in a party's primary election if he or she had voted in another
party's primary within the previous twenty-three months was struck down as
an unconstitutional abridgment of the right to associate with the political
party of one's choice. The effect of the statute was to preclude a voter who
had changed party affiliation from voting in any primary for almost two
years.
22
Just as individual voters have constitutionally protected associational
rights, political parties and their members are beneficiaries of Supreme
Court cases which have delineated associational freedom as an element of
first amendment rights. Beginning with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son, 23 the Supreme Court found in the first amendment, as applied to the
States through the fourteenth amendment, a right to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.24 Associations themselves have
standing to assert violations of associational rights, 25 and interference with
the rights of the association is deemed to impinge on the members'
freedom.
26
Freedom of association is particularly valued where the association is
system of counting votes in statewide primary elections; system weighted rural votes more heav-
ily than urban votes).
19. Eg., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (candidate filing fees); Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134 (1972) (candidate filing fees); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (to obtain place
for presidential candidates on general election ballot, state required minor parties to submit
petitions signed by 15% of the number of voters in the last gubernatorial election; only new
voters could sign petitions; party had to conduct a primary, organize a state central committee,
and select delegates to a national convention).
20. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30.
21. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
22. Cf Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (upholding a New York primary statute
requiring party affiliation at least 30 days prior to the general election in order to vote in the
party's next primary election. The effect was to require affiliation up to 11 months prior to a
primary. The Court found the statute did not "lock" a voter into party affiliation from one
primary to the next).
23. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). There were hints of a constitutionally protected right of associa-
tion in earlier cases. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 247-48 (1957); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), but NAACP v. Alabama stands as the landmark case in explic-
itly recognizing freedom of association as a right deriving from first amendment protections of
speech, petition and assembly. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-
23 (1978).
24. E.g. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
(1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366
U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
25. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
26. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250.
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one with a political purpose, 27 and the right has been extended to political
parties.28 Even before freedom to associate was recognized as a discrete con-
stitutional right, the Alabama Democratic Party in 1952 successfully resisted
a challenge to a Party rule. Under this rule, primary candidates for positions
as presidential electors were required to support the National Convention
nominee.29 The right to associate requires states to provide "feasible" means
for parties, other than the Republican and Democratic Parties, to gain access
to the general election ballot.3 0 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has held that, in accordance with the first amendment
rights of association, the Republican Party can apportion National Conven-
tion delegates among the states without regard to the principle of "one per-
son, one vote".
3 1
Rights of association, like other first amendment rights and the right to
vote, are not absolutes. 32 This is particularly true in the election context,
where state regulation is a necessity.33 IriJenness v. Fortson,3 4 a Georgia ballot
access statute required minor party candidates to submit petitions contain-
ing signatures equal to at least five percent of the vote cast in the last general
election. This statute was sustained as protecting an important state interest
in avoiding voter confusion resulting from a ballot containing large numbers
of candidates with minimal public support. The Court found that the stat-
ute did not freeze the political status quo.35 Generally, preservation of the
integrity of the electoral process is seen as a valid state objective. 36 More-
over, states are not required to choose ineffectual means to that goal.
3 7
27. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
28. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968). See the discussion of Cousins in text accompanying notes 54 to 60 infa.
One article has suggested that the right to associate for political purposes should be recog-
nized as the central right at issue in the whole area of election cases. Ahrens & Hauserman,
Fundamental Election Rights.- Association, Voting and Candidacy, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 465 (1980).
29. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
30. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (striking down an Ohio statute which made it
"virtually impossible" for third parties to gain a place on the general election ballot); see note 19
supra.
31. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976). Accord, Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th
Cir. 1968). Contra, Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S 858 (1971); Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972). Rpon represents a reconsideration of Georgia and Bode in light of
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
32. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973).
33. In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974), the Court said:
[T]he States have evolved comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election
codes regulating in most substantial ways, with respect to both federal and state elec-
tions, the time, place, and manner of holding primary and general elections, the regis-
tration and qualification of voters, and the selection and qualification of candidates.
It is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state election laws would fail to
pass muster under our cases ....
Md. at 730.
34. 403 U.S. 431 (1971). But set Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
35. 403 U.S. at 439.
36. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973). See, e.g., Marchioro v. Chaney, 442
U.S. 191, 196 (1979); American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 783 n.14 (1974); Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
37. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 736; Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 n.10 (1973).
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A puzzling feature of the election cases is the standard of review which
the courts apply in balancing state interests against alleged burdens on con-
stitutionally protected rights. In non-election freedom of association cases
the Supreme Court has typically held that the subordinating state interest
must be "compelling" 38 and that the statute cannot survive when a more
narrowly drawn alternative would be effective. 39 This standard of strict
scrutiny has also been applied in right-to-vote cases where the franchise has
been totally denied. 40 But the Supreme Court has not been consistent in
applying the strict scrutiny standard to alleged violations of associational or
voting rights in election cases. Even when the compelling interest standard
is purportedly applied, the state election statute is not automatically struck
down. Thus state statutes which have restricted either the ability to vote or
the ability of candidates to obtain ballot positions have been upheld on the
basis of state interests characterized as "legitimate,"'4 1 "important," 42 and
"compelling. '43 As the Court pointed out in Storerv. Brown, given the practi-
cal necessity for regulation of elections, there is no rule which automatically
invalidates every substantial restriction of the right to vote or associate.
44
The decision in these cases is a matter of degree, and results are difficult to
predict with any great assurance.
45
A final complicating factor is that while political parties enjoy protec-
tion from undue state intrustions into their associational rights, the parties
themselves may be deemed to be engaging in state action, and thereby sub-
ject to constitutional restraints, when their rules or actions are an integral
part of the election process. 46 This is particularly true of the two major par-
ties. Political parties have a hybrid nature. They are voluntary associations,
but unlike other private associations, they have an ongoing, statutorily rec-
38. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
39. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
40. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
41. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761-62 (1973). Cf. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S.
51 (1973): "[A] significant encroachment upon associational freedom cannot be justified upon a
mere showing of a legitimate state interest." Id. at 58.
42. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. at 442.
43. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974). American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782
n.14 (1974). See generally Note, Prmaq, Elections: The Real Party in Interest, 27 RUTGERS L. REV.
298 (1974) [hereinafter cited as firAnas Elections ]; Comment, The Constitutionality of Non-Member
Voting in Political Party Avnagy Elections, 14 WILLAMETTE L.J. 259 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Non-Member Voting].
44. 415 U.S. 724, 729, 730.
45. Id. at 730.
The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be
made. Decision in this context, as in others, is very much a "matter of degree," very
much a matter of consider[ing] the facts and circumstances behind the law, the inter-
ests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disad-
vantaged by the classification.
Id. (citations omitted).
Tribe concludes that mild restrictions on parties need only rationally relate to legitimate
state interests, whereas substantial erosions of associational freedom must serve a compelling
state interest. L. TRIBE, supra note 23, § 13-22.
46. Detailed discussion of state action doctrines is beyond the scope of this paper. On state
action problems in the election law context, see generally Kester, Constitutional Restrictions on Polit-
ical Parties, 60 VA. L. REV. 735 (1974); L. TRIBE, supra note 23, at §§ 13-23 to 13-25; Develop-
ments, supra note 14, at 1155-1163.
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ognized role in the election of public officials. When political parties select
candidates, and particularly when those selections are incorporated by the
state (such as by preferred ballot access), it has been argued that the parties
themselves are acting as quasi-governmental entities.4 7 In the so-called
White Primary cases the Supreme Court struck down, as violative of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, a series of attempts by the Texas
Democratic Party to exclude blacks from Democratic primary elections.
48
Lower courts have sustained state action challenges to party rules not
alleged to be racially discriminatory. 49 However, the Supreme Court has
not reached the merits in any case invalidating party actions for constitu-
tional violations not racially based. O'Brien v. Brown5° concerned a due pro-
cess challenge by delegates from California threatened with denial of seating
by the 1972 Democratic National Convention. In this case, the Court indi-
cated grave doubts about courts injecting themselves into party disputes,
specifically noting that no claims had been made of racial discrimination.
5'
Assuming party action in some contexts does amount to state action,52
there is a potential conflict between constitutional rights. To the extent
party actions are invalidated, the associational rights of the party and of the
members who support its actions have been infringed; to the extent the party
actions are upheld, the voting or associational rights of the plaintiffs may
have been infringed. At least two lower courts have suggested that a more
lenient standard of scrutiny is appropriate when reviewing a party's candi-
date selection processes alleged to violate constitutional rights. This lower
standard of scrutiny would arguably account for the constitutional rights of
the party and its supporting members.
53
An examination of one further case, Cousins v. Wigoda, 54 is necessary to
47. L. TRIBE, supra note 23, § 13-23; Developments, supra note 14, at 1161; Non-Member Vot-
ing, supra note 43, at 292-93; Pr'may Electrons, supra note 43, at 304.
48. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (fifteenth amendment); Smith v. Allright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944) (fifteenth amendment); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (fourteenth
amendment). Terry represents the farthest reach of the state action doctrine in the election
context, since the exclusion was from a "voluntary" club of Democrats, the Jaybird Association,
which conducted pre-primary elections. The Jaybird candidates invariably won the Demo-
cratic primaries and general elections. The Terry decision, in which there was no majority opin-
ion, has been explained only as a "response to the peculiar history of state attempts to foster and
shield racial discrimination." Developments, supra note 14, at 1163. See also Kester, supra note 46,
at 758, suggesting Terry went "too far."
49. See cases cited in note 31 supra, and cases cited in Comment, Cousins v. Wigoda: Frt-
mary Elections, Delegate Selection, and the National Political Convention, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 699, 717
n.83 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Delegate Selection].
50. 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
51. Id. at 4-5.
52. The most conceptually perplexing question in state action theory is when, and why,
private entities should be held to constitutional standards originally adopted as restrictions on
governmental power. As previously indicated, this question is beyond the scope of this paper.
53. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. dented, 424 U.S. 933 (1976) (challenge to apportionment of delegates-among the states to the
Republican National Convention); Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn. 1976)
(three-judge court), affdmem., 429 U.S. 989 (1976) (suit against a state and both major parties
asserting non-affiliated voters should be allowed to vote in party primaries; relief denied).
54. 419 U.S. 477 (1975). See generally Rotunda, Constitutional and Statutory Resr'cions on Poht-




an understanding of Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette. Like
O'Brien, Cousins arose over conflicts between rival groups of delegates to the
1972 Democratic National Convention. One group of delegates, Wigoda,
had been duly elected in a primary election conducted under Illinois election
statutes. The other group, Cousins, had been selected at private caucuses.
The Convention Credentials Committee, and ultimately the Convention it-
self, found that the composition of the Wigoda delegation violated Party
rules concerning slate-making and affirmative action, and decided to seat the
Cousins delegates. An Illinois appellate court affirmed an injunction prohib-
iting the Cousins group from serving as delegates. 55 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Illinois court was
correct in granting primacy of state law over DNP rules on delegate qualifi-
cations and eligibility.
In reversing the lower court decision, the Supreme Court placed pri-
mary importance upon the constitutionally protected right of political asso-
ciation enjoyed by the DNP and its adherents. 56 The Court applied the
strict scrutiny standard and found Illinois' interests in the integrity of its
electoral process and the right of its citizens to effective suffrage not compel-
ling in the context of selecting delegates to the National Party Convention.
The Court emphasized the national scope of the task--selection of presiden-
tial and vice-presidential nominees-performed by delegates to National
Conventions. The Court noted that if each state were allowed to establish
delegate qualifications without regard to Party policy, the result would be
intolerable. Therefore, the national interest served by the Convention was
greater than "any interest of an individual State."
'5 7
Two further points should be made about Cousinis. First, while some of
the Justices differed in their analyses of the case, they agreed unanimously
that Illinois could not force the National Convention to seat the Wigoda
delegates. 58  Second, the Court stated it was expressing no view as to
whether national party decisions on delegate selection constitute state ac-
tion. 59 In the last sentence of the opinion, however, the Court pointed out
no claim had been raised that the DNP was operating outside the confines of
the Constitution6°-thereby intimating the result might be different where
such claims are raised.
55. Wigoda v. Cousins, 14 Ill. App. 3d 460, 302 N.E.2d 614 (1973). The Cousins delegates
took their seats at the Convention despite the injunction. Criminal contempt charges in Illinois
were held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision. 419 U.S. at 481.
56. 419 U.S. at 487.
57. Id. at 490-91.
58. Id. at 488, 492 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), 496 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
59. 419 U.S. at 483 n.4.
60. The last sentence concluded with a quote from O'Brhn to the effect that the convention
was the proper forum for resolving the dispute. Justice Rehnquist stated that much of the
majority's language was too broad and argued that this last sentence virtually turned O'Brien on
its head since in O'Brien claims were made that Party delegate selection procedures violated the
Constitution. 419 U.S. at 492, 494 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Stewart, J., concur-
ring in the result). The Court may technically be correct that the Wigoda delegates filed no
claim in this action alleging the DNP was operating outside the Constitution. Much of the
lower court opinion, however, focused on the question of whether the constitutional rights of the
Wigoda delegates and Illinois voters were violated when the Wigoda group was rejected and the
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III. DEMOCRA TIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STA TES V. L4FOLLErTE
According to the Supreme Court, the issue in LaFollette was not whether
Wisconsin could conduct an open primary or whether the DNP could im-
pose its rules upon Wisconsin by requiring Wisconsin to limit voting in the
Democratic primary to publicly declared Democrats. 6' Instead, the issue
was whether Wisconsin could force the DNP to honor open primary results
that were reached in a process violative of DNP rules. 62 Despite strenuous
arguments to the contrary,6 3 the Court saw LaFollette as a delegate selection
case in its totality, since the delegates, who were admittedly selected in a
separate process that complied with DNP rules, were statutorily bound in
their convention votes by the results of the open primary.64 As such, the
Court found that Cousins controlled the outcome of the LaFolletle case.
65
The majority reiterated the principle that the DNP and its adherents
enjoy a constitutionally protected right of political association.6 6 In apply-
ing this principle to LaFollete, the Court held that freedom to associate for
political goals necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the members
of the association, to limit the membership to those persons,6 7 and to protect
the group from intrusions by those with adverse political interests. 68
While the state argued that the burden on associational freedoms was
minimal, the DNP claimed that such burdens were substantial. The major-
ity refused to decide this issue,69 stating that neither the courts nor the states
should substitute their judgments for the association's on the wisdom of
otherwise constitutional membership requirements. 70 Although refusing ex-
plicitly to address this question, later in the opinion the Court did refer to
the state's "substantial" intrusion into the Party's associational freedom.
7'
In evaluating the state's interests, the Court applied the "compelling
interests" test, again citing Cousins. The Court recognized the state's sub-
stantial interest in regulating primaries, 72 and that associational freedoms
are not absolute. 73 But, executing a fancy sidestep, the Court found the
Cousins group seated. The Illinois court answered in the affirmative. See Wigoda v. Cousins, 14
Ill. App. 3d at 471-80, 302 N.E.2d at 624-31.
61. 450 U.S. at 120.
62. Id.
63. Brief for Appellee, State of Wisconsin, at 7, 11-12. See text accompanying notes 85-87
ingfa.
64. 450 U.S. at 123 n.24, 125 n.30. As the National Party stated: "If the rules controlled
nothing more than the selection of delegates bound to cast votes predetermined by another
process, they would hardly be worth litigating." Brief for Appellant at 21.
65. 450 U.S. at 121.
66. Id. at 121-22 (citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama cx rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
67. 450 U.S. at 121-22.
68. Id. at 122 (citing Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952)).
69. Id. at 123-24.
70. Id. at 123 n.25.
71. Id. at 125-26.
72. Id. at 124 n.28 (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941)).




state's asserted interests-integrity of the electoral process, secrecy of the bal-
lot, increased voter participation, preventing harassment of voters-all irrel-
evant. The majority's rationale was that such interests went to the conduct
of the primary, not to the imposition of the primary results on delegates
selected in a separate process. 74 The state interests might be compelling as
related to the primary itself, but they did not justify intrusions into the asso-
ciational freedom of the National Party and its members.
75
In conclusion, the Court held that Wisconsin could conduct an open
primary. The state, however, could not bind Wisconsin delegates to the Na-
tional Convention to vote in accordance with the open primary results if
doing so would violate DNP rules.
76
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF LAFOLLETTE
The decision in LaFollette rests firmly on its own foundation and is fur-
ther buttressed by the precedent of Cousins. The broad holding in Cousins
apparently would find no compelling state interests in regulating Party pro-
cedures for National Convention delegate selection. The burden placed
upon the DNP in LaFolletle is substantially more severe than the burden
placed upon it in Cousins. Nevertheless, the Wisconsin Supreme Court con-
sidered the burden minimal since declaration of party affiliation while vot-
ing, which would satisfy DNP rules, was not shown to be more effective than
the Wisconsin open primary statute in protecting the Party from adverse
influences. 77 Essentially the Wisconsin court found a "closed" primary con-
ducted under Party rules to be only slightly more closed than the "open"
primary. 78 Justice Powell, in his dissent, found the burden minimal because
the DNP is such an amorphous non-ideological creature that it has nothing
to fear from an open primary. 79 Both the Wisconsin court and Justice Pow-
ell missed the point. As an association, the DNP may wish to strengthen or
change itself. The Wisconsin law could prevent the DNP from implement-
ing any of its own judgments about who should participate in its most criti-
cal function-candidate selection. What meaning does freedom of
association have if the association has no control over who can participate in
its decision-making?
Further, while in Cousins the Illinois Court decision prevented certain
persons from taking part in the Convention, the Wisconsin court decision
would have compelled the Convention to accept delegates whose votes were
determined through a process that violated DNP rules. In Cousins the Court
unanimously agreed that a state could not force a Convention to accept dele-
74. 450 U.S. at 125.
75. Id. at 125-26.
76. Id. at 126. In a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, Justice Powell
found no substantial burden on the Party, given its nonideological orientation, and found ar-
guably compelling state interests in support of the statute. Id. at 126-38 (Powell, J., dissenting),
77. 93 Wis. 2d at 499-510, 287 N.W.2d at 530-35.
78. Id. at 510, 287 N.W.2d at 535. The Court quoted from A. RANNEY, CURING THE
MISCHIEFS OF FACTION 166-67 (1975): "[Tlhe so-called 'closed' primaries are just a hair more
closed than the so-called 'open' primaries."
79. 450 U.S. at 131-32 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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gates, yet this is what the Wisconsin order would have done. There are sev-
eral factors which weigh against a finding that Wisconsin had any
compelling interests that would sustain its law. As previously noted, the
Wisconsin order did create a substantial burden. Also, the Cousins precedent
failed to recognize such compelling state interests. Furthermore, only Michi-
gan and Wisconsin mandate open, binding presidential preference
primaries.
80
Despite the correctness of the LaFolltte result, the opinion must have
seemed particularly hollow from Wisconsin's perspective. The Court essen-
tially said that the state and the Wisconsin Supreme Court had completely
misperceived the issues. The compelling interests the state asserted in sup-
port of its open primary were held to be irrelevant to the real issue-whether
the state could bind the DNP on delegate selection procedures. Thus, the
Court found that Wisconsin could conduct an open primary, but could not
bind the DNP with its results. To conduct a non-binding primary, however,
would seem an exercise in futility, a totally unsatisfactory option for a state
attempting to ensure a fair and orderly candidate selection process. 81 A
state is not required to utilize ineffectual means to achieve its aims.
8 2
States may attempt to circumvent the LaFollelle decision; however, the
results would be unchanged. Wisconsin could pass a statute requiring Na-
tional Convention delegates to be actually selected in an "open" primary,
based on the argument that LaFollette is not controlling; in the LaFollette
opinion, the state's interests in regulating the candidate selection process
were not weighed against the Party's associational rights. The real issue
presented in LaFollette was whether the asserted state interest in an open
selection process was compelling in the context of selecting delegates to a
National Party Convention. While the Supreme Court resolved the immedi-
ate controversy, it side-stepped this balancing issue, and supplied minimal
guidance for the future.
The "hard judgments," 83 which take place privately in chambers, are
not reflected in the LaFollette opinion. The Supreme Court has the admit-
tedly difficult challenge of articulating decisions that provide guidance in
the future beyond the immediate facts of the case84 and yet avoiding an
advisory opinion. Once one begins to look at the implications behind the
hard judgments required in balancing the various interests in this case it is
80. See note 101 in7fra.
81. Justice Powell, who saw the inadequacy of the Court's analysis of the state interest,
claimed the majority's argument on this point was "premised on the unstated assumption that a
nonbinding primary would be an adequate mechanism for pursuing the state interests involved.
This assumption is unsupportable because the very purpose of a presidential primary. . . was
to give control over the nomination process to individual voters." 450 U.S. at 134 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
82. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 736; Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 n.10
(1973).
83. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 730 (1974). See note 45 supra.
84. Address by Chief Justice Vinson, American Bar Association Banquet (Sept. 7, 1949).
Chief Justice Vinson was candid on this point: "[T]he Supreme Court must continue to decide
only those cases which present questions whose resolution will have immediate importance far
beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
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understandable, if not applaudable, that the Court preferred to save specific
pronouncements on them for another day.
Given that the defendant was the DNP, that it was involved in selecting
its candidate for president, that its selection would obtain an automatic bal-
lot position, and that its choice would become one of only two persons in the
country who had a chance to win, a strong argument can be made that
voting rights of Wisconsin citizens were at least implicated in this case. The
state claimed that this was a voting rights case;8 5 an amicus curiae brief was
submitted arguing the rights of independent voters;8 6 and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that voting rights were involved.
8 7
Consideration of the possibility that the Party is violating voting rights
presupposes that the Party action amounts to state action. The Supreme
Court seemed to accept this presuppostion when it noted that Party mem-
bership requirements had to be consitutionally permissible. However, the
Court did not even discuss the voting rights of independents which the state
and amici curiae asserted.
One implication is that challenges by independent voters to Party or
state imposed requirements that non-affiliated voters not be allowed in
primaries are doomed to failure. Such challenges have been denied in lower
courts,8 8 and the result is undoubtedly correct. Independent voters have no
stake in the Party nor any desire to join. Therefore, the situation of in-
dependent voters is not analogous to the black voter in the White Primary
cases who deisred to join and met all of the qualifications except skin color.89
Nor can the independent be compared to the voter in Kusper v. Ponlikes,9°
who was prevented by the state from affiliating with the party of her choice
for twenty-three months. Whatever voting rights non-party adherents have
in party primaries are far outweighed by the associational rights of the party
and its members.9' This is true whether the primary is for National Conven-
tion delegates, federal offices, or state offices, since the relative weights of
these rights are not affected by the level of the office.
Another implication of the Court's refusal to discuss voting rights con-
cerns the future of the state action doctrine. In O'Brien, Cousins, and LaFol-
/ette, 92 questions were presented concerning the constitutionality of national
85. Brief for Appellee at 7, 17.
86. Ami us Curiae Brief (submitted by two independent voters from Wisconsin).
87. 93 Wis. 2d at 481, 287 N.W.2d at 522.
88. Young v. Gardner, 497 F. Supp. 396 (D.N.H. 1980); Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp.
837 (D. Conn.), aJdmem., 429 U.S. 989 (1976); Smith v. Penta, 81 N.J. 65, 405 A.2d 350, appeal
dismised for want of substantial federal question, 444 U.S. 986 (1979). The Young Court said: in-
dependents "cannot expect they will have or are entitled to have the same rights of choosing the
candidate who is to run under a given party's banner as do the party faithful." 497 F. Supp. at
402.
89. See Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 842 n.4 (D. Conn.), afdmmr, 429 U.S. 989
(1976).
90. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
91. Accord, Prna y Elections, supra note 43. Contra, Note, The Party Afjhation Requirement." A
Constitutional Inquiy, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 71 (1980); Non-Member Potlng, supra note 43. The
author of Prznay Elections, supra note 43, at 308-11, points out that the voting rights of party
members are also impinged upon when the votes of outsiders with no collective stake in the
association are allowed to dilute the results of the party primary.
92. 450 U.S. at 124 n.26 (The Court favorably cited Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republi-
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party action. From these cases it is increasingly apparent that the Court will
not find a national party's actions unconstitutional unless there is gross
abuse. This is consistent with the general reluctance of the Burger Court to
find state action on the part of private entities. 93 The tenor of the above
mentioned opinions was to place emphasis on the associational rights of
political parties, and to deprecate or disregard both state regulatory interests
and asserted constitutional rights of party members or voters. This suggests
that the present Court views political parties more as private voluntary as-
sociations than as public quasi-governmental entities. It would appear that,
unless invidious race or sex 9 4 discrimination were found, the Court would be
unwilling to declare any party candidate selection procedures
unconstitutional.
Cousins was absolutist about the state's interest in fair and orderly elec-
tions, and held that no individual state interest could be compelling in the
national context of presidential candidate selection. LaFollete did not reiter-
ate this extremely broad finding. The Court admitted that states have "im-
portant" interests in regulating primary elections, and then refused to
consider Wisconsin's interests. This was unfortunate; since the Court refused
to weigh the state interests, it remains unclear to what extent, if any, the
LaFollette Court was retreating from the Cousins decision.
By refusing to draw lines through a process of balancing the various
state, voter, and Party interests present in LaPollette, the Court has created
the potential for some interesting situations. For example, in Rosario V. Rocke-
feller95 an affiliation statute was upheld against attack from individual vot-
ers. Conceivably this statute is now vulnerable to attack by the National
Party. The state statute struck down in Kusper, which prevented voting in a
party's primary for twenty-three months after voting in another party's pri-
mary, could presumably be adopted as a party rule and withstand attack
from the same voter. Such contradictory results would be intolerable. Hy-
pothetically, a national party could decide that the candidate selection pro-
cess will be restricted to precinct chairpersons, or state committee members,
or impose party dues of $5.00 or $1000.00 per year, 96 or impose not just
affiliation requirements, but loyalty oaths.9 7 These are unlikely possiblities.
One of the main goals of political parties is to attract voters in order to elect
party candidates. This goal should work as as self-correcting mechanism en-
couraging parties to be open and fair.
The point is that primary election cases involve overlapping, sometimes
can Party, 525 F.2d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. dnied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976) to the effect that a
party's choice among the various ways of advancing its interests deserves the protection of the
Constitution).
93. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
94. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
95. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
96. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (prohibiting denial of the vote in federal elections,
including presidential primaries, for failure to pay a poll tax).
97. Cf. Clark v. Meyland, 261 N.C. 140, 134 S.E.2d 168 (1964) (holding unconstitutional a
state statute requiring persons wishing to change party affiliation and vote in the new party's
primary to pledge in writing to vote for the new party's candidates in the general election).
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conflicting, sometimes complementary, interests of the state, the party, its
members, and non-members. These interests cannot always be reconciled,
but sensitive judicial pronouncements should take them into account with
an awareness that decisions in these cases are "very much a matter of de-
gree." 98 Opinions that sweep too broadly--Coustns---or side-step the hard
choices--LaFolleite-fail, not necessarily in their results, but in their rejection
of the opportunities presented by the facts for movement towards ultimately
workable resolutions of these bristly problems.
The immediate impact of LaFollelle outside Wisconsin will be negligi-
ble. No other state conducts an open presidential preference primary, bind-
ing on political parties.9 9 A number of states, however, conduct open
primaries for state and federal offices.l°0 Should state parties decide to chal-
lenge these statutes, LaFolletle will certainly provide strong arguments. 0 ' At
the least, LaFollette holds that a party's right to keep non-affiliated persons
out of a state party's candidate selection process is protected by the first
amendment. Only a compelling state interest will overcome that right. But
LaFollette is not dispositive. LaFollette arose in the context of presidential
candidate selection and is based on Cousins, which relied on the national
scope of the party's interest. At the state level the state's interest in the legiti-
macy of its own government and representatives amounts to a more power-
ful interest than that present in the National Convention context.' 0 2 The
result should depend on the balancing the court undertakes.
CONCLUSION
LaFollette marks another step in ensuring that national political parties
have sufficient freedom to make the changes they feel necessary to retain
98. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 730. See note 45 supra. Cf Primary Elections, supra note 43,
at 322 (suggesting that party interests in associational freedom should be considered when
courts review voter challenges to durational affiliation requirements contained in primary elec-
tion voter eligibility statutes).
99. Brief for Appellee, State of Wisconsin, at 37 n.41. See a/so CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, supra note 3, outlining 1980 delegate selection procedures for all the states.
Michigan also had an open, binding presidential primary. When the Michigan Demo-
cratic Party informed the Secretary of State that the state Party intended not to participate in
the primary, because it would violate National Party rules, a Michigan voter brought suit
against the Secretary of State, seeking to compel him to enforce the statute against the state
Party. The federal district court dismissed the suit, since it found the statute unconstitutional as
applied to the State Democratic Party, basing its decision on Cousins. Ferency v. Austin, 493 F.
Supp. 683 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
100. See Non-Member Voting, supra note 43, at 262.
101. Before the present case was decided, in 1980, the Washington State Democratic Party
challenged the Washingon "blanket" primary statute under which the names of all parties'
candidates are printed on a single ballot, and voters can vote for candidates of different parties
in the same primary, though not for the same office. Washington does not have a presidential
primary. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding no substantial bur-
den had been shown and finding compelling state interests in some of the same interests asserted
by Wisconsin in LaFolertte-secrecy of party identification and broad participation in primaries.
Heavey v. Chapman, 93 Wash. 2d 700, 611 P.2d 1256 (1980). Should this statute be challenged
again, the Washington Court would obviously have to consider LaFollette in analyzing both the
burden and the state interests, which were keyed essentially to voter rights. A concurring opin-
ion specifically indicated it was following the reasoning adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in LaFollette. 93 Wash. 2d at 706, 611 P.2d at 1259 (Horowitz, J., concurring).
102. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1210.
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their vitality. The message seems to be: leave the national parties alone, let
them make their own rules and resolve their own disputes. This, however,
will not make the disputes go away. By hinting at a retrenchment from the
broadest statements in Cousins, and by avoiding an explicit evaluation of the
proffered state interests, the Court has kept its options open for inevitable
future disputes. The cost of this approach is uncertainty. LaFollete can sup-
port virtually unlimited party leeway in determining its internal affairs, and
yet loopholes remain. The open binding presidential primary is now possi-
ble only with a national party's acquiescence, but at the state level, predic-
tions of the imminent demise of state imposed open primaries is premature.
As for the Democrats, it remains to be seen whether they have the wis-
dom to use their freedom to complete the reversal of 1980's setbacks.
Chrtstopher j Marzn

